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Collector/Agent To T... v. Bhadrachalam Divisio...
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The Collector/Agent to Government, Khammam District (the appellant in the appeal) filed this writ appeal against an order dated 9-4-1998 passed in Writ Petition No.33 of 1998 by a learned single Judge.
Writ Petition No.33 of 1998 was brought by the Bhadrachalam Division Lorry Owners Association (the writ petitioner). The writ petition sought a writ of mandamus declaring as arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction the action of the Collector/Agent in entertaining Suit OS No.49 of 1996. Suit OS No.49 of 1996 had been instituted by Sri Chennupati Ramakotaiah Lorry Transport (the third respondent/plaintiff) in the Agency Court for a perpetual injunction against the Association and included an interlocutory application for temporary injunction.
The single Judge accepted the writ petitioner's contention that, under Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 ("the Regulation"), only suits relating to lands could be entertained by the Agency Court and, on that basis, held the suit filed by the third respondent not maintainable. The Collector/Agent (whose act in entertaining the suit was impugned) has appealed from that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Agency Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try a suit for perpetual injunction (a suit of civil nature) brought by the third respondent, or whether its jurisdiction is limited to suits relating to land under Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959.
- Whether Section 3 of the Regulation operates to oust or restrict the jurisdiction of the Agency Court to entertain civil suits not relating to transfer of immovable property.
- Whether the Collector/Agent (who constituted the Agency Court and was impleaded as 1st respondent in the writ petition) has locus standi to prefer this writ appeal against the single Judge's order, given that the plaintiff in the Agency Court did not challenge that order.
- Separately raised but not decided by the court on this appeal: questions of territorial jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction of the Agency Court (these were noted but left open for the Agency Court to decide).
Arguments of the Parties
Writ Petitioner (Bhadrachalam Division Lorry Owners Association)
- Contended that under Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959, suits that could be entertained in the Agency Court were limited to those "relating to lands", and therefore the suit for perpetual injunction was not maintainable in the Agency Court.
- Argued that the Collector/Agent (who constituted the Agency Court) had no locus to challenge the single Judge's order because the plaintiff (the third respondent) had accepted that order and had not appealed.
- Also advanced, before the appeal court, additional contentions that the suit was not maintainable on grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction and the nature of the subject-matter; the appellate court specifically declined to express any opinion on those contentions and left them to the Agency Court.
Collector/Agent to Government / Government Pleader for Social Welfare (Appellant)
- Submitted that the contention attributing a restricted jurisdiction to the Agency Court on the basis of Section 3 of the Regulation was misconceived because Section 3 does not deal with the jurisdiction of the Agency Court.
- Relied on Rule 3 of the A.P. Agency Rules, 1924 (framed under Section 6 of the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874), which provides that the Courts shall (subject to the provisions therein) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except suits whose cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred. The Government Pleader argued this rule confers on Agency Courts the same plenary civil jurisdiction as Civil Courts under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Contended there was no statute or rule shown to the court which expressly or impliedly bars the Agency Court from entertaining a suit for perpetual injunction; therefore the Agency Court was competent to try the suit.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar (Apex Court) | That a suit's maintainability requires no authority of law; it is sufficient that no statute bars the suit. | The court relied on this principle to support the proposition that a civil suit may be instituted unless expressly or impliedly barred by statute. |
| K.S. Venkataraman and Company v. State of Madras (Apex Court) | Authority on the construction of ouster provisions and jurisdictional exclusion principles (as used by the court to support strict construction of ouster). | Cited to fortify the view that ouster of a court's jurisdiction must be strictly construed and not readily inferred. |
| Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee (Apex Court) | Principles/tests relevant to determining exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal and ouster of ordinary courts. | Relied upon for the proposition that certain tests/principles guide whether jurisdiction is exclusive and that ouster must be established by statute; and later cited as providing tests to be borne in mind. |
| Khadi and Village Industries Commission v. N.S. Pai (Karnataka High Court, Division Bench) | Supportive precedent on jurisdictional questions and interplay of special forums with ordinary civil jurisdiction. | Referred to as reinforcing the court's approach that Agency Courts are substitutes for Civil Courts and that ouster must be clear. |
| Modern Machinery Stores v. District Judge (Rajasthan High Court), AIR 1983 Raj 178 | Authority on similar jurisdictional/construction issues regarding special fora and ouster of civil jurisdiction. | Used to bolster the court's position that exclusion of ordinary remedy depends on the precise ambit of the statutory machinery and that ouster is not to be lightly inferred. |
| Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. (Apex Court) | Suggested tests/fundamental principles to be borne in mind when deciding cases raising the question of exclusive jurisdiction of a Tribunal. | Invoked to support the analytical framework the court applied in assessing whether the Agency Court's jurisdiction was ousted by statute. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the relevant statutory instruments and applied established principles concerning court jurisdiction and ouster of jurisdiction.
- The court observed that Rule 3 of the A.P. Agency Rules, 1924 provides that Agency Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature, excepting suits whose cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred. The court characterized this provision as effectively analogous to Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and noted that an Agency Court in Agency Areas is a substitute for a Civil Court with corresponding jurisdiction.
- Two conditions were identified by the court as necessary for an Agency Court to be competent: (i) the suit must be of a civil nature; and (ii) the suit's cognizance must not be expressly or impliedly barred by statute. The court emphasized that ouster provisions must be strictly construed and cannot be readily inferred.
- Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that the suit filed by the third respondent (for perpetual injunction) is a suit of civil nature seeking civil relief. The court further held that Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 deals with transfer of immovable property by members of scheduled tribes and does not purport to address the jurisdiction of the Agency Court.
- Because no other statute or statutory rule was shown to the court that would expressly or impliedly bar the Agency Court from entertaining a suit for perpetual injunction, the court concluded that the Agency Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
- On the question of locus to appeal, the court acknowledged the general rule that a court or statutory quasi-judicial authority is normally not permitted to assail an order of a superior court on the ground that it is not an aggrieved party. However, the court identified an "extraordinary situation" here: allowing the single Judge's order to stand would effectively restrict Agency Court jurisdiction to land-related suits only, substantially curtailing its jurisdiction and causing serious administrative and justice-administration difficulties in Agency Areas. Given that the Collector/Agent (whose jurisdiction was directly affected) was impleaded as 1st respondent in the writ petition, the court found that the Collector/Agent had sufficient locus to prefer the writ appeal.
- The court declined to express any opinion on separate contentions raised regarding territorial jurisdiction and subject-matter of the dispute, noting that those matters could permissibly be raised before and decided by the Agency Court.
Holding and Implications
The writ appeal is allowed; the order dated 9-4-1998 passed by the learned single Judge is set aside, and Writ Petition No.33 of 1998 is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The decision removes the single Judge's declaration that the suit OS No.49 of 1996 was not maintainable in the Agency Court; accordingly, the suit in the Agency Court may proceed subject to any defenses or objections (such as territorial jurisdiction or subject-matter) which the defendant(s) may raise before that court.
- The Collector/Agent's action in entertaining the suit is thereby validated as within the Agency Court's jurisdiction under Rule 3 of the A.P. Agency Rules, 1924, insofar as no statute bars such cognizance.
Broader implications noted by the court: the single Judge's restrictive interpretation would have substantially curtailed Agency Court jurisdiction and created serious administrative problems in Agency Areas; for that reason the State and its authorities were permitted to challenge the order even though the private plaintiff had not appealed. The opinion did not announce the creation of a new legal precedent beyond applying existing principles (i.e., strict construction of ouster provisions and the application of Rule 3 of the Agency Rules analogous to Section 9 CPC).
1. The Collector/Agent to Government, Khammam District has filed this writ appeal against the order dated 9-4-1998 passed in WP No.33 of 1998 by the learned single Judge.
2. WP No.33 of the 1998 was filed by the Bhadrachalam Division Lorry Owners Association, Bridge Road, Bhadrachalam, praying for writ of mandamus declaring the action of the Collector/Agent to Government-appellant herein, who is impleaded as 1st respondent in the writ petition, in entertaining the suit OS No.49 of 1996 filed by one Sri Chennupati Ramakotaiah Lorry Transport, Vijayawada, for perpetual injunction against the writ petitioner, as arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction.
3. It appears that the 3rd respondent filed suit OS No.49 of 1996 praying for the relief of perpetual injunction against the writ petitioner's association from interfering with his transport business along with an interlocutory application for temporary injunction. The said suit was entertained by the Collector/Agent to Government, Khammam District and that is why the Bhadrachalam Division Lorry Owners Association, against which injunction was sought before the Agency Court, filed the writ petition. Before the learned single Judge, it appears, it was contended that under Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959, (for short, 'the Regulation'), a suit relating to lands could only be entertained by the Agency Court and not other kinds of suits. The learned Judge accepting the said contention of the writ petitioner held that the suit filed by the 3rd respondent is not maintainable and consequently, the learned Judge allowed the writ petition and declared that the suit filed by the 3rd respondent is not maintainable. Hence, this writ appeal by the Collector/Agent to Government, Khammam District.
4. Learned Government Pleader for Social Welfare would contend that the contention put forth before the learned Judge that under section 3 of the regulation only suits relating to the lands could be entertained and not any other suit is totally misconceived inasmuch as section 3 of the regulation does not deal at all with the jurisdiction of the Agency Court to entertain the suit. Learned Government Pleader would draw our attention to Rule 3 of the A.P. Agency Rules, 1924, ( for short, 'the Agency Rules') framed by the Governor by virtue of the power conferred under Section 6 of the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874. Rule 3 of the Agency Rules reads-
"3. The Courts shall subject to the provisions herein contained have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature, excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred."
5. The provision of Rule 3 of the Agency Rules is exactly similar to that of section 9 of cpc. By virtue of Rule 3 of the Agency Rules, the Agency Court has the jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature, excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. At the outset, it needs to be noticed that an Agency Court is a substitute for a Civil Court in every respect in the Agency Areas and therefore, it has the same jurisdiction, which a Civil Court has under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Generally speaking, Agency Courts like Civil Courts have plenary powers to try all suits which involve determination of any civil right. Only two things are required to give the jurisdiction, i.e., (i) dispute must be of a civil nature, and (ii) its cognizance must not be barred by other statute either expressly or by necessary implication. Ouster of Agency Courts jurisdiction cannot be readily inferred and the provisions of ouster have to be strictly construed. Out of one incident or transaction more than one cause of action may arise, each giving rise to an independent right. Every right has a remedy and exclusion of ordinary remedy will depend upon the ambit of machinery provided for in the provisions of exclusion. Therefore, all will depend upon host of factors like the nature of the grievance, grounds of challenge, nature of remedy provided for in the enactment and conditions attached to that remedy. There is an inherent right in every person to bring a suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute, one may, at one's peril, bring a suit of one's choice. It is no answer to a suit, howsoever frivolous the claim, that the law confers no such right to sue. In Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar, , the Apex Court held that a suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit. A suit is expressly barred if a legislation in express terms says so. It is impliedly barred if a statute creates a new offence or a new right and prescribes a particular penalty or special remedy. In that event, no other remedy can, in the absence of contrary intention, be resorted to. In forming this opinion, we are fortified by the judgments of the Apex Court in K.S. Venkataraman and Company v. State of Madras, , Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, , and the judgment of a Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in Khadi and Village Industries Commission v. N.S. Pai, , and also the judgment of Rajasthan High Court in Modern Machinery Stores v. District Judge, AIR 1983 Raj 178. However, two conditions are required to be fulfilled before an Agency Court can be said to be competent to try a suit, i.e., the suit must be of a civil nature; and (ii) the cognizance of such a suit should not have been expressly or impliedly barred. In Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., , and Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee (supra), the Apex Court suggested certain tests/fundamental principles to be borne in mind in deciding cases where the question of exclusive jurisdiction of Tribunal is raised. It is not the case of the writ petitioner that the jurisdiction of the Agency Court is ousted explicitly or impliedly by any other statute.
6. It cannot be gainsaid that the suit filed by the 3rd respondent in the Agency Court is a suit of civil nature seeking a civil remedy. section 3 of the regulation does not at all deal with the jurisdiction of the Agency Court to entertain the suits. On the other hand, section 3 of the regulation deals with transfer of immovable property by a member of a scheduled tribe. In view of Rule 3 of the Agency Rules and since it is not brought to our notice by the learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner any other statute or statutory rule which bars the jurisdiction of the Agency Court to entertain a suit for perpetual injunction, we hold that the Agency Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the 3rd respondent. In that view of the matter, with respect, we cannot sustain the order of the learned single Judge. However, learned Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent-writ petitioner would contended that the impugned order need not be interfered at the instance of the Agent to the Government who constitutes the Agency Court because the plaintiff has accepted the order of the learned single Judge and it has not come forward to assail the validity of the same. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioner contends that the Collector/Agent to Government, Khammam District, has no locus to assail the correctness of the orders made by the learned single Judge. This contention of the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent-writ petitioner is not acceptable to the Court. It is true that normally, a Court or a statutory quasi-judicial authority or Tribunal, is not permitted to assail the order of a superior Court or the Tribunal if its order is set aside or quashed by such superior Court or Tribunal on the ground that it is for the aggrieved parties to pursue further legal remedies and not for the Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, because, they cannot be treated as aggrieved parties. But, here is an extraordinary situation and if the order of the learned single Judge is allowed to stand, the jurisdiction conferred upon the Agency Court under Section 3 of the Agency Rules would be restricted to entertaining the suits in respect of the land only and the jurisdiction of the Agency Court to entertain all other suits of civil nature would be ousted thereby substantially curtailing the jurisdiction of the Agency Court. The situation created by the order ofthe learned single Judge is drastic and far-reaching and it will create serious problems in the administration of justice in the Agency Areas of the State of Andhra Pradesh. In such situation, simply because the plaintiff who instituted the suit in the Agency Court has not preferred appeal against the order of the learned single Judge, that would not come in the way of the State and its authorities in assailing the correctness of the order of the learned single Judge. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Collector/Agent to Government, Khammam District has no locus standi to prefer this writ appeal against the order of the learned single Judge. It is also relevant to notice that the Collector/Agent to Government, Khammam District, was arrayed as 1st respondent in the writ petition and by the order under appeal, his jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the respondent No.3 is ousted. Looking from that angle also, the writ appeal filed by him is maintainable and could be entertained.
7. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we allow the writ appeal and set aside the order dated 9-4-1998 passed by the learned single Judge and dismiss Writ Petition No.33 of 1998 with no order as to costs.
8. Before parting with this case, another submission made by the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent be noted. According to the learned Counsel, the suit filed by the 3rd respondent is not maintainable even otherwise on the grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction in the Agency Court, the subject-matter of the dispute etc. We do not wish to express any opinion on this contention of the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent. If that is the case, it is permissible for the 1st respondent to raise all these pleas before the Agency Court for its consideration and decision.
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