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Giduthuri Kesari Kum... v. State Of Telangana R...
Factual and Procedural Background
These Criminal Petitions were filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) seeking to quash the proceedings related to Domestic Violence Cases (DVCs). The Court initially entertained doubts regarding the maintainability of these quash petitions in light of the judgment in Velisetti Chandra Rekha and another v. The State of A.P.. The Court conducted a preliminary hearing on the maintainability of these petitions before proceeding further. The petitions generally challenged the continuation of proceedings against the petitioners, who claimed to be unnecessarily roped into the cases without their connivance or complicity.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings in Domestic Violence Cases are maintainable given the civil nature of reliefs under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (D.V. Act).
- Whether mere impleadment of a person as a respondent in a Domestic Violence Case gives rise to a criminal offence warranting quashing of proceedings at the initial stage.
- Whether the Magistrate can issue coercive processes such as non-bailable warrants at the stage of passing protection or residence orders under the D.V. Act.
- Under what exceptional circumstances can quashment of proceedings be allowed, such as absence of any domestic relationship or prior acquittal in related criminal cases.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- Reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the D.V. Act are civil in nature but several provisions (e.g., Sections 2(i), 12, 28) indicate that proceedings are governed by the Cr.P.C. and handled by Judicial Magistrates of First Class.
- Magistrate Courts are treating D.V. proceedings as criminal cases and issuing non-bailable warrants (NBWs) against parties who fail to appear, causing hardship to petitioners who are often unnecessarily implicated.
- Continuation of proceedings without fault on their part is an abuse of process of Court, which can be remedied by the Court’s inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
- Judgments quashing D.V. proceedings under suitable circumstances (such as in Inderjit Singh Grewal, Ashish Dixit, and Markapuram Siva Rao) support maintainability of their petitions and decision on merits.
Respondent's Arguments
- In view of the judgment in Velisetti Chandra Rekha, the quash petitions are not maintainable as the reliefs under the D.V. Act are civil in nature and mere impleadment does not create a criminal offence.
- Conceded that in some subsequent judgments (e.g., Markapuram Siva Rao) proceedings have been quashed, but maintainability remains questionable.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Velisetti Chandra Rekha and another v. The State of A.P. | Orders under Sections 18 to 22 of the D.V. Act are civil reliefs; only violation of protection or residence orders constitutes an offence under Sections 31 and 32. | Confirmed that mere impleadment does not amount to a criminal offence; quash petitions on this ground are generally not maintainable. |
| Inderjit Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab | Proceedings under D.V. Act may be quashed when continuation amounts to abuse of process, e.g., where divorce decree obtained by fraud is involved. | Recognized exceptional circumstances where quashment is appropriate. |
| Ashish Dixit vs. State of Uttar Pradesh | Proceedings can be quashed if petition is filed against unrelated or unknown persons. | Supports dismissal of cases where petitioners are unnecessarily roped in. |
| Markapuram Siva Rao and others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh | Quashment justified where earlier criminal case ended in acquittal and subsequent D.V. case raises identical allegations. | Affirmed quashment in exceptional cases to prevent abuse of process. |
| Gundu Chandrasekhar vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh | Reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 are civil in nature; violation of orders under Section 31 is an offence but enquiry under Sections 18-22 is not a criminal trial. | Reinforced civil character of reliefs under the D.V. Act and limited criminal consequences. |
| Mohit Yadam and another vs. State of Andhra Pradesh | Domestic Violence Act is a remedial statute with no direct penal consequences except breach of protection orders under Section 31. | Clarified that proceedings till passing orders under Sections 18-22 are civil and quash petitions on mere impleadment are not maintainable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the nature and scope of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, emphasizing that the reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act are predominantly civil in nature and intended as civil remedies to protect women from domestic violence. The Court noted that the Act was enacted to address gaps not covered by penal provisions such as Section 498A IPC, aligning with constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 15, and 21.
The Court analyzed the procedure under Section 28 of the D.V. Act, which subjects proceedings to the Cr.P.C. but allows Magistrates discretion to lay down their own procedure, including non-insistence on personal attendance and the use of ex parte orders. The Court held that coercive measures like non-bailable warrants are generally unwarranted at the stage of passing protection or residence orders.
Regarding the maintainability of quash petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court observed that since the proceedings are civil in nature and not criminal trials, respondents cannot routinely seek quashment on the ground of unnecessary impleadment. Instead, they should participate in the enquiry to establish non-involvement. However, in exceptional cases—such as absence of any domestic relationship as defined under Section 2(f) of the D.V. Act, or where a competent court has already acquitted the respondents of identical allegations—quashment is justified to prevent abuse of process.
The Court applied these principles to the present petitions, dismissing those filed merely on the ground of unnecessary impleadment and allowing further hearing only in a case involving prior acquittal in a related offence under Section 498A IPC.
Holding and Implications
The Court held that except in exceptional circumstances, quash petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenging proceedings in Domestic Violence Cases on the ground of unnecessary impleadment are not maintainable and are accordingly dismissed.
Specifically, only petitions filed where there is either no domestic relationship or where prior acquittal in identical allegations exists may be entertained to avoid abuse of process. This decision directly affects the parties by limiting the scope for premature quashment of D.V. proceedings but does not set new precedent beyond reaffirming established principles regarding the civil nature of reliefs under the D.V. Act.
Counsel for Petitioners: Sri G. Abdul Khader
Counsel for Respondent No.1: Public Prosecutor
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
:
All these Criminal Petitions are filed under Section 482 of Code of
Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) seeking to quash the proceedings in respect
of Domestic Violence Cases (DVCs.).
2) This Court entertained a doubt regarding maintainability of these
quash petitions in view of judgment of this Court in the case of Velisetti
Chandra Rekha and another v. The State of A.P. and another and
hence, heard learned counsel for petitioners and learned Public
Prosecutor.
3) In the above decision, in a similar petition filed to quash the
proceedings in DV case, a learned single Judge of this High Court has
observed thus:
Para 2: The petitioners cannot be punished for any offence under the
Act. Only on violating the Protection Orders passed under Section 18
of the Act and Residence Orders under Section 19 of the Act, the
Magistrate can proceed under Section 31 of the Act and can summon
the violators to show cause why penalty for breach of the protection
should not be imposed on them. Further as per Section 32 of the Act,
the offence under Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act shall be a
cognizable and non-bailable one. Before passing any orders, summons
have to be served on the respondents and they can either appear
before the court or can be represented by an Advocate for passing
appropriate orders under Section 18 or 19 of the Act. In view of the
same, issuing of summons and non-bailable warrants for their
presence, is not at all warranted, at the stage of passing of the
protection orders or residence orders by the concerned Magistrate. On
issuing such Non-bailable warrants on the presumption that they have
committed the offence under the Act, the petitioners approached this
Court for quashment of the proceedings.
Para 3: Since the resident orders can be passed against all the
respondents, preventing them from interfering with the possession
of the aggrieved person in the Domestic Violence Case, mere
impleadment of the petitioners in the Domestic Violence Case,
does not give raise to a criminal offence to quash the proceedings
at the initial stage.(Emphasis supplied)
4) So, precisely the observation of the learned Judge is that orders
passed under Sections 18 to 22 of Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 (for short D.V Act) are in the nature of civil reliefs
and none of the orders treat the concerned respondent as an offender and it
is only the violation of the order passed under Sections 18 and 19 is treated
as an offence under sections 31 and 32 of dv act and therefore, mere
impleadment of a person as a party respondent in a Domestic Violence
Case, does not give rise to a criminal offence to quash the proceedings at
the initial stage.
5) In the light of above observations, this Court preferred a preliminary
hearing on the maintainability of the above quash petitions.
6) Learned counsel for petitioners argued that though reliefs under
sections 18 to 22 of dv act are in the nature of civil reliefs but several
provisions under dv act particularly sections 2 (i), 12, 28 etc. would
reveal that the reliefs under aforesaid sections shall be dealt with by the
Judicial Magistrate of First Class and the adjudication of the proceedings
under sections 12, 18 to 23 and 31 is governed by the provisions of Cr.P.C.
and the concerned Magistrate Courts are treating the proceedings under DV
Act as criminal case and if the parties failed to turn up for any reason,
issuing NBWs. against them which causes any amount of hardship to the
parties most of whom are unnecessarily roped in cases without their
connivance and complicity in the case and further, they are not responsible
and answerable to the reliefs sought for by the petitioner. In this legal and
factual scenario, they argued, continuation of the proceedings against the
petitioners will be abuse of process of the Court only which can be obviated
by this Court under its inherent powers conferred by Section 482 Cr.P.C.
They submitted that the observations in Velisetti Chandra Rekhas case
(1 supra) can be confined to that particular case and in fact in some other
cases, under suitable circumstances, the proceedings in D.V. cases were
quashed by this Court and Supreme Court as well. They relied upon the
following decisions:
1. Inderjit Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab
2. Ashish Dixit vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
3. Markapuram Siva Rao and others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
They submitted that their petitions are maintainable and may be decided on
merits.
7) Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that in view of
judgment in Velisetti Chandra Rekhas case (1 supra) the present petitions are
not maintainable. Of course, he fairly conceded that subsequent to the above
judgment, in another judgment in Markapuram Siva Raos case(4 supra) a
learned Judge has quashed the proceedings in DV case.
8) In the light of above arguments, the nature of the proceedings under
D.V. Act is relevant to decide the issue.
9) When the statement of objects and reasons of D.V.Act is perused, it was
felt by the law framers the phenomenon of domestic violence is widely
prevalent but has remained largely invisible in the public domain. Presently,
where a woman is subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relatives, it is an
offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code but civil law does not
however address this phenomenon in its entirety. It was with this observation
the Legislature proposed to enact the Domestic Violence Act keeping in view
the rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution
to provide for a remedy under the civil law (Emphasis Supplied) which is
intended to protect the women from being a victim of domestic violence and
to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society.
10) So, a study of statement of objects and reasons would show that though
the domestic violence against women was addressed to some extent by the
penal law under Section 498A, the same was not addressed by the civil law it
was felt. Hence, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act was
brought into force w.e.f. 26.10.2006. The reliefs sought to be provided under
this enactment, as we will presently see are therefore predominantly civil in
nature in tune with the object of the Act. In the line, Section 18 provides
Protection order against domestic violence; Section 19 intended to grant
Residence order; Section 20 confers Monetary reliefs; Section 21 grants
Custody order relating to the custody of the children and Section 22 confer
compensation and damages to the victim of domestic violence. So these
remedies are purely civil in nature and it is important to note none of the
several forms of the domestic violence committed by the respondents under
these sections is referred as an offence and respondents as offenders. It is
only
when an order is passed under any of the aforesaid sections and the breach of
protection order is caused by them, such breach will be termed as an offence
under Section 31 of the D.V. Act and the same is categorized as cognizable
and non-bailable under Section 32 of the D.V. Act. That is what held in
Velisetti Chandra Rekhas case (1 supra). In the subsequent judgments also
similar view was expressed as below:
i) In Gundu Chandrasekhar vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh , a learned
judge of this High Court observed thus:
None of the reliefs claimed in D.V.C. No.8 of 2011 by the 2nd
respondent can be called crimes. Though, the Act empowers a
Magistrate to entertain the complaint of an aggrieved person under
Section 12 of the Act and makes it incumbent on the Magistrate to
make enquiry of the same under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act are in the nature of
civil reliefs only. It is only violation of order of the Magistrate which
becomes an offence under Section 31 of the Act and which attracts
penalty for breach of protection order by any of the respondents.
Similarly Section 33 of the Act provides for penalty for discharging
duty by Protection Officer. Except under Sections 31 and 33 of the Act
which occur in Chapter V, all the reliefs claimed under Chapter IV of
the Act are not offences and enquiry of rights of the aggrieved person
under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act cannot be termed as trial of a
criminal case. (Emphasis supplied)
ii) In Mohit Yadam and another vs. State of Andhra Pradesh , a learned
judge of this High Court observed thus:
Para 22: If a statute does not provide an offender liable to any
penalty (conviction or sentence) in favour of the state, it can be said
that legislation will be classified as remedial statute. Remedial statutes
are known as welfare, beneficent or social justice oriented legislations.
A remedial statute receives a liberal construction. In case of remedial
statutes, doubt is resolved in favour of the class of persons for whose
benefit the statute is enacted. Whenever a legislation prescribes a duty
or penalty for breach of it, it must be understood that the duty is
prescribed in the interest of the community or some part of it and the
penalties prescribed as a sanction for its purpose. None of the
provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has direct penal
consequences. (Emphasis supplied)
Para 23: Under Section 31 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, breach
of protection order, or of an interim protection order, by the
Respondent shall be an offence under the Act. Therefore, all other
orders passed under Sections 17,18,19,20 and 22 of the Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 have no penal consequences, even if the
Respondent committed breach of the order, except as provided under
Section 31 of the Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, it is clear that the proceedings conducted till passing of the
orders under Section 18 to 22 are only civil in nature to provide a civil
remedy. Thus it is a civil comfit packed with a criminal wrapper.
11) Then the procedure is concerned, no doubt the above reliefs are to be
provided by a Judicial First Class Magistrate. As rightly submitted by learned
counsel for petitioners, under Section 12 of D.V. Act, an application seeking
one or more of the reliefs under this Act has to be submitted to the Magistrate.
Under Section 2(i) Magistrate means Judicial Magistrate of First Class or as
the case may be, Metropolitan Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under the
Code of Criminal Procedure in the area where the aggrieved person resides
temporarily or otherwise or the respondent resides or the domestic violence as
alleged to have taken place. It is also true that Sec.28 speaks of the
procedure
to be followed in adjudicating the applications. It reads thus:
Section 28. Procedure:-
(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all proceedings under
Sections 12,18,19,20,21,22 and 23 and offences under Section 31 shall
be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974).
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the court from laying down
its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 or
under sub-section (2) of Section 23.
12) A close perusal of Section 28 would show that though as per this
Section the proceedings under Sec.12, 18 to 23 and offences under Sec. 31 are
governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, that is not an inscrutable
rule inasmuch as Sec.28(1) is having a saving clause and also subject to sub-
section(2). When we analyse the limitations of Section 28(1) with reference
to the civil nature of the remedies provided under Sec.18 to 22 and saving
provisions under Sec.13 and 23, we can understand that for conducting
enquiry, the Court need not insist for personal attendance of the parties for
each adjournment like in criminal cases. It is because, Sec.13 lays down that
the Magistrate shall issue a notice of the date of hearing fixed under Sec.12 to
the Protection Officer for serving on the respondent. So for securing the
appearance of respondent, at the first instance, the Magistrate need not, nay
shall not issue warrant. Even if the respondents failed to turn up after
receiving notice and file their counter affidavit if any, the Magistrate need
not
take coercive steps for securing their presence and on the other hand he can
treat them as Non-contesting respondents and pass an exparte order by
virtue of the power conferred on him under Sec.23 of the D.V.Act. So during
the enquiry under Sec.12 and till an order is passed under Sec.18 to 23, the
Magistrate need not insist the presence of parties for each adjournment and
take coercive steps due to their absence. It is only under exceptional
circumstances, if the Magistrate feels required, he may issue warrants for
securing the presence of the concerned party. Such a judicial flexibility to
lay
down own procedure is conferred on the Magistrate under Sec.28(2) of the
D.V. Act. By following this procedure, learned Magistrate can obviate the
presence of the respondents, some of whom in most of the cases are
unnecessarily roped in, throughout the enquiry.
13) The next aspect is having regard to the fact that the reliefs provided
under Section 18 to 22 are civil reliefs and enquiry under Sec. 12 of D.V. Act
is not a trial of a criminal case, whether the respondents can seek for
quashment of the proceedings that they were unnecessarily roped in and
thereby continuation of the proceedings amounts to abuse of process of Court
etc., pleas. In my considered view, having regard to the facts that the scheme
of the Act which provide civil reliefs and the Magistrate can lay his own
procedure by not taking coercive steps in general course and the enquiry being
not the trial of a criminal offence, the respondents cannot rush with 482
Cr.P.C petitions seeking quashment of the proceedings on the ground that they
were unnecessarily roped in. They can establish their non-involvement in the
matter and non-answerability to the reliefs claimed by participating in the
enquiry. It is only in exceptional cases like without there existing any
domestic relationship as laid under Section 2(f) of the D.V. Act between the
parties, the petitioner filed D.V case against them or a competent Court has
already acquitted them of the allegations which are identical to the ones
leveled in the Domestic Violence Case, the respondents can seek for
quashment of the proceedings since continuation of the proceedings in such
instances certainly amounts to abuse of process of Court.
We can find such instances in the decisions cited by the petitioners.
i) In Inderjit Singh Grewals case (2 supra), the complainant and her
husband took divorce by mutual consent before the District Judge, Ludhiana
under Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act and later it appears, she filed a
complaint before the Magistrate under D.V Act on the allegation that herself
and her husband obtained decree of divorce by playing fraud upon the Court
and now her husband causes domestic violence to her. She independently
filed a civil suit in the Court of Judge, Senior Division, Ludhiana seeking
declaration that the decree of divorce was null and void as it was obtained by
fraud. In this scenario, Honble Apex Court held that when she was a party to
the fraud, she cannot take advantage of it and in any event, the Magistrate
Court in criminal proceedings cannot declare the decree of Civil Court as null
and void and thus held that the continuation of proceedings amounts to
travesty of justice and quashed.
ii) In Ashish Dixits case (3 supra), the complainant appeared to have filed
the petition under D.V. Act not only against husband and parents-in-law but
also against some sundry persons including the tenant of the house whose
name was not known to her. In such circumstances proceedings were
quashed.
iii) In Markapuram Siva Raos case (4 supra), the facts were that earlier
case under Section 498-A and 506 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry
Prohibition Act were ended in acquittal against other accused except the
husband and subsequently with identical allegations, the wife filed a petition
under D.V. Act against all of them. It was held that such petition would
amount to abuse of process of Court and quashed the proceedings against the
petitioners.
Therefore, except in exceptional circumstances stated supra, the quash
petitions are not maintainable on a simple ground that the respondents are
unnecessarily roped in the case without their fault.
view of his powers under Section 28(2) of D.V Act shall issue notice to the
parties for their first appearance and shall not insist for the attendance of
the
parties for every hearing and in case of non-appearance of the parties despite
receiving notices, can conduct enquiry and pass exparte order with the
material available. It is only in the exceptional cases where the Magistrate
feels that the circumstance require that he can insist the presence of the
parties
even by adopting coercive measures.
ii) In view of the remedies which are in civil nature and enquiry is not a
trial of criminal case, the quash petitions under Sec.482 Cr.P.C on the plea
that the petitioners are unnecessarily arrayed as parties are not maintainable.
It
is only in exceptional cases like without there existing any domestic
relationship as laid under Section 2(f) of the D.V. Act between the parties, the
petitioner filed D.V. case against them or a competent Court has already
acquitted them of the allegations which are identical to the ones leveled in the
Domestic Violence Case, the respondents can seek for quashment of the
proceedings since continuation of the proceedings in such instances certainly
amounts to abuse of process of Court.
13) In that view, when the present Criminal Petitions are perused, except
Crl.P.No.7289 of 2014, the other petitions are filed with the plea that there is
no domestic violence and the petitioners were unnecessarily roped in the case.
Hence they are held not maintainable and accordingly dismissed. In
Crl.P.No.7289 of 2014, the ground for quashment of proceedings is that the
earlier C.C.No.554 of 2010 for the offence under Section 498-A IPC with
similar allegations was acquitted. Hence, the said petition is taken up for
hearing. Criminal Petition Nos.16576, 16607, 16608 of 2014; 76, 99, 226,
311, 388, 395 and 476 of 2015 are dismissed.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand
closed.
_________________________
U. DURGA PRASAD RAO, J
Date: 16.02.2015
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