1. This petition invokes the writ jurisdiction to quash a “no flying” order and to restore all benefits of which the petitioner has been deprived as a consequence thereof.

2. Respondent 2, the Union of India, owas and operates the first respondent which shall hereinafter be referred to as the Air India or corporation. Petitioner is a pilot who served the Indian Air Force from 1962 to 1976 and for distinguished service received the Vayu Sena Medal in 1971. In 1976 he joined the Air India and until mid-1984 underwent the usual progression. Came June 1984, and the entry of the army into the Golden Temple on 6 June, 1984. Agitated by this entry, the petitioner addressed a letter on 10 June, 1984 to the Dadar Gurudwara Prabhandak Samiti to forward his protest and the return of the Vayu Sena Medal to the Governor of Maharashtra. The letter emphasized petitioner's not being actuated by political considerations and his aversion to the protest being publicised. The caution notwithstanding, the protest found its way into the press. Four days later, i.e, on 14 June, 1984, there was a discussion between him and the Deputy Director of the training department in regard to the press report. Two months after this conference, petitioner addressed a letter to the said Deputy Director as a follow-on to the discussion. In this letter he spoke of the protest routed through the Samiti as “done on the spur and in the heat of the moment”, the factual non-return of the medal and his respect therefor and lastly his not being associated with “any religious group or organisation”. In the first week of November 1984… on 5 November, 1984 … the. Operations Manager, Training, informed ‘the petitioner of the receipt of some communication casting doubts on his loyalty to the nation and the corporation. Ten days later, petitioner refuted the insinuations in a written clarification to the Deputy Director and reaffirmed his loyalty. He was on Conversion Training to Airbus 310 as from 3 August, 1986 to 6 April, 1987. This involved flying duties, but as a trainee. That interlude apart, petitioner has not been given flying duties as from 7 November, 1984. Numerous representations to the authorities including the Prime Minister not having yielded a result, petitioner on 29 August, 1987, lodged the petition, occasioning this judgment.

3. The “no flying” disability and its consequences in terms of monetary and non monetary deprivations are assailed on various grounds. As a pilot, petitioner was engaged to fly aircrafts and he has a right to perform this task. The protest letter of 6 June, 1984, was innocuous and had been retracted. What occurred later was a mystery. The decision was arbitrary, unjust, illegal and unconstitutional. It be quashed and petitioner duly restituted for the losses sustained. The stand of the corporation and Union of India through their returns made at different stages may be summarised thus. Petitioner's letters, dated 10 June, 1984 and 14 August, 1984 showed the hold of raw emotions on his mind. A mind so buffeted could not be trusted to fly planes of a corporation which functioned in a highly competitive milieu. The environment was a risky one and the presence of an emotionally upset employee in the cockpit could work havoc with the clientele. Reports had come to the ears of the authorities of petitioner's display of disbelief in the contents of a booklet explaining Government's compulsions for staging Operation Bluestar. This showed that protestations notwithstanding, petitioner was not truly reconciled. Security considerations had led the Government to direct Air India to ground petitioner. This direction was not a suspension within the meaning of regulations framed under S. 45 of the Air Corporations Act, 1953. It fell under S. 34 of the said Act. The said direction was just and fair. No final decision had been taken though the information available till now did not permit the withdrawal of the direction at this stage. Whatever could be done to ensure petitioner's pay, allowances and prospects had been done. The petition was without merit and deserved dismissal.

4. This is the stage to enumerate certain statutory provisions that have a bearing on the petition. Air India is a corporation established under S. 3 of the Air Corporations Act. Under S. 4 thereof, the corporation's management vests in a board. Section 7 lays down the functions of each corporation, the object being the provision of “safe, efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated air transport services”. The corporations mentioned in S. 3 though wholly Government owned are enjoined by S. 9 to act “so far as may be on business principles”. The Central Government is empowered by S. 34 to give binding directions to the corporations as to the exercise and performance of their functions. The Air India has framed regulations with the previous approval of the Central Government vis-a-vis the terms and conditions of service for its officers and other employees vide S. 45(2)(b). Exercising this power, the corporation has framed Air-India Employees Service Regulations. Regulation 43-A thereof empowers the authority concerned to suspend an employee pending an enquiry into the misconduct ascribed to him. The expression “Central Government” is not defined in the Air Corporations Act. This necessitates recourse to the General Clauses Act (Act, 10 of 1897), for under S. 3 of that Act, the definitions thereunder apply to all Central Acts and regulations “unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context”. Section 3(8)(b) of this Act enacts the expression to mean “the President”.

5. The factual position needs a brief clarification for a proper assessment of submissions advanced on behalf of the rivals. Until 7 November, 1984, petitioner was on flying duties despite knowledge of the letter of protest dated 6 June, 1984. At the same time let it be remembered that there was no conscious exoneration… certainly not in 1984 itself. The press leak had raised official eye-brows and this was as early as 14 June, 1984. Petitioner waited for two months thereafter to retract his denunciation in writing. The later event, as reported according to an affidavit tendered on behalf of Air India, was the reaction of petitioner to the contents of a booklet issued by the Indian Embassy in Bahrain which explained the Government's stand in regard to the developments in Punjab. After a cursory glance through, petitioner is said to have flung down the booklet. Petitioner went on disclaiming the happening and the inference drawn there from. Air India, no doubt with the concurrence of the Government, relented to the extent of permitting petitioner to go for the Airbus 310 Conversion Training. This was for the period 3 August, 1986 to 6 April, 1987.

6. The controversy raised by this petition boils down to two questions, viz.:

(i) whether the petition discloses an actionable cause; and

(ii) whether the “no flying” order is illegal and unconstitutional.

Miss Jaisingh contends that there is no gainsaying the adverse consequences flowing from the no flying disability imposed upon her client. A pilot's primary, and, in fact the only duty, is to fly aircrafts. Unless he keeps flying he will fall into a rut which will affect his future prospects. The disability casts a stigma on him in that his colleagues shun him and he becomes an object of suspicion or derision. The embargo on flying deprives him of flight allowance and this has a spiralling effect on other allowances and contributions to be made by the employer. The respondents would have it that as along as petitioner's pay, grade and continuity of service are kept intact, he has no right to complain. A resolution of the issue requires a closer look into the consequences of the grounding. Financially the petitioner does suffer though the extent of the loss may not be very clear. He has not been able to go for Airbus 747 Conversion Training because of the currency of the embargo. That flying duties are rotated amongst pilots so as to ensure an equitable sharing of hours logged and flight allowance earned, is not disputed. A pilot excluded from the rotation automatically suffers a loss measurable in terms of money. An order having these consequences cannot but be actionable. Forget the monetary aspect and let us turn to the non monetary features. It is argued that a mere omission to allot work to an employee is not actionable. This contention requires a scrutiny of the case-law on the subject.

7. Earnest Turner, a salesman in the employ of Sawdon and Company, who was put off duty assailed the said action. Sawdon and Company, replied saying that Turner had no cause to complain in that his salary was not withheld. Kennedy, J., held in Turner's favour on the making out of an actionable cause and this led to an appeal by Sawdon and Company. The Court of Appeal in its judgment in Turner v. Sawdon and Company, [1901 (2) K.B 653], held otherwise, their view being that it was within the province of the master to say that he would go on paying wages, but was under no obligation to provide work. Hodge v. Ultra Electric, Ltd., [1943 (1) K.B 462], turns on the compliance or otherwise of a direction to reinstate an employee and is thus of little relevance to the present case. Miss Jaisingh places great reliance on Langston v. Auew, [1974(1) All E.R 980], to contend that an employee has a right to claim allocation of work and-that during the continuance of the employment, the employer cannot decline to allocate work. The facts of the case were that a non-union workman was not assigned work because of the refusal of his unionised co-workers to work with him. The Court of Appeal appears to have been greatly swayad by the Master of Rolls, Lord Denning. That Judge's proclivity to union-bashing comes out in all its starkness in this, for that reason, unacceptable precedent. The next case relied upon by petitioner's counsel is Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union, [A.I.R 1959 S.C 1342]. What this precedent lays down is the absence of a right in law to the master to suspend a workman, unless the same be founded upon the terms of the contract or the rules governing the service. The point before me is very different, viz., whether during the subsistence of the employment the servant has a right to insist on allocation of work even though the master does not wish him to work and does not withhold the wages? Air India relies on T. Cajet v. Jormanik Stem, [A.I.R 1961 S.C 276], clarifying the ratio in Hotel Imperial case (vide supra), the majority judgment says:

“But that case did not lay down that the master could not forbid the servant from working while he was inquiring into his conduct with a view to removing him from service. It was specifically said there that if the master does so, viz., forbids the servant to work and thus in fact suspends him as an interim measure he will have to pay the wages during the period of suspension”.

Further on, the judgment makes it clear that in the absence of a specific power, no part of the wages could be withheld. Theoretical justification for the apparently contradictory view is forthcoming in V.P Gindroniva v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [(1970) 1 SCC 362 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1494], where it was observed:

“The distinction between suspending the contract of service of a servant and suspending him from performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is subsisting is important. The suspension in the latter case is always an implied term in every contract of service. When an employee is suspended in this sense, it means that the employer merely issues a direction to him that he should not do the service required of him during a particular period. In other words the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee, which because the contract is subsisting, employee must obey”.

The above passage makes it clear that the master has a right to forbid the employee from working and this right vests in him by the very fact of his being the employer. Lest this be construed as a carte-blanche, let me make it clear that a public servant cannot be kept in a state of suspended animation for an unreasonable length of time. Petitioner's counsel rightly pointed to the adverse consequences to a servant placed like her client when the master, i.e, the State, has a monopoly over civil aviation. New limbos cannot be, permitted to flourish sine die. Such a servant's right to work commensurate to his status in the shape of normal official work, has been recognised by the highest Court of the land in Chinnasamy (P.K) v. Government of Tamil Nadu, [1988-I L.L.N 26]. This answers the submission that a mandamus or like writ can be had only to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty. No authority even if acting on security considerations can continue indefinitely the treatment like that meted out to petitioner and yet seek absolution on the plea that petitioner's pay and prospects remain intact. Actionable cause having been established, I turn to the merits.

8. Petitioner attacks the direction on several grounds. It is first argued that a direction as contemplated by S. 34 of the Act must be in writing. Only thus can one know the identity of the maker, the addressee, the subject and all such particulars as make up an official or statutory act. No document incorporating the direction has been placed on record. There is considerable merit in the argument— but on grounds of method and propriety in the transaction of public business. What is vested in the Central Government by S. 34 is executive power. Miss Jaisingh presses Zalam Singh v. Union of India, [AIR 1969 Del. 285], in support of her submission. As I read the decision it is on a different issue, viz., construction of a notification appointing functionaries under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, in order to ascertain the legality of an appointment, In law “direction” would mean “guidance or command”. Section 34 speaks of such “directions” as to the exercise and performance of their functions by the corporations. This is not a legislative function. That power, i.e, to enact legislation and/or approve the same is lodged in Ss. 44 and 45 of the Air Corporations Act. Section 34, being what it is, does not mandate writing as a compulsory condition for its existence or validity.

9. The second ground of attack is the submission that the expression “Central Government” in S. 34 means the President. Admittedly it was not the President who gave the impugned direction and, therefore, that section cannot be pressed in defence. Does the context or the subject indicate a departure from the legislative dictionary (Act, 10 of 1987) as is argued by counsel for the Union of India? The President is not cut out for the role envisaged for the Central Government by S. 34. The authority contemplated by S. 34 is one who has to have a close contact with a corporation. This alone would place it in a position to know how the functions of the corporation were being carried out. Under the Constitution, discretionary powers apart, the President is not expected to personally immerse himself in the day-today administration of Government departments. The requirement of Art. 77 of the Constitution that all executive action of the Government be expressed to be taken in the name of the President cannot be conceived of as applicable to S. 34. The nature of the power lodged in S. 34 implies that the Central Government contemplated thereby, is the administering department/ministry of that Government, i.e, the executive.

10. The third ground urged is that Air India's powers to discipline its employees are confined to the regulations framed under S. 45. The regulations do not permit of the grounding of pilots. Section 34 cannot be resorted to for exercise of the disciplinary power. In any case a direction under that section cannot be given to found a course of action outside the framework of the regulations. The learned Additional Solicitor-General counters the argument by Ss. 7 and 9 of the Act. It is suggested that these sections not only enable but mandate that the Central Government to do everything to ensure an air transport service inspiring faith in its safe, efficient and business-like functioning. Employees affected by religious feelings at the controls would not be able to inspire confidence either in the management or the travellers. To lay off such an employee would fall within S. 34's ambit. The two sections deal with different matters. That however does not mean that there can be no overlapping. In any case where the regulations are silent to permit a grounding action as in the present case, I cannot conceive of a more appropriate source than S. 34 to step into the void and ensure the safety and efficiency of the service. Instillation of confidence in the passengers would be in conformity with business principles.

11. Miss Jaisingh assails the impugned decision as arbitrary, unfair and unjust. She points to Air India's satisfaction about petitioner's loyalty and capacity. That the Air India had regained faith in the petitioner is proved by exhibit O, dated 10 July, 1985. It obtained permission to send him on training for conversion to A310 aircraft. Good as this revival of the Air India's confidence may be, that does not preclude exercise of the Government's powers under S. 34 of the Act.

12. This brings me to the submission that the burden to satisfy the reasonableness of the action lies upon the respondents. Reliance is placed upon Para. 16 of the judgment in Nakara (D.S) v. Union of India [1983 — I L.L.N 289]. It is not necessary to go into this aspect of the case, for it is obvious that the petitioner can prove his loyalty by saying no more than that he is loyal. To counter this claim of the petitioner, the respondents rely upon first the letter, dated 6 June, 1984, and next the alleged reaction of the petitioner upon the perusal of a booklet issued by the Indian Embassy in Bahrain explaining the Government's stand in relation to Operation Blue Star. In so far as the second incident is concerned, I must say that there is a great deal of substance in what the petitioner has to say on the subject. The story built up by the respondent-Union of India is that petitioner while at the movements control point cams across the said booklet, cursorily went through it and threw it down in a gesture indicative of his disbelief at the contents of the booklet. Not a word was uttered by the petitioner. Too much has been read into a gesture, for the same is susceptible of many other explanations. A possible one is that the petitioner felt dismayed at the inartistic or inadequate terminology used in the booklet. But there remains the letter of 6 June, 1984. The words used in that letter are very clear. Petitioner in that letter declares that his religious feelings have been hurt as a result of the army action at Golden Temple, and that as a protest, he wishes to return his Vayu-Sena Medal to the Government. The S.G.P.C is requested to convey the protest of the petitioner as also to return the medal to the Government. The S.G.P.C is the body which looks after the Gurudwara at Dadar, Bombay. Considering the routing of the protest through the S.G.P.C as an affirmation of petitioner desiring to join an institutional protest, cannot be categorised as an unwarranted inference. Petitioner stood up and wanted to be counted as one who was with the community in the matter of protesting against the Government of India's action by sending the army inside the Golden Temple. If the S.G.P.C was asked to lodge the protest and return the medal to the Government, there was hardly any substance in the disclaimer that the petitioner desired anonymity and did not want his protest to come to the notice of the public. More than two months later, the petitioner thought it necessary to retract his protest in writing and this was after a discussion with the Deputy Director, Training Department, on 14 June, 1984. Miss Jaisingh argues that the manner chosen by the petitioner for lodging the protest was a quiet and democratic one and that the petitioner cannot be faulted for giving expression to his sincere belief. But in that case, the Government of India cannot be faulted for taking him off flying duties. The Union of India has taken exception to the disclosure of the material collected by it in relation to the trustworthiness of the petitioner. Sri S.K Misra, Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Civil Aviation, has tendered an affidavit in support of the claim of privilege made in respect of the reports received from Intelligence on the subject. An offer has been made to show the relevant papers to me and on behalf of the petitioner it has been vehemently argued that I look into the papers before ruling upon the claim of privilege. Sri Misra in his affidavit avers that the papers of which he speaks are secret documents and communication made in official confidence. He goes on to say that a careful examination has led him to the conclusion that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the documents. At the end, there is the recital that the claim of privilege does not rest on grounds of expediency or to prevent exposure or to gain an unfair advantage in the litigation. On behalf of the petitioner it is contended that the contents of the affidavit are so worded as to ensure technical compliance with the requirement of Ss. 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act. Material particulars in respect of the reports such as when they were received, who received them and from what source, have not been given. The claim of privilege is advanced for no better reason than the official penchant for keeping things a secret. Counsel relies upon the famous cases of Air Canada v. Secretary of State for Trade, [1983(1) All E.R 910] and the Judges' case, 1981 Supp SCC 85. The point sought to be made by Miss Jaisingh on the basis of these decisions is that

firstly, the claim for privilege should be carefully scrutinised and not accepted for the mere asking;

secondly, that it should not be ruled upon without looking at the documents for which privilege is claimed, and

lastly, that the Court has always to bear in mind the need to balance two competing public interests and normally in such a case it should rule in favour of the public interest requiring a fair disposal of cases.

13. The affidavit tendered by Sri Misra gives a gist of the intelligence reports received in respect of the petitioner. The necessary file numbers have been quoted. These files comprise writings by the officers of the Government of India in the Ministries of Civil Aviation and Home Affairs as also the Intelligence Bureau. The affiant says that the privilege is not being claimed to prevent exposure or a possible loss of the case in Court. It is public interest and the injury thereto following disclosure, which is the motive for the claim of privilege. In the face of this clear assertion made by a responsible officer of the Government of India, I do not see any reason to look into the documents to satisfy myself about the veracity of what has been stated in Sri Misra's affidavit. This is not placing undue reliance upon the affiant because of his high status; but because he seems to be aware of the seriousness of the task that he has to perform. A further reason for my not willing to look into the papers is the reluctance to view any material which is kept out of the reach of one of the parties to the lis. The competing interests spoken of by counsel are those of an open Government and proper administration of justice on the one hand and the security of the State on the other. Material relating to the risk in allowing an aircraft to be handled by one who felt it necessary to lodge his protest in writing and by return of a valued token, is material of a highly sensitive nature. Material having a bearing on so sensitive a matter can cause irreparable harm if revealed in a Court of law. It is not as if the Government or any officer of the Government is inimically disposed towards the petitioner. The fact that there has been undue delay in the completion of the enquiry and in the taking of a decision, does not mean that there does not exist any rational material to hold that the doubts in relation to the petitioner's loyalty and trustworthiness are well-founded. Counsel pointed to respondents allowing petitioner to go for Airbus 310 Conversion Training as proof that there was no substance in the plea of petitioner being a security risk. A pilot undergoing training is not really in charge of the aircraft. Being under training is being under constant watch. The trainer is very much present, and being under his observation, the trainee can hardly do anything except follow instructions. Allowing petitioner to go on training and the satisfaction of the Air India and the Union of Pilots vis-a-vis petitioner's competence and loyalty, does not compel the Government to retract the direction. The submission that the Government must establish the existence of good reason for the direction given by it, cannot be accepted. Counsel relied upon certain observations made in the B.D Belliappa case, [1979 — I L.L.N 324], in support of her submission. That decision has to be read in the context of the facts thereof. The Government servant involved was a junior compositor. There was no allegation that he had been singled out for discriminatory treatment because of security considerations. Belliappa's services were terminated without the assignment of any reason and the argument that this was in accordance with discretion vested in the authority was negatived by pointing out in Para 18, at page 328:

“… But, such discretion has to be exercised in accordance with reason and fair play and not capriciously. Bereft of rationality and fairness, discretion degenerates into arbitrariness which is the very antithesis of the rule of law on which our democratic policy is founded …”

Cited in that decision with approval were the words in Shadi Ram v. State of West Bengal, [(1975) 2 SCC 81 : A.I.R 1975 S.C 550], where it was stated:

“there is nothing like unfettered discretion immune from judicial reviewability”.

But it is not as if the decision impugned is completely baseless. Even if we ignore the alleged disbelief shown by petitioner after perusing the Indian Embassy's booklet on Government stand in relation to the developments in Punjab, the letter of 6 June, 1984, and the delay in retracting the protest contained therein, cannot be overlooked. This would show that there is some basis for the Government's doubts as to petitioner's presence in the cockpit. Having gone thus far, I make it clear that I am not to be understood as justifying the long delay of the Government in coming to a final decision. There can be nothing worse to the morale of the service than keeping a member thereof indefinitely wondering as to what the Government eventually proposes to do. In this context I cannot do better than cite a passage from a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Gupta(O.P) v. Union of India, [1987 — II L.L.N 847], in Para. 15, at page 854:

“… It is a clear principle of natural justice that the delinquent officer when placed under suspension is entitled to represent that the departmental proceedings should be concluded with reasonable diligence and within a reasonable period of time. If such a principle were not to be recognised, it would imply that the executive is being vested with a totally arbitrary and unfettered power of placing its officers under disability and distress for an indefinite duration”.

With a few changes in words the spirit of the passage applies to the instant case. More than three years have passed since petitioner was taken off flying duties. Left to itself, it does not appear that the Government will take any decision in the near future. To remedy this unwillingness to take a decision, some directions will have to be given. I propose to grant 90 days' time to the Government to make up its mind and take a final decision in relation to the disability imposed upon the petitioner. Hence the order.

Respondent 2 enjoined to take a final decision in regard to the “no flying” disability imposed upon the petitioner within 90 days from today. A writ embodying the above direction do issue. Rule partly made absolute with parties being left to bear their own costs.