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Shevaram Thadaram Jaisinghani v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from a Chamber Summons filed by the defendants seeking further and better particulars under Order VI, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). A preliminary objection was raised by the plaintiff challenging the maintainability of the Chamber Summons on the ground that it was filed after the returnable date, June 26, 1967, and was thus barred under sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order VI as framed under the High Court's rule-making power under Section 122 of the CPC. The defendants responded by contending that the rules framed under Section 122 do not apply to the Original Side of the High Court, and alternatively, that the summons was not properly served as it was not accompanied by a copy of the plaint as required by Order V, Rule 2, also framed under Section 122.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the rules framed under Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically Order VI, Rule 5(2), apply to proceedings on the Original Side of the High Court.
- Whether the Chamber Summons filed by the defendants is barred for being filed after the returnable date of the summons.
- Whether the summons was properly served on the defendants, particularly regarding the requirement of serving a copy of the plaint along with the summons under Order V, Rule 2.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The Chamber Summons is barred by sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order VI, as it was not taken out before the returnable date of June 26, 1967.
Defendants' Arguments
- The rules framed under Section 122 of the CPC do not apply to the Original Side of the High Court.
- If the rules do apply, the summons was not properly served because it was not accompanied by a copy of the plaint as required by Order V, Rule 2.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a detailed analysis of the rule-making powers conferred on the High Court under Section 122 and Section 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as well as Clause 37 of the Letters Patent establishing the High Court. It was held that:
- The expression "High Courts" in Section 122 must be construed to include the High Court's entire jurisdiction, including its Original Side, unless the High Court specifically restricts the applicability of a rule.
- Section 129 confers a separate rule-making power for the Original Civil Jurisdiction, which can be inconsistent with the body of the CPC, whereas rules under Section 122 cannot be inconsistent with the body of the CPC but can alter the rules in the First Schedule.
- Clause 37 of the Letters Patent grants a broad rule-making power for all civil proceedings before the High Court, including the Original Side, with the guidance to align as far as possible with the CPC.
- These three sources of rule-making power overlap in respect of the Original Civil Side, but differ in their scope and limitations.
- Given these considerations, the court concluded that the provisions of Order VI, Rule 5(2), and Order V, Rule 2, framed under Section 122, are applicable to the Original Civil Side of the High Court.
- Since the summons was not properly served (as it lacked a copy of the plaint), the objection that the Chamber Summons was barred for being filed late does not arise.
- Accordingly, the preliminary objection raised by the plaintiff was rejected.
Holding and Implications
The court's final ruling was to make the Chamber Summons absolute in respect of certain items, thereby rejecting the plaintiff's preliminary objection.
Holding: The provisions of Order VI, Rule 5(2), and Order V, Rule 2, as framed under Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, apply to the Original Side of the High Court. The Chamber Summons was not barred as it was not properly served, and thus the plaintiff's objection was rejected.
Implications: The decision clarifies that procedural rules framed under Section 122 of the CPC apply to the Original Side of the High Court unless expressly restricted. It also emphasizes the importance of proper service of summons accompanied by a copy of the plaint. No new precedent beyond this clarification was established.
Vimadalal, J.:— This is a Chamber Summons taken out by the defendants for further and better particulars under O. VI, r. 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. A preliminary objection was raised by Mr. Mody to the maintainability of the Chamber Summons on the ground that it is barred by the provisions of sub-r. (2) of r. 5 of O. VI of the Code of Civil Procedure, as framed under the Rules made by the High Court under s. 122 of that Code, in so far as it has not been taken out before the returnable date of the Summons which was June 26, 1967. The answer of Mr. R.P Bhatt on behalf of the defendants to that preliminary objection raised by the plaintiff is twofold; first, that the Rules framed under s. 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to the Original Side of the High Court; and, secondly, that, if it is held that they do apply to the Original Side of the High Court, there has been no proper service of the summons on the defendants, in view of the fact that a copy of the plaint was not served along with the summons, as required by O. V, r. 2, Civil Procedure Code, as framed under the same rule-making power contained in s. 122 of that Code.
3. The point, undoubtedly, is a very narrow one, but as it raises an important question of practice which is not covered by authority, I had reserved orders on this Chamber Summons. It is not disputed that the present Chamber Summons has not been taken out by the defendants before the returnable date of the Summons which was served upon them in this case. If O. VI, r. 5(2)., as framed under s. 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is held applicable to the Original Side of the High Court, this Chamber Summons must, therefore, be held to be barred as being out of time. That brings me to the first contention of Mr. Bhatt. Part X of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the rule-making power, of the High Courts, and it is necessary for me to refer to ss. 122 and 129 which occur in that Part. Section 122 confers on High Courts power to make rules regulating their own procedure, as well as the procedure of Courts subordinate to them. The question which arises is whether the power conferred on the High Court by the said section to frame procedural rules for itself should be construed as limited by the context in which it occurs. In other words, the question is whether the reference to subordinate Courts in the said section should be held to indicate that power is conferred on the High Court to make rules for itself, only in relation to subordinate Courts, and not in regard to its Original Side. I am not prepared to read any such limitation into the plain meaning of the expression “High Courts” which, in my opinion, must be construed to mean High Courts in regard to their entire jurisdiction. In the case of High Courts which have Original Jurisdiction, that expression must, therefore, be held to include that jurisdiction also. It would, of course, be open to the High Court to frame a rule under s. 122 for regulating the procedure of any particular Court or Courts subordinate to it, or of its own Original Side or Appellate Side only, but, in that event, the High Court must in specific terms restrict the applicability of such a rule in the manner desired. The next contention is that, in view of the fact that s. 129 confers an express rule-making power on High Courts in regard to their Original Civil Jurisdiction, s. 122 must be read as applying to all jurisdiction other than Original Civil Jurisdiction, as s. 129 would otherwise be rendered superfluous. I am afraid, there is no substance in that contention, for the simple reason that the ambit and extent of the rule-making power contained in those sections is different. It is expressly stated in s. 122 that the Rules framed by the High Court under that section can annul, alter or add only to the Rules contained in the First Schedule to the Civil Procedure Code. The necessary implication of that provision is that they cannot be inconsistent with the body of that Code. Section 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the other hand, confers on the High Court power to frame rules to regulate the procedure on its Original Civil Side, with only this limitation that they must not be inconsistent with the Leters Patent, or other law, establishing the High Court in question. It must, therefore, follow that they could be inconsistent with everything else, including even the body of the Civil Procedure Code. The third type of rulemaking power is to be found in cl. 37 of the Letters Patent by which this Court was established. Clause 37 confers power on this High Court to make rules for the purpose of regulating all civil proceedings before it, which must, as a matter of plain language, include proceedings both on the Original Side as well as the Appellate Side of the High Court. The only restriction which cl. 37 imposes, if restriction it can be called, is that, in making such rules, the High Court should be “guided”, “as far as possible”, by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, having regard to s. 121 of that Code, would mean the body of the Code as well as the Rules contained in the First Schedule thereto.
4. A careful analysis of the rule-making power contained in these three provisions therefore shows that they overlap to a considerable extent, in so far as rules for regulating the procedure on the Original Civil Side of the High Court, which is the question with which I am concerned on the present Chamber Summons, could be framed under s. 122 or under s. 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or under cl. 37 of the Letters Patent. It must not, however, be forgotten that, whilst a rule framed under s. 122 for regulating the procedure on the Original Civil Side of the High Court cannot be inconsistent with the body of the Code, a rule framed under s. 129 of the same Code could be inconsistent therewith. A rule framed under either of those sections can, however, be inconsistent with the rules contained in the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure.
5. As far as the rule-making power contained in cl. 37 of the Letters Patent in regard to the Original Civil Side is concerned, the situation may best be expressed by stating that a rule framed thereunder should not, as far as possible, be inconsistent with the provisions contained in the body of the Code of Civil Procedure, or in the First Schedule thereto. The ambit and extent of the rule-making power contained in each of these provisions is, therefore, different. The mere fact that s. 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly confers the power to frame rules for regulating the procedure on the Original Civil Side of the High Courts cannot lead to the conclusion that no such rules can be framed under s. 122 of the same Code. In fact, O. XXXVII, r. 1, as recently amended and framed under s. 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has expressly made the provisions of O. XXXVII (as amended) applicable to the High Court, which must mean the Original Side of the High Court. That could not possibly have been done if the High Court had no power under s. 122 to make the same applicable to proceedings on its Original Side. In the result, I have come to the conclusion that the provisions of O. VI, r. 5(2), as well as of O. V, r. 2 as framed under the rule-making power contained in s. 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are applicable to proceedings on the Original Civil Side of this Court also.
6. In that view of the matter, it must be held that the Summons in the present case has not been properly served on the defendants, in so far as it was admittedly not accompanied by a copy of the plaint as required by O. V, r. 2, as framed under s. 122, Civil Procedure Code. No question of the present Chamber Summons being barred by reason of its having been filed before the returnable date of the Summons can arise, since the Summons itself has not been properly served, as already stated by me. The preliminary objection raised on behalf of the plaintiff to the present Chamber Summons must, therefore, be rejected.
[His Lordship then proceeded to make the Chamber Summons absolute in respect of certain items.]
Solicitors for the plaintiff: Tyabji Dayabhai & Co.
Solicitors for the defendants: Amarchand & Mangaldas.
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