1. The instant appeal is directed against the Judgment and decree dated 11-09-1996 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Bhimavaram, in O.S. No. 26 of 1988.

2. The unsuccessful defendants 1 to 3, 5 and 8 in the suit are the appellants. The first respondent herein is the plaintiff and the other defendants in the suit have been arrayed as other respondents herein. The suit was filed for declaration that the plaint schedule property which is trust property belongs to the plaintiff and for consequential relief of possession and for directing the defendants to pay damages at Rs. 1,09,000/- for use and occupation of the same and also for future profits and costs.

3. The case of the plaintiff as can be seen from the plaint is as follows: The plaintiff Ashramam was founded in or about the year 1946 by one Alluri Bhagavanraju under a registered Trust Deed dated 06-08-1946. The plaint schedule mentioned property along with some other properties were endowed to the plaintiff under the said Trust Deed dated 6-8-1946. The Trust was constituted with the intention of running an Ayurvedic Dharma Vaidyasala where the patients are to be treated freely or to run an ayurvedic Vaidyalayam or both for the purpose of free treatment of patients and for training the students and for conducting All India Ayurvedic Mafia Mandali Examinations and also to impart Sanskrit to students. It was further mentioned in the Trust Deed that the building and site in the plaint schedule property should be used for running an Ayurvedic Free Clinic or Ayurvedic Educational Institution or for both. As per the terms of the Trust Deed, the said Alluri Bhagavanraju, the founder trustee, shall act as managing trustee of the plaintiff Trust for his life time and S/Sri Dantuluri Narayanaraju, Gokaraju Srirama Raju, Alluri Venkatapathiraju and Kalidindi Narasimharaju were nominated as Trustees. The plaintiff ran a tree Ayurvedic Clinic in the plaint schedule building till or about the year 1968.

4. While so, the sixth defendant Educational Trust constituted by the seventh defendant who was managing the affairs of "the Trust through its Chairman requested the plaintiff's managing trustee Alluri Bhagavanraju in or about the year 1968 to allow sixth defendant to make use of the schedule premises temporarily for running its educational institution in Bhimavaram as it was not having any building of its won. The seventh defendant agreed to vacate the said premises within a year or two by securing some other accommodation preferably in or around Prakruthi Ashramam, Bhimavaram. Believing the said representation, the plaintiff permitted the seventh defendant to run the educational institution of the sixth defendant in the premises purely on temporary basis.

5. While things stood thus, in or about the year 1975, the defendants 4 and 5 have taken over all the institutions that are being run by the sixth defendant. The defendants 4 and 5 have been running a Junior College, by name, Kasturiba Government Junior College, the eighth defendant institution in the schedule premises under the direct control and supervision of the defendants 1, 2 and 4. Subsequently, the plaintiff managing trustee demanded the defendants to vacate the schedule premises and hand it over to him for running an Ayurvedic Free Hospital as per the terms of the Trust Deed. A notice dated 06-02-1980 was also issued to some of the defendants to deliver the possession of the schedule premises but the defendants failed to vacate the premises. Hence, the suit.

6. The suit was resisted by filing a written statement by the third defendant which was adopted by the defendants 1,2,4,5 and 8 by filing a memo. The defendants 6 and 7 remained ex parte. The substantial plea taken in the written statement was that when the seventh defendant requested the plaintiff to allow him to run the Junior College in the plaint schedule building permanently without any rent, Alluri Bhagavanraju accepted the request of the seventh defendant and informed him that he can use and occupy the building in question as long as he wanted and he need not pay any rent and, therefore, reposing confidence in the statement made by the said Bhagavanraju, the seventh defendant occupied the building in question, invested huge amounts for renovation and alterations and did not (sic. did) run the college in the said building since 1969 without paying any rent. It was the further plea of the defendants that the defendants have been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property as of right for over statutory period and thereby perfected title over the plaint mentioned property and title of the plaintiff if any in the schedule property was extinguished by lapse of time. The defendants denied all material averments made in the plaint while putting the plaintiff in strict proof of the same.

7. On the above pleadings, the trial court framed the following four issues at the time of settlement of issues:

(1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration and possession of the plaint schedule properly?

(2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to Rs. 1,09,000/- for damages and for use and occupation of the plaint schedule property?

(3) Whether the third defendant perfected his title to the plaint schedule property by adverse possession? and (4) To what relief?

8. At the time of trial, three witnesses were examined on the side of the plaintiff and Exs. A-1 to A-16 were got marked. Two witnesses were examined on the side of the defendants and Exs. B-1 to B-11 were got marked.

9. Appreciating the evidence on the points, the learned trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff as prayed for with costs. On Issue No. 1, the learned Subordinate Judge was of the view that the suit schedule mentioned property was the property of the plaintiff Trust and it was given on temporary basis to the defendants 6 and 7. On Issue No. 3, the learned Judge was of the view that the defendants failed to discharge their burden in proving that they had perfected their title in the suit schedule property by adverse possession. Aggrieved by the said findings, the appellants filed the instant appeal, as aforesaid.

10. Having regard to the pleadings of the plaintiff and defendants, it is visibly clear that the title over the suit schedule property initially vested with the plaintiff. It is at the instance of the seventh defendant representing the sixth defendant Trust, the sixth defendant Trust was permitted by the plaintiff to run an educational institution in the said premises. Admittedly, the Colleges that are being run by the sixth defendant Trust have been taken over by the State. That is how the defendants 1 to 5 have come into picture. The eighth defendant Government Junior College is being run in the property in question.

11. Although the defendants have not admitted the establishment of the Trust under a Trust Deed, it is beyond any reasonable doubt as can be seen from the subsequent stance of either side. In addition thereto, Ex. A-2 registered Trust Deed amply proves the creation of the Trust thereunder. From Ex. A-2 and from the other oral and documentary evidence available on record, it has been clearly proved by the plaintiff that the property in question is the property of the Trust meant to be used for a specific purpose in tune with the avowed objects for which the Trust has been constituted. The very description of the plaintiff in the plaint makes it manifest that it is a charitable endowment which has not been denied specifically by the defendants. In view of the same, it has been clearly established that the plaint schedule property is the property of the plaintiff Trust. It is beyond any pale of controversy having regard to the two pleas taken by the defendants inter alia in the written statement, namely, that the property has been permitted to be used by the seventh defendant for the sixth defendant to run the eighth defendant College permanently without any rent and that the defendants perfected their title by means of adverse possession for a long use from the year 1969 till the date of suit. The two pleas taken by the defendants inter alia in the written statement are quite inconsistent and are mutually exclusive. One cannot survive in the presence of the other. Having taken the plea of permissive possession albeit on permanent basis, it is not open to the defendants to take up the other plea of prescriptive title by means of adverse possession. It is quite unfortunate that the defendants representing the fifth defendant State has taken such a stance like an ordinary private litigant. The State which is expected to care for the rule of law is not expected to take such frivolous pleas in a suit of this nature. Whosoever is/are responsible for having advised the State in taking such pleas, therefore, must pay heavily for such a stance.

12. Having regard to the nature of the controversy in between the parties inter se I am of the considered view that it is clearly a case where it may be disposed of without even adverting to the other oral and documentary evidence adduced on either side. Section 10 of the Limitation Act is the straight answer to the question which provision is germane to be considered in the context and it reads as under:

10. Suits against trustees and their representatives:

Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, no suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property, or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time.

Explanation:- For the purposes of this section any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee there of.

13. As can be seen from Section 10 of the Limitation Act, no plea of limitation can be taken by anybody in a suit pertaining to the properties of trust. Therefore, a suit can be maintained at any time either by the trust or for the trust properties. Oblivious of this legal position, the State has unfortunately resorted to take such a frivolous plea of adverse possession, as discussed hereinabove, like a private litigant. Therefore, the plea of adverse possession is not at all sustainable by any stretch of the imagination. The suit is bound to be decreed without any hesitation. The court below, having regard to the evidence adduced on the point and appreciating the same in its own way, no doubt, has reached an independent conclusion in a different dimension without adverting to the crucial provision which is germane in the context for consideration and the validity or otherwise of the pleas taken by the defendants inter alia in the written statement. As discussed hereinabove, it is not quite relevant for the present purposes to discuss the oral evidence adduced on either side. The defendants have not asked for any remission on the improvements they have made, if any, over the property in question. When the suit is liable to be decreed, they must also pay the damages for its use and occupation during the period. They have been assessed reasonably in the plaint and have been accepted by the Court below without any hesitation. In that view of the matter, since no illegality in that regard has been shown before this Court about the quantification of the damages, there is nothing to interfere with the findings of the trial Court even in respect of the damages awarded for use and occupation.

14. For the above reasons, the Appeal Suit fails and is dismissed with costs.