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Saikee Mazar And Others v. B.N Patel And Others

Bombay High Court
Apr 12, 1988
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Case Summary — Petition challenging Maharashtra Prisons (Remission System) Rules, 1962

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition, before Agarwal, J., seeks a declaration that the Maharashtra Prisons (Remission System) Rules, 1962 are ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution and an order directing Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (the Inspector General of Prisons, Bombay, and the State of Maharashtra) to grant remission to the petitioners under those Rules.

The petitioners were convicted under sections 135(1)(a) and 135(1)(b) read with section 135(1)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 and section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. Each was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years and fined Rs. 2,000 on each of three counts; the substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The period of detention undergone during trial was ordered to be set off against the sentence under section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The petitioners say they were arrested on 19 October 1985 and remained in custody as under-trial prisoners until conviction on 11 May 1987, and contend they were not given the benefit of the Remission Rules for the period spent as under-trials. Relying on section 428 CrPC (which provides for setting off pre-conviction detention against the sentence imposed), they submit that the pre-conviction detention became part of their sentence by legal fiction and therefore they should receive remission for that period under the Remission System Rules. They further challenge the Rules under Article 14 for allegedly discriminating between under-trial (criminal) prisoners and convicted prisoners.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Maharashtra Prisons (Remission System) Rules, 1962 are ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution by denying remission to under-trial (criminal) prisoners while granting it to convicted prisoners.
  2. Whether the set-off of pre-conviction detention under section 428 CrPC equates an under-trial detention with imprisonment on conviction, thereby entitling under-trial prisoners to remission under the Rules.
  3. Whether classification between under-trial (criminal) prisoners and convicted prisoners is a permissible classification under Article 14.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by Shri Sardar)

  • The petitioners argued that because section 428 CrPC sets off the period of detention undergone during investigation, inquiry or trial against the sentence imposed on conviction, that period becomes part of the sentence and hence should attract remission under the Maharashtra Prisons (Remission System) Rules, 1962.
  • They relied on definitions in section 3 of the Prisoners' Act, 1894 to show that an under-trial falls within the definition of a “criminal prisoner” and contended that the State Government’s power under section 59 of the Prisons Act to make rules for awarding marks, shortening sentences and rewards for good conduct authorises rules applicable to all categories of prisoners defined in section 3.
  • The petitioners contended there was no justification for making the Remission Rules applicable only to convicted prisoners and not to criminal (under-trial) prisoners; this differential treatment, they argued, violated Article 14 as unreasonable classification. They argued that under-trial prisoners maintain prison discipline and face punishment for breaches of discipline, and that the object of remission (reward for good conduct) applies equally to them.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any specific arguments advanced on behalf of the Respondents in opposition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gopal Vinayak Godse v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 600 Held that the Prisons Act does not confer on any authority a power to commute or remit sentences; the Act provides for regulation and treatment of prisoners. Section 59 of the Prisons Act allows the State Government to make rules for rewards for good conduct, but rules must be construed within the scope of the Act and cannot substitute for judicially imposed sentences. The court relied on this precedent to conclude that the Rules must be read as enabling remission as a matter of concession within the executive's province and do not empower substitution of judicial sentence. This supports the view that remission is within the discretion of the appropriate Government and that the Remission Rules operate within the statutory scope.
Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Anne Venkateswara Rao, (1977) 3 SCC 298; AIR 1977 SC 1096 Reiterated the Godse principle and held, with reference to section 428 CrPC, that set-off of pre-conviction detention against a sentence does not equate the two kinds of detention (under-trial/remand vs. imprisonment on conviction) for all purposes; set-off is a legislative policy without obliterating the distinction between the categories. The court treated this precedent as a "complete answer" to the petitioners' contention that set-off under section 428 makes under-trial detention equivalent to imprisonment on conviction. It supported the conclusion that classification between under-trial and convicted prisoners is intelligible and rational for legislative purposes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court rejected the petitioners' challenge after a step-by-step analysis that relied principally on two Supreme Court authorities (Gopal Vinayak Godse and Government of Andhra Pradesh v. A. V. Rao). The reasoning unfolded as follows:

  1. The court noted that the Prisons Act (section 59) empowers the State Government to make rules inter alia for rewards for good conduct, but the Act does not give any authority power to commute or remit sentences; rather, it regulates prison administration and treatment of prisoners (following Godse).
  2. The Rules framed under the Prisons Act must be construed within the statutory ambit — they enable remission as a concession and operate within the province of the appropriate Government; they do not substitute for judicial sentences.
  3. With reference to the A. V. Rao decision, the court emphasized that section 428 CrPC provides for set-off of pre-conviction detention against a sentence, which is a legislative device. However, set-off does not equate under-trial or remand detention with imprisonment on conviction for all purposes. The set-off expresses policy but does not abolish the legal distinction between the categories of detention.
  4. The court applied Article 14 jurisprudence on permissible classification: a classification is constitutionally valid if (i) it is founded on an intelligible differentia distinguishing those grouped from those left out, and (ii) the differentia has a rational nexus to the legislative object. The court observed Article 14 prohibits class legislation but not reasonable classification.
  5. Applying that test, the court found under-trial prisoners and convicted prisoners form distinct classes. The difference between the two categories is real and bears a just and reasonable relation to the object of the legislation governing remission and prison administration.
  6. The court further observed that Rule 3 of the Remission System Rules grants remissions as a matter of concession and not as a right, reinforcing that Article 14 could not be invoked successfully to require identical treatment in this context.
  7. On this basis — relying on the cited precedents and the Article 14 classification test — the court concluded the petitioners' challenge to the Rules under Article 14 was without merit and rejected it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed; the Rule (issued in the petition) is discharged. The court held that the Maharashtra Prisons (Remission System) Rules, 1962 are not violative of Article 14 on the grounds advanced by the petitioners.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the petitioners are not entitled, as a matter of law, to remission under the Remission System Rules for the period they spent in custody as under-trial prisoners on the basis of section 428 CrPC and Article 14 challenge advanced.
  • The court treated the two Supreme Court decisions cited as decisive; it found that the classification between under-trial prisoners and convicted prisoners is permissible and rationally related to the object of prison regulation and remission rules.
  • The opinion does not state that it sets any new precedent beyond applying the existing principles in Godse and A. V. Rao; it confines its conclusion to the petitioner's challenge and dismisses the petition on the grounds explained above.

Disposition: Petition dismissed.

Show all summary ...

Agarwal, J.:— This petition seeks a declaration that the Maharashtra Prisons (Remission System) Rules, 1962 are ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and for an order directing the Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 being the Inspector General of Prisons, Bombay and the State of Maharashtra to grant remission to the petitioners under the said Rules. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that they are entitled to remission for the period spent by them in jail custody as under-trial prisoners.

2. The petitioners were found guilty for the offences under sections 135(1)(a) and 135(1)(b) read with section 135(1)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 and section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. They were sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- on each of the aforesaid three counts. The substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The period of detention undergone during the trial was ordered to be set off against the sentence of imprisonment that was awarded against the petitioners. It is the grievance of the petitioners that they were arrested in connection with the aforesaid offences on the 19th of October 1985 and had remained in custody until the date of their conviction dated the 11th of May 1987 as under-trial prisoners. According to them, they had not been given the benefit of the Maharashtra Prisons (Remission System) Rules, 1962 for the period during which they were in custody as under-trial prisoners. Their grievance is that if the said Rules apply to convicted prisoners, the same should apply with equal force to under-trial prisoners. The period spent by them in jail as under-trial prisoners was set off under section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Hence, by fiction of law created by section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code the period spent in jail as under-trial prisoners became part of the sentence imposed upon the petitioners. Hence, that period was spent in jail as convict prisoners. The petitioners thus became entitled to remissions in respect of that period also.

3. Shri Sardar, the learned Advocate appearing in support of the petition, in all fairness pointed out two decisions of the Supreme Court, one in the case of Gopal Vinayak Godse v. The State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1961 SC 600 and the other in the case of the Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Anne Venkateswara Rao reported in (1977) 3 SCC 298 : AIR 1977 SC 1096 as covering the subject raised in the present petition. Shri Sardar, however, submitted that the vires of the said Remission System Rules not having been challenged in those decisions, it would be still open to him to submit that the said Rules offend Article 14 of the Constitution. He submitted that section 3 of the Prisoners' Act, 1894 defined criminal prisoner to mean a prisoner duly committed to custody under the writ, warrant or order of any Court or authority exercising criminal jurisdiction; it defined convicted prisoner to mean a criminal prisoner under sentence of a Court and includes a person detained in prison under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under the Prisoners' Act; and civil prisoner to mean a person who is not a criminal prisoner.

4. According to Shri Sardar, an under-trial prisoner would fall within the description of ‘criminal prisoner’ as defined in section 3 of the said Act. Placing reliance upon section 59 clauses (5) and (21) of the said Act, he submitted that the State Government had been authorised to make Rules for awarding of marks and the shortening of sentences and for rewards for good conduct. According to him, the State Government had thus been authorised to make Rules regarding all the three categories of prisoners defined in section 3 of the Act. If the State Government had chosen to frame the aforesaid Remission System Rules as applicable only to convicted criminal prisoners and not to criminal prisoners, there was no justification for the same. The said Rules were not just. There was no good reason for denying the benefit of the said Rules to the criminal prisoners while offering the same to convicted criminal prisoners. The said Rules, therefore, violate Article 14 of the Constitution as denying equal opportunity before the law and were thus liable to be quashed.

5. Shri Sardar pointed out that the under-trial prisoners were equally bound to maintain the discipline of the prisons and were liable to be punished in cases of breach thereof. The object of granting remission was to give a reward for the good conduct and discipline while in prison. If the same was to be extended to the convicted prisoners, there was no justification to deny the said benefit to the under-trial prisoners.

6. In our judgment, there is no merit in the aforesaid submissions of Shri Sardar and the same are liable to be rejected. It has been held in the case of Gopal Vinayak Godse (supra) that the Prisons Act does not confer on any authority a power to commute or remit sentences; it provides only for the regulation of prisons and for the treatment of prisoners confined therein. Section 59 of the Prisons Act confers a power on the State Government to make rules, inter alia, for rewards for good conduct. Therefore, the rules made under the Act should be construed within the scope of the ambit of the Act. The Prisons Act does not substitute a lesser sentence for a sentence awarded by the Court. The Rules enable a prisoner to earn remissions but the question of remission is exclusively within the province of the appropriate Government. If the Government decides to remit the punishment to which a person has been sentenced, the remission may be worked out according to Rules framed under the Prisoners Act.

7. The aforesaid decision was reiterated in the case of the Government of Andhra Pradesh v. A.V Rao (supra) and it was further held with reference to section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term, the period of detention, if any, undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction, shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him. Section 428 provides that the period of detention of an accused as an undertrial prisoner shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on conviction. The section only provides for a set off, it does not equate an ‘undertrial’ detention or remand detention with imprisonment on ‘conviction’. The provision as to set off expresses a legislative policy; this does not mean that it does away with the difference in the two kinds of detention and puts them on the same footing for all purposes.

8. In our judgment, the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court are a complete answer to the submissions advanced by Shri Sardar. The undertrial prisoners and the convict prisoners make a distinct classification and cannot attract the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. What Article 14 prohibits is class legislation and not reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. If the Legislature takes care to reasonably classify persons for legislative purposes and if it deals equally with all persons belonging to a ‘well-defined class’, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that the law does not apply to other persons. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that, that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. Article 14 does not insist that legislative classification should be scientifically perfect or logically complete. The difference which will warrant a reasonable classification need not be great. What is required is that it must be real and substantial and must bear some just and reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. When a law is challenged as denying equal protection, the question for determination by the Court is not whether it has resulted in inequality, but whether there is some difference which bears a just and reasonable relation to the object of legislation. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not per se amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. To attract the operation of the clause it is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is unreasonable.

9. The under-trial prisoners are a distinct category as distinguished from the convict prisoners. Merely because section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for set off of the period of detention undergone during investigation, inquiry or trial, the same cannot equate an under-trial detention or remand detention with imprisonment on conviction. The provision as to set off expresses a legislative policy but the same cannot do away with the difference in the two kinds of detention and put them on the same footing for all purposes. Moreover, as provided in Rule 3 of the aforesaid Remission System Rules, remissions are granted as a matter of concession only and not as of right. Hence; on this ground also no resort can be had to Article 14 of the Constitution. In this view of the matter, it will have to be held that the present petition is devoid of any merit and deserves to be dismissed. In the result, Rule discharged.

Petition dismissed.