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Nagisetty Nagaiah v. State Of A.P & Anr.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (the Act). The complainant (here, the appellant in this criminal appeal) alleged that the respondent-accused had issued a cheque (Ex. P1) for Rs. 88,888/-, which was dishonoured on presentation with an endorsement that payment was stopped by the drawer. The trial Court dismissed the complaint on several grounds. In the present appeal, the single point urged by the appellant was that the lower Court erred in concluding that Ex. P1 was not issued for the discharge of a legally enforceable debt, on the basis that the complainant had failed to discharge an initial burden of establishing that Ex. P1 was issued for the discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
The trial Court had referred to earlier decisions of the State Court holding that the initial burden is on the complainant to show the cheque was issued for discharge of a legally enforceable debt, after which the burden shifts to the accused. The appellant relied on apex Court authorities (Hiten P. Dalal and K.N. Beena) to contend that the presumption under Section 139 of the Act operates in favour of the complainant and that the accused bears the burden of rebuttal.
On the factual matrix examined by the Court: P.W.1 and P.W.3 gave evidence that dealings existed and that Ex. P1 was issued on 20-7-1996; however, contradictions and admissions emerged in cross-examination — notably admissions that cash was given to the accused on 20-7-1996, that a blank cheque signed by the accused was filled by a third person (different ink used in body of cheque versus signature), and the existence of a letter from the accused (Ex. D1) dated 6-7-1996 (i.e., before Ex. P1) to the bank reporting a missing signed blank cheque and requesting a stop payment. The accused denied issuance and any debt under examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the complainant bore an initial burden to establish that Ex. P1 was issued for the discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability such that the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be invoked.
- Whether the apex Court decisions in Hiten P. Dalal and K.N. Beena displace the State Court decisions relied upon by the trial Court and, consequently, whether the presumption under Section 139 must be raised by the Court without any initial factual basis shown by the complainant.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant argued that, following the apex Court's decisions in Hiten P. Dalal and K.N. Beena, there is no initial burden on the complainant to prove that the cheque was issued for discharging a legally enforceable debt; Sections 118 and 139 create a presumption that the cheque was issued for discharge of debt or liability.
- The presumption under Section 139 operates in favour of the holder and the accused must rebut the presumption by cogent evidence; mere denials or reply notices are not sufficient.
- Because the respondent-accused did not discharge his burden of rebuttal, the lower Court should not have held that the complainant failed to discharge any initial burden and therefore should have invoked the presumption under Section 139.
Respondent/Accused's Arguments (as recorded)
- The accused denied issuing the cheque and denied any debt owed to the complainant (as per Ex. P6 and his replies under Section 313 Cr.P.C.).
- The accused asserted that he habitually kept signed blank cheques with his representatives for convenience in contract execution and that one such signed blank cheque went missing; he wrote to the bank on 6-7-1996 (Ex. D1) requesting stop payment on a missing signed cheque.
- The accused suggested professional rivalry between him and the complainant and denied knowledge of how the complainant obtained or filled up the cheque; the accused maintained that the cheque was a blank signed cheque misused by a third party.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| B. Mohan Krishna v. Union of India (1996 Cri. L.J. 636) | Holds that the initial burden is on the complainant to show the cheque was issued for the discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability; thereafter the burden shifts to the accused to establish the cheque was not of the nature referred to in Section 138. | The trial Court relied on this decision to hold that the complainant had an initial burden; the present Court recognized the ratio but examined whether the factual basis for raising the presumption existed in this case. |
| C.B. Lingam v. Vitta Murali Krishna Murthy (1997 (2) ALT (Crl.) 100) | Holds that when the respondent denies that the cheque was issued for a legally enforceable debt, the complainant must prove circumstances showing the cheque was issued in discharge of such debt; until the initial burden is discharged, Section 139 presumption cannot be used against the respondent. | The trial Court relied on this authority to place an initial factual burden on the complainant; the present Court evaluated whether those factual prerequisites were present. |
| Hiten P. Dalal ((2001) 6 SCC 16) | Explains that Section 139 creates a presumption that the holder received the cheque for discharge of a debt or liability; the evidential burden shifts to the drawer/accused to prove otherwise. The court must raise the presumption where factual basis is established; presumptions of law may shift onus to accused who must adduce evidence to show reasonable possibility of non-existence of presumed fact. | The appellant relied on this decision to argue there is no initial burden on the complainant; the present Court acknowledged the decision's principle but emphasized that the factual basis for raising the presumption must be present and found it lacking on the facts of this case. |
| K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan ((2001) 8 SCC 458) | Following Hiten P. Dalal, reiterates that Sections 118 and 139 create presumptions: negotiable instruments are presumed made for consideration (Section 118) and cheques presumed received for discharge of debt (Section 139); the presumptions are rebuttable, and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the accused. | The appellant invoked this authority to support the contention that the accused should bear the burden of rebuttal; the Court accepted the rule but applied it to the factual record and concluded that the factual basis for invoking the presumption was not made out. |
| State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer (cited within Hiten P. Dalal) | Noted for the proposition that where the factual basis for raising a presumption exists, the court is obliged to raise it; presumptions of law may shift the evidential burden. | Referenced in the discussion of the nature and effect of presumptions under Sections 138 and 139; used to explain that presumptions are rules of evidence and shift burden where factual basis exists. |
| Trilok Chand Jain v. State of Delhi (cited in Hiten P. Dalal) | Referred to for the standard that the accused must put forward acceptable evidence showing that the explanation is probable or that the material on record renders the presumed fact improbable to rebut the presumption. | Used in the Court's reasoning to underscore the standard required to rebut presumptions under Sections 138 and 139; the Court found the accused (in that case) failed to meet the standard, and used the reasoning analogously in assessing the present record. |
| C. Antony v. K.G. Raghavan Nair (2002 (2) ALD (Crl.) 880 (SC)) | Illustrates that deficiencies such as non-examination of a person who had the cheque, differences in ink between the body and signature of the cheque, and evidence that the cheque was a blank filled by another can justify the trial Court's rejection of the complaint and acquittal. | The Court held the facts of the present case were almost similar to C. Antony and treated that authority as supporting the conclusion that the trial Court was justified in acquitting the accused given the deficiencies and inconsistencies in the complainant's case. |
| Bhim Singh Rup Singh and Dharamdeo Singh (mentioned) | Referenced as authorities followed in C. Antony; the specific rules or principles from these cases are not elaborated in the provided opinion text. | The opinion notes that the C. Antony decision followed the law laid down in those cases; the present Court invoked C. Antony (which in turn followed those cases) to support affirming the trial Court's findings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in three linked analytical steps:
- The Court reviewed the legal authorities. It recognised two strands in the case law: (a) State Court decisions (B. Mohan Krishna; C.B. Lingam) placing an initial factual burden on the complainant to show the cheque was issued for discharge of a legally enforceable debt, and (b) apex Court decisions (Hiten P. Dalal; K.N. Beena) that explain Sections 118 and 139 create presumptions in favour of the cheque-holder and place an evidential burden on the drawer/accused to rebut them. The Court accepted that the ratio of these decisions is not in dispute.
-
The Court then turned to the facts found by the trial Court and the evidence on record to decide whether the factual basis for raising the presumption under Section 139 existed here. The Court identified multiple factual deficiencies and inconsistencies in the complainant's case:
- P.W.1 asserted dealings and a debt of Rs. 88,888/-, but in cross-examination admitted that on the date of Ex. P1 (20-7-1996) he gave cash to the accused and did not remember whether he had withdrawn the amount from the bank that day.
- P.W.3 corroborated that cash was paid and the cheque was given on 20-7-1996, creating inconsistency with the complainant's earlier averments that repeated demands and postponements preceded issuance of Ex. P1.
- The cheque Ex. P1 bore a signature in blue ink whereas the body was filled in black ink by a third person — a fact not satisfactorily explained by the complainant, and the person who filled the cheque was not examined.
- Ex. D1 (letter dated 6-7-1996), written 15 days before Ex. P1, shows that the accused had already reported a signed blank cheque missing and requested stop payment — undermining the complainant's claim that the cheque was issued to discharge a debt.
- The complainant failed to produce documentary evidence of any legally enforceable debt (no account books, no income-tax return or audit report) to establish business transactions or outstanding liabilities between the parties.
- The legal notice (Ex. P4) merely asserted a debt without specifying the purpose or documentary foundation; the complainant's trial evidence developed a different narrative but with contradictory admissions on cross-examination.
- Applying the law to these facts, the Court concluded that the "factual basis" required to invoke the presumption under Section 139 was absent. The Court emphasised that the presumption is to be raised only where the factual foundation for it has been established. Because the basic facts that would justify invoking the presumption were missing or were inconsistent on the record, the trial Court correctly held that the initial burden (in the sense of producing the factual basis) had not been discharged by the complainant. The Court further relied on the reasoning in C. Antony as analogous support for upholding an acquittal where similar deficiencies existed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Criminal Appeal is dismissed.
Implications:
- The direct effect of the decision is that the trial Court's acquittal of the accused is affirmed; the complainant's complaint under Section 138 was rejected for lack of sufficient factual basis to invoke the presumption under Section 139 of the Act.
- The Court applied existing authorities (both State Court and apex Court decisions) and concluded that, although the legal presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 exist and may shift evidential burden to the accused, such presumptions are only to be raised where the factual basis for invoking them is established. On the facts of this case those foundational facts were missing or inconsistent.
- The opinion does not set out any new legal precedent; it applies established principles to the specific evidential record and explains that the absence of required factual foundations precludes invoking Section 139's presumption against the accused in this case.
JUDGMENT
1. The only point that is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the lower Court erred in coming to the conclusion that Ex. P1 cheque was not issued for the discharge of legally enforceable debt, since the complainant-appellant failed to discharge his initial burden by establishing that Ex. P1 was issued for discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability and as such, the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short ‘the Act’) cannot be drawn.
2. The parties are hereinafter referred to as arrayed by the trial Court. Though the complaint filed by the complainant was dismissed on several grounds, the said point alone was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant in this appeal. The trial Court in view of the reported decisions of this Court in B. Mohan Krishna v. Union of India (1) 1996 Cri. L.J 636 and C.B Lingam v. Vitta Murali Krishna Murthy (2) 1997 (2) ALT (Crl.) 100 held that the initial burden is on the accused to establish that the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt and then only the burden shifts to the accused to establish that the cheque issued was not of the nature referred to in Section 138 of the Act. Whereas, it was contended on behalf of the complainant before the Court below that the evidence of P.Ws 1 to 3 is consistent as to advancing of amount by the complainant to the accused and issuing of Ex. P1-cheque by the accused. Therefore, presumption can be drawn that the cheque was issued for discharging a legally enforceable debt. In B. Mohan Krishna's case (1 supra), it was held as under:
“…….the rebuttal presumption under Section 139 of the N.I Act operates only in favour of a payee or a holder in due course or in favour of a person, without consideration, became the holder of the cheque……..the initial burden is on the complainant to show that the cheque was issued for the discharge of a legally enforceable debt or other liability. Then, the burden shifts to the respondent to establish that the cheque issued was not of the nature referred to in Section 138…”
3. In C.B Lingam's case (2 supra), it was held as follows:
“……when once the respondent takes the plea that the cheque was not issued for the discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability, then the complainant is bound to prove the circumstances under which the cheque was given in his favour and the same is issued in discharge of legally enforceable debt. Unless this initial burden is discharged by the complainant, the presumption available under section 139 cannot be made use of against the respondent…”
4. Whereas, the learned counsel for the appellant herein contends that in view of the authoritative pronouncements of the apex Court in Hiten P. Dalal (3) (2001) 6 SCC 16 and K.N Beena v. Muniyappan (4) (2001) 8 SCC 458 the judgments of this Court referred to above have no relevance and there is no initial burden on the part of the complainant to prove that the cheque was issued for discharging a legally enforceable debt in view of the provisions contained in Sections 118 and 139 of the Act. The Court has to presume that the cheque had been issued for discharging a debt or liability, which presumption, of course, could be rebutted by the accused by proving to the contra. Mere denial or rebuttal by the accused in the reply notice by the complainant is not enough. The accused had to prove by cogent evidence that there was no debt or liability. In the instant case, the respondent-accused not having discharged his burden, the lower Court ought not to have held that the complainant has not discharged his initial burden and as such, the presumption under Section 139 of the Act cannot be invoked.
5. In Hiten P. Dalal's case (3 supra) it was held as under:
“21. The appellant's submission that the cheques were not drawn for the “discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability” is answered by the third presumption available to the Bank, under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This section provides that:
“139. It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.”
The effect of these presumptions is to place the evidential burden on the appellant of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability.
22. Because both Sections 138 and 139 require that the court “shall presume” the liability of the drawer of the cheques for the amounts for which the cheques are drawn, as noted in State Of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer it is obligatory on the court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been established. “It introduces an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to the accused.” (Ibid, at p. 65, para 14.) Such a presumption is a presumption of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact which describes provisions by which the court “may presume” a certain state of affairs. Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, because by the latter, all that is meant is that the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact
(emphasis supplied).
36. The brunt of the evidence given by the appellant's witnesses was as to the nature of the transactions between the appellant and the Bank. However, not one of the defence witnesses gave any evidence in support of the only defence of the appellant, namely, that the four cheques in question had been given towards intended transactions which did not take place. No one said why the appellant had executed and delivered the particular cheques to the Bank or that the appellant had not given the four cheques to discharge his debts to the Bank. Nor did any defence witness claim that the cheques were given on account of any ready-forward transactions. In fact DW 1 in cross-examination admitted that it was not the practice of a purchasing party to hand over cheques in advance. The appellant alone could have said why he had admittedly executed the four cheques, handed them over to the Bank and never asked for their return. He did not choose to do so.
38. The burden was on the appellant to disapprove (sic disprove) the presumptions under Sections 138 and 139, a burden which he failed to discharge at all. The averment in the written statement of the appellant was not enough. Incidentally, the defence in the written statement that the four cheques were given for intended transactions was not the answer given by the appellant to the notice under Section 138. Then he had said that the cheques were given to assist the Bank for restructuring (Ext. H). It was necessary for the appellant at least to show on the basis of acceptable evidence either that his explanation in the written statement was so probable that a prudent man ought to accept it or to establish that the effect of the material brought on the record, in its totality, rendered the existence of the fact presumed, improbable. (Vide Trilok Chand Jain v. State of Delhi) The appellant has done neither. In the absence of any such proof the presumptions under Sections 138 and 139 must prevail.
6. In K.N Beena's case (4 supra), the apex Court following its earlier decision in Hitel P. Dalal's case (3 supra), held as under:
“…..It appears that the learned Judge had lost sight of Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Under Section 118, unless the contrary was proved, it is to be presumed that the negotiable instrument (including a cheque) had been made or drawn for consideration. Under Section 139 the court has to presume, unless the contrary was proved, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for discharge, in whole or in part, of a debt or liability. Thus, in complaints under Section 138, the court has to presume that the cheque had been issued for a debt or liability. This presumption is rebuttable. However, the burden of proving that a cheque had not been issued for a debt or liability is on the accused….”
7. There may not be any dispute as to the ratio laid down in the above decisions. But, the basic facts of this case do not inspire the confidence of the Court to convict the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act, whether the accused led any evidence or not in view of the presumption under Section 139 of the Act and rebutted the contentions of the complainant. P.W 1 stated in his evidence that the accused had dealings with him and he fell due Rs. 88,888/- and that he demanded for payment personally. The accused postponed the payment on several occasions. The accused issued a cheque for Rs. 88,888/- drawn on Vysya Bank Limited, Nandyal on 20-7-1996. Therefore, as seen from the evidence in the chief examination, it is the assertion of P.W 1 that the accused had dealings with him and fell due Rs. 88,888/- and he demanded personally and the accused postponed payment on several occasions. In the complaint also, it was averred that the accused fell due to the complainant a sum of Rs. 88,888/- and in spite of repeated demands, the accused had not paid any amounts to the complainant. Finally, the accused issued Ex. P1 cheque. He is interesting to note that during the cross-examination, RW. 1 stated that on the date of Ex. P1 itself, he gave cash. On the request of the accused, he gave cash of Rs. 88,888/-. He has not obtained any pronote. He did not remember that he withdrew the amount from the Bank on the date of Ex. P1 or not. He admitted that a blank cheque was issued and the same was filled up by third party and not by the accused. The evidence of P.W 3 shows that on 20-7-1996 itself the complainant paid cash and the accused gave cheque Ex. P1 in his presence. Therefore, in view of the evidence of P.W 1 during cross-examination and the evidence of P.W 3, the version of the complainant that he demanded several times and the accused postponed the payment and finally issued Ex. P1-cheque was inconsistent. The nature of dealings which the accused was having with the complainant were also not explained. Further, it is interesting to note that Ex. P1 was issued on 20-7-1996 whereas Ex. D1 letter marked through P.W 2 shows that the accused herein had addressed a letter on 6-7-1996 itself to the Bank stating as under:
“I have noticed that out of my Cheque Book a Blank cheque bearing No. 486359 but signed by me is missing. I have not filled up the cheque. I request you stop payment, if presented to you by anybody”.
8. Whereas, ‘in the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 3 it is stated that the amount was paid to the accused on 20-7-1996 and the cheque was issued to P.W 1 on 20.7.1996 itself.
9. As seen from above, the letter Ex. D1 was addressed 15 days prior to the issuance of Ex. P1-cheque. Therefore, the very laying of the complaint itself does not inspire confidence of the court, whether the complainant has discharged the initial burden as held by this Court or not. The accused-respondent was examined under Section 313 of Cr. P.C He denied the issuance of the cheque and admitted the contents of the reply notice-Ex. P6. He also denied that there was any debt due to P.W 1.
10. In Ex. P4-legal notice, the complainant merely stated that the accused due to him an amount of Rs. 88,888/- and in spite of repeated demands, the accused had not paid any amount to him. Finally, the accused issued a cheque for Rs. 88,888/- on 20.7.1996 and on presentation of the same in the Bank, it was returned with an endorsement that payment was stopped at the instance of the drawer. The complainant did not say anything in Ex. P4 for what purpose he had given the amount to the accused. He merely stated that the accused due an amount of Rs. 88,888/- to him. But, while examined as P.W 1, he developed his version and stated that himself and accused were class-I contractors and had dealings with him and the accused fell due an amount of Rs. 88,888/-. In the cross-examination, he had stated that he gave cash to the accused and he does not remember whether he had withdrawn the amount from the bank on the date of Ex. P1. The complainant also deposed that one of the persons belonging to the accused had filled up Ex. P1. He did not say the name of that person or any other particulars nor examined that person. In Ex. P6-reply notice, the accused categorically denied of having any amount due to the complainant and he emphatically stated that there was no occasion or any necessity for him to become indebted to the complainant. He also stated that there is professional rivalry between him and the complainant because both of them are contractors. He further stated that he has been undertaking contract works at various places and therefore, for the facility of disbursing the amount while executing the contract works, he was in the habit of keeping the blank cheques signed by him, so that they may be used by his representatives on the field for encashment and payment. Without his knowledge, the cheque in question, which was a blank cheque but signed by him, missed. He immediately i.e on 6-7-1996 addressed a letter to the Manger, Vysya Bank Limited, Nandyal requesting to stop payment. He stated that he failed to know how the complainant had managed to obtain possession of that cheque and who had filled up that cheque. With regard to professional rivalry, P.W 1 admitted that on 20-5-1996 himself, accused and others filed tenders in the Circle Officer, Irrigation Department, Giddalurand the accused got the said contract, but he denied the suggestion that since the accused secured the said contract, he bore grudge against him.
11. Firstly, the fact that the amount due by the accused in the business transaction between the complainant and the accused was not proved. The complainant did not file any account books, not even a scrap of paper, to show that there were business transactions between himself and the accused and the accused due to him an amount of Rs. 88,888/-. No income-tax return or audit report has been placed before the Court to construe that there was any legally enforceable debt to inspire that the factual basis for raising presumption under Section 139 of the Act had been established. Secondly, a close examination of Ex. P1-cheque reveals that the signature on the cheque was in blue ink, but it was filled up altogether with a different ink (black), admittedly, by a third person, which was not properly explained by the complainant. Even otherwise, the accused had sent a letter dated 6-7-1996 i.e much prior to the date of Ex. P1-cheque dated 20-7-1996. It is admitted by the complainant that the amount was paid to the accused on 20-7-1996 and on that day itself, the cheque was issued. Therefore, the complainant failed to make out any case against the accused and thus the question of raising legal presumption under Section 139 of the Act does not arise. It is obligatory on the part of the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of presumption had been established. In this context, the Court below has rightly held that the initial burden on the part of the complainant was not discharged, since, in this case, the factual basis for raising such presumption had not been established. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the factual basis for raising of the presumption under Section 139 of the Act has been established. ‘Initial’ means that which begins or stands at the beginning, i.e, the factual basis for raising such a presumption as per law. In this case, such facts are missing. In almost identical situation, the apex Court in C. Antony v. K.G Raghavan Nair. (5) 2002 (2) ALD (Crl.) 880 (SC) held that:
“8. Then again, it is to be noticed that the trial Court also took into consideration the plea of the appellant that the cheque in question was given in a blank state to Chandrappa Panicker and he being a close friend of the respondent in collusion with each other misused the said cheque to defraud the appellant. The trial Court also observed that non-examination of Chandrappa Panicker has also weakened the case of the respondent especially in view of the fact that the Court had noticed that the said Chandrappa Panicker was seen in the premises of the Courthouse at the time of trial. This is also a relevant factor on which the trial Court relied upon but the High Court did not consider the effect of the said default on the part of the respondent. The third circumstance relied upon by the trial Court is in regard to the difference in the ink found in the body of the cheque as well as in the signature of the appellant. It is the case of the respondent that the appellant had filled up the cheque in its entirety including its signature and had brought the cheque to the office of Vijay Kumar to be handed over to the respondent but the learned Magistrate on a perusal of the cheque, found that the ink used in the body of the cheque was different from the ink used in the signature on the cheque, therefore, he drew an inference that the case put forth by the respondent was doubtful, hence, could not be accepted. Even in this regard the High Court has failed to apply its mind. Having considered the findings delivered by the trial Court in regard to the above 3 points, we are of the opinion that the trial Court was justified in coming to the said conclusion because of the above three deficiencies pointed out by the trial Court, and that the respondent's complaint ought to fail. In such a situation, we are of the opinion that the High Court fell in error in reappreciating the case of the respondent on a totally different perspective without coming to the conclusion that the findings given by the trial Court on the above three points are either irrelevant or contrary to material on record. Therefore, following the law laid down by this Court in the above said cases of Bhim Singh Rup Singh (supra) and Dharamdeo Singh (supra), we are of the opinion that the High Court was in error in reversing the findings of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.”
12. The facts of the instant case are almost similar to the one in the above case. Therefore, it cannot be said that the trial Court was wrong in rejecting the plea of the complainant and acquitting the accused. The initial burden does not mean that it is a burden on the part of the complainant to prove that there was a legally enforceable debt or liability by leading evidence. The mere, basic facts of the case should inspire the invocation of the legal presumption under Section 139 of the Act. In the absence of such factual basis, the lower Court cannot be said to have erred in holding that the initial burden was not discharged by the complainant, which is absent in this case, as seen above.
13. For all the above reasons, the Criminal Appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.
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