- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
M. Sunil Chakravarth... v. Principal Sreekalaha...
Factual and Procedural Background
The writ petitioners are engineering students from different semesters who were detained by their college for falling short of the required attendance. Their attendance ranged from 27% to 35%, whereas the regulation required a minimum of 75%. The college displayed their names as detained but forwarded their candidature to the university for examination. Upon discovering the students were ineligible due to attendance, the university cancelled their candidature. The students challenged this cancellation before the Single Judge, who dismissed the writ petition. The college’s Academic Committee has authority to condone attendance shortage only for students with at least 65% attendance, and no authority exists to condone attendance below that threshold. The legal question arose whether any authority can condone attendance shortage beyond the powers granted by regulations.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether cancellation of the examination candidature of students on the ground of short attendance was legal.
- Whether any authority has power to condone attendance shortage below the prescribed minimum attendance requirement under the relevant regulations.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shri Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra, (1976) 1 SCC 311 : AIR 1976 SC 376 | Consideration of various grounds for cancellation of candidature including attendance and other disciplinary issues; no clear stipulation on condonation limits. | The court found this case distinguishable and agreed with the Single Judge’s decision not to rely on it due to different facts and absence of a clear rule on condonation limits. |
| Ashok Kumar Thakur v. University of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 298 : AIR 1973 SC 221 | Authority of the Principal to condone attendance shortage up to a specified limit; no authority beyond that limit. | The court applied this precedent to affirm that no authority can condone attendance shortage beyond the prescribed limit, thereby supporting dismissal of the petitioners’ claims. |
| Principal, Patna College, Patna v. Kalyan Srinivas Raman, AIR 1966 SC 707 | This precedent was cited as relevant authority on attendance and examination eligibility though specific principles were not detailed in the opinion. | Referenced to support the legal framework on attendance requirements and condonation limits. |
| Akilesh Lumani v. Principal, Sir C.R Reddy Autonomous College, Eluru, 2000 (4) ALD 630 (DB) | Relevant to attendance regulations and condonation policies. | Referred to reinforce the understanding of attendance rules and limitations on condonation. |
| K. Pradeep v. Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Hyderabad, 2002 (3) ALD 667 (DB) | Interpretation of attendance regulations and consequences of non-compliance. | Cited to support the conclusion that attendance below 65% cannot be condoned by any authority. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the attendance regulations applicable to the petitioners, noting that the College Academic Committee has authority to condone attendance shortage only for students with attendance between 65% and 75%. Since the petitioners’ attendance was between 27% and 35%, no authority had power to condone their shortage. The court distinguished the precedent of Shri Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University because it involved different facts and lacked a clear rule on condonation limits. The court relied on Ashok Kumar Thakur v. University of Himachal Pradesh, which held that an authority cannot condone attendance shortage beyond its prescribed jurisdiction. The court emphasized that it cannot compel an authority to act beyond its legal competence. It also referred to relevant regulations and other precedents to affirm that attendance below 65% cannot be condoned and that this prohibition cannot be overridden even by judicial mandamus. Despite sympathy for the petitioners, the court found no legal basis to interfere with the cancellation of their examination candidature.
Holding and Implications
The writ appeal is dismissed.
The court’s decision directly results in upholding the cancellation of the petitioners’ examination candidature due to insufficient attendance. No authority, including the court, can condone attendance below 65% as per the regulations. The ruling does not establish any new precedent but confirms the binding nature of attendance requirements and the limits on condonation powers. The petitioners’ loss of academic opportunity is regretted but legally justified under the existing regulatory framework.
Bilal Nazki, J.:— A short point is involved in this writ appeal as to whether cancellation of the examination of the writ petitioners on the ground of short of attendance was legal or not.
2. The facts are not at dispute. All the writ petitioners are engineering students of different semesters and they fell short of attendance.
3. Their names were displayed by the college as having been detained. Thereafter the students along with their parents went to the college and the college management forwarded their candidature to the university for examination. Once the university found that the candidates were not eligible, they cancelled their candidature. It was challenged before the learned Single Judge who has dismissed the writ petition. These candidates have put in attendance ranging from 27% to 35%, whereas the requirement under the relevant regulation was 75%. The College Academic Committee has the power to condone the shortage of attendance in case of those candidates who have attended 65% of classes and beyond this there is no power with anybody to condone the shortage. This is not disputed. The only question which remains is whether the shortage can be condoned by any authority, if there is no power under the regulations and rules. This question has already come up before various Courts and has been decided. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners/appellants submits that the learned Single Judge was not right in holding that the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Shri Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra, (1976) 1 SCC 311 : AIR 1976 SC 376, had no application in the matter. Before going to the other judgments, we would first deal with this judgment. It was altogether a different case in different circumstances. There were different grounds taken for cancellation of the candidature of the petitioner in that case. At one stage it was stated that the candidate was involved in offences under Sections 376, 366 and 363 of I.P.C On the other occasion it was said that he had not obtained permission from Superior Officers as the course was being run for the persons in service. At one instance it was also said that the candidate had not attended the requisite number of lectures, but a certificate was issued by the principal certifying that he had attended the prescribed number of academic years. There was a dispute also with regard to the fact that whether he had attended the classes or not. It is also not clear from the judgment whether there was any stipulation that beyond a certain point of time, shortage of attendance could be condoned. Therefore the learned Single Judge was right in not relying on this judgment. However, on the other hand, we have judgments which are on all fours as far as the present case is concerned. We would not be multiplying the judgments, but we would only rely on a few judgments. In Ashok Kumar Thakur, Appellant v. University of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 298 : AIR 1973 SC 221, the Supreme Court held in Paras 4 and 5,
“4. The only question that now remains is whether the petitioner's deficiency in the matter of attendance could be condoned by any authority. The final lecture statement of the Bilaspur and Dharamsala colleges shows that the petitioner was short of 20 lectures in Civics, of 18 lectures in Economics, of 10 lectures in History and of 8 lectures in English. Now the rules as to condoning of deficiency in the matter of attendance of lectures are to be found in Chapter XV of the Punjab University Calendar 1969. Volume III (Rules). The relevant Rule is 1(a) and the material portion of it is in the following terms:
“(I) Taking into consideration the results of the House examinations:
(a) The Principal of a College affiliated in the Faculties of Arts, Science and Oriental Learning may condone the deficiency in lectures as under:
(i) Upto 15 lecturers in each of the subjects;”
Since the petitioner's deficiency in the matter of attendance exceeded 18 lectures in Economics and 20 lectures in Civics, it was beyond the jurisdiction or competence of the Principal to condone this deficiency. In our opinion this completely destroys the case of the petitioner.
5. Considering that this case concerns the carper of a young student we tried to look at the matter with all possible sympathy and consideration but we do not see how we can direct or compel an authority to do something which is beyond its legal competence to do. Since the Principal is the only authority who can condone and since it was beyond his competence to condone the shortage in question, we do not see how we can intervene in favour of the petitioner even if the petitioner had succeeded in making out a case for condonation. In our opinion, the appeal must fail on this short point. Much as we regret the unfortunate fact that the petitioner is going to lose almost two precious years of his academic life we are in law bound to confirm the decision of the High Court, and dismiss the petitioner's appeal. We, therefore, do so. In the circumstances of this case, however, we are making no order as to costs.”
4. We may also refer to judgments reported in Principal, Patna College, Patna v. Kalyan Srinivas Raman, AIR 1966 SC 707, Akilesh Lumani v. Priticipal, Sir C.R Reddy Autonomous College, Eluru, 2000 (4) ALD 630 (DB) and K. Pradeep v. Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Hyderabad, 2002 (3) ALD 667 (DB). Regulation No. 5 lays down:
“5. Attendance.
i. A student has to put in a minimum of 75% of attendance in aggregate of all the subjects for acquiring credits in the I year and/or each semester thereafter.
ii. Condonation of shortage of attendance in aggregate upto 10% (65% and above and below 75%) in each semester or I year may be granted by the College Academic Committee.
iii. A student will not be promoted to the next semester unless he satisfies the attendance requirement of the present semester/I year.
a. Shortage of Attendance below 65% in aggregate shall in no case be condoned.
b. Student whose shortage of attendance is not condoned in any semester/I year are not eligible to take their end examination of that class and their registration shall stand cancelled. They may seek re-admission for that semester/I year when offered next.
c. Condonation of shortage of attendance as stipulated in 5(ii) above shall be granted on genuine and valid grounds with supporting evidence.
d. A stipulated fee shall be payable towards condonation of shortage of attendance.”
5. Since nobody has power to condone the attendance below 65% therefore, it should be assumed that even this Court cannot order such a condonation. Something which is prohibited by the regulations cannot be subject-matter of a mandamus.
6. For these reasons, though we have sympathy with the petitioners, but we have no option, but to dismiss the writ appeal.
7. No costs.
Alert