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S.V Surendra Rao & Anr. (Since Died) v. Bharat Chandra, Secretary, Home Dept. & Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
This contempt case arises from an order dated 7-6-1999 passed by this Court in W.P. No. 8386 of 1999. The writ petition directed respondents 2 and 3 to implement the orders of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal dated 19-4-1994 in O.A. No. 2894 of 1992. The petitioners complained that despite the Tribunal's final order, no action was taken, causing them hardship. The Tribunal's order invalidated certain government orders and lists related to the training and appointment of Head Constables and prescribed the correct procedure for appointments and reversions of OSSIs. The petitioners alleged wilful non-compliance of the Tribunal's orders and the Court's directions, amounting to contempt of Court. However, the Court declined to entertain the contempt petition itself.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings for non-compliance of orders passed by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal.
- Whether the Supreme Court's decision in T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Government of Andhra Pradesh affects the contempt jurisdiction over Administrative Tribunal orders.
- Whether the contempt petition filed before the High Court for non-compliance of its own order directing implementation of the Tribunal's order is maintainable.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The A.P. Administrative Tribunal's order dated 19-4-1994 was final and directed immediate action, which was not complied with despite lapse of several years.
- The High Court had passed orders directing implementation of the Tribunal's orders, but these were violated.
- The wilful non-compliance of the Court's orders amounts to contempt of Court, justifying the present contempt proceedings.
Respondents' Arguments
- This contempt case is not maintainable because the contempt jurisdiction over Administrative Tribunal orders lies exclusively with the Tribunal itself, not the High Court.
- The Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India recognized judicial review by High Courts, but the power to punish for contempt in service matters remains with the Administrative Tribunal under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
- The Supreme Court's later decision in T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Government of Andhra Pradesh reaffirmed that Administrative Tribunals alone have contempt jurisdiction over their orders, and High Courts cannot initiate contempt proceedings for violation of Tribunal orders.
- Even if the High Court reverses the Tribunal's order and issues directions, contempt jurisdiction does not merge into the High Court; it remains with the Tribunal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India | Recognition of judicial review power of High Courts over Administrative Tribunal decisions. | Explained that despite judicial review, contempt jurisdiction over Tribunal orders is distinct and vested in the Tribunal under the Administrative Tribunals Act. |
| Government of A.P. v. K. Ananth Reddy | Clarification that Contempt of Courts Act vests contempt power only in Supreme Court and High Courts, but Administrative Tribunals have contempt jurisdiction under referential legislation. | Supported the position that Administrative Tribunals have contempt jurisdiction in service matters, limiting High Courts' role. |
| T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2000 (8) SCALE 366 | Administrative Tribunals retain power to punish for contempt; High Courts cannot initiate contempt proceedings for violation of Tribunal orders. | Held that contempt jurisdiction lies exclusively with Administrative Tribunals even after High Court judicial review; this precedent was decisive in dismissing the present contempt case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the jurisdictional issue of contempt proceedings in the context of service matters where the Administrative Tribunal has passed final orders. It noted that although the High Court had directed implementation of the Tribunal's orders, the power to punish for contempt of those orders remains exclusively with the Administrative Tribunal, as per the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The Supreme Court's decision in T. Sudhakar Prasad clarified that judicial review by the High Court does not confer contempt jurisdiction over Tribunal orders to the High Court. The Court rejected the petitioners' contention that the contempt petition before the High Court was maintainable, explaining that the merger theory does not apply in contempt jurisdiction. Therefore, even if the High Court's order becomes final, it cannot initiate contempt proceedings for non-compliance of the Tribunal's orders. Consequently, the Court dismissed the contempt petition as not maintainable and advised the petitioners to approach the Administrative Tribunal for contempt proceedings if desired.
Holding and Implications
The contempt case is dismissed as not maintainable.
The direct effect of this decision is that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings for non-compliance of orders passed by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal, even if the High Court has directed implementation of those orders. The petitioners must approach the Administrative Tribunal to invoke contempt jurisdiction. No costs were awarded. This decision reaffirms the exclusive contempt jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunals over their orders in service matters and clarifies the limits of High Court jurisdiction in such contexts. No new legal precedent beyond the reaffirmation of existing Supreme Court rulings was established.
1. This contempt case emanates out of an order dt. 7-6-1999 passed by this Court in W.P.NO. 8386 of 1999. By the said order in the writ petition direction was issued to respondents 2 and 3 to give effect to the orders of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal dt. 19-4-1994 passed in O.A.No. 2894 of 1992. The complaint of the writ petitioners was that even though the Administrative Tribunal has passed an order on 19-4-1994 and the same had become final it was not given effect to on account of which they are put to great hardship. It is apt to extract hereunder the relief granted by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal.
"(1) Substitution of PSO 107 by G.O.Ms.No. 585. Home dated 7-10-1991 is held to be invalid.
(2) The list of Head Constables prepared in the year 1990 in various parts of the State in anticipation of G.O.Ms.No. 585 for sending them for training is held to be illegal and will not be operated any further. This will not affect the persons who have already successfully completed the tests after training by the end of April 1994.
(3) The list of Head Constables prepared in 1992 for sending them to training in the various parts of the State is held to be illegal and will not be operated upon.
(4) Only those Head Constables who have passed in the initial test contemplated by 2 (C) by the respective Zonal Officers viz., Deputy Inspector General in accordance with the provisions of 2(C) except the requirements in common question paper for all the Head Constables in the State to be treated as qualified for being sent for training and to the extent of vacancies for them should be sent for training for regular appointments after training according to Rules 11(3) and 15.
(5) Inclusion in any lists other than the one mentioned in para 4 will not confer or continue as OSSIs otherwise than in accordance with law or as mentioned in this judgment.
(6) No Head Constable working as OSSI will be replaced by another temporarily appointed Head Constable as OSSI. For effecting reversion of OSSIs for want of vacancies due to regular candidates being appointed or other valid grounds, the reversion of OSSIs will be in reverse order of seniority of Head Constables (in Districtwise seniority) among those who are already working as OSSIs by the date of the interim order viz., 9-2-1993 which is adopted by the Director General of Police Memo dt. 25-2-1993. The Government will immediately take steps for making regular appointments to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police in accordance with the rules both by direct recruitment and by promotion. This should be initiated within three months from date of receipt of this order. Any Head Constables who is continued as OSSIs because of any interim order of the High Court and contrary to the conclusions in this judgment will be continued till expedite orders by the Court".
2. Mr. K. Ananth Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that even though the Tribunal vide its order dt. 19-4-1994 directed the Government to take steps immediately, no action was taken in spite of lapse of several years and hence present writ petition was filed seeking a direction to give effect to the orders of the Tribunal. He further submits that though this Court has also passed orders directing implementation of the orders of the Tribunal, the same were violated and as such there is wilful non-compliance of the orders of this Court amounting to contempt of Court.
3. We are not expressing as to whether there is wilful non-compliance of the orders for the reason that we are not entertaining this contempt case.
4. In a service matter when the order of A.P. Administrative Tribunal was not complied with, the successful party had initiated contempt proceedings against the Governmental authorities for punishing them for the wilful non-compliance of the said orders of the Tribunal. Against the said initiation of proceedings and contending that the Administrative Tribunal had no jurisdiction to initiate the contempt proceedings in view of the recognition of the power of judicial review of this Court by the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, the State Government filed a writ petition and this Court acceded to the said contention in Government of A.P. v. K. Ananth Reddy, that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 vests the power of contempt only in two Courts, i.e., Supreme Court and the High Courts and in view of the constitution amendment and taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court in service matters, the Administrative Tribunal was vested with the power of contempt by referential legislation under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and such reference to the word Tribunal wherever occurred in Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. 1985 had disappeared in view of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar's case (1 supra). But, the said Judgment has been reversed by the Supreme Court in T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2000 (8) SCALE 366 holding that regardless of the recognition of the power of judicial review of the High Court over the judicial decisions of the Administrative Tribunals the power to punish for contempt still rests with the Administrative Tribunals and that it has not been divested and that the High Courts are not entitled for initiation of contempt proceedings for violation of the orders passed by the Administrative Tribunals and that the Administrative Tribunals alone have jurisdiction to entertain the contempt cases and any decision committing the contemnors for contempt is only appealable to Supreme Court.
5. But Mr. K. Ananth Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, submits that this Contempt Case is filed for wilful non-compliance of the orders passed by the Court in Writ Petition No. 8386 of 1989 and as such the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in T. Sudhakar Prasad's case (3 supra) is not applicable. We do not accede to this contention. In the said Writ Petition we had directed to give effect to the orders passed by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal if the said orders had become final. The said order has to be understood in the context of the Supreme Court's decision in T. Sudhakar Prasad case (3 supra) that we had only affirmed the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal and as the merger theory is not applicable in the case of contempt, contempt jurisdiction lies only with the Administrative Tribunals and not with the High Court. Even if the order of the Administrative Tribunal is reversed by the High Court and becomes final, the High Court will not be having jurisdiction to punish the contemnors in case of non-compliance of the said orders. This is the only, way in which the Judgment of the Supreme Court in T. Sudhakar Prasad's case (3 supra) can be understood.
6. In the circumstances, we dismiss this contempt case as not maintainable. It is open to the petitioners to approach the Tribunal for invoking the power of contempt, if they so desire. No costs.
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