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Shaik Sharfuddin v. Joint Collector, R.R. District
Summary of Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner purchased Ac. 11.35 gts. of dry land in S.No. 168, Nagaram village, Maheswaram Mandal (Ranga Reddy District) by an unregistered sale deed dated 16-7-1957 and has since been in possession and enjoyment, according to his case. The land was described as "Dastagandham Choutawa Inam." The Tahsildar, Ibrahimpatnam granted a ryotwari patta to the petitioner by D.D. No. A.8-5472/69 dated 31-10-1969, which the petitioner says became final.
Under the A.P. (T.A.) Abolition of Inams Act, 1995 (the Act) and the Rules made thereunder, the petitioner applied for an occupancy rights certificate in Form No. 1. The Mandal Revenue Officer (M.R.O.) reported on historical possession and pahanies; subsequently the 2nd respondent issued an occupancy rights certificate dated 11-6-1992 showing the petitioner and respondents 3 to 6 as grantees. The petitioner appealed to the 1st respondent, who dismissed the appeal. The petitioner filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking certiorari to quash the proceedings of the 1st respondent (Proceedings No. B/3/418/94 dated 8-8-1995) and of the 2nd respondent (Proceedings No. J/2994/1987 dated 11-6-1992) as illegal and contrary to the Act, and claiming that respondents 3 to 6 are not entitled to occupancy rights for Ac. 9.20 gts. out of the land.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the occupancy rights certificate issued by the 2nd respondent (and confirmed by the 1st respondent) is illegal for failing to comply with Rule 6 of the Rules under the Act (i.e., not issuing notice and not holding the enquiry as prescribed) and thus liable to be quashed by certiorari.
- Whether respondents 3 to 6 were in possession of the disputed land on the crucial date for entitlement to occupancy rights (the date(s) relevant under the Act, including the date of vesting and the date the rest of the provisions came into force) and therefore properly shown in the occupancy rights certificate.
- Whether the writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable in view of the availability of alternative remedies (such as revision), as contended by respondents 3 to 6.
- Whether the findings of fact recorded by the primary and appellate authorities are vitiated by procedural infirmity (e.g., failure to give opportunity to be heard, reliance on interpolated documents) such that certiorari is appropriate.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The occupancy rights certificate showing respondents 3 to 6 was issued without conducting the enquiry mandated by Rule 6 of the Rules (no notice fixed date for enquiry and no call for objections), rendering the certificate invalid.
- Respondents 3 to 6 never applied in Form No. 1 and did not file any petition claiming rights; they were improperly shown in the occupancy certificate though not in occupation on the date of vesting or on the crucial date (1-11-1973).
- The ryotwari patta granted to the petitioner on 31-10-1969 and the pahani for 1973-74 establish exclusive possession of the petitioner on the crucial date and therefore respondents 3 to 6 should not have been included.
- The authorities acted perversely and without considering relevant material; the petitioner was not given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses; there is no suo motu power to make entries in favour of persons who had not applied.
- Relied on the decision in B. Ramaender Reddy v. The District Collector to submit that rights survive if the person was in possession on the relevant date and that occupancy rights depend on possession on the later crucial date rather than mere vesting.
Respondents 1 and 2 (Government) Arguments
- Pointed to statutory definitions (e.g., definition of "inamdar") and to Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 of the Act, submitting that the Collector must consider the nature and history of the land and claims of persons in the enquiry.
- The appellate authority found that the Urdu document dated 16-7-1959 relied upon by the petitioner was interpolated and that the pahani for 1973-74 was not exclusively in the petitioner's name; based on the M.R.O.'s report and these findings, the appellate authority dismissed the appeal.
- Therefore the appellate order was based on sound reasoning and material and should not be interfered with.
Respondents 3 to 6 Arguments
- The writ petition is not maintainable because an alternative remedy of revision was available; relied on G.V. Narsimha Reddy v. Syed Aktar Ali.
- Their predecessors (Mangali family) were inamdars; family settlement and transfer (deed dated 4-7-1968) and other materials showed division (Ac. 2.15 gts. each) in their favour; these facts were before the 2nd respondent during enquiry under Sections 8 and 10 of the Act.
- The primary and appellate authorities issued notices and conducted a comprehensive enquiry, and their findings (including affidavits and family statements) supported issuance of occupancy certificate to both petitioner and respondents 3 to 6; those findings were based on relevant material and not amenable to interference in certiorari jurisdiction.
- Relying on The State of Maharashtra v. Laman Ambaji, they argued that the ryotwari patta in favour of the petitioner did not conclusively establish entitlement when others were also shown to be in possession.
- They also contended the appeal to the 1st respondent was time barred (the court record showed delay was condoned).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| B. Ramaender Reddy v. The District Collector, Hyderabad, 1993 (2) An.W.R. 84 (D.B.) | Principle that rights of inamdar/tenant are not extinguished if the person was in possession on the relevant date; occupancy rights depend on possession on the crucial date (1-11-1973 in Andhra Pradesh context). | The petitioner relied on this decision to argue exclusive entitlement by virtue of possession on the crucial date. The court acknowledged the legal proposition but observed that the appellate authority reached contrary factual findings (e.g., interpolation in documents) and therefore the petitioner's reliance did not prevail. |
| The State of Maharashtra v. Laman Ambaji | Authority relied upon to argue that a ryotwari patta alone may not conclusively establish exclusive possession where others are shown to be in possession. | Respondents 3 to 6 relied on this decision to challenge the evidentiary weight of the petitioner's ryotwari patta. The court recorded that this argument was made by respondents 3 to 6 but ultimately evaluated the factual findings of the authorities and disposed of the writ petition on the basis of those findings and certiorari principles. |
| G.V. Narsimha Reddy v. Syed Aktar Ali, 1988 (2) ALT 136 | Cited for the proposition that availability of an alternative remedy (revision) may bear on maintainability of writ petitions. | Respondents 3 to 6 relied on this to contend the writ was not maintainable. The court considered the point and held that notwithstanding alternative remedies, at the stage and the age of the petition (filed in 1995), the writ petition was maintainable; thus the precedent did not bar the petition's adjudication on merits. |
| Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan (Supreme Court) | Defines the scope of certiorari: available to correct errors of jurisdiction or where a tribunal acts illegally/improperly, including breaches of natural justice (e.g., deciding without giving opportunity to be heard). | The court applied this principle to assess whether certiorari was appropriate. Finding that both primary and appellate authorities had considered material and given parties opportunity to be heard, the court held that no jurisdictional error or procedural denial justified certiorari and therefore dismissed the petition. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by reviewing the factual matrix, the statutory framework and the parties' contentions. It identified the limited scope of certiorari jurisdiction as explained in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan: certiorari is available to correct jurisdictional errors or where a decision is made in breach of principles of natural justice.
The court examined the M.R.O.'s report, the entries in the pahanies, the ryotwari patta, and the findings recorded by both the primary (2nd respondent) and appellate (1st respondent) authorities. While acknowledging the petitioner's submission and reliance on B. Ramaender Reddy regarding possession-based entitlement to occupancy rights, the court noted that the appellate authority had found interpolations in the Urdu document the petitioner relied on and had concluded that the pahani for 1973-74 was not exclusively in the petitioner's name.
The court accepted the proposition that certiorari can correct jurisdictional or procedural infirmities, but determined that, on the record, both the primary and appellate authorities had given parties an opportunity to be heard and had considered the material on record. The court characterized the appellate finding that respondents 3 to 6 were also in possession on the crucial date as a factual finding based on the enquiry and material and observed that such a finding is not susceptible to interference in certiorari proceedings merely because the petitioner disputes the factual conclusion or challenges the weight of evidence.
Consequently, the court concluded that there was no legal basis (jurisdictional error or denial of natural justice) to quash the impugned orders and that the writ petition was therefore misconceived.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED.
Implications:
- The writ petition challenging the occupancy rights certificate issued by the 2nd respondent and confirmed by the 1st respondent was dismissed as misconceived on the record before the court.
- The court held that both the primary and appellate authorities had considered the material and had given the parties opportunity to be heard; the factual finding that respondents 3 to 6 were in possession on the crucial date could not be interfered with in certiorari jurisdiction.
- There is no order as to costs.
- The decision operates as a determination of the dispute between the parties in this case; the opinion does not purport to lay down any new or broader precedent beyond application of established certiorari principles and discussion of the authorities cited.
This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.
1. This writ petition is filed seeking a writ of Certiorari calling for the records pertaining to the order passed by the 1st respondent in his Proceedings No. B/3/ 418/94 dt. 8-8-1995 confirming the order passed by the 2nd respondent in Proceedings No. J/2994/1987 dt. 11-6-1992 and quash them as being illegal, arbitrary, unjust and violative of the provisions of the A.P. (T.A.) Abolition of Inams Act, 1995 (for short 'the Act') and consequently declare that the respondents 3 to 6 are not entitled for occupancy rights certificate to an extent of Ac. 9.20 gts. out of Ac. 11.35 gts. ir S.No. 168 situated at Nagaram village, Maheswaram Mandal, Ranga Reddy District.
2. The case of the petitioner is that he purchased an extent of Ac. 11.35 gts. of dry land in S.No. 168 situated at Nagaram village through an unregistered sale deed dt. 16-7-1957 from one Mangali Shankaraiah, Mangali Lakshmaiah and others and since then he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same. The land in question is 'Dastagandham Choutawa Inam' and that the inamdars Shankaraiah and Lakshmaiah and others sold the land in question to the petitioner and that the pahanies prior to 1980 do establish the possession and enjoyment of the petitioner over the said land. It is the further case of the petitioner that the Tahsildar, Ibrahimpatnam granted ryotwari patta to the petitioner in D.D. No. A.8-5472/69 dt. 31-10-1969 and that the copies of the said patta was communicated to the Patwari of Nagaram village and Zamabandi section for the purpose of mutation in the revenue records and that the said patta became final as nobody questioned the same including the respondents 3 to 6.
3. It is the further case of the petitioner that he filed an application before the 2nd respondent for grant of occupancy rights certificate in Form No. 1 as required under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of the Rules made under the Act. Pursuant to his application, the M.R.O. Maheswaram conducted an enquiry and submitted his report through his Proceedings No. A/5070/87 stating that as per the Khasara phani for the year 1955 and pahanies for the years 1956-57 and 1957-58 one Mangali Anthaiah was in possession over the land in question on the date of vesting i.e. 20-7-1955 and subsequently, the petitioner purchased tht land in question through an unregistereo sale deed and that he was in possession as per the pahanies for the years 1973-74 i.e., on the crutial date on 1-11-1973. It is the further case of the petitioner that the 2nd respondent by conducting suo motu enquiry granted occupancy rights certificate dated 11-6-1992 to the petitioner and the respondents 3 to 6. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondents 3 to 6 have managed the Revenue Official and got their names shown in the pahanies for the years 1979-80 to 1983-84 without his knowledge and consent at the instance of the Patwari of the village and that basing on the illegal entries in the pahanies for the years 1979-80 to 1983-84, the 2nd respondent showed the names of the respondents 3 to 6 in the occupancy rights certificate along with him to an extent of Ac. 2.15 gts. each. Aggrieved by the action of the 2nd respondent in showing the names of the respondents 3 to 6 in the occupancy rights certificate dated 11-6-1992, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the 1st respondent contending that the 2nd respondent ought not to have shown the names of the respondents 3 to 6 in the occupancy rights certificate since they were not in occupation of the land in question on the date of vesting of inam in the Government under the provisions of the Act and that the respondents 3 to 6 did not satisfy the requirements under the provisions of the Act to be shown in the occupancy rights certificate and that they did not pay any consideration to the vendor of the petitioner. The petitioner also filed an affidavit before the appellate authority enclosing a copy of the unregistered sale deed of the year 1957. The petitioner also contended before the appellate authority that the ryotwari patta granted to him on 31-10-1969 by the Tahasildar, Ibrahimpatnam became final and in view of the same, the 2nd respondent ought not to have shown the respondents 3 to 6 in the occupancy rights certificate. The 1st respondent without considering the contentions raised by the petitioner and the material placed by the petitioner and the provisions of the Act, dismissed the appeal of the petitioner. Against the order of the 1st respondent dismissing the appeal of the petitioner, the present writ petition has been filed invoking the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri E.S. Ramachandra Murthy contended that the respondents have committed grave error in showing the names of the respondents 3 to 6 in the occupancy rights certificate without holding an enquiry as contemplated under Rule 6 of the Act, which ordains a notice to every person claiming interest in the land specified fixing a date on which an enquiry is to be held and calling for objections. It is further contended that as the respondents did not conduct any enquiry as contemplated under Rule 6 of the Rules, the occupancy rights certificate issued in Form No. 3 showing the names of the respondents 3 to 6 is invalid in law and is liable to be set aside. It is farther contended that the respondents failed to note that the respondents 3 to 6 never made any application in Form No. 1 to the authorities requesting for grant of occupancy rights certificate and that they did not even file any petition before the 2nd respondent claiming any right over the land in question. It is further contended that the respondents failed to see that the essential requirement for grant of occupancy rights certificate is that the person claiming for occupancy rights certificate must be in possession of the property as on the date of vesting of Inam and in the instant case admittedly, the respondents 3 to 6 were not in possession of the land as on 1-11-1973 or earlier to that.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri E.S. Ramchandra Murthy further contended that the finding reached by the respondents 1 and 2 is perverse and the same is not based on relevant material and that under the provisions of the Act, the date of vesting i.e. 20-7-1955 is crucial for grant of occupancy rights certificate. The procedure for grant of occupancy certificate is that on making an application by a person for occupancy certificate, the Collector will hold an enquiry with regard to the nature and history of the land and grant occupancy certificate to the person whoever is in possession on the crucial date. He further contended that the ryotwari patta and the pahani for the year 1973-74 exclusively prove the possession of the petitioner alone. He further contended that there is no suo motu power conferred on the Collector and that there is no application field by the respondents 3 to 6 and in the absence of any such application by them, the official respondents 1 and 2 ought not to have granted the occupancy rights certificate. The learned Counsel further contended that the finding reached by the primary and appellate authority suffers from non-consideration of the documents and the petitioner was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness and therefore the occupancy certificate granted showing the names of the respondents 3 to 6 is liable to be set aside.
6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of this Court reported in B. Ramaender Reddy v. The District Collector, Hyderabad, 1993 (2) An.W.R. 84 (D.B.). and contended that notwithstanding the abolition of the inams on 20-7-1955 and vesting the inams in the State, the rights of the inamdar or tenant are not extinguished provided they are in possession of the land on the relevant date and that in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the rest of the provisions were brought into force on 1-11-1973 and the right to get occupancy right is not related to the right of vesting of inams in the Government and that though the lands vested in the State on 20th July, 1955, if the inamdar or various types of tenants were in possession of lands in on 1-11-1973, they would be entitled to occupancy rights under the Act. He further contended that as per the report of the Mandal Revenue Officer, the petitioner was found in possession of the land in question as per the pahani for the year 1973-74 i.e., the crucial date 1-11-1973 and accordingly, he contended that the occupancy certificate issued by the 2nd respondent, as confirmed by the 1st respondent, showing the names of the respondents 3 to 6 along with the petitioner cannot be sustained. There is no dispute with regard to the proposition of law enunciated in the above decision, but the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the respondents 3 to 6 were not in possession of the land in question along with the petitioner cannot be accepted inasmuch as the appellate authority held that there are interpolations in Urdu document, on which the petitioner placed reliance to show that he was in possession of the land in question on the crucial date and accordingly, basing on the report of the Mandal Revenue Officer, dismissed the appeal.
7. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader for the respondents 1 and 2 drawn my attention to the definition of inamdar which reads as under:
"2(d) inamdar means a person holding as inam or a share therein, either for his own benefit or in trust and includes the successor in interest of an inamdar, and
(i) where an inamdar is a minor or of unsound mind or an idiot, his lawful guardian.
(ii) where an inamdar is a joint Hindu family, such joint Hindu family."
and also Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 of the Act and contended that as per the above provisions of the Act, an enquiry has to be conducted by the Collector and in such an enquiry, concerned authority has to consider the nature and history of the land and also the claims of the persons for grant of occupancy rights certificate. In the instant case, the appellate authority holding that the Urdu document dt. 16-7-1959 showing that the petitioner purchased the land was interpolated and that the entry in the pahani for the year 1973-74 is not the exclusive of the petitioner but on behalf of his brother also, dismissed the appeal and therefore the appellate order is based on sound reasoning and it cannot be interfered.
8. The learned Counsel for the respondents 3 to 6 contended that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order of the 1st respondent and a revision ought to have been filed and in support of his contention, he relied on the decision of this Court in G.V. Narsimha Reddy v. Syed Aktar Ali, 1988 (2) ALT 136. This writ petition is of the year 1995 and at this length of time when the matter is being heard finally, merely because an alternative remedy is available, it cannot be said that the writ petition is not maintainable. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the writ petition is also maintainable.
9. The learned Counsel for the respondents 3 to 6 further contended that Mangali Shankaraiah and others were the inamdars of the land in question and that their father Late Bade Saab purchased the said land under a deed dt. 4-7-1968 and during his life time he had given Ac. 2.15 gts. each to the respondents 3 to 6 and the petitioner in the family settlement and that the said fact was also brought to the notice of the 2nd respondent during the enquiry under Sections 8 and 10 of the Act and after the said enquiry, occupancy certificate was given to them along with the petitioner and since then they are also in possession and enjoyment of the land in question and that the petitioner did not challenge the occupancy certificate issued by the 2nd respondent during the life time of their father, the 1st respondent rightly rejected the appeal of the petitioner as there were no grounds to sustain the same.
10. The learned Counsel for the respondents 3 to 6 further contended that the primary authority as well as the appellate authority conducted a comprehensive enquiry after issuing notices to all the parties and granted occupancy certificate in favour of the petitioner as well as the respondents 3 to 6 and the finding is based on relevant material and the petitioner cannot contend for the first time that the order is not in compliance with Sections 5 and 6 of the Act and that there was relevant material before the R.D.O. to arrive at a reasonable conclusion and the same cannot be interfered with while exercising the certiorari jurisdiction. It is further contended that the appellate authority has also considered the affidavits of indamdars and also the affidavit of the mother of the petitioner which clearly prove that the petitioner as well as the respondents 3 to 6 are in possession and cultivating the land in question. He relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Maharashtra v. Laman Ambaji, and contended that the ryotwari patta granted in favour of the petitioner has no legs to stand inasmuch as the respondents 3 to 6 were also in possession of the land in question along with the petitioner and that the primary as well as the appellate authority after due enquiry issued the occupancy certificate rightly showing the respondents 3 to 6 along with the petitioner. He further contended that the appeal filed before the 1st respondent is time barred. This contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents 3 to 6 cannot be accepted inasmuch as a perusal of the original file go to show that the delay in filing the appeal was condoned.
11. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, the Supreme Court held that a writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or Tribunals or where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. A perusal of the orders of the primary and appellate authority, it is evident that both the authorities have considered the material on record after giving an opportunity to the parties and recorded a finding that the respondents 3 to 6 are also in possession of the land in question along with petitioner as on the crucial date and such finding cannot be said to be arrived at by taking into consideration of the inadmissible evidence or eschewing the admissible evidence and such finding of fact cannot be interfered in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction. In the circumstances, I hold that the writ petition is misconceived and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
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