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Krishnapatnam Port Company Limited v. Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Others
Structured Summary of Court Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, Krishnapatnam Port Company Ltd. (KPCL), a public limited company engaged in development of Krishnapatnam Deep Water Port, challenged a final recovery order dated 19.11.2013 issued by the 3rd respondent (Commercial Taxes authority), directing KPCL to remit tax deducted at source (TDS) of Rs.92,98,03,154/- together with interest under Section 22(2) read with Section 22(4) of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (AP VAT Act).
KPCL's factual position was that under a state concession agreement dated 17.09.2004 (concession agreement) the Government undertook to forego revenue streams including exemption from sales tax on inputs for project construction; KPCL engaged M/s Navayuga Engineering Company Ltd. (NECL) as EPC contractor and asserted that no amounts were deducted from NECL's running account (RA) bills and that any entries in accounts were only provisions required by accounting/audit standards. KPCL also had a pending writ petition (W.P. No.31525 of 2013) seeking clarification/directions regarding continuity of fiscal exemptions.
The respondents (Commercial Taxes) contended that KPCL had deducted TDS from NECL's RA bills for the period September 2007 to March 2013 but had not remitted the full amounts to the Government; they relied on ledger extracts, auditors' reports and statutory provisions (Section 22(3) & (4) of the AP VAT Act and related rules) to show a statutory duty to deduct and remit. The 3rd respondent issued recovery notices and ultimately the impugned order dated 19.11.2013 demanding remittance of Rs.92.98 crores.
KPCL moved this writ petition challenging the recovery order as contrary to law, violative of natural justice and without jurisdiction. The writ was heard and decided by a bench including Ramesh Ranganathan, J. and M. Satyanarayana Murthy, J., and the petition was dismissed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether KPCL was under a statutory obligation under Section 22(3) & (4) of the AP VAT Act to deduct TDS from the running account bills of NECL despite clause 3.16 of the concession agreement claiming exemption from sales tax on inputs.
- Whether the books of account of KPCL demonstrate that KPCL had in fact deducted tax at source from NECL's running account bills and whether those amounts were remitted to the Government.
- Whether the respondents were justified in requiring payment of TDS first and permitting refund claims later (i.e., whether the Government’s notification/G.O. could be treated as an entitlement to avoid remittance).
- Whether doctrines of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation (relying on the concession agreement) could prevent application of the AP VAT Act or excuse non-remittance of deducted tax.
- Whether KPCL made false statements on oath and suppressed material facts, and the consequences thereof.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (KPCL)
- KPCL relied on the concession agreement dated 17.09.2004 (entered into under the Andhra Pradesh Infrastructure Development Enabling Act, 2001) which, by clause 3.16, purportedly exempted KPCL from sales tax on all inputs required for project construction; this made KPCL not liable to deduct TDS from contractor payments.
- KPCL asserted that accounting entries showing TDS were only provisions required by accounting and auditing standards; they did not physically withhold amounts from NECL’s RA bills and the auditors’ certificates supported that no TDS was physically deducted.
- KPCL contended that the State should speak with one voice and the concession agreement binds the Government; refund notifications and prior refunds showed the State recognized the concessionary arrangements.
- KPCL argued that the question involved mixed law and fact and had wider legal implications that could not be adequately addressed in a statutory appeal; they sought writ relief rather than statutory appeal.
- KPCL asserted promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation arising from the concession agreement and conduct of the Government in granting fiscal incentives.
Respondents' Arguments (Commercial Taxes / 1st & 3rd respondents)
- The respondents submitted that KPCL had not exhausted statutory remedies (appeal under the AP VAT Act) and that writ jurisdiction should not be used to circumvent alternative remedies.
- They relied on ledger entries, annual reports, auditors’ notes and KPCL's own statements to show KPCL had deducted TDS from NECL's RA bills for multiple years and had remitted only part of the deducted sums, leaving substantial undisputed arrears.
- They argued that the AP VAT Act does not permit exemptions in the manner contended under clause 3.16 of the concession agreement; the AP VAT Act only permits refunds under Section 15(1) and does not confer power to exempt dealers from tax.
- They contended that clause 2.3 (change in law) of the concession agreement contemplated the AP VAT Act as a change in law and required amendment procedure; consequently clause 3.16 could not override statutory obligations under the AP VAT Act.
- The respondents maintained that even if refund notifications (G.O.Ms. No.609) were issued, KPCL was statutorily obliged to deduct and remit TDS; refunds (where available) are to be claimed by the contractor by prescribed procedure, not by permitting the contractee to retain government money.
- They also alleged KPCL had made false statements on oath claiming no deductions were made, whereas records demonstrated deductions and unpaid remittances; thus KPCL had abused the process of court and should face consequences.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vadilal Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh | Cited for the proposition that the Government is bound by a concessionaire agreement and departments cannot dispute its binding effect. | The petitioner invoked this authority to assert the concession agreement bound the State; the court noted the argument but proceeded to examine change-in-law clauses and statutory law which affected enforceability of clause 3.16. |
| State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. | Principle of construction: interpret the instrument as a whole; give effect to all clauses; avoid picking clauses in isolation. | The court applied this constructional rule to read clause 3.16 in context with clauses 1.2, 2.3, 13.2 and 13.3 of the concession agreement. |
| GE India Technology Centre P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax | Principle under Income-tax law (Section 195): TDS obligation applies only to sums "chargeable under the Act". | The court distinguished GE India (Income-tax context) and held it was misplaced because Section 195's "chargeable" concept does not correspond to the VAT/TDS regime under the AP VAT Act; thus GE India did not excuse KPCL's statutory duty under Section 22(3). |
| Bhawani Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of Punjab | Principle that where exemption exists under the same statute, collection at one stage with later refund cannot validate a levy where there is no liability at all. | The court distinguished Bhawani Cotton Mills because in the present case NECL's deemed sales were prima facie chargeable under the AP VAT Act and there was only a statutory refund mechanism (not a statutory exemption under the AP VAT Act). The court found Bhawani applicable only where there is total non-liability under the statute. |
| A. V. Fernandez v. The State of Kerala | Cited among authorities distinguishing exemption regimes and treatment of turnover for tax purposes. | Used as part of the legal background distinguishing exemption from non-liability; court relied on the distinction in its analysis of exemption vs refund under AP VAT Act. |
| Messrs. Chatturam. Horilram Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar | Authority referenced in the context of exemptions and statutory interpretation. | Referenced alongside other authorities to explain difference between exemption under same Act and mere refund/remedy under changed law; court relied on the group of authorities for the legal distinction. |
| Dipak Babaria v. State of Gujarat (and related authorities: Taylor v. Taylor; Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor; Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh; State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh; Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad; Dhananjaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka; Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd.) | Principle: where statute prescribes the method to exercise a power, that method is exclusive and must be followed (i.e., statutory prescription must be followed). | The court relied on this body of authority to hold that Section 22(3) & (4) prescribe the method to deduct and remit TDS and that KPCL could not retain sums or vary the statutory method; the method prescribed by statute had to be followed. |
| State of Punjab v. Punjab Fibres Ltd. | Rule that conditions in a notification enabling refunds must be strictly complied with. | The court cited this authority to emphasize that the G.O. (notification) under Section 15(1) of the AP VAT Act enables refund subject to strict compliance with its conditions. |
| Kasinka Trading v. Union of India; Excise Commissioner, U.P. v. Ram Kumar; M.P. Sugar Mills v. State of U.P.; Godfrey Philips India Ltd. v. Union of India | Principles about promissory estoppel and estoppel against the Government: no estoppel against Government in exercise of legislative powers; promissory estoppel cannot be used to enforce a promise contrary to law. | The court applied these authorities to hold that KPCL could not invoke promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation to continue exemption contrary to the AP VAT Act. |
| Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn.; Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quin; National Buildings Construction Corpn. v. S. Raghunathan | Principles concerning legitimate expectation and limits to using it to invalidate administrative decisions when the decision accords with law. | The court relied on these authorities to say legitimate expectation alone could not prevail where continued exemption would be contrary to statute and where the agreement provided for change-in-law remedies. |
| A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nand Havana Paripalanai Sangam; S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath | Principles on false averments and requirement to come to court with clean hands; courts must neutralize advantage obtained by abusing the judicial process. | The court applied these authorities when finding that KPCL had suppressed material facts and made false statements on oath and therefore imposed exemplary costs and dismissed the petition. |
| Other authorities cited on fraud/dishonesty (e.g., Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi; Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran; Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Girdharilal Yadav; State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash B. Parmar; Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. v. Coal Tar Refining Company; Mohammed Ibrahim v. State of Bihar; Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy) | General principle: courts must act against dishonest litigants; false statements warrant costs and other sanctions. | The court relied on these authorities to justify exemplary costs and to underscore the consequence of suppressing material facts and making false statements on oath. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through a structured legal analysis addressing each principal contention:
- Construction of the concession agreement: The court emphasized the settled rule of construction that a written instrument must be read as a whole (citing State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills). Clause 3.16 (fiscal incentives including exemption from sales tax) could not be read in isolation; the agreement also contained clause 2.3 (change in law), clause 1.2(c) (severability), clause 13.2 (compliance with laws), and clause 13.3 (taxes and duties).
- Effect of change in law (AP GST to AP VAT): The AP GST Act (which permitted exemptions under Section 9) was repealed and the AP VAT Act, 2005 came into force on 01.04.2005. The court held that the AP VAT Act did not permit the Government to grant exemptions of the kind available under the prior regime; it only permitted refunds under Section 15(1). Therefore, the enactment of the AP VAT Act and repeal of APGST constituted a "change in law" under clause 2.3 of the concession agreement. Clause 2.3 provided mechanisms for amendment but did not entitle KPCL to compensation; KPCL did not pursue the amendment remedy under clause 2.3.
- Statutory duty to deduct and remit TDS: The court analyzed Section 22(3) and 22(4) of the AP VAT Act and Rules 17 & 18. It concluded KPCL (as contractee, a company) had a statutory obligation to deduct TDS from amounts payable to NECL (works contract) and remit those sums to the Government within prescribed time. If a contractee deducts and fails to remit, the Act treats such amounts as unpaid tax and permits recovery with interest.
- Effect of G.O.Ms. No.609 (notification under Section 15(1)): The court acknowledged that the State issued G.O.Ms. No.609 dated 29.05.2006 which, while in force (deemed effective from March 2006 to April 2010 or project completion), enabled refund of tax paid by KPCL or contractors subject to strict conditions. The court stressed that a refund is a remedy distinct from an exemption, and even when a notification permits refund the contractee must still follow the statutory procedure for deduction and remittance; the contractor can then seek refund if entitled.
- Factual inquiry into accounts: The court examined ledger extracts, journal entries, auditors' reports and KPCL's own statements. It found that KPCL's books showed entries debiting capital work in progress and crediting TDS/works contract tax accounts, with NECL credited only for net amounts, indicating that TDS was deducted from RA bills. Auditors' reports for 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12 disclosed crystallised arrears of TDS (Rs.1794.93 lakhs; Rs.4056.20 lakhs; Rs.6101.04 lakhs respectively). KPCL's own comparative statement filed to the tax authority admitted deductions and partial remittances leaving balances. The court concluded KPCL had indeed deducted TDS but had not remitted the full amounts to the Government.
- On payment-first/refund-later contention: The court held that the statutory scheme required deduction and remittance as prescribed. Even if G.O.Ms. No.609 allowed refunds, that did not absolve KPCL of the statutory duty to remit the deducted sums; refunds (where available) had to be claimed by the contractor by complying with the notification's conditions.
- Promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation: The court examined the doctrines and authorities invoked. It held that promissory estoppel cannot be used to enforce a promise by the Government that is contrary to law. The concession agreement itself contemplated change-in-law and required amendment if necessary; therefore KPCL could not claim a continuing right to exemption under the agreement when the AP VAT Act removed the statutory basis for such exemption. Legitimate expectation, standing alone, could not override clear statutory obligations or the contractual change-in-law mechanism.
- False statements and suppression: The court found KPCL had repeatedly asserted on oath that no TDS was deducted, and that any accounting entries represented mere provisions. The court concluded these assertions were false in light of ledger entries, auditors’ reports and KPCL’s own statements, and that KPCL had suppressed material facts and thereby abused the judicial process.
- Relief analysis and conclusion: Because KPCL had statutory obligations to deduct and remit TDS, had in fact deducted but not remitted the full amounts, and had tried to resist recovery citing unenforceable contractual provisions and making false statements, the court dismissed the writ petition and imposed costs for abuse of process.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Writ Petition is dismissed.
Direct implications (as stated in the opinion):
- KPCL's writ petition challenging the recovery order dated 19.11.2013 failed and is dismissed.
- The court found KPCL had deducted TDS from NECL's running account bills and had failed to remit the full deducted amounts to the Government; the recovery action by the Commercial Taxes department was sustained on that basis.
- Because KPCL suppressed facts and made false statements on oath, exemplary costs of Rs.75,000/- were imposed on KPCL to be paid to the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes within three weeks from receipt of the Order; failure to pay would permit recovery in accordance with law.
- Miscellaneous petitions pending (if any) were ordered to stand automatically dismissed.
Broader implications: The court applied existing statutory provisions (AP VAT Act, Sections 22 & 15) and well-established doctrines of contractual construction, change-in-law, promissory estoppel and administrative law. The opinion enforces the statutory duty to deduct and remit TDS under Section 22(3) & (4) and emphasizes that refunds under Section 15(1) do not permit retention of government money by a contractee. The judgment does not announce a novel legal principle beyond applying existing authorities and statutory interpretation to the facts; its effect is principally binding on the parties and factually similar cases.
Counsel for the petitioner: Sri A.V.Krishna Koudinya, Learned Senior Counsel for Sri Ancha Panduranga Rao Counsel for respondents: Sri P. Balaji Varma, Learned Special Standing Counsel for Commercial Taxes;
>HEAD NOTE:
? Citations:
: (per Honble Sri Justice Ramesh Ranganathan)
The final order for recovery of tax dated 19.11.2013 issued
by the 3rd respondent, whereby the petitioner-Krishnapatnam Port
Company Ltd (KPCL for short) was directed to remit the tax
deducted at source of Rs.92,98,03,154/-, along with interest in
terms of Section 22(2) read with Section 22(4) of the Andhra
Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005, is under challenge in this
Writ Petition as being contrary to law, in violation of principles of
natural justice, and as without jurisdiction.
The petitioner herein, a public limited company, is engaged
in the business of construction and development of the
Krishnapatnam Deep Water Port in Nellore District, and in
providing necessary infrastructural facilities for handling port
operations thereat. It is the petitioners case that they were
identified as being the most qualified to undertake construction
and infrastructure activities of the port for, and on behalf of, the
State of Andhra Pradesh; consequent thereto, a state concession
contract was entered into by the State of Andhra Pradesh
represented by its Principal Secretary, Roads and Buildings
Department, with them on 17.09.2004; the said agreement which
was to subsist for a period of 50 years inter alia, amongst other
terms and conditions, provided for necessary fiscal incentives to
them in respect of various fiscal levies imposed by the State in
connection with the construction and development of the port
project; in view of the state concession contract, the relationship
between the State of Andhra Pradesh and KPCL is that of a
principal and an agent; Clause 3.16 of the said contract provided
for exemption from sales tax (VAT from 2005 onwards) on all
inputs and sales, if any, deemed; sales tax was totally exempt on
all inputs, required for construction of the port, for the purpose of
the project construction throughout; the concession agreement, in
terms of Clause 1.1 thereof, reflects the understanding between the
parties in regard to the port project; in view of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Vadilal Chemicals Ltd v. State of Andhra
Pradesh , the Government of A.P. (GoAP for short) is bound by
the concessionaire agreement, and no department can dispute its
binding effect; G.O.Rt.No.193 was issued approving the project
report for construction and development of the port in Phase-II; the
petitioner filed W.P.No.31525 of 2013 seeking a direction to the
Government for issuance of necessary clarifications/suitable
directions as to the continuance of the grant of exemption from
sales tax, entry tax etc as spelt out in clause 3.16 of the
agreement; the said Writ Petition is still pending before this Court;
for the purpose of execution of the works, required for the
development of the port project, the petitioner had entrusted the
work to M/s. Navayuga Engineering Company Limited (NECL for
short) on engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) basis;
NECL is the holding company of the petitioner; they have the
necessary expertise in pile foundations and port construction; they
agreed to complete the work entrusted to them on payment of the
agreed amount; the 3rd respondent issued notice dated 12.09.2013
informing KPCL that they had deducted tax from the bills of NECL,
and they should show-cause why Rs.116,44,35,116/- should not
be recovered from them; on receipt of the show-cause notice, KPCL
submitted their explanation on 23.09.2013 contending that, by
virtue of the conditions in the agreement, the GoAP undertook to
forego revenue streams from the project, such as exemption from
sales tax in all the inputs required for project construction; they
did not recover any tax from the contractor; the records
maintained by them establish that, while clearing the running
account bills, no amount was deducted from NECL; they were
ready and willing to co-operate by producing necessary material
evidence; without considering their reply, and without verifying the
records, the 3rd respondent, relying on the material available with
him, had passed the order dated 19.11.2013 directing them to
remit Rs.92,98,03,154/-; their account books make it clear that, in
fact, no taxes were deducted by them; even otherwise, as per the
concessionaire agreement dated 17.09.2004, the Government had
exempted sales tax on all the inputs required for project
construction; the petitioner is, therefore, not liable to deduct tax;
the statutory auditors had clarified, by issuing certificates, that no
deduction was made in respect of the EPC contract; only a
provision, for works contract tax liability, was made in the
accounts; this was disclosed as a statutory liability in the
accounts; such disclosure is mandatory in order to meet the audit
requirements, and cannot be construed as their having deducted
tax; the 3rd respondent, in the impugned order, held that a limited
review of their accounts revealed that they had deducted tax at
source from September, 2007 to March, 2013; in their reply to the
show-cause, KPCL had categorically stated that they were ready
and willing to produce the material evidence required by the 3rd
respondent; the impugned order was passed without considering
the material on record, relying only upon the annual accounts; the
3rd respondent ignored accounting principles under which a
provision is made to meet tax liability, and erroneously concluded
that the petitioner had deducted tax; the 3rd respondent ought not
to have passed the assessment order on a limited review of the
accounts; the 3rd respondent erred in holding that the petitioner
was duty bound to deduct tax, as it was contrary to the concession
agreement; the said agreement was entered into under the
provisions of the A.P. Infrastructure Development Enabling Act,
2001 (hereinafter called the 2001 Act); before determining the
petitioners liability, the 3rd respondent should have verified their
records or that of their contractor, in order to decide the issue
whether or not tax was deducted from the bills of the contractor;
instead of verifying the complete records, the 3rd respondent had,
on a limited review of the records, determined the tax liability
against the petitioner; no finding has been recorded by the 3rd
respondent that the petitioner had deducted tax from the
contractor; in the absence of such a finding, the 3rd respondent
lacks jurisdiction to pass the impugned order demanding tax from
the petitioner; the 3rd respondent has no authority to audit the
accounts; no authorization has been shown to the petitioner; the
premise, on which the 3rd respondent held that the petitioner had
enriched themselves by deducting tax, is contrary to the
concession agreement whereunder the State had agreed to forego
all revenue streams, including sales tax; as such the question of
unjust enrichment, and evasion of tax does not arise; the 3rd
respondent cannot act contrary to the concession agreement, and
they are estopped from seeking tax from the concessionaire i.e., the
petitioner; the 3rd respondent, without furnishing the material
relied upon by them to the petitioner, has passed the impugned
order; as the State Government had, by the concession agreement,
granted exemption of sales tax on all inputs, the petitioner is not
obligated to deduct tax; the order of the 3rd respondent is in
violation of principles of natural justice, and is without
jurisdiction; the concession agreement, entered into between the
petitioner and the 2nd respondent, is binding on all the
respondents; the agreement contemplates exemption of all input
taxes; the 1st respondent issued G.O.Ms.No.609 dated 29.05.2006
duly following the concession agreement, and directed the
commercial tax department to refund the taxes paid by the
petitioner; the petitioner has not deducted tax as alleged by the 3rd
respondent; if the 3rd respondent is allowed to enforce the demand
against the petitioner, the same would hamper progress of the
project; and it would consequently affect not only the petitioners
interest, but also larger public interest.
In his counter-affidavit, the 1st respondent submits that the
petitioner had filed the Writ Petition without exhausting the
efficacious alternative remedy of an appeal under the AP VAT Act;
the writ jurisdiction is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent the
alternative remedies available under the Act; the petitioner has
made false and incorrect statements on oath; in para 11 of their
affidavit they stated that they did not recover any tax from the
contractor, and the records maintained by them establish that,
while clearing the running account (RA) bills, no amount was
deducted from NECL; from the records submitted by the petitioner
before him it was established that they had deducted amounts
towards works contract tax in each of the running account (RA)
bills; false statements have been made by the petitioner only to
mislead this Court; he had relied on, and had referred to, the
running account bills as reflected in the ledger accounts of the
petitioner, and not on any books or material of NECL; the
averment that only a provision was made to meet the tax liability is
also misleading; the audit report, appended to the annual report,
discloses that it is not a mere making of a provision, but a
declaration of amounts being in arrears, and the arrears also being
an undisputed amount; this is a clear and categorical admission;
no mandamus would lie enabling a private individual to retain
amounts not belonging to them, or to hold it after collecting it as
state revenue; no mandamus can also be sought to restrain an
authority from performing his statutory duty; the petitioners
contention, that no amount was deducted towards TDS, is a
question of fact and not of law; these questions can be properly
agitated by way of an appeal provided under the statute; he had
completed audit of the petitioners accounts based on the
authorization issued by the Deputy Commissioner (CT); thereafter,
in pursuance of the authorization given for assessment, he was in
the process of completing the assessment; during the audit, it
came to his notice that the petitioner had deducted amounts
towards TDS from their contractor i.e NECL; Section 22(3) and (4)
of the Act obligated the petitioner to deduct amounts from the
running account bills of their contractor, and remit the same to the
revenue; he had issued notice for recovery of the amounts
deducted by the petitioner as TDS; the recovery notice relates to
the years 2007-08 to 2011-12; Rs.5.86 crores was included in the
impugned notice, for the period 2012-13, as the petitioner had a
statutory duty to deduct tax at source from the amount payable to
the contractor as mandated under Section 22(3); there is no
provision for granting exemption under the AP VAT Act; no dealer
can be exempted from payment of tax or from the application of the
statutory provisions; the concession agreement also refers only to
exemption from sales tax on all inputs required for project
construction; it does not speak of exemption from payment of all
sales tax, or from the provisions of the A.P. VAT Act; the
understanding of the petitioner, regarding clause 3.16 of the
concession agreement, is contrary to the provisions of the A.P. VAT
Act; the State Government issued G.O.Ms.No.609 dated
29.05.2006 in terms of Section 15(1) of the AP VAT Act; the said
notification came into force with effect from March, 2006, and was
to remain in force till April, 2010 or the completion of project
whichever was earlier; the said GO stipulated that the taxes paid
by the petitioner, or their contractors or sub-contractors, shall be
refunded within 30 days from the date of submission of their
claims; in notification-II, annexed to the said GO, it was stated that
the tax paid under Section 4(7) of the Act, for execution of the
works contract relating to the project work of the petitioner, would
be refunded on production of proof of remittance of the tax
deducted at source in accordance with Section 22(4) of the Act; the
State Government has not granted any exemption to the petitioner
under the said G.O; the G.O. only enabled the contractor, who paid
the tax on execution of the works contract, to obtain refund from
the Government including the tax paid on purchase material used
for construction of the port; the subject matter of the G.O. does not
relate to purchases made by the petitioner, but to the works
contract undertaken by the contractor of the port; the petitioner is
not the beneficiary of the G.O; on verification of the annual report,
for the year 2011-12, he noticed that the petitioner had declared
Rs.61.01 crores as the arrears of works contract TDS payment; he
had, therefore, issued notice dated 15.07.2013 calling for their
objections; he had visited the premises of the petitioner on
17.08.2013; during scrutiny of the accounts, it was detected that
the petitioner had deducted tax at source of Rs.116.22 Crores, but
had remitted only Rs.7.07 crores; consequently, he had issued
notice dated 12.09.2013 calling for the petitioners explanation
regarding recovery of TDS amounts of Rs.108.52 Crores; the
petitioner filed their objections on 24.09.2013, 18.10.2013 and
08.11.2013 along with some extracts of the ledgers; in their
objection letter dated 24.09.2013, the petitioner admitted
deduction of Rs.143 Crores, remittance of about Rs.50.00 Crores,
leaving a balance of Rs.92.98 Crores; on the basis of the material
on record i.e. the annual reports, works contract tax ledger
accounts and the contractors ledger accounts, for the years 2009-
10, 2010-11 and 2011-12, maintained by the petitioner, a final
notice was issued for recovery of Rs.92.98 crores held by the
petitioner, representing deduction of tax at source from the
payments made to the contractor; the recovery notice is based on
the records maintained by the petitioner, and which was made
available by them; even after receipt of the recovery notice, the
petitioner did not produce any material to establish that the
amounts were not deducted; a scrutiny of the ledger accounts
revealed that the contractor, apart from the payments towards
running account bills, had received advances/loans; the Chartered
Accountants certificate, that no amounts were deducted, cannot
be believed; the certificate was issued based on the figures
mentioned in the table therein; the said certificate also stated that,
for the year ending 31.03.2013, the amounts have been disclosed
as disputed liability in view of the pending writ petitions; the
disclosure in the auditors report, in so far as the years 2008-09 to
2011-12 are concerned, is of undisputed arrears towards TDS;
Section 22(3) of the Act mandated the petitioner to deduct and
remit TDS from the amounts payable to the contractor for
execution of the works contract; the petitioner is the contractee
and has engaged NECL as the contractor for execution of the works
contract of their port; the petitioner was, therefore, liable to deduct
and remit amounts towards TDS; Section 22(4) mandates that, if
the contractee does not deduct or deducts but does not remit TDS,
such amounts are liable to be recovered from the contractee as
unpaid tax; the petitioner is holding Rs.92.98 Crores of
government money deducted by them as TDS from the contractor;
the petitioner cannot retain money due to the Government for its
private purpose; and the Writ Petition is devoid of merits.
In the affidavit filed in reply thereto, the petitioner reiterated
that they did not recover any tax from the contractor; the records
maintained by them establish that, while clearing the running
account (RA) bills, no amount was deducted from NECL; the
records submitted by them to the 1st respondent would show that
they did not deduct amounts towards TDS on works contract in
each of the running account (RA) bills; they did not make any false
and misleading statements before this Court; they had only made a
provision to meet the tax liability; the concession agreement,
between them and the Government, subsists for a period of 50
years; clause 3.16 thereof provides for exemption from sales tax on
all inputs and deemed sales; it is for the purpose of extending
some more fiscal incentives, other than those specified in clause
(a), has it been clarified in clause (b) that, at the request of the
concessionaire, necessary notifications or recommendatory letters
shall be issued by the Government to any authority of the
Government permitting tax concessions or some other benefits;
they have filed W.P. No.31525 of 2013 seeking a direction to the
Government to issue necessary clarifications/suitable directions
regarding continuance of, or grant of, exemption from sales tax on
all inputs required for port construction as spelt out in Clause 3.16
of the state concession contract entered into between the
Government and the petitioner; as the respondent has wrongfully
exercised the discretion, conferred upon it by the statute, on
irrelevant considerations ignoring relevant considerations, in such
a manner as to frustrate the object for which the discretion has
been conferred, a writ of mandamus would lie; they have neither
collected any amount nor have they retained any amount after its
collection; the question raised in this Writ Petition is a mixed
question of law and fact, having far reaching legal implications,
which cannot be decided in a statutory appeal; they have not
deducted any amount from the running bills, which they are
permitted to deduct under Section 22(3) and (4); as there is no
deduction, the question of repaying the same to the revenue does
not arise; they have been exempted from payment of sales tax on
all inputs required for project construction; the Government
directed the 3rd respondent on 24.11.2010 not to take any coercive
action against KPCL regarding entry tax; they have not deducted
tax at source of Rs.116.12 crores, or remitted only Rs.7.07 crores;
they have not admitted deduction of Rs.143 crores, or to have
remitted only Rs.50 crores withholding the remaining amount, and
leaving a balance of Rs.92.98 crores unpaid; these allegations are
made only to prejudice this Court; they did not withhold Rs.92.98
crores of Government money as alleged; and they have built a
modern port in the east coast of India investing huge amounts with
the object of providing the country with a world class
infrastructure project in the private public partnership.
In the impugned proceedings dated 19.11.2013, the 1st
respondent referred to his verification of the annual reports, his
visit to Krishnapatnam port, to the non-payment of TDS under
Section 22(4) by the petitioner, the notice of recovery dated
12.09.2013, and to the contents of the petitioners letter of
objections dated 24.09.2013 and 08.11.2013, 30.11.2013 and
08.1.2013. The 1st respondent held that NECL could claim refund
of the tax on the inputs used in the execution of works contract to
KPCL; there was no express provision exempting the assessee from
subjecting the payments, made to the contractor through R.A.
bills, to TDS; the Commercial Tax Department was merely seeking
remittance of the tax deducted at source as mirrored by the
petitioners accounts, as it would otherwise amount to unjust
enrichment; the contractor and the contractee are two separate
assessable entities in the eye of law; as a contractee, the petitioner
had rightly subjected the payments, made to the contractor, to
TDS; the default was in non-payment; the petitioner companys
auditors had qualified their report stating that TDS payments have
not been remitted; G.O.Ms. No.609 dated 29.05.2006 refers only to
refund, and does not permit retention of the sums collected; the
moment any sum is deducted by the assessee, the deducted sum
becomes the property of the government; any claim for refund can
only be preferred, before the appropriate authority, later; the Act
does not grant any right to the assessee to retain sums of money
deducted as TDS, or to refrain from deposited it with the
department; the assssee, being a public limited company, is
obliged to deduct tax at source from out of the amounts payable to
the contractor, and to pay it to the department within fifteen days
from the date of recovery; a limited review of the accounts revealed
that the petitioner had deducted tax at source from September,
2007 to March, 2013, but had failed to remit the same, resulting in
violation of Section 22(3) of the Act; Section 22(4) of the Act casts
an obligation on the petitioner to remit the works contract tax,
deducted at source from the contractor, within fifteen days of
recovery; failure to remit the same is in breach of Section 22(4) of
the Act; the 1st respondent is, consequently, empowered to recover
it from the contractee as if it is unpaid tax; a limited review of the
ledger, pertaining to NECL which is the principal contractor, for
the tax period September, 2007 to March, 2013, revealed that the
petitioner had deducted tax at source under Section 22(3) of the
Act, but had not paid it to the department, thereby violating the
conditions prescribed under Section 22(4) of the Act; a reasonable
opportunity was granted to the petitioner; and the petitioner is
liable to remit TDS of Rs.92,98,03,154/-, along with interest, as
per the express provisions of Section 2(2) read with Section 22(4) of
the Act, without prejudice to the final outcome of the audit, and to
avoid unjust enrichment on their part.
Elaborate oral submissions were made by Sri A.V. Krishna
Koudinya, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioners. Written arguments have also been submitted by Sri A.
Panduranga Rao, Learned Counsel for the petitioner. Sri P. Balaji
Varma, Learned Special Standing Counsel for Commercial Taxes
appearing on behalf of the respondents, put forth his submissions,
both oral and written, in support of the impugned order. It is
convenient to examine the rival submissions under different heads.
I. IS KPCL UNDER A STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO DEDUCT
TDS FROM THE RUNNING ACCOUNT BILLS OF NECL, WHEN
THE CONCESSION AGREEMENT EXEMPTS THEM FROM
PAYMENT OF SALES TAX?
Sri A.V. Krishna Koundinya, Learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner, would submit that KPCL had
entered into a revised concession agreement with the State of
Andhra Pradesh on 17.09.2004 for construction of the
Krishnapatnam Port on a Build, Own, Share and Transfer (BOST)
basis; in terms thereof, they are not liable to pay sales tax on the
inputs required for project construction; by clause 3.16 of the
revised concession agreement, GoAP undertook to forego revenue
streams in various forms as per the 2001 Act, more specifically
exemption from sales tax on the inputs required for project
construction; no restrictions were placed on such exemption; the
counter-affidavit of the 3rd respondent merely supports his order,
without dealing with the revised concession agreement dated
17.09.2004; for the period prior to April, 2010 (i.e., during
September, 2007 to March, 2008, 2008-09 and 2009-10) KPCL
had remitted Rs.16,63,79,337/-, Rs.11,06,35,978/-, and
Rs.8,30,63,846/- towards TDS; the balance TDS deductible was
remitted to the works contractor as an advance; these deductions
were made in view of G.O.Ms. No.609 dated 29.05.2006, though
there was no liability as per the agreement; these TDS amounts,
remitted to the State Government by KPCL, were refunded to the
works contractor i.e., NECL by the Commercial Taxes Department;
and under these circumstances, having granted refund earlier, the
3rd respondent is not justified in claiming the balance TDS amount
for this period i.e., even after acknowledging that there was no tax
liability for these years; during the years 2010-11 and 2011-12,
Rs.7,39,03,600/- and Rs.6,72,95,180/- respectively were remitted
to the Commercial Tax Department; no payments were made
subsequently, as there was no undertaking to make any refund;
the 1st respondent, while adopting the counter-affidavit filed in
W.P. No.31525 of 2013, has confirmed the grant of exemption, and
the grant of refund in Phase I; he contends that the request for
extension of fiscal incentives for Phase II is under examination;
clause 3.16 of the agreement does not place any such restriction
but exempts, from sales tax, all inputs required for project
construction; the bills pertaining to Phase II were raised before
31.03.2010; as G.O.Ms. No.609 dated 29.05.2006 was subsisting,
TDS was made and remitted to the Government on the bills raised
by the works contractor; subsequently, refund of these payments
were also granted by the Commercial Taxes Department; this
establishes that the averments, in the counter-affidavit in W.P.
No.31525 of 2013 filed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to
the effect that grant of exemption is still under consideration, is an
afterthought, apart from being violative of the agreement dated
17.09.2004; and W.P. No.31525 of 2013 was filed by KPCL
aggrieved by the inaction of the Principal Secretary, O/o the Chief
Minister, Government of Andhra Pradesh in not considering and
disposing of the representation made by them on 18.08.2013 to
the Chief Minister, Government of Andhra Pradesh regarding
issuance of necessary and suitable orders for continuance of the
fiscal exemption incentives in terms of the statutory contract
entered into between KPCL and the State of Andhra Pradesh.
Sri P. Balaji Varma, Learned Special Standing Counsel for
Commercial Taxes, would submit that the 2001 Act, and the
Concession Agreement dated 17.09.2004, are both prior in time to
the AP VAT Act, 2005; the A.P. VAT Act and the Rules made
thereunder fall within the meaning of change in Law in clause
2.3 of the Concession agreement; the A.P.VAT Act does not provide
for exemption as was provided under the APGST Act; clause 2.3
also provides for a remedy in circumstances of a change in Law;
G.O.Ms. No.609, by itself, falls within the meaning of changes in
law; alternatively G.O.Ms. No.609 can be construed as remedying
the situation arising from the enactment of the AP VAT Act; under
clause 2.3, the GoAP has insulated itself from liabilities arising
from a change in the tax laws; the petitioner was required to
comply with the obligations under the changed tax law; in the light
of clause 2.3 of the agreement, on the enactment of the AP VAT Act
and issuance of GO.Ms. No.609, clause 3.16 stood
replaced/overruled; Clause 2.3, 13.2 and 13.3 make clause 3.16 of
the agreement subservient to the provisions of the new tax law in
this case the AP VAT Act; the contention, urged on behalf of the
petitioner, that, if there is no tax liability, the revenue cannot claim
that TDS should be paid first, and refund can be sought later, is
not tenable; KPCL is under an obligation to comply with the
provisions of the AP VAT Act and GO Ms.No.609; and, as such,
they are liable to deduct TDS from the amounts paid to NECL, and
remit the same to the Government.
Sri P. Balaji Varma, Learned Special Standing Counsel,
would further submit that reliance placed on behalf of KPCL on
Bhawani Cotton Mills Ltd. v. The State of Punjab ; and GE
India Technology Centre P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-
Tax , is misplaced; in both these cases exemption was granted
under the provisions of the same Act; in Bhawani Cotton Mills
Ltd2, though the charge was created under the Act by general
provisions, the same Act also provided for relief from the said
charge by way of exemption; such an exemption, under the same
Act, would result in a situation of no charge under the Act; in the
case on hand, no exemption has been granted under the provisions
of the AP VAT Act, and KPCL has been extended the benefit of
refund by way of G.O.Ms. No.609 issued under Section 15 thereof;
KPCL is not justified in contending that clause 3.16 alone is
applicable, and not G.O.Ms. No.609; in so far as GE India
Technology P Ltd3 is concerned, it dealt with whether TDS should
be made from every payment or from payment chargeable under
the provisions of Act; in the present case, the amounts paid by
KPCL to their contractor i.e, NECL were, generally, chargeable to
tax; no relief has been granted either to KPCL or NECL, under the
provisions of the AP VAT Act, from being charged to tax under the
Act; and KPCL is under an obligation to deduct TDS from the
running account bills of the contractor i.e., NECL, and remit the
same to the Government.
Section 9(1) of the APGST Act enabled the State Government,
by notification in the A.P. Gazette, to make an exemption in
respect of any tax or interest payable under the Act (i) on the sale
or purchase of any specified class of goods, or (ii) by any specified
class of persons in regard to the whole or any part of their
turnover. Section 9(2)(b) stipulated that any exemption from tax
may be subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be
specified in the notification. The Andhra Pradesh Infrastructure
Development Enabling Act, 2001 (hereinafter called the 2001
Act), which came into force on 20.08.2001, was enacted during
the APGST regime. The 2001 Act was made to provide for the
rapid development of physical and social infrastructure in the
State, and to attract private sector participation in the designing,
financing, construction, operation and maintenance of
infrastructure projects in the State, to provide a comprehensive
legislation for reducing administrative and procedural delays,
identifying generic project risks, detailing various incentives,
detailing the project delivery process, and also to provide for other
ancillary and incidental matters thereto, with a view to presenting
bankable projects to the private sector, and to improve the level of
infrastructure in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Section 1(3) of the
2001 Act made the Act applicable to all infrastructure projects
implemented through a public private partnership in the sectors
enumerated in Schedule III thereto, and to such other sectors as
would be notified by the Government under the Act from time to
time. Section 2(h) of the 2001 Act defines concession agreement
to mean a contract of the nature specified in Schedule-I between
the developer and the State Government relating to any
infrastructure project, or such other contract as may be
prescribed, from time to time, by the Government. Section 2(j)
defines construction to mean any construction, reconstruction,
rehabilitation, improvement, expansion, addition, alteration and
related works and activities including supply of any equipment,
materials, labour and services related to the building or
rehabilitation of any infrastructure project comprising of physical
structures or systems, or commodities or for utilization of
resources or provision of services. Section 2(rr) defines State
support to mean grant by the State of any administrative support,
asset-based support, foregoing revenue benefits support,
undertaking contingent liabilities by providing guarantees or
financial support to the development as enumerated in Schedule V
of the Act. Section 2(s) defines infrastructure project or project to
mean a project in the sectors as notified under the Act by the
Government.
Schedule-I to the 2001 Act details the concession agreement
or arrangement, with their variations and combinations, that may
be arrived at by the Government Agency for undertaking
infrastructure projects. The various arrangements are indicated in
Schedule-I, and the Government Agency is entitled to evolve and
arrive at such concession agreement or arrangement incorporating
any of the arrangements enumerated in Schedule-I or any other
arrangements as may be found necessary or expedient for any
specific project. The various arrangements referred to in Schedule
I also include Build-and-Transfer (BT); Build-Lease-and-Transfer
(BLT); Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT); Build-Own-and Operate
(BOO); and Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT). It does not,
however, specifically provide for a Build-Own-Share-Transfer
(BOST) arrangement. Schedule V of the 2001 Act relates to State
support and provides that the Government would consider grant of
the various forms of State support, as referred to thereunder,
ranked in its order of preference. Third, in the order of preference,
is foregoing revenue streams. Clause-III (i) of Schedule V enables the
Government to forego revenue streams in the case of all Category-II
projects. The Government is, however, entitled to forego revenue
streams in case of Category-I projects only if the sector policy
specifically provided for the same. Among the support, to be
provided by the State Government, included exemption of sales tax
on all inputs required for project construction.
Clause 3.16(a)(i) of the Revised Concession agreement, on
which reliance is placed by Sri A.V. Krishna Koundinya, Learned
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, cannot be
read in isolation and out of context, and should be read along with
the other clauses of the agreement. It is a rule of construction,
applicable to all written instruments, that the instrument must be
construed as a whole in order to ascertain the true meaning of its
several clauses, and the words of each clause must be so
interpreted as to bring them in harmony with the other provisions
of the instrument, if that interpretation does no violence to the
meaning of which they are naturally susceptible. The best
construction of deeds is to make one part of the deed expound the
other, and so to make all the parts agree. Effect must, as far as
possible, be given to every word and every clause. Just as a
document cannot be interpreted by picking out only a few clauses
ignoring the other relevant ones, in the same way the nature and
meaning of a document cannot be determined by its end-result or
one of the results or consequences which flow from it. The
nomenclature and description is not determinative of the real
nature of the document or of the transaction thereunder. These
have to be determined from all the terms and clauses of the
document and all the rights and results flowing therefrom, and not
by picking and choosing certain clauses and the ultimate effect or
result. (State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. ;
Halsbury's Laws of England, 'Fourth Edition, Volume 12,
paragraph 1469 at page 602).
The Revised Concession Agreement, for development of the
Krishnapatnam Port, was entered into between the Government of
Andhra Pradesh (GoAP for short) and KPCL on 17.09.2004
(before the AP VAT Act, 2005 came into force). Clause 1.2 [c] of the
said agreement stipulated that, in case of ambiguities or
discrepancies in the agreement and should any clause of the said
agreement prove illegal or unenforceable, the parties to the
agreement undertook to replace it by a valid clause that came
closest to what the illegal or unenforceable intended to stipulate;
and, if such replacement was not possible, then the rest of the
agreement would survive and bind the parties to the agreement as
if the illegal or unenforceable clause in question were not a part of
the agreement. Clause 2.1 defined applicable law to mean all
laws in force and effect as on the date of the agreement, and which
may be promulgated or brought into force and effect thereafter.
Clause 2.3 defined change in law to mean the occurrence or
coming into force of any of the following, after the submission of
the detailed proposal, (a) the enactment of any new Indian Law;
and (b) the repeal, modification or re-enactment of any existing
Indian Law. The said clause also provided that if, after the date of
the agreement, there was a change in the Law, which substantially
and adversely affected the rights of the concessionaire under the
agreement, the concessionaire could, by written notice, request
amendments to the terms of the agreement. The concessionaire
was, however, not entitled to any compensation whatsoever from
the GoAP as a result of a change in the law. It enabled GoAP to
decide, after mutual discussion with the concessionaire, on
amending the terms of the agreement including extension of the
concession period. It also provided for changes in tax laws and
regulations and specifically provided that the concessionaire was
not entitled to any compensation for any increase in indirect
and/or direct tax, which the Concessionaire was liable to pay in
respect of the port project. Clause 2.5 defined commencement
date to mean the date of execution of the agreement. Clause 2.6
defined commercial operations date to mean the date on which
KPCL was entitled to commence deep water operation of the Port in
accordance with the provisions of the agreement. Clause 2.7
defined concession to mean the exclusive right and authority
granted by GoAP to KPCL for designing, financing, building,
owning, maintaining, operating and transferring an all weather,
deep water, multi-purpose port at Krishnapatnam together with a
right to levy, collect and retain appropriate port dues and tariffs for
port services rendered to port users during the concession period.
Clause 2.8 defined concessionaire to mean KPCL; and Clause 2.9
defined concession period to mean the period of concession as
specified in Clause 3.3. Clause 2.44 defined Taxes and Duties to
mean and include all taxes and duties including stamp duties
payable as per the law of the land in connection with all port
related activities. Clause 3.3.1 stipulated that concession period
shall mean the period commencing from the date of execution of
the agreement, for development of the Krishnapatnam Port, dated
04.01.1997 and ending on the expiry of 30 years from the
commercial operations date. The concessionaire was entitled for
extension by a further period of 20 years provided they developed
the port assets as per the detailed project report, and met the
performance standards. Clause 3.16 related to fiscal incentives
and, under sub-clause (a)(i) thereof, the GoAP undertook to forego
revenue streams from the project, in the following forms, as per the
2001 Act including (i) exemption from sales tax on all inputs
required for project construction. Clause 13.2 related to
compliance with laws and, thereunder, KPCL was to be
responsible, at all times, to comply with all applicable laws
including future changes in any applicable law which should
include legislation, rules, regulations, ordinances relating to ports,
as well as general laws including taxation etc. The said clause
enabled KPCL to challenge any law, in an appropriate forum,
which prejudicially affected the implementation of the terms of the
agreement or their rights. Clause 13.3 related to tax and duties
and required KPCL to pay all taxes, duties etc., as defined earlier
in the agreement which, at any time, may be levied by any
Government Authority upon KPCLs interest in or activities covered
by the agreement as well as upon the premises.
The power to exempt any dealer from payment of tax on the
sale or purchase of any specified class of goods, under Section 9 of
the APGST Act, was available to the State Government only during
the APGST regime, and not thereafter. The AP VAT Act, 2005 came
into force on 01.04.2005, and the APGST Act, 1957 was repealed.
While the proviso to Section 80 of the AP VAT Act stipulated that
such repeal would not affect the previous operation of the APGST
Act or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired,
accrued or incurred thereunder, the AP VAT Act did not confer any
power on the Government to exempt any dealer from payment of
sales tax. It is because tax exemption is not contemplated under
the A.P. VAT Act, does Section 69(1) thereof require industrial
units, availing tax holiday or tax exemption on the date of
commencement of the Act, to be treated as a unit availing tax
deferment.
Section 15(1) of the AP VAT Act merely enables the State
Government, if it is necessary to do so in the public interest and
subject to such conditions as it may impose, by a notification, to
provide for grant of refund, of the tax paid, to any person on the
purchases effected by him and specified in the said notification.
Section 15(2) enables the Government to issue any notification
under section 15(1) so as to be retrospective from any day not
earlier than the appointed day, and such notification would take
effect from the date of its publication in the Gazette or such other
earlier or later date as may be mentioned therein. Under Section
15(3), applications for refunds are required to be made in duplicate
to the Commissioner within a period of six months from the date of
purchase, or as the Government may prescribe in the notification,
and must be accompanied by the purchase invoice in original. The
power conferred on the State Government, under the AP VAT Act,
is only to grant refund of the tax paid by the dealer, on the
purchases effected by them, and not to exempt them from payment
of tax either on the purchase or the sale of goods.
Clause 2.3 of the revised concession agreement relates to
change in law, Relief under Change in law and changes in Tax Laws. It
defines change in law to mean the occurrence or coming into force,
after the submission of the detailed proposal, (a) the enactment of
any new Indian law and (b) the repeal of any existing Indian law.
The enactment of the A.P. VAT Act, and the repeal of the APGST
Act, constitute change in law within the meaning of clause 2.3(a).
Under the sub-head Relief under change in law, clause 2.3 provides
that if, after the date of the agreement, there is a change in the
Law, which substantially and adversely affects the rights of the
concessionaire under the agreement (KPCL), they could, by written
notice, request amendments to the terms of the agreement. As
Section 9(1) of the APGST Act provided for exemption from sales
tax, and the AP VAT Act makes no provision for exemption and
only provides for refund under Section 15(1), clause 2.3 enabled
KPCL to seek amendment of the agreement, which remedy they
chose not to exercise. Clause 3.16(a) of the revised concession
agreement, whereby GoAP agreed to forego revenue streams from
the project as per the 2001 Act including exemption from sales tax
on all inputs required for project construction, necessitated
amendment consequent upon the change in law as GoAP had no
power, under the AP VAT Act, to exempt KPCL from sales tax on
the inputs required for project construction. It is not in dispute
that the terms of the revised concession agreement have not been
amended after the A.P. VAT Act came into force. While providing
for amendment of the agreement, clause 2.3 also made it clear that
KPCL was not entitled to compensation from the GoAP as a result
of the change in law (i.e, repeal of the APGST Act and the
enactment of the A.P. VAT Act). Clause 2.3 also provided for
change in Tax Laws and Regulations and expressly stipulates that
KPCL was not entitled to compensation for increase in indirect tax
which they were liable to pay in respect of the port project. As
clause 3.16 became unenforceable, consequent upon the repeal of
the APGST Act and the enactment of the AP VAT Act, KPCL could
have, in terms of clause 1.2(c), replaced it by a valid clause and, if
such replacement was not possible, then the remaining part of the
agreement would survive as if the unenforceable clause (i.e., clause
3.16) was not a part of the agreement. Clause 13.2 of the revised
concession agreement, under the head compliance with law required
KPCL not only to comply with the existing laws but also future
changes, if any, in the applicable laws, including taxation laws.
KPCL was, therefore, obligated, in terms of clause 13.2 of the
agreement, to comply with the provisions of the AP VAT Act
including Section 22(3) thereof, and deduct works contract tax at
source from the running bills of the contractor i.e., NECL.
Further clause 13.3, under the head Taxes and Duties required
KPCL to pay all taxes as defined earlier in the Agreement which, at
any time, may be levied by any Government authority upon KPCLs
interest in or activities covered by the Agreement. Reliance placed
on behalf of KPCL, on clause 3.16 of the revised concession
agreement, to contend that they are entitled for exemption from
payment of value added tax till completion of the project, even after
AP VAT Act came into force, is therefore misplaced.
As shall be referred to in detail hereinafter, even during the
period when G.O.Ms. No.609 dated 29.05.2006 was in force, KPCL
did not remit the tax, deducted by them from the running account
bills of NECL, to the Government in its entirety. The contention
that they did not make payment subsequently, as there was no
undertaking to make any refund, is merely an afterthought, and
has been urged only for the purposes of this Writ Petition. Even
otherwise absence of any notification, under section 15(1) of the
A.P. VAT Act, does not absolve KPCL of their statutory obligation to
deduct tax at source from the running account bills of NECL, and
to remit the deducted tax to the Government in its entirety. It
would not be proper for this Court to examine, whether or not
GoAP is obligated to issue a notification under section 15(1) of the
A.P. VAT Act for grant of refund, in the present writ proceedings as
this is the subject matter of examination in W.P. No.31525 of 2013
filed by KPCL. Suffice it to hold that KPCL is statutorily obligated
to deduct tax at source from the running account bills of NECL
and to remit the amount, representing the deducted tax at source,
to the government, whether or not a notification is issued by GoAP
under section 15(1) of the Act. The only distinction is that, if a
notification is issued under section 15(1) of the Act, NECL would
be able to seek refund of the tax deducted at source by KPCL and
paid to the Government, otherwise not.
Let us now examine the judgments cited by Sri A.V. Krishna
Koundinya, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner. While considering the scope of Section 195(2) of the
Income-tax Act the Supreme Court, in GE India Technology
Centre P. Ltd.3, held that the tax, which is required to be
deducted at source, is deductible only out of the chargeable sum;
this is the underlying principle of Section 195; Section 195
imposes a statutory obligation on any person responsible for
paying, to a non-resident, any sum "chargeable under the provisions of
the Act" which expression does not find place in the other Sections
of Chapter XVII; the Income-tax Act constitutes one single integral
inseparable Code; hence, the provisions relating to TDS applies
only to those sums which are chargeable to tax under the Income-
tax Act; the interpretation of the Department not only required the
words "chargeable under the provisions of the Act" to be omitted, it also
lead to absurd consequences; it resulted in a situation where even
when the income had no territorial nexus with India, or was not
chargeable in India, the Government would nonetheless collect tax;
Section 195(2) provided a remedy by which a person may seek a
determination of the "appropriate proportion of such sum so
chargeable" where a proportion of the sum so chargeable was liable
to tax; the expression, "sum chargeable under the provisions of the Act" in
Section 195(1), must be given weightage; further Section 195 used
the word `payer', and not the word "assessee"; the payer was not
an assessee; the payer became an assessee-in-default only when
he failed to fulfill the statutory obligation under Section 195(1);
and if the payment did not contain the element of income, the
payer cannot be made liable.
The statutory obligation imposed by Section 22(3) of the A.P.
VAT Act on KPCL, (a company registered under the Companies Act,
1956), is to deduct, from out of the amounts payable by them to
NECL, in respect of the works contract executed for them, an
amount calculated at the prescribed rate, and to remit such
amount to the Government. It is not even the case of KPCL that
the deemed sale of goods, involved in the execution of the works
contract, by NECL is not liable to tax under the A.P. VAT Act.
Their justification for not deducting tax at source from the running
bills of NECL and in not remitting such tax, deducted at source
from the bills of NECL, to the Government is that they are exempt
from tax not under the A.P. VAT Act but under clause 3.16 of the
revised concession agreement entered into with the GoAP.
Reliance placed on behalf of the petitioners on GE India
Technology Centre (P) Ltd3, wherein the statutory obligation to
deduct tax at source was only on payment of the sum chargeable to
tax under the provisions of the Income Tax and not otherwise, is,
therefore, misplaced.
In Bhawani Cotton Mills Ltd.2 the Supreme Court held
that, if the Act makes it mandatory that the tax can be collected
only at one stage, it is not enough for the State to say that a
person, who is not liable to pay tax, must, nevertheless, pay it in
the first instance, and then claim refund at a later stage; if a
person is not liable for payment of tax at all at any time, the
collection of tax from him, with a possible contingency of refund at
a later stage, will not make the original levy valid because, if
particular sales or purchases are exempt from taxation altogether,
they can never be taken into account, at any stage, for the purpose
of calculating or arriving at the taxable turnover and for levying
tax; and the provisions contained in a statute, with respect to
exemption of tax or refund or rebate on the one hand, must be
distinguished from the total non-liability or non-imposition of tax,
on the other.
Unlike in Bhawani Cotton Mills Ltd2, NECL is liable to be
subjected to tax under the AP VAT Act on the deemed sale of goods
involved in the execution of the works contract for KPCL. The law
declared by the Supreme Court, in Bhawani Cotton Mills Ltd2,
would apply to cases where there is no liability to pay tax under
the provisions of a statutory enactment, and not to cases where,
though there is liability to pay tax under the legislative provision,
exemption from payment of tax is claimed in terms of a clause in a
contract. In this context it is necessary to bear in mind that the
three stages in the imposition of tax are the declaration of liability,
assessment, and recovery. If there is a liability to tax, imposed
under the terms of the taxing statute, then follow the provisions in
regard to the assessment of such liability. If there is no liability to
tax there cannot be any assessment either. Sales or purchases, in
respect of which the statute does not impose any liability to tax,
cannot be included in the calculation of turnover for the purpose of
assessment, and the exact sum which the dealer is liable to pay
must be ascertained without any reference thereto. There is a
broad distinction between the provisions contained in the statute
in regard to exemptions from tax or refund or rebate of tax on the
one hand, and the non-liability to tax or non-imposition of tax on
the other. In the former, but for the provisions as regards
exemption or refund or rebate of tax, the sales or purchases would
have to be included in the gross turnover of the dealer because
they are, prima facie, liable to tax and the only thing which the
dealer is entitled to, in respect thereof, is the deduction from the
gross turnover in order to arrive at the net turnover on which tax
can be imposed. In the latter, the sales or purchases are exempt
from taxation altogether. If they are thus not liable to tax, no tax
can be levied or imposed on them, and they do not come within the
purview of the Act at all. The very fact of their non-liability to tax is
sufficient to exclude them from calculation of the gross turnover,
as well as the net turnover, on which sales tax can be levied or
imposed. (Bhawani Cotton Mills Ltd.2; A. V. Fernandez v. The
State of Kerala ; and Messrs. Chatturam. Horilram Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar ).
In cases of non-liability to tax under the A.P. VAT Act, a
dealer need not disclose the turnover in their returns. However, in
cases where the dealer is granted exemption in the exercise of the
powers conferred under a statute, the sales would have to be
included in the gross turnover, and the dealer would only be
entitled to deduct therefrom, the exempted turnover, for arriving at
the net turnover. As there is a deemed sale of goods involved in
the execution of a works contract, and the value of the goods at the
stage of its incorporation in the works constitutes the measure for
imposition of tax, NECL was liable to pay VAT under the AP VAT
Act and as the A.P. VAT Act, unlike the APGST Act, does not confer
any power on the Government to grant exemption, KPCL was
statutorily obligated to deduct TDS from the running account bills
of NECL.
II. DO THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF KPCL SHOW THAT THEY
HAD DEDUCTED TAX AT SOURCE FROM THE RUNNING
ACCOUNT BILLS OF NECL?
Sri A.V. Krishna Koundinya, Learned Senior Counsel, would
submit that for the period, subsequent to 2010-11, journal entries
were passed in the books of KPCL debiting the capital works in
progress (CWIP) account and crediting the Income Tax TDS, Works
Contract Tax TDS and NECL A/c respectively; the amounts paid
were shown by debiting NECL A/c, advance to NECL A/c (being
the Works Contract Tax TDS) and the Income Tax TDS A/c, and
crediting the bank account; these entries were incorrectly
construed by the 3rd respondent as actual deduction of TDS for the
works contract; and, for the period subsequent to 2010-11, no TDS
was made except showing it as a provision as required by the audit
and accounting standards, and as explained in the above referred
journal entries.
Sri P. Balaji Varma, Learned Special Standing Counsel for
Commercial Taxes, would submit that the statement filed by KPCL,
along with their letter of objections dated 23.09.2013, (filed in reply
to the show cause notice dated 12.09.2013), shows the TDS
amount, amount paid and balance; this statement establishes
that KPCL has deducted TDS amounts; enclosed to the Annual
report for the year 2009-10 is the Auditors report and, from clause
ix(a) thereof, it is evident that (i) TDS of AP works contract Tax for
Rs.1794.93 lakhs is in arrears, (ii) the said amount in arrears is
the crystallised liability, and as such is undisputed; similarly the
Annual Report, for the years 2010-11, shows the amount in
arrears as Rs.4056.20 lakhs; the Annual Report for the year 2011-
12 discloses TDS arrears as Rs.6101.04 lakhs; the ledger of NECL,
in the books of KPCL, for the years 2009-10, 2010-2011 and 2011-
2012 show that KPCL had, in fact, deducted tax at source; and the
Statements, for the years 2009-2010, 2010-11 and 2011-12,
contain the following information (a) Date of running bill, (b) Value
of the work, (c) Amount deducted and credited to Works Contract
Account, (d) Amount credited to Income Tax TDS account, (e)
balance credited to NECL, (f) the total amount of works contract
tax deducted, remitted to the Government, and the balance tax
payable, (g) the balance tax payable being carried forward, and (h)
amounts shown in the Annual Report as undisputed (crystallised)
arrears.
Section 22(3) of the A.P. VAT Act requires a company,
registered under the Companies Act, 1956, to pay, from out of the
amounts payable by them to a dealer in respect of the works
contract executed for them, an amount calculated at such rate as
may be prescribed; and for the company (contractee), deducting
tax at source, to remit such amount in the manner prescribed.
Section 22(4) requires any authority or person, deducting any sum
in accordance with Section 22(3), to pay, within the prescribed
time, the sum so deducted, to the credit of the State Government.
Section 22(4) also provides that if the authority or the person does
not deduct, or after deducting fails to pay, tax as required by
Section 22, he shall be deemed to have not paid the tax within the
time prescribed under the provisions of the Act; and, in such a
case, all the provisions of the Act, including the provisions relating
to interest, shall apply mutatis mutandis to such unpaid tax.
Rule 17(1)(f) of the AP VAT Rules, 2005 (hereinafter called
the Rules) stipulates that, where tax has been deducted at
source, the contractor - VAT Dealer shall obtain Form 501A with
unique ID from the Assistant Commissioner/Commercial Tax
Officer concerned, and supply the same to the contractee. The
contractee is required to complete Form 501A with the required
information, and supply the same to the contractor within 15 days
after the end of the month in which the deduction is made. The
Contractor-VAT dealer is required to submit Form 501A along with
the tax return. Rule 18 relates to tax deduction at source and,
under sub-rule (1)(a) thereof, the tax deducted at source shall be,
in general, at the rate of either 4% or 2%/5% or 2.5% as prescribed
in sub-clause (i) or (ii) respectively of clause (b). Rule 18(1)(bc)
stipulates that the VAT dealer shall obtain Form 501A, with unique
ID, from the Assistant Commissioner/Commercial Tax Officer
concerned, and supply the same to the contractee. The contractee
is required to complete Form 501A, supplied by the contractor,
indicating the TIN of the contractor, the amount of tax deducted at
source, and the details of the related contract; and supply the
same to the contractor within fifteen days from the date of each
payment. Rule 18(1)(bd) requires the contractor to submit Form
VAT 501A, duly certified by the contractee, together with Form VAT
200, by the 20th of the month, following the month in which the
payment was received. Rule 18(2) stipulates that any amount or
any sum, deducted in accordance with the provisions of Section
22(3) and paid to the State Government, shall be treated as a
payment of tax on behalf of the dealer executing the works
contract; and credit shall be given to the said dealer, for the period
for which the amount was so deducted, on production of the
certificate furnished by the contractee. Rule 18(4) stipulates that,
where the contractee fails to remit such tax deducted at source
within 15 days of the date of payment to the contractor, the
person, authorised to make payment and to deduct tax, shall be
liable to pay interest, for the delayed payment, as may be
applicable under the Act.
In reply to the show cause notice issued by the 3rd
respondent dated 12.09.2013, for the tax period from September,
2007 to March, 2013, the petitioner stated, in their letter dated
23.09.2013, that the records maintained by them categorically
established that no amount was recovered while clearing the R.A.
bills. Along with the said reply the petitioner filed two statements,
the first is the statement of the works contract tax and TDS details
as per their books, and the second statement is as per the show
cause notice dated 12.09.2013, which shall be referred to in detail
later in this order. Along with their reply dated 23.09.2013, the
petitioner also enclosed a certificate of their Chartered Accountant
dated 28.11.2013 wherein details of the EPC work done bills, and
payments made to the EPC contractor, were furnished in a tabular
statement. The Chartered Accountant certified that, in their
opinion and from the data given in the tabular statement, it was
evident that the petitioner had made payment of EPC work done
bills to the contractor in full without retaining/withholding any
amount for Works contract tax; the concessionaire did not
withhold/deduct works contract TDS in a physical form, from the
payments against EPC work done bills, in view of the fiscal benefits
(including sales tax) granted to them vide Clause No.3.16 of the
concession agreement, and its pending application with the GoAP
for issue of a suitable G.O. extending the fiscal benefits; however
provision, for works contract tax liability, was made in the
accounts as required by the accounting and auditing standards,
and the same was disclosed as a statutory liability in the annual
accounts; the said provision was disclosed as disputed liability in
the annual accounts, for the year ending 31.03.2013, in view of the
pending writ petitions; and in the event of a G.O. being issued by
the GoAP, extending fiscal benefits like works contract tax, which,
in the opinion of the management of KPCL and the legal opinion,
was highly likely, the entire works contract tax liability would be
transferred/adjusted against the advances/dues of the EPC
contractor.
The contention of KPCL that they did not deduct tax at
source, from the running account bills of NECL (representing the
amounts payable for execution of works contract for construction
of the Krishnapatnam Port), is not borne out from the records
placed for our perusal. Along with his counter-affidavit, the first
respondent has filed the relevant extracts of the ledger account of
NECL in the books of accounts of KPCL. By way of illustration a
few of the entries, relating to the period 01.04.2009 to 31.03.2010,
are extracted hereunder:
Date
Particulars
Vouche
r type
Debit
Credit
21-9-2009
By (as per details)
Capital work in progress
TDS Payable
Works Contract Tax
(Being RA-6 received
towards Phase II)
Journal
125,08,13,800.00 Dr
2,83,43,440.00 Cr
5,00,32,552.00 Cr
1,17,24,37,808.00
5-11-2009
By (as per details)
Capital work in progress
TDS Payable
Works Contract Tax
(Being RA-7 received
towards Phase-II)
Journal
82,57,82,360.00 Dr
1,65,15,647.00 Cr
3,30,31,294.00 Cr
77,62,35,409.00
30-12-
By (as per details)
Capital work in progress
TDS Payable
Works Contract Tax
(Being RA-7 received
towards Phase-I)
Journal
38,66,33,250.00 Dr
77,32,665.00 Cr
1,54,65,330.00 Cr
36,34,35,255.00
5-2-2010
By (as per details)
Capital work in progress
TDS Payable
Works Contract Tax
(Being RA-7 received
towards Phase-II)
Journal
58,99,60,800.00 Dr
1,17,99,216.00 Cr
2,35,98,432.00 Cr
55,45,63,152.00
05-02-
By (as per details)
Capital work in progress
TDS Payable
Works Contract Tax
(Being RA-7 received
towards Phase-II)
Journal
47,02,61,500.00 Dr
94,05,230.00 Cr
1,88,10,460.00 Cr
44,20,45,810.00
Similar journal entries were passed in the books of accounts
of KPCL for the years 2010-11 and 2011-12 also. It is wholly
unnecessary for us to burden this judgment with all the other
entries. Suffice it to hold that the ledger account of NECL, in
books of accounts of KPCL, itself shows that works contract tax
was deducted from the RA bills of NECL. From out of the capital
work in progress KPCL has deducted, among others, works
contract tax and has given NECL credit only for the balance
amount. It is only the net amount which, on their account being
credited, is shown as payable to NECL by KPCL. It is evident
therefore that, while KPCL had deducted tax at source from the RA
bills of NECL, they have not remitted the TDS amount to the
Government. This is also evident from the auditors report for the
three years 2009-10 to 2011-12 which form part of the annual
report of KPCL for the said three years. The Annual Report for the
year 2009-10, (a copy of which is enclosed along with the Writ
Petition), contains the Auditors Report for the said year. Clause IX
(a) of the Annexure to the Auditors Report reads as under:
(a) According to the records of the company and information and explanations
given to us the company has been generally regular (except the items reported
hereunder) in depositing undisputed statutory dues including Income-tax, Sales
tax, VAT, Wealth tax, Service tax, Customs duty, cess and other statutory dues
with the appropriate authorities during the year. According to the
information and explanations given to us, no undisputed amounts payable
in respect of above were in arrears, as at 31st March, 2010 for a period of
more than six months from the date on which they became payable except
an amount of Rs.1794.93 lakhs in respect of TDS of AP Work contract
Tax.) (emphasis supplied).
It is evident therefrom that KPCL is in arrears of Rs.1794.93
lakhs in respect of TDS of AP Work contract tax. A similar
objection is to be found in the Auditors Report for the year 2010-
11 wherein the amount in arrears is shown as Rs.4056.30 lakhs,
and the Auditors Report for the year 2011-12 wherein the amount
in arrears is shown as Rs.6101.04 lakhs. Along with their
counter-affidavit, the respondents have furnished a tabular
statement of the ledger account of NECL, in the books of KPCL, for
the years 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13, wherein
details of the running bills of NECL are furnished including (a) the
date of the running bill; (b) the value of the work as per accounts;
(c) amount credited to works contract tax (WCT) account; (d)
amount credited to income tax TDS account; (e) balance amount
credited to NECL; (f) the total amount of works contract tax due as
shown in the annual report; and (g) the amount, shown in the
statement filed by the petitioner along with their reply to the show-
cause notice, in the remarks column. The figures in the tabular
statement tally with the figures in the Auditors reports enclosed as
part of the Annual reports of KPCL, and supports the submission
of the respondents that KPCL had deducted tax at source towards
works contract tax, and did not remit such tax deducted at source,
in its entirety, to the Government.
Along with their Writ Petition, KPCL has enclosed a
comparative statement (filed by them along with their letter dated
23.09.2013 submitted in reply to the show cause dated
12.09.2013). The first statement relates to WCT/TDS details as
admitted by KPCL, and the second statement is as shown in the
show cause notice issued by the first respondent on 12.09.2013. It
is useful to extract both these statements.
Statement of WCT TDS details as per KPCL
Tax
period
Sept, 07 to
Mar,08
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
2012-13
Total
TDS
Amount
166,379,337
290,129,018
270,513,797
240,955,280
404,445,693
58,657,970
1,431,081,095
Amount
paid
166,379,337
110,635,978
83,063,846
73,903,600
67,295,180
501,277.941
Balance
179,494,040
187,449,951
167,051,680
337,150,513
58,657,970
929,803,154
Rupees Ninety Two Crores Ninety Eight lakhs Three thousand one hundred and fifty
four only.
As per show cause notice dated 12.09.2013
Tax
period
Sept, 07 to
Mar,08
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
2012-13
Total
TDS
Amount
167,173,373
76,423,818
273,436,394
240,955,280
404,145,693
79,188,260
1,241,422,818
Amount
paid
--
--
31,121,972
-
45,865,680
--
76,987,652
Balance
167,173,373
76,423,818
242,314,422
240,955,280
358,380,013
79,188,260
1,164,435,166
Rupees One hundred sixteen crores froty four lakhs thirty five thousand one
hundred and sixty six
only.
Even from their own statement enclosed with their reply
letter dated 23.09.2013, filed in reply to the show cause notice
dated 12.09.2013, it is clear that KPCL had deducted tax at source
from the running account bills of NECL, but did not pay the entire
amount, representing the tax deducted at source, to the
Government. While KPCL had deducted TDS, and claim to have
paid the entire deducted tax to the Government for the period from
September, 2007 to March, 2008, even, on their own admission,
they had deducted TDS for the subsequent years 2008-09 to 2011-
12, but had only paid a part thereof to the Government. While
TDS, for Rs.5,86,57,970/-, was admittedly deducted for the year
2012-13, KPCL failed to pay even a single rupee to the Government
for the said year.
III. ARE THE RESPONDENTS JUSTIFIED IN CONTENDING
THAT TAX SHOULD BE PAID FIRST AND REFUND
CLAIMED LATER?
Sri A.V. Krishna Koundinya, Learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of KPCL, would submit that the State should
speak with one voice; the agreement entered into by the State of
Andhra Pradesh cannot be ignored by the respondents; and, if
there is no tax liability, it cannot be said that TDS should be paid
first, and refund can be claimed later.
It is no doubt true that the State, which is represented by
different departments, should speak in one voice. (Vadilal
Chemicals Ltd.1). While GoAP had, under clause 3.16(a)(i) of the
revised concession agreement, exempted KPCL from sales tax on
all inputs required for project construction during the APGST
regime and prior to the repeal of the APGST Act, they were disabled
from continuing to grant KPCL such exemption after the AP VAT
Act came into force. As Section 15(i) of the Act enabled them to
issue a notification providing for grant of refund, GoAP, having
found it necessary to do so in the public interest, issued G.O.Ms.
No.609 Revenue (CT-II) Department dated 29.05.2006, directing
that the tax paid:-
a). By M/s. Krishnapatnam Port Company Ltd to their sellers on the purchase of
all inputs for construction of Krishnapatnam Port;
b). By the contractors and sub-contractors, if any, engaged by or for
Krishnapatnam Port Ltd on their purchases of all inputs used for construction of
M/s. Krishnapatnam Port under the provisions of the said Act;
shall be refunded to the respective purchasers subject to the following
conditions:
(1). The goods purchased by M/s. Krishnapatnam Port Company Ltd or its
contractors or sub-contractors must be for or use or consumption in the
execution of the project work of Krishnapatnam Port.
(2). M/s. Krishnapatnam Port Company Ltd shall furnish a separate declaration
duly signed by the competent authority to the effect that the goods purchased by
it are for use or consumption in the exemption of project work of Krishnapatnam
Port Ltd for each tax invoice in respect of which refund of tax paid is claimed.
(3). Where the said contractors or sub-contractors make claim for refund of the
said tax paid in addition to the tax invoices or invoices received from their
sellers
they shall furnish the said declaration in respect of each such invoice duly
signed by the said person on behalf of Krishnapatnam Port Company Limited.
The Notification was deemed to have come into force with
effect from the month of March, 2006 and to be in force till April,
2010 or the completion of the said project whichever was earlier.
The refund of taxes paid by KPCL or its contractors or sub-
contractors, was be made within (30) days from the date of the
submission of the claims.
A refund can be claimed only for the tax paid and
consequently NECL, as the contractor for the construction of the
Krishnapatnam Port Project, was liable to pay tax on the deemed
sale of inputs used in the execution of the contract of construction
of the Krishnapatnam Port. It is for the tax paid in this regard, did
G.O.Ms. No.609 dated 29.05.2006 enable refund to be claimed by
them. During the course of arguments this Court was informed by
Sri S. Ravi, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of NECL,
that NECL had sought for, and was granted, refund of the tax
deducted at source by KPCL from their running account bills and
remitted to the Government for the tax periods 2007-08 to 2009-
2010. The very fact that KPCL had deducted TDS, albeit in part,
for the aforementioned tax periods, and NECL had obtained refund
of these amounts from the Government, goes to show that both
KPCL and NECL were well aware that they were not entitled to
claim exemption from tax under the AP VAT regime, and could only
claim refund of the tax paid, that too only if a notification was
issued by GoAP under Section 15(1) of the AP VAT Act, and the
conditions stipulated therein had been complied with. To avail the
benefits of a notification, the conditions prescribed therein should
be interpreted in terms of its wording, and must be strictly
complied with. (State of Punjab v. Punjab Fibres Ltd. ). The
submission of Sri A.V. Krishna Koundinya, Learned Senior
Counsel, that the tax deducted at source, after 2010-11, was paid
to NECL as advance, has been urged for the first time in the
written arguments filed after hearing of the Writ Petition had
concluded, and is neither reflected in the affidavit filed by KPCL in
support of the writ petition, nor in the affidavit filed by them in
reply to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents. No
material has been placed before us to support this contention. In
any event, having deducted TDS from the running account bills of
NECL, KPCL was statutorily obligated to remit the said amount to
the Government, and not pay it as advance to NECL.
As NECL was liable to pay tax under the AP VAT Act, for
execution of the works contract of construction of the
Krishnapatnam Port, KPCL was statutorily obligated, under
Section 22(3) of the AP VAT Act, to deduct tax at source from the
running account bills of NECL, and remit the deducted tax amount
to the Government. The fact that NECL could seek refund of the
tax paid, in view of G.O.Ms. No.609 dated 29.05.2006, did not
absolve KPCL of their statutory obligation to deduct tax at source.
Even on a notification being issued under section 15(1) of the AP
VAT Act, the contractee is statutorily obligated, under Section
22(3) thereof, to deduct tax at source from the running account
bills of the contractor, and the contractor is entitled, thereafter, to
claim refund. If a statute has conferred a power to do an act, and
has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised,
it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any manner other
than the one prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if
this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have
been enacted. (Dipak Babaria v. State of Gujarat ; Taylor v.
Taylor ; Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor ; Rao Shiv Bahadur
Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh ; State of U.P. v. Singhara
Singh ; Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad ; Dhananjaya
Reddy v. State of Karnataka ; and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam
Limited v. Essar Power Limited ).
As noted hereinabove G.O.Ms. No.609 dated 29.05.2006 was
in force from March, 2006 till April, 2010 or completion of the
project whichever was earlier. While KPCL was required to deduct
tax at source from the running account bills of NECL from March,
2006 onwards, NECL was entitled to claim refund of the deducted
tax only till G.O.Ms. No.609 dated 29.05.2006 was in force, and
not thereafter. For the tax period 2007-08 to 2009-10 and April,
2010 KPCL is liable to remit the balance TDS, deducted from the
running account bills of NECL, to the Government (i.e., the
difference between the tax deducted at source and the TDS amount
already remitted to the Government), and NECL would be entitled
to claim refund thereof in accordance with G.O.Ms. No.609 dated
29.05.2006. However for the period subsequent to April, 2010,
while KPCL is bound to remit the tax deducted at source from the
running account bills of NECL to the Government, NECL would not
be entitled to claim refund in the absence of a notification being
issued by the Government under Section 15(1) of the A.P. VAT Act.
IV. DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATION:
Sri A.V. Krishna Koundinya, Learned Senior Counsel
appearing for KPCL, would submit that the GoAP had, by way of
the revised concession agreement, made to KPCL an unequivocal
promise to exempt them from payment of sales tax; this agreement
is intended to effect a legal relationship; and KPCL had acted upon
the said promise and had complied with its obligations under the
concession agreement. Learned Senior Counsel would also invoke
the doctrine of legitimate expectation to contend that KPCL had a
legitimate expectation to be exempted from payment of sales tax till
completion of the Krishnapatnam Port Project.
There can be no estoppel against the Government in the
exercise of its legislative, sovereign or executive powers. (Kasinka
Trading v. Union of India ; Excise Commissioner, U.P. v. Ram
Kumar ). While the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable
against the Government also, particularly where it is necessary to
prevent fraud or manifest injustice, the doctrine cannot be pressed
into aid to compel the Government or the public authority to carry
out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which
is outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government
or of the public authority to make. The doctrine of promissory
estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract, and Courts are bound
to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved
and the public good at large. The fundamental principles of equity
must ever be present in the mind of the Court while considering
the applicability of the said doctrine. If it can be shown, having
regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, that it would be
inequitable to hold the Government or the public authority to its
promise, assurance or representation, the doctrine must yield.
(Kasinka Trading16; Godfrey Philips India Ltd. v. Union of
India ). The doctrine of promissory estoppel would not apply in
the teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law, and there can
be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power.
(M.P. Sugar Mills v. State of U.P. ; Kasinka Trading16). As the
APGST Act, which conferred power on the Government to exempt a
dealer from payment of sales tax, has been repealed, and the AP
VAT Act does not empower the Government to grant exemption but
only enables it to grant refund, the doctrine of promissory estoppel
cannot be invoked to compel the GoAP to carry out a promise
contrary to the provisions of the A.P. VAT Act.
Likewise KPCL/NECL cannot claim a legitimate expectation
to be continued to be exempt from payment of sales tax, as the
revised concession agreement itself provides for a change of law,
and the steps required to be taken by the parties to the agreement
in this regard. As grant of exemption is contrary to law (ie the
A.P.VAT Act), KPCL cannot claim to have a legitimate expectation
that GoAP would continue to grant it exemption. If a denial of
legitimate expectation, in a given case, amounts to denial of a right
guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross
abuse of power or violation of principles of natural justice, the
same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting
Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation, without
anything more, cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these
principles. It can be one of the grounds to consider but the court
must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these
principles warranting interference. (Attorney General for New
South Wales v. Quin ; National Buildings Construction Corpn.
v. S. Raghunathan ). To strike down the exercise of
administrative power, solely on the ground of avoiding the
disappointment of the legitimate expectations of a person, would
be to set the Court adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism.
Moreover, the notion of a legitimate expectation (falling short of a
legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the
exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law.
(Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn. ; Attorney
General for New South Wales20; S. Raghunathan21). As has been
referred to hereinabove, the revised concession agreement provides
for a situation where there is a change in law. It requires the
agreement to be suitably amended to bring it in conformity with
the change in law. Having failed to do so, it is not now open to
KPCL to contend that exemption from payment of sales tax should
be continued, notwithstanding that it would then fall foul of the
provisions of the A.P. VAT Act, on the application of the doctrine of
legitimate expectation. The contention that the doctrine of
legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel are attracted does
not, therefore, merit acceptance.
V. HAS KPCL MADE FALSE STATEMENTS ON OATH IN THE
WRIT AFFIDAVIT AND THE REPLY AFFIDAVIT?
Sri P. Balaji Varma, Learned Special Standing Counsel,
would submit that the petitioner has made false and untrue
statements, and have filed and relied on false documents to
substantiate their untrue and false statements in the writ petition;
and they have not only approached the court with unclean hands,
but have also played fraud on the Court.
False averment of facts is a serious problem faced by Courts.
Once discovered, it is the duty of the Court to take appropriate
steps to ensure that no one derives any benefit or advantage by
abusing the legal process. Fraudulent and dishonest litigants
must be discouraged. (A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya
Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nand Havana Paripalanai
Sangam Represented by its President ). Every person invoking
the jurisdiction of the Court must state the truth, be it in the
pleadings, affidavits or evidence. The pleadings must set-forth
sufficient factual details which inspire confidence and credibility. If
false averments, evasive and false denials, are introduced and the
Court discovers falsehood, concealment and distortion in the
pleadings and the documents, it should, in addition to full
restitution, impose appropriate costs. It is the bounden obligation
of the Court to neutralize any unjust and/or undeserved benefit or
advantage obtained by abusing the judicial process. (A.
Shanmugam23).
Dishonesty should not be permitted to bear fruit and confer
benefit to the person who has made a misrepresentation. (District
Collector and Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare
Residential School Society, Vizianagaram v. M. Tripura
Sundari Devi ; Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran ; Vice
Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan. v. Girdharilal
Yadav ; State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing
Parmar ; Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. v. Coal Tar
Refining Company ; Mohammed Ibrahim v. State of Bihar ;
and Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy ). One who comes to the
Court, must come with clean hands. A person, whose case is
based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be
summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. (S.P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (Dead) by
LRs. ).
Para 11 of the affidavit, filed in support of the Writ Petition,
refers to the reply submitted by KPCL to the show cause notice
issued by 3rd respondent, wherein KPCL had stated that they had
not recovered any tax from the contractor, and the records
maintained by them establish that, while clearing the running
account bills, no amount was deducted from NECL. In para 12 of
the writ affidavit it is stated that the account books of KPCL
categorically make it clear that, in fact, no taxes were deducted by
the petitioner and only a provision for works contract tax liability
was made in the accounts. Again in para 16 of the writ affidavit it
is reiterated that KPCL had not deducted tax as alleged by the 3rd
respondent. In para 3 of their counter affidavit the 3rd respondent,
while referring to the averments in the writ petition, stated that
KPCL has made incorrect and false statements, and the writ
petition is liable to be dismissed on that ground. In reply thereto
KPCL, at para 3 of their reply affidavit, while denying that they had
made false statements in the writ affidavit, stated:-
when there is no deduction from the contractor, the allegation of
deduction in the running account (RA) bills and its reflection in the ledger
account is just a figment of imagination.
Likewise, at para 6 of the reply affidavit, it stated:-
auditors report appended to the annual report is not a declaration of
the amount being in arrears also being an undisputed amount. It is just a
provision made to meet the tax liability. It is not a categorical admission and
a
statement intended to mislead as alleged by the petitioner.
Para 13 and 15 of the reply affidavit is a reiteration of the
same statements.
The petitioner has not only suppressed relevant facts
regarding their having deducted tax at source from the running
account bills of NECL, they have made false statements on oath
before this Court that there is no deduction of tax at source from
NECL. They have, by resort to such dishonest means, secured
interim stay of all further proceedings, (order in W.P.M.P.
No.43132 of 2013 in W.P. No.34680 of 2013 dated 02.12.2013)
and have thereby avoided remitting the tax deducted at source,
from the running account bills of NECL, to the Government. The
undeserved benefit and advantage obtained by KPCL, by abusing
the judicial process, must be neutralized.
VI. CONCLUSION:
The Writ Petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. As
they have suppressed facts, made false statements on oath, and
have thereby abused the process of Court, KPCL shall pay
exemplary costs of Rs.75,000/- to the Commissioner, Commercial
Taxes within three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this
Order, failing which it shall be open to the Commissioner,
Commercial Taxes to recover the said amount from them in
accordance with law. The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any,
shall also stand automatically dismissed.
_______________________________
(RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J)
____________________________________
(M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY, J)
Date:03.12.2014.
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