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Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Maharashtra State Electricity Board

Bombay High Court
Apr 19, 1967
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Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Articles 226 and 227 challenged an order dated 11 May 1966 appointing respondent No. 2, Shri S.S. Ghisad, as an Executive Engineer on probation in the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (the Board). Petitioner No. 1 is an association of Engineers employed by the Board; petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are employees and members of that association. The Board had published an advertisement calling for applications for several Executive Engineer posts with specified minimum qualifications and seven years' experience. Petitioner No. 2 (R.C. Gupta) applied but was not called for interview and alleges no intimation; petitioner No. 3 (S.P. Shinde) did not apply, asserting he had only five years' experience and therefore considered himself ineligible under the advertised minimum. Respondent No. 2 received an appointment order in May 1966 to one of the Executive Engineer posts. The petitioners contend that respondent No. 2's appointment violated the advertised terms (specifically the minimum experience requirement), denied departmental candidates a fair and equal opportunity to compete, and infringed fundamental rights (art. 16). Returns were filed by respondent No. 1 (the Board) and respondent No. 2 resisting the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Maharashtra State Electricity Board is "the State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution for purposes of Part III (i.e., whether the Board is amenable to fundamental rights challenges).
  2. Whether the Board, in appointing respondent No. 2 despite his not satisfying an advertised minimum experience requirement, denied departmental candidates (including petitioners Nos. 2 and 3) a fair and equal opportunity in violation of Article 16(1).
  3. Whether Regulation 21 of the Board's Recruitment Regulations empowered the Selection Committee to relax or condone minimum qualifications or experience prescribed in Schedule A, independently of the Board's own power under Regulation 8.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The appointment of respondent No. 2 violated the advertised terms and conditions (in particular the minimum period of experience of seven years) and thus deprived departmental candidates of a fair, equal and reasonable opportunity to compete.
  • The manner of appointment infringed petitioners' fundamental right under Article 16(1) (equality of opportunity in public employment).
  • Regulation 8 vests the power to modify minimum qualifications and experience only in the Board (not in the Selection Committee), and therefore the Selection Committee could not, after advertisement, condone or relax the minimum experience requirement.

Respondent No. 1 (Maharashtra State Electricity Board) — Arguments

  • The petition under Article 227 is not tenable because the appointment order is not a judicial or quasi-judicial order (though the petition also proceeded under Article 226).
  • The Association (petitioner No.1) was disputed as having locus, being non-juristic; separate contentions addressed departmental candidates' rights to petition.
  • The regulations permitted departmental candidates to apply for vacancies advertised for direct recruitment; departmental applications are to be forwarded by superior officers so as to provide information on suitability; forwarding without recommendation is a factor in not selecting a candidate.
  • The Selection Committee was entitled to relax conditions (and had done so here), respondent No. 2 being an exceptionally good candidate with superior academic record and suitable experience; the Selection Committee had discretion to recommend relaxation.
  • The Board contended the regulations and internal circulars did not prohibit departmental candidates from applying even if they lacked prescribed qualifications or experience.
  • It was further contended that the Board, being a statutory authority, might not fall within Article 12; accordingly contention on applicability of Article 16 was raised.

Respondent No. 2 (Shri S.S. Ghisad) — Arguments

  • The petition was mala fide and the petitioners knew the recruitment regulations, including Regulation 21 (empowering Selection Committee to relax conditions in deserving cases).
  • No denial of equality of opportunity because candidates are selected from two distinct categories (departmental employees and outside candidates), and the regulations differentiate these classes.
  • The Board is not "State" under Article 12, and Article 16 would not apply because the Board is not within the constitutional definition of "State".
  • Respondent No. 2 also advanced factual justification: his exemplary academic performance and rapid promotions were relevant to selection and the exercise of discretion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishan Gopal v. Punjab University [1966] A.I.R Punj. 34 Cited by respondents to support contention that certain statutory universities/institutions might not be "State" under Article 12 (distinction between State-maintained and State-aided institutions). The Court noted this authority was relied upon by respondents but found the respondents' contentions not well founded in the present context; the case was discussed in relation to University of Madras reasoning.
University of Madras v. Shantha Bai Used (by respondents) to draw distinctions between State-maintained and State-aided educational institutions for Article 12/14 analyses (American precedents considered). The Court reviewed the Madras decision and observed that distinctions drawn there are not directly relevant to determining whether a statutory authority like the Electricity Board is "State" for Part III purposes.
Ena Ghosh v. State of West Bengal [1962] A.I.R Cal. 420 Cited in the context of whether certain statutory institutions fall within Article 12. The Court noted the reliance but did not treat these precedents as decisive against holding the Board to be "State"; they were examined as part of the respondents' reliance.
Devadas v. Karnatak Engineering College [1964] A.I.R Mys. 6 Discussed concept that "State" is an abstract political conception acting through agencies/instrumentalities; relevant to Article 14/12 interpretation. The Court referred to observations in Devadas regarding agencies acting for the State but used them to contrast with the specific statutory powers and public functions of the Electricity Board.
Mohan Lal v. State [1966] A.I.R Raj. 1 Rajasthan High Court view that Rajasthan State Electricity Board was an "other authority" and thus within Article 12. The Court cited this decision as supportive authority for treating statutory electricity boards as "other authority" within Article 12.
Nambooripad v. C.D Board [1956] A.I.R T.C 19 Authority holding Cochin Devaswom Board (a statutory authority) to be an "other authority" within Article 12. The Court relied on this as an example of statutory authorities being within Article 12.
R. Sarangapani v. Madras Tort Trust [1961] A.I.R Mad. 234 Cited as an instance where a Port Trust Board constituted under statute was treated as an "other authority" under Article 12. The Court treated this decision as indicative of the principle that statutory authorities exercising public functions may be "State".
K.S. Ramamurthy v. Chief Commr., Pondicherry [1963] A.I.R S.C. 1464 Supreme Court exposition of Article 12: inclusive definition of "the State" and that "all local or other authorities" within territory of India are included; authorities created under statute may be included. The Court relied on para 11 of this decision as the preferred test and used it to support the conclusion that the Board is "State" under Article 12.
Lucy v. Adams, 1955 350 U.S. 1 American case indicating that the 14th Amendment may apply to aided universities vested with statutory powers. The Court referenced American authorities (including Lucy v. Adams) when discussing comparative jurisprudence and commentary (Basu) but treated them as background to its reasoning rather than as controlling precedent.
Florida v. Board of Control American case cited in the same context as Lucy v. Adams about applicability of constitutional protections to aided universities with statutory powers. Used by the Court as part of comparative material cited in commentary; not applied directly but noted in the discussion of how courts have treated statutory powers as indicating State action.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two main parts: (A) whether the Maharashtra State Electricity Board is "State" within Article 12; and (B) whether the appointment process denied equal opportunity under Article 16 by permitting relaxation of advertised minimum requirements without adequate public representation.

A. Article 12 analysis (Is the Board "State"?)

  • The Court examined the statutory framework (Electricity Supply Act, 1948) and identified specific statutory powers and duties of the Board (formation by State Government; body corporate with perpetual succession; powers to acquire/hold property; powers under sections 36, 37, 41, 45; obligation to submit financial estimates to State Legislature; borrowing and sanction controls; control over accounts and audits; members and servants as public servants; directions by State Government on questions of policy; regulations subject to State Government approval; and other indicia of public function and state control).
  • Relying on the inclusive language of Article 12 and the Supreme Court decision in K.S. Ramamurthy (para 11), the Court concluded that authorities created under statute and vested with governmental powers and public functions are "other authorities" within Article 12.
  • The Court considered respondent authorities' reliance on cases about universities (Krishan Gopal, University of Madras v. Shantha Bai, Ena Ghosh, Devadas) distinguishing State-maintained from State-aided institutions. The Court found those distinctions inapplicable to the present statutory Board which exercises core public functions and statutory powers (including powers resembling eminent domain and compelled closure/use of plant).
  • On balance, and having regard to statutory duties and control by State Legislature and Government, the Court held the Board is "State" under Article 12 and thus subject to Part III and judicial review for violation of fundamental rights.

B. Recruitment regulations and Article 16 analysis

  • The Court examined the Board's Maharashtra State Electricity Board Classification and Recruitment Regulations, 1961 (Schedule A, Regulations 5, 8, 9, 12, 19, 20, 21, 23 and 36) and the advertised qualifications/experience in Annexure A.
  • Regulation 8 prescribes that the minimum qualifications/experience shall be as shown in Schedule A. Regulation 21 allows the Selection Committee to recommend in deserving cases the grant of higher starting pay, condonation of physical defect and/or relaxation of age-limit and educational or other qualifications. Regulation 23 permits departmental candidates to apply for advertised posts provided they possess prescribed qualifications and experience. Regulation 36 allows relaxation of academic qualifications on promotion for departmental candidates but does not expressly permit relaxation of experience.
  • The Court addressed two competing interpretations:
    • Respondents' position: Regulation 21 gives the Selection Committee an overriding power to relax or condone minimum qualifications (including experience) even after advertisement and without prior notice.
    • Petitioners' position: Regulation 8 vests modification power only in the Board; Regulation 21 should be strictly construed and does not authorise the Selection Committee to relax the minimum experience prescribed in Schedule A; any relaxation of minimum requirements should be declared by the Board before issuing an advertisement so that all potential applicants know the conditions under which they can compete.
  • The Court accepted the petitioners' argument that Regulation 21 cannot be interpreted as a residuary or overriding power enabling the Selection Committee to ignore minimum requirements prescribed in Schedule A. The emphasis in the Regulations on minimum experience (separate column in Schedule A) and the omission of experience from the specific relaxation examples in Regulation 21 supported a narrow construction of Regulation 21.
  • Crucially, the Court held that if the Board intended to permit relaxation of minimum qualifications or experience in particular cases, the Board (under Regulation 8) must first exercise that power and indicate such intention in the advertisement so that all candidates (including departmental candidates who might otherwise not apply) would have an informed opportunity to compete. The Court found no such representation in Annexure A.
  • The Court found the Board's own return (para. 3) inconsistent with respondents' novel construction that departmental candidates were never barred from applying even if lacking prescribed qualifications — the return suggested candidates could apply even without prescribed experience, undermining the respondents' stance. The procedure of routing departmental applications through superiors created additional practical barriers and prejudices departmental candidates.
  • Because the advertisement did not indicate any possibility of relaxation and the Selection Committee's purported post-advertisement relaxation disadvantaged departmental candidates who had refrained from applying or whose applications were forwarded without recommendation, the Court found a denial of equality of opportunity under Article 16(1).

Holding and Implications

Holding: PETITION ALLOWED.

Direct consequence: The Court allowed the petition challenging the appointment dated 11 May 1966 of respondent No. 2 as Executive Engineer and struck down the appointment process in so far as it violated Article 16(1) by denying departmental candidates a fair and equal opportunity. The Court directed that the Board take steps, without loss of time, to readvertise the post in the light of the observations made, so that the most deserving candidate may be employed. The Court ordered no costs.

Implications: The decision requires the Board to ensure that any intended relaxation of minimum advertised qualifications or experience is made known in the advertisement (i.e., the Board must exercise its power under Regulation 8 prior to advertising). The ruling addresses the direct effect on the parties (quashing the appointment and directing readvertisement). The opinion does not state that a broader new precedent is being expressly declared beyond the reasoning applied to these statutory provisions and facts.


End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion (Abhyankar, J.). No information has been invented or inferred beyond the text of the opinion.

Show all summary ...

Abhyankar, J.:— By this petition under arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution the petitioners pray that the order dated May 11, 1966, appointing respondent No. 2 Shri S.S Ghisad, as an Executive Engineer, be quashed, and that respondent No. 2 be restrained from acting as Executive Engineer of respondent No. 1. Petitioner No. 1 is an association of Engineers employed by respondent No. 1 i.e the Maharashtra State Electricity Board. Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are employees of the Maharashtra State Electricity Board and also members of the Association. Respondent No. 1, the Maharashtra State Electricity Board, is a statutory corporation constituted under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (Central Act No. 54 of 1948). Respondent No. 1 issued an advertisement in newspapers, inviting applications for the post of Executive Engineers (E and M) in the Board. Annexure A to the petition is a copy of that advertisement. The advertisement was in respect of several posts to be filled including that of Executive Engineers (E and M). Applications were to be made on or before December 10, 1965. In the advertisement calling applications for the post of Executive Engineers, the qualifications and the requirements of experience as well as conditions of age limit have been given. For the post of Executive Engineer, E and M, the following conditions and requirements of the candidates were advertised:

Sr. No. Name of the post and pay scale Qualification Experience Ago limit 1. Executive Engineer (E. & M) Rs. 500-50-800-EB-50-1100 Degree in Electrical or Mechanical Engineering of an Indian or Foreign University or its equivalent. Experience in Electrical Engineering for 7 years out of which 3 years should have been in a position of responsibility connected with:— i. Design, erection and maintenance of transmission and distribution systems. or ii. Design, construction and/or operation and maintenance of Hydro or Thermal Station. or iii. Commercial activities like load survey, tariff calculations, Power Sales and development etc. 40 years

2. Petitioner No. 2 Shri R.C Gupta has been serving with respondent No. 1 Board since about 7 years as a Deputy Executive Engineer, Testing Division. Petitioner No. 3 Shri S.P Shinde, who is a graduate in Engineering (Electrical) from Usmania University, was appointed as a Junior Engineer with the Board in 1961 and has since been promoted and was serving as an Assistant Engineer when the advertisement was issued. Petitioner No. 2 Shri R.C Gupta had made an application for being considered for the post of Executive Engineer advertised by the Board; apparently, he sent his application through his superior officers as he was already serving in the department with respondent No. 1 Board. Petitioner No. 2 was not called for interview, nor was any intimation given to him about his application. Petitioner No. 3 Shri Shinde did not apply at all, but according to Shri Shinde he did not make any application for the post as he had only 5 years' experience to his credit, whereas the minimum period of experience as per advertisement was not less than 7 years. He has also alleged that in view of the specific regulations by which the recruitment is governed, he did not consider himself eligible to make the application because of the condition of minimum experience. It appears that respondent No. 2 Shri Ghisad received an appointment order some time in May 1966, appointing him as an Executive Engineer on probation, for a period of two years. The actual order issued under the signature of the Secretary of the Board is Annexure C to the petition. Now, the grievance of the petitioners is that respondent No. 2 has been appointed to one of the posts of Executive Engineers in pursuance of the advertisement calling applications issued by respondent No. 1 Board, in violation of the terms and conditions of the appointment as advertised, and that petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 and other members of the petitioner No. 1 Association, who were otherwise eligible for being considered for appointment if the condition of minimum experience of 7 years was to be relaxed, have been in any case denied a fair, equal and reasonable opportunity of competing for these public posts. In other words, the fundamental right of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 and other members of the Association who were eligible otherwise has been infringed by the manner in which respondent No. 1 Board had appointed respondent No. 2 in this case.

3. Separate returns have been filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 1 resists the petition on several grounds. According to it, the petition under art. 227 is not tenable because the order of appointment is not a judicial or a quasi-judicial order. But this objection is no longer tenable as the petition is also under art. 226 of the Constitution. Respondent No. 1 also disputes the right of petitioner No. 1 which is an Association, to file the petition as it is not a juristic person. As regards the grievance of petitioner No. 2, the case of respondent No. 1 is that there was no bar to either of the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 making an application. According to the regulations for filling of posts, framed by the Board, out of 4 posts 3 posts are reserved for departmental candidates and though the 4th vacancy is to be filled by direct recruitment, in the case of a post of Executive Engineer the departmental candidates are also eligible to make application for the 4th post. But in case of departmental candidates their applications are to be forwarded by their superiors because the Board could not otherwise have any data or record in respect of these candidates, and it is for the superior officers of the departmental candidates to speak about the calibre, work, initiative etc. of the departmental candidates while forwarding their applications. The applications of the departmental candidates could be forwarded for being considered for appointment to higher posts if the superior officer found that they are suitable and deserving. Even if the departmental candidate did not have the requisite experience or qualification for the post, these deserving departmental candidates, who had a chance or whose applications could be considered by the Selection Committee, have not been shut out from consideration by the Selection Committee. Their specific case is that the application of petitioner No. 2 was forwarded by the superior officer but without any recommendation, and so the appointing authority did not think him suitable. As regards petitioner No. 3, the case of the Board is that he was not prevented from making an application as lie was aware of the regulations and the recruitment rules. In fact, respondent No. 1 has stated that there was no specific bar either in the regulations or in the rules for candidates who had less experience to apply for the posts. As petitioner No. 3 did not apply at all, he could have no grievance and the petition at his instance is, therefore, not tenable. As regards the actual selection of respondent No. 2 and the appointment made by the Board, it is alleged that he was a very superior candidate having had a brilliant career and having secured First Division at all examinations and having secured 73 per cent marks in the B.E (Honours) Electrical Engineering Examination in the First Class. So far as experience of respondent No. 2 was concerned, he was promoted in the organisation in which he was employed within a short period of service of three years, and the charge he held in the company of repute was taken into consideration by the Selection Committee. So far as the satisfaction of the condition regarding experience is concerned, the Selection Committee had a right to select a candidate on relaxing the condition required by respondent No. 1 Board, and having exercised their discretion in recommending relaxation of the condition of experience, there was no infringement of any regulation or right as claimed by any of the petitioners.

4. Respondent No. 2 has characterised the petition as mala fide. According to him, all the petitioners knew the regulations by which the recruitment is governed, and in particular, Regulation 21 under which the Selection Committee has been empowered to relax the condition in suitable cases. As petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are governed by these regulations, they cannot make a complaint when the appointment is made in pursuance of the powers given to the various authorities by the regulations for recruitment, in order to help the Board. In the alternative, respondent No. 2 has urged that there is no question of discrimination or denial of equal opportunity to petitioners Nos. 2 and 3, or any other member of petitioner No. 1 Association, inasmuch as under the recruitment rules there are two well defined categories from which candidates are selected. Candidates like petitioners Nos. 2 and 3, who are already in the employment of the Board, form a distinct and separate class from other candidates who are not employees of the Board and who are not governed by the regulations of the Board. It is urged that the very fact that petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are employees of the Board and form a different class shows that in the matter of filling of posts even by direct recruitment they cannot make any grievance against the Selection Committee in the matter of exercise of their right of relaxing the condition or any qualification in the case of any outside candidate. So far as departmental candidates are concerned, their applications are required to be routed through superior officers and provision has been made by instructions for departmental officers to make recommendations in respect of deserving departmental candidates to condone or relax conditions in the matter of qualifications or experience. Thus, the power of relaxation having been vested in the Selection Committee in the regulation itself by which the recruitment is governed, the petitioners could make no grievance if this power is utilised in a proper case like that of respondent No. 2. Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 and respondent No. 2 are not of the same class as they come from two separate and distinct categories of candidates, and therefore, there is no denial of equality of opportunity in filling this post inter se between departmental candidates. There can be no complaint of discrimination. It is further urged that the petitioners cannot claim any fundamental right when respondent No. 1 recruits its employees and art. 16 will be applicable only to those cases where the recruitment is at the instance of “State” as defined in art. 12 of the Constitution. According to the respondents, the Maharashtra State Electricity Board, though a statutory authority, does not come within the definition of “State” under art. 12 of the Constitution and no question of infringement of fundamental right, therefore, arises.

5. It is first necessary to consider whether the Maharashtra State Electricity Board, which is a statutory corporation, would answer the definition of the word “State” defined in art. 12 of the Constitution, for interpretation of Part III of the Constitution. Article 12 says:

“In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, ‘the State’ includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and Legislature of each of the States and all the local and other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.”

6. According to the petitioners, respondent No. 1 is “other authority” within the territory of India and, therefore, fully answers the description of “State” within the meaning of art. 12 of the Constitution. To examine this contention it will be useful to see how the Board is constituted and what are its powers under the statute under which it takes its birth. Under s. 5 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, the State Government is under a duty bound to constitute by a notification in the Official Gazette the State Electricity Board, and the Board is to consist of not less than three and not more than seven members. After providing for the term of office and conditions for appointment of members, the State Government is empowered to suspend from office or remove from office any member of the Board for specified reasons. The Board under s. 12 shall be a body corporate, having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire and hold property, both movable and immovable, and can sue and be sued in its name. Chapter IV deals with powers and duties of the State Electricity Board and among its other duties s. 18 makes it a specific duty of the Board, with the general duty of promoting the coordinated development of the generation, supply and distribution of electricity within the State in the most efficient and economical manner. In order to perform this duty, some specific powers are vested in the Board. For example, under s. 36 the Board may at any time declare to a licensee owning a generating station within an area for which a scheme is in force that the station shall be permanently closed down. Again under s. 37, the power of compulsory purchase by the Board of main transmission lines belonging to the licensee under stated conditions has been invested with the Board. Again under s. 41, where the Board considers it necessary to use for any of its purposes any transmission lines or main transmission lines of a licensee, the Board has been given the power to use such lines to the extent to which the capacity thereof is surplus to the requirements of the licensee. Under s. 45, if a licensee fails to close down his generating station pursuant to the declaration under s. 36, the Board may authorise any of its officers to enter upon the premises of such station and shut down the station or the plant or works. Section 60 is indicative of the nature of the functions and responsibilities undertaken by the Board under that section in respect of debts and obligations incurred, of all contracts entered into and all matters and things engaged to be done by, with or for the State Government for any of the purposes of the Act before the first constitution of the Board shall be deemed to have been done, entered into or engaged to be done by, with or for the Board, and all suits or other legal proceedings instituted by or against the State Government may be continued or instituted by or against the Board. In other words, so far as the function of production, supply and distribution of electrical energy is concerned, whenever that was done by the Government may now be done by the Board as the statutory duty of the Board. Under s. 61 the Board is required to submit to the State Government a statement in the prescribed form of the estimated capital and revenue receipts and expenditure for the ensuing year. On receipt of this statement, it is to be laid before the house of the State Legislature; the statement is open to the discussion in the house and the Board is required to take into consideration any comments made on the stated statement in the State Legislature. Thus, the control of the representatives of the people in the form of criticism and suggestions as to the manner in which the Board functions is ensured by this provision. The borrowing power of the Board is being made subject to the previous sanction of the State Government and the State Government is empowered to guarantee the loans that may be raised by the Board. The distribution of the Revenues of the Board are also controlled by the statute according to the provisions of s. 67, and the accounts and audit of the Board are to be carried out in the manner prescribed by the State Government in consultation with the Controller and Auditor General of India. Under s. 74 any officer of the Board has the power of entry for the purpose of lawfully using any transmission lines or main transmission lines. The Board is required to be guided in discharge of its functions by such directions on questions of policy being given to it by the State Government. The regulations made by the Board under cls. (a) and (b) of s. 79 are subject to previous approval of the State Government. The members of the Board and servants are constituted public servants under s. 81 and a statutory protection is given to the acts of such servants of the Board done in good faith and they are immune from suit, prosecution or legal proceedings. Detailed provisions have been made in the Sixth Schedule of the Act regarding the financial position and the management of the Board's finance. It is thus clear that the statutory authority created under the Electricity Supply Act, namely, the Board, has been invested with certain public functions and has to discharge them as public authority in the matters connected with the generation and supply of electricity. Certain powers of remission of delay are also invested with the Board in discharge of its functions.

7. According to the respondents, however, the Electricity Supply Board constituted under the Electricity Supply Act is not covered by the definition of “State” under art. 12 of the Constitution because it does not discharge any of its sovereign functions. The test that the respondents would apply in order that an authority may be considered as “State” within the meaning of art. 12 is whether it discharges any of the sovereign functions of the State. The respondents have invited our attention to the following decisions in support of their contention: Krishan Gopal v. Punjab University . [1966] A.I.R Punj. 34. University of Madras v. Shantha Bai, 2 Surendra Kumar v. Cen. Board of Sec. Education, 3 Ena Ghosh v. State of West Bengal . [1962] A.I.R Cal. 420. and Devadas v. Karnatak Engineering College . [1964] A.I.R Mys. 6.. In this connection reference was also invited to the observations on page 326 of Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 11th edn. and of Craie's at page 178. In our opinion, the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents are not well founded. In the Punjab case, the question was whether the Punjab University constituted under the Universities Act, was a “State” within the meaning of art. 12 of the Constitution. The Division Bench apparently followed the reasoning in the Madras case in University of Madras v. Shantha Bai and also a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ena Ghosh v. State of West Bengal. Apparently the Division Bench accepted the observation of Narayana Pai, J. in Devadas v. Karnatak Engineering College to the effect that the term “State” was an abstract political conception and it could act only through the agencies or instrumentalities through which it exerted its political power on those whom it governed or ruled. There the question was under art. 14 of the Constitution and therefore it was further observed that art. 14 necessarily sought to control State action or the action of the State through its agencies or instrumentalities. Now the Madras decision purports to interpret the connotation of the word “State” in art. 12 by reference to certain decisions of the American Supreme Court. Making a pointed reference to these decisions in America, regarding universities, the Division Bench observed as follows (p. 69):

“The question has also been considered in America with special reference to Universities. Where the University is maintained by the State any regulation or law made by the University which is repugnant to the 14th Amendment has been held to be unconstitutional and appropriate writs have been issued. … But where the University is not one maintained by the State, their regulations are not open to attack under the 14th Amendment because such a University cannot be considered to be a State.”

8. Then in para. 7 the Division Bench observed as follows:

“It will be abundantly clear from the provisions enacted in part 3, that the Indian Constitution has also recognised the distinction between State-maintained institutions and State-aided institutions. Thus, while Art. 28(1) enacts that no religious instruction shall be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds, Art. 28(3) provides that religious instruction might be given in educational institutions recognised by the State or receiving aid out of State funds, but that no person should be compelled to take part in such instructions. Article 29(2) also recognises that educational institutions might be either State-maintained or State-aided. Adopting therefore the principles laid down in the American authorities, it must be held that educational institutions will be within the purview of Art. 15(1), only if they are State-maintained and not otherwise; and that the regulations of the University of Madras, which is State-aided and not State-maintained are not within the prohibition enacted in Art. 15(1).”

9. Now, whatever be the relevancy of the State-maintained as opposed to State-aided educational institutions, in considering whether universities or educational institutions erected as a result of statutory provisions, are immune from the requirements of art. 14 of the Constitution, we fail to see how that consideration is relevant in the present context. We may also mention that Shri Basu, the learned commentator on the Constitution of India, has observed at p. 141, Vol. I, of 5th edn. of his treatise, that the distinction made in the specific provisions of arts. 28 and 29 cannot be imported to interpret the general provisions of arts. 12 and 15(1). According to the learned author, the test for the application of art. 12 is whether the authority has the power to make ‘laws’ as defined in art. 13, or the power to administer such laws. It is further observed that where a body exercises power conferred by a statute, it is obvious that it is exercising governmental power in its ordinary sense; there is the authority of the State behind its acts (assuming that the acts are held intra vires). Then the learned author refers to the Board of Trustees constituted by a statute in the United States, being taken as agents of the State. The learned author has also referred to later decisions of the Americal Supreme Court in Lucy v. Adams . 1955 350 U.S 1, 100 L. ed. 3. and Florida v. Board of Control, 7 where the American Supreme Court has held that the 14th Amendment is applicable to aided Universities if they are vested with statutory powers.

10. We would prefer to take the view that where a statute authorises a person or a body corporate to exercise a statutory power to issue orders and to exercise at least some of the governmental functions such as eminent domain or a right of entry or to make rules which are required to be obeyed, such an authority is ‘the other authority’ within the meaning of art. 12 of the Constitution and must be held to answer the description of the word “State” within the meaning of that article. The Rajasthan High Court in dealing with a similar question in the matter of Rajasthan State Electricity Board has taken the view that the Rajasthan Board was the “other authority” and therefore the State within the meaning of art. 12 of the Constitution, (see Mohan Lal v. State . [1966] A.I.R Raj. 1..) Similar statutory authorities have been held to be ‘other authorities’ within the meaning of art. 12, such as Cochin Devuswom Board in Nambooripad v. C.D Board . [1956] A.I.R T.C 19. and Port Trust Board constituted under the Madras Port Trust Act in R. Sarangapani v. Madras Tort Trust . [1961] A.I.R Mad. 234. These decisions indicate the principle to be applied in such cases. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also indicated in a recent case the test that may be applied in determining whether an authority would be “other authority” within the meaning of art. 12 of the Constitution.

11. In K.S Ramamurthy v. Chief Commr., Pondicherry . [1963] A.I.R S.C 1464., their Lordships observed as follows in para. 11:

“…Art. 12 gives an inclusive definition of the words ‘the State’ and within these words of that Article are included (i) the Government and Parliament of India, (ii) the Government and the legislature of each of the States, and (iii) all local or other authorities. These are the only authorities which are included in the words ‘the State’ in Art. 12 for the purpose of Part III. Then follow the words which qualify the words ‘all local or other authorities’. These local or other authorities which are included within the words ‘the State’ of Art. 12 are of two kinds, namely, (i) those within the territory of India, and (ii) those under the control of the Government of India. There are thus two qualifying clauses to ‘all local or other authorities’. These clauses are, (i) within the territory of India and (ii) under the control of the Government of India. It would in our opinion be grammatically wrong to read the words ‘under the control of the Government of India’ as qualifying the word ‘territory’. From the scheme of Art. 12 it is clear that throe classes of authorities are meant to be included in the words ‘the State’ there; and the third class is of two kinds and the qualifying words which follow ‘all local or other authorities’ define the two types of such local or other authorities as already indicated above. Further, all local or other authorities within the territory of India included all authorities within the territory of India whether under the control of the Government of India or the Governments of various States and even autonomous authorities which may not be under the, control of the Government at all.”

12. The portion italicised above would suggest that their Lordships had under consideration autonomous authorities which can be created under statutes of the State or Central Legislature. If that be the correct interpretation of art. 12, it must follow that the category of authorities under the ‘other authorities’ would include all those authorities which are created under the statute or in general for the discharge of public functions are amenable to the control of the State and whose acts are capable of scrutiny by public authority like executive government or the Legislature of the State and which have been invested with the power of eminent domain viz. right of entry or enforcing shutting out of transmission lines or taking over transmission plant in the instant case. We are, therefore, satisfied that respondent No. 1 is “State” within the meaning of art. 12 of the Constitution, and is bound by the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and its actions can be subject to judicial review if challenged as violative of any fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

13. The next and most important question canvassed before us was whether in making appointment of respondent No. 2 the Board has really denied a fair and equal opportunity to petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 or other members of petitioner No. 1 Association, in being considered for appointment as an Executive Engineer.

14. In this connection we must first dispose of the contention of respondent No. 2 that no question of equality of opportunity arises so far as petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 or other departmental candidates are concerned, for they form a class by themselves. If this contention of respondent No. 2 were to be accepted, then there would be no grievance, it is urged, as the two types of candidates are governed by different conditions. That there can be a valid classification in making recruitment to public office from different channels need not be a matter of serious debate. But the question is whether in the particular case the regulations for recruitment to service made by respondent No. 1 Board do make such a distinction. Respondent No. 2 argues that there is no similarity of circumstances between petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 on the one hand and respondent No. 2 on the other. In order to understand the implication of this contention it is necessary to examine in some details the regulations made by the Board to govern the recruitment of its employees. Section 15 of the Electricity Supply Act empowers the Board to appoint a Secretary and such other officers and servants as may be required to enable the Board to carry out functions under the Act, and the appointment of the Secretary shall be subject to the approval of the State Government. Under s. 79, els. (c) and (k), the Board is empowered to make regulations not inconsistent with the Act and the rules made thereunder, to provide for:

(c) the duties of officers and servants of the Board and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service;

(k) any other matter arising out of the Board's functions under the Act for which it is necessary or expedient to make regulations.

15. Now, regulations have been made by the Board and they have been annexed by respondent No. 1 to its return. The regulations are called the Maharashtra State Electricity Board Classification and Recruitment Regulations, 1961, and the Regulations came into force from October 1, 1961. But the Regulations themselves provide under s. 1(iii) that if any of these Regulations come into conflict with the provisions of law for the time being in force, the latter shall be deemed to be operative. Under Regulation 5, all appointments to posts in the service of the Board shall normally be made in accordance with the provisions of the Regulations, but appointments may be made either by promotion of persons holding lower posts in the respective cadre or by direct recruitment, as the case may be, in the manner specified in Schedule A. Then there is a note added to this regulation 5, which is as follows:

“Note. Nothing in this Regulation shall be deemed to restrict the authority of the Board to adopt other methods or standards of recruitment in such cases as it considers necessary.”

16. Now, Schedule A referred to in regulation 5 divides posts in the service of the Board into different categories such as technical posts of various pay grades. The post of Executive Engineer, E & M, is at serial No. 5 among the technical posts. Its pay-scale is Rs. 500-50-800-EB-50-1,100. The category is Executive Engineer E & M, the qualifications are Degree in Electrical or Mechanical Engineering of an Indian or Foreign University or its equivalent, and the experience required is experience in Electrical Engineering for 7 years out of which 3 years should have been in a position of responsibility, connected with (i) design, erection and maintenance of transmission and distribution system, or (ii) design, construction and/or operation and maintenance of hydro or thermal stations, or (iii) commercial activities like load survey, tariff calculations, power sale and development etc. Then in column 8 it is provided: “By departmental promotion and by direct recruitment subject to the condition that every fourth vacancy shall be filled by direct recruitment.”

17. Regulation 6 provides the age limits, the lower age limit being 20 years and the upper age limit 40 years for pay group No. I, in which the post of Executive Engineer is included. Regulation 8 is an important regulation and is as follows:

“Subject to such modifications as the Board may decide, the minimum qualifications and/or experience required for the various categories of posts shall be as shown in Schedule A.”

18. Under Regulation 9 it is provided that where no special qualifications in respect of education are prescribed, it is left to the discretion of the Selection Committee concerned to select such persons as appear to it to be suitable for the duties that are assigned to the posts or that the candidates if appointed are required to perform. Regulation 12 requires that the posts intended to be filled by direct recruitment shall be advertised and filled according to the prescribed procedure. Regulation 19, which is relevant in the context of powers claimed for Selection Committee, is as follows:

“All appointments or promotions to posts in the respective Pay Groups shall be made by the competent appointing authorities concerned on the recommendations of the competent Selection Committees concerned, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by the Board.

Provided that, in the case of vacancies of purely temporary nature and of leave vacancies where no person recommended by the Selection Committee concerned for inclusion in the waiting list is available, the competent appointing authority may at its discretion appoint suitable persons for a period not exceeding six months, subject to the conditions:

(i) that no candidate who has completed a total service of 6 months shall be reappointed or continued unless he is selected by the competent Selection Committee,

(ii) that the services of such a person appointed on purely temporary basis are discontinued, no sooner a selected candidate is available.

Provided further that, in the case of an immediate necessity when no person from the waiting list is available, a purely temporary appointment may be made by the competent Appointing Authority pending selection by the appropriate Selection Committee.”

19. Under regulation 20 the Board is empowered for the purpose of the regulations to constitute from time to time different Selection Committees to select and recommend candidates for appointments to posts in respective pay-groups under the Board. Then follows regulation 21, which is the sheet anchor of the defence of the respondents, and it is as follows:

“The Selection Committee may, besides selecting and recommending candidates, also recommend in deserving cases grant of higher starting pay, condonation of physical defect and/or relaxation of age-limit and educational or other qualifications.”

20. Regulation 23 is important inasmuch as it provides that when the posts required to be filled by direct recruitment are advertised, departmental candidates may apply for the same, provided they possess the prescribed qualifications and experience. We may now notice one more regulation, No. 36, under which, when a post is being filled by departmental promotion, the competent authority may relax the academic qualifications if the departmental candidate to be appointed is otherwise suitable and qualified by reason of adequate experience and/or by having passed the prescribed departmental examination.

21. According to respondent No. 2, candidates who are not employees of the Board when a post is to be filled by direct recruitment, form a class or category entirely different and distinct from departmental candidates who are enabled to compete when the post is to be filled by direct recruitment. According to respondent No. 2, regulation 23 which throws open an opportunity to the departmental candidates when the posts are required to be filled by direct recruitment or advertised, itself postulates that they must possess the required qualification and experience. The departmental instructions issued in this connection, of which a copy has been filed, also require such an application to be routed and forwarded through the immediate superiors of the candidates concerned, and that superior officer has to make an endorsement while forwarding the application whether the departmental candidate satisfied the requirements and qualifications for the post. We have found it difficult to accept this contention urged on behalf of respondent No. 2. In this connection it is also urged that the departmental candidates like petitioners Nos. 2 and 3, who must be fully aware of the regulations governing the recruitment to services under the Board, cannot make any grievance if their applications are not considered by the Selection Committee, because it is one of the conditions of their employment that when the question of considering their applications for posts to be filled by direct recruitment or as advertised arises, the regulations do not permit the departmental candidate to be considered eligible if the departmental candidate does not possess the prescribed qualifications and experience. In other words, such a construction would be tantamount to saying that Regulation 21 does not apply when the candidate to be considered by the Selection Committee is a departmental candidate but only applies when the candidate is a non-departmental candidate when the post is to be filled by direct recruitment. We are unable to appreciate the justification for such a construction of Regulations 21 and 23. The return submitted on behalf of the Board itself is also destructive of such an argument. In para. 3 of the return respondent No. 1 has stated as follows:

“It is submitted that the petitioner No. 2 was recently promoted to a post next below the post advertised from a lower post and the petitioner No. 3 himself did not apply in spite of the fact that the rules and the official circular No. Estt/III/Misc/3506, dated 13-4-1962, did not prohibit him from applying for the post even though he did not have the qualification and the experience prescribed by the rules and mentioned in the advertisement.”

22. If that is the interpretation of the employer himself, i.e respondent No. 1, then it is difficult to uphold the contention of respondent No. 2 that even though candidates may come from two different channels i.e departmental candidates and non-departmental candidates when the post is advertised, it is to be filled by direct recruitment. It must, therefore, be held that respondent No. 2 cannot avoid the application of art. 16 of the Constitution, infraction of which is complained by the petitioners on the ground that the petitioners form a separate class different and distinct from candidates like respondent No. 2 in the matter of appointment by direct recruitment and advertisement. Our attention was invited after the arguments were over, to a short note printed at Note No. 399 in the Supreme Court Notes, at page 390 and 391, in the issue of November 15, 1966, Vol. VIII, No. 19. The very brief description in the Note is not of much assistance. Merely because the recruitment to a certain post is from different sources, art. 16(1) would not be violated by reason of the ratio to be filled by each source not being equal. That is not the question before us. The question before us is whether for the same post candidates from different categories are eligible for competition and whether they can be treated differently in the matter of qualifications and experience by the relaxations of requirements advertised for the post.

23. Thus, the only crucial point that remains to be considered is whether in making selection of respondent No. 2 and accepting that recommendation, the appointing authority was justified in appointing respondent No. 2 even though he failed to satisfy one of the conditions for appointment as per advertisement inviting applications. Reliance is heavily placed in this connection on regulation 21 of the Recruitment Regulations which we have extracted above. If regulation 21 can be considered as repository of an overriding power in the Selection Committee to recommend any deserving cases for condonation or relaxation of the condition of age limit or educational or other qualifications, then it is urged that the Selection Committee, having exercised this power which the regulations vested in it, no grievance could be made for having exercised this power. The first question therefore is whether there is such a power in the Selection Committee.

24. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, regulation 8 invests the power of modification of the minimum qualifications or experience required for the various categories of posts only in the Board and not in the Selection Committee. The qualifications and the period of experience in respect of each post as given in Schedule A of the Regulations are described as the ‘minimum’ qualifications. It is meaningless to suggest that this minimum can be further reduced or qualified by some authority other than the Board. What regulation 8 does is to invest the Board which is the supreme authority in the matter of employment, with a power to make a modification in the minimum qualification in the matter of education or age or experience. But we fail to see how such a power can be claimed for the Selection Committee as a matter of course. We must notice one more argument which, in our opinion, has some substance, urged on behalf of the petitioners. Regulation 8 seems to make a distinction between the requirements, such as “qualifications” and “experience”. The argument is that under regulation 21 the power of relaxation or condonation that is claimed for the Selection Committee is only in the matter of qualifications but not of experience. Now, Schedule A to these Regulations prescribes qualifications for several posts in column 5 and the nature and period of experience in column 6 for different posts. If it were intended that the Selection Committee should have power to relax or condone the requirements with regard to experience as prescribed in column 6 in respect of several posts in the Schedule, the regulation ought to have so stated explicitly. As the power claimed by the Selection Committee is entirely discretionary, it is to be strictly construed, and in the absence of any reference to experience as one of the considerations regarding which the Selection Committee may condone or relax the requirements of the regulation, it is urged that the Selection Committee has no power to condone the deficiency of a candidate even if otherwise suitable in the matter of minimum experience prescribed by the regulations. It appears the regulation considered the qualification of experience as of considerable importance. Under regulation 36 with reference to the post to be filled by departmental promotion, the competent authority has been empowered to relax academic qualifications if the departmental candidate is otherwise suitable and qualified by reason of adequate experience and has passed the prescribed departmental examination. Even in the case of departmental promotion, it is pointed out that the competent authority has not been given the power to condone or relax the requirement of minimum experience required for the post. Thus, emphasis being on the qualification of minimum experience being satisfied by all candidates, it is not permissible, as claimed by the respondents, for the Selection Committee, even assuming that regulation 21 is applicable, to relax the requirement of minimum experience in the case of any candidate for the post which is to be filled by direct recruitment.

25. But we are not satisfied that regulation 21 can be called in aid by the Selection Committee once the Board issues an advertisement prescribing the educational qualification and experience required of a candidate for a particular post, which regulation 8 itself prescribes as a minimum condition for candidature. It is argued that an employer should have an inherent right in case of an exceptionally suitable candidate to relax some of the conditions which ordinarily govern recruitment for the post. That there may be a need for such a power in the employer may not be disputed, but when the recruitment is governed by statutory regulations, the regulations themselves must make prior provision for such contingencies. If under regulation 8 minimum qualifications and period of experience are fixed in the matter of recruitment to any of the posts given in the Schedule, we fail to see how the Selection Committee in purported exercise of its power under regulation 21 can ignore the requirement of minimum qualification or experience as given in Schedule A. Once regulations are made for regulating the recruitment to the services, both the Board and the candidates are bound by the regulations. The Selection Committee, which is the creature of the Board, is also bound by the regulations. We are therefore unable to accept the suggestion that regulation 21 is in the nature of residuary power in the Selection Committee to relax or condone educational qualification or, as claimed, the condition regarding minimum of experience required for the post in the case of a deserving candidate. Regulation 8 being worded as it is, the only authority to effect modification in the minimum qualifications prescribed for the post would be the Board itself. The Board, therefore, could in a given case call for applications stating that ordinarily the qualifications should be those as are mentioned in Schedule A but clearly indicating in the advertisement itself that the Board reserves to itself the power in suitable cases on recommendation of the Selection Committee to relax or condone the conditions regarding qualifications or experience in exceptional cases. If it is given out in the advertisement itself that there is no rigidity in the matter of educational qualification or experience required of a candidate for a particular post, opportunity is thrown open to everyone who considers himself fit and qualified for the post to compete with confidence that his deficiency in a particular qualification or in the matter of experience may be considered and more than mitigated by superiority of his claim in other respects. But so long as the advertisement does not give any such indication that the Board itself would relax the condition of minimum qualification or experience, there is no opportunity for those who may not have minimum qualification or experience to compete at all. When such is the case, it is not permissible for the appointing authority to condone or relax any of the conditions to the detriment of equal opportunity being made available to other candidates whose cases for similar condonation or relaxation could not be considered by the Selection Committee for want of proper advertising.

26. Equality of opportunity will be determined for the purpose of art. 16 of the Constitution by the representation made in the advertisement calling for applications for filling up a post. The advertisement at Annexure A, calling applications, nowhere suggests that the educational qualifications mentioned in column 5, or the period of experience mentioned in column 4, for the post of Executive Engineer (E & M), was liable to relaxation or condonation in deserving cases. In the absence of such a representation, if a candidate like petitioner No. 3 considered himself ineligible, the fault cannot be laid at the door of such candidate.

27. We are not impressed by the statement made on behalf of respondent No. 1 in para. 3 of its return that candidates like petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 were not debarred from applying for the post even though they did not have qualifications and experience prescribed by the rules. Now, at what stage and by what means persons like petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 were likely to come to know that the rigidity of minimum qualification or experience is likely to be condoned or relaxed by the Selection Committee is shrouded in mystery. The procedure prescribed does not give any opportunity to such persons to have any knowledge of the possibility of relaxation or condonation of minimum requirements.

28. As we have already held, regulation 8 and regulation 21 cannot be simultaneously operated unless the Board, which is the only authority entitled to modify the minimum requirements regarding qualifications and experience, consciously exercises its power under regulation 8, and proclaims in the advertisement calling applications for a particular post that the minimum requirements are liable to be relaxed or condoned in suitable cases. What regulation 21 does is to create an enabling power in the Selection Committee to make a recommendation, but the recommendation is required to be accepted by the Board, the appointing authority. It was not explained during the course of lengthy arguments at what stage and in what manner the Board would be in a position to exercise its power of relaxation or condonation in respect of a particular candidate or candidates the minimum requirements of qualifications and experience, and how the decision of the Board to exercise this power of modifying the requirements was to be made known to the candidates. In our opinion, the power of the Board under regulation 8 has to be exercised before the advertisement is issued. If the Board considers that it is advisable to relax the rigidity of minimum requirements regarding qualification and experience in respect of a particular post, that decision cannot be taken subsequently to the prejudice of the rights of candidates who are shyed away or kept from making even an application when the advertisement speaks of minimum requirements from a candidate for a particular post.

29. We are also unable to appreciate the validity of the contentions of respondent No. 1 that the regulations permit the interdiction of any other authority such as the superior of a departmental candidate, to withhold an application or to make any endorsement regarding the qualifications or the experience of the departmental candidate, which is prejudicial. The return seems to suggest that in the case of petitioner No. 2 his application was forwarded without any endorsement on the ground that petitioner No. 2 did not have the requisite qualification and period of experience. This procedure, for which no statutory power is shown, creates an unnecessary handicap for the departmental candidates when applying for posts to be filled by direct recruitment by advertisement. As far as we can see, in view of the clear provision of regulation 23, when posts are required to be filled by advertisement, departmental candidates may apply. But the provision in that regulation that such candidates may apply provided they possess the prescribed qualifications and experience clearly shows that in the case of departmental candidates nobody would be able to apply if the candidate did not possess the prescribed qualification and experience. In view of the statement of respondent No. 1, the departmental candidates and the direct candidates are on a par. We fail to see how a direct candidate having less than minimum experience as advertised could at all be considered for the post for which minimum qualifications were advertised. Regulation 23 itself postulates that when posts are advertised prescribing minimum qualifications, departmental candidates cannot apply if they do not possess the prescribed qualifications and experience. But the advertisement does not say that the qualification and experience as advertised are not rigid and are liable to relaxation and condonation, or that ordinarily the prescribed qualifications and experience were expected but not necessarily insisted. Such an advertisement effectively prevents departmental candidates from making even an application at all. It is in this sense that equality of opportunity has been denied to the departmental candidates in this case in competing for the post to be filled by direct recruitment. If the advertisement were to show that there is no rigidity regarding minimum qualifications and experience, and that in suitable cases they are liable to be relaxed or condoned the petitioners would have no legitimate grievance. That not having been done, it must be held that the petitioners have been denied fair opportunity of competing for the post to be filled by direct recruitment by advertisement. Thus the right of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 under art. 16(1) has been infringed and the action of respondent No. 1 in making appointment of respondent No. 2 to a public office in violation of this right is required to be struck down. It is regrettable that a highly qualified candidate like respondent No. 2 suffers on account of this order, but the public authorities who have a constitutional obligation to discharge in exercise of their functions cannot act to the detriment of constitutional right of other citizens. But in upholding the constitutional right no undue injury should be suffered by any other citizen. We, therefore, feel that respondent No. 1 will take adequate steps, without loss of time, to readvertise the post in the light of the observations made above and will be in a position to employ the most deserving candidate.

30. The petition is allowed, but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.