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Rampati Satya Harichandra Prasad (Plff.) v. Atkuri Venkatanarayana

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Nov 9, 2001
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Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Civil Revision arises from an order dated 20-7-2001 passed by the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur in I.A. No. 865 of 2001 in A.S. No. 31 of 2001. The petitioner is the plaintiff in O.S. No. 218 of 1995 (on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kovvur). The suit originally sought declaration of an easementary right and consequential perpetual injunction. The trial Court decreed the suit by Judgment and Decree dated 14-6-2001. The defendant (respondent herein) filed A.S. No. 31 of 2001 (the appeal) and also I.A. No. 865 of 2001 seeking stay and suspension of execution of the decree dated 14-6-2001. The appellate Court allowed the application by its order dated 20-7-2001. The present revision challenges that interlocutory order of the appellate Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned order granting stay of execution of the decree for perpetual injunction in O.S. No. 218 of 1995 is tenable in law.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Plaintiff / Revision Petitioner)

  • The grant of stay of the injunction decree is illegal and contrary to Order XLI Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Relied on judgments of this Court in Pothuru Venkata Rama Raju v. Yandra Venkata Narasayya and Pokala Polaiah v. Pokala Avulaiah to support the contention that a decree for perpetual injunction is not an executable decree and therefore cannot be stayed.
  • Argued that because the decree for perpetual injunction is not executable, the appellate Court lacked jurisdiction/authority to stay its execution.

Respondent's Arguments (Defendant / Respondent in Revision)

  • Submitted that the impugned order passed by the lower appellate Court is legal and justified and that the decree passed by the trial Court is an executable decree.
  • Relied on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in M. Ramachandra Reddy v. Janaki and the decision of the Supreme Court in Mool Chand Yadav v. Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur to support the proposition that a decree for perpetual injunction can be executable and that an appellate Court may stay its execution in appropriate circumstances.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
POTHURU VENKATA RAMA RAJU v. YANDRA VENKATA NARASAYYA Held that a decree for perpetual injunction is not an executable decree and therefore cannot be stayed under Order 41 Rule 5 C.P.C.; however, such decrees can be suspended in appropriate cases (distinction drawn between executable decrees for money/possession and injunction decrees). The Court noted this decision and extracted paragraphs 9–10, but concluded that it conflicts with the Supreme Court decision in Mool Chand Yadav and the earlier decision in Ramachandra Reddy. The Court treated the conflicting holding as rendered per incurium because Ramachandra Reddy and the Supreme Court authority were not considered there.
POKALA POLAIAH v. POKALA AVULAIAH Observed that when a decree of permanent injunction is issued, the appellate Court, on review, should consider issuing a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 2 C.P.C., rather than passing an order of stay under Order XLI Rule 5(2); emphasized need for reasoning, material and findings before such interlocutory orders. The Court recorded this dicta, observed that the facts of Pokala Polaiah are not applicable to the instant case, but considered the principle regarding how appellate Courts should exercise interlocutory powers.
M. RAMACHANDRA REDDY v. JANAKI Held that a decree for perpetual injunction is an executable decree when Order 41 Rule 5(1) is read with Order 21 Rule 32(1) C.P.C.; therefore, an appellate Court in an appropriate case may order stay of execution of such a decree. The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that a perpetual injunction can be executable and that Order 41 Rule 5 empowers the appellate Court to stay execution in appropriate cases. The opinion treats this as an earlier binding precedent of the High Court relevant to the present matter.
MOOL CHAND YADAV v. RAZA BULAND SUGAR CO. LTD., RAMPUR (Supreme Court) Held that when an order having serious civil consequences is passed, it is open to the appellate Court to suspend the operation of that order during the pendency of the appeal (especially when appeal is admitted), to avoid disruptive oscillation in possession or other serious consequences. The Court invoked this Supreme Court authority to support the view that appellate Courts may suspend or stay the operation of orders with serious civil consequences pending appeal, and used it to justify the interlocutory stay in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the issue as whether the impugned order granting stay of execution of a decree for perpetual injunction was legally sustainable. It proceeded in the following analytical steps, relying strictly on materials and authorities referenced in the opinion:

  1. Statutory framework: The Court quoted Order XLI Rule 5 C.P.C. in full and highlighted its sub‑rules. The Rule provides that an appeal does not automatically stay execution of a decree but empowers the appellate Court, for sufficient cause, to order a stay of execution; and sets out conditions under sub‑rule (3) (substantial loss, absence of unreasonable delay, and furnishing security) and sub‑rule (5) (no stay if deposit/security not furnished as specified).
  2. Executable nature of injunctions: The Court examined competing High Court decisions and a Supreme Court decision on whether a decree for perpetual injunction is an executable decree. It recalled that Order XXI Rule 32 C.P.C. contemplates enforcement measures (including detention or attachment) where a party willfully disobeys an injunction, and that in M. Ramachandra Reddy the learned Judge held that a decree for perpetual injunction is clearly executable under Order XXI Rule 32(1) and so falls within the scope of "execution" under Order XLI Rule 5(1).
  3. Conflict of authorities: The Court acknowledged that in Pothuru Venkata Rama Raju a different view was taken — that perpetual injunctions are not executable and thus not amenable to stay under Order XLI Rule 5 — but recorded that Pothuru did not refer to the earlier Ramachandra Reddy decision and that its view conflicts with the Supreme Court decision in Mool Chand Yadav. The Court observed that a decision rendered without considering Supreme Court law on the point must be treated as per incurium.
  4. Application to facts: The Court noted relevant factual circumstances: during the suit pendency there had been no injunction and the plaintiff used an alternative public passage; the appellate Court expressly recorded concern that allowing the plaintiff to use the suit passage by virtue of the decree pending appeal could cause loss to the defendant's land and irreparable loss to the defendant. The Court found force in that factual apprehension as a sufficient basis for the appellate Court's exercise of discretion to stay execution.
  5. Weight of Supreme Court authority: The Court relied on Mool Chand Yadav to support the proposition that where an order would have serious civil consequences, the appellate Court may suspend its operation during the pendency of appeal — especially when the appeal is admitted — to avoid continuous pendulum-like changes in possession or other consequences.
  6. Discretionary nature of interlocutory order: The Court emphasized that the appellate Court exercised a discretion in light of the facts and circumstances and that such discretionary interlocutory orders, unless illegal or impermissible, are not ordinarily interfered with by revision.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.

Implications and Direct Effects:

  • The impugned order of the lower appellate Court granting stay of execution of the decree for perpetual injunction is upheld and will not be interfered with by this Court on revision.
  • The Court directed the lower appellate Court to proceed with the appeal (A.S. No. 31 of 2001) expeditiously and to dispose of it within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
  • There is no order as to costs.
  • On the legal implications noted in the opinion: the Court treated the decision in Pothuru Venkata Rama Raju as conflicting with Supreme Court authority in Mool Chand Yadav and with the earlier High Court decision in M. Ramachandra Reddy, and observed that the conflicting decision must be regarded as rendered per incurium for failing to consider those authorities. The opinion therefore reinforces that, in appropriate cases and having regard to facts and statutory requirements (Order XLI Rule 5 read with Order XXI Rule 32), an appellate Court may stay or suspend the operation/execution of a decree for perpetual injunction pending disposal of an appeal.

Note: This summary is limited to and strictly derived from the statements, authorities and reasoning contained in the provided opinion text.

Show all summary ...

1. This revision is filed against the order dated 20-7-2001 passed by the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur in I.A. No. 865 of 2001 in A.S. No. 31 of 2001. The plaintiff in O.S. No. 218 of 1995 on the file of the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kovvur, is the petitioner herein. The above suit was filed for declaration of easementary right and for consequential perpetual injunction. The trial Court after considering the respective contentions of the parties decreed the suit by Judgment and Decree dated 14-6-2001; against which appeal - A.S. No. 31 of 2001 - has been filed by the defendant, respondent herein. He had also filed an application in I.A. No. 865 of 2001 for stay and suspension of the execution of the decree dated 14-6-2001 in O.S. No. 218 of 1995. The appellate Court, after considering the matter, allowed the said application by order dated 20-7-2001; against which, the present revision has been filed.

2. At the outset, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the very grant of stay of the injunction decree is illegal and contrary to the provisions laid down under Order XLI Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code and in support of his contention, he has relied upon the Judgments of this Court in POTHURU VENKATA RAMA RAJU v. YANDRA VENKATA NARASAYYA1 and POKALA POLAIAH v. POKALA AVULAIAH 2. He further submits that the decree for perpetual injunction is not an executable decree and, therefore, the question of either staying or suspending the said decree would not arise and that, therefore, the impugned order is illegal and without jurisdiction.

3. Mr. M.V. Durga Prasad, the learned counsel for the respondent, submits that the impugned order passed by the lower appellate Court is quite legal and justified and that the decree passed by the trial Court is an executable decree. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court K. Ramaswamy, J. (as he then was) rendered in M.RAMACHANDRA REDDY v. JANAKI3 and the decision of the Supreme court in MOOL CHAND YADAV v. RAZA BULAND SUGAR CO.LTD., RAMPUR4.

4. The issue that falls for consideration is as to whether the impugned order granting stay of execution of the injunction decree in O.S. No. 218 of 1995 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kovvur is tenable in law ?

5. For deciding the above issue, it is necessary to refer to Order XLI Rule 5 of Civil Procedure Code, which reads thus:

"R.5 Stay by Appellate Court:- (1) An appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except so far as the Appellate Court may order, nor shall execution of a decree be stayed by reason only of an appeal having been preferred from the decree; but the Appellate Court may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree.

(2) Where an application is made for stay of execution of an appeal able decree before the expiration of the time allowed for appealing there from, the Court which passed the decree may on sufficient cause being shown order the execution to be stayed.

(3) No order for stay of execution shall be made under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) unless the Court making it is satisfied-

(a) that substantial loss may result to the party applying for stay of execution unless the order is made;

(b) that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and

(c) that security has been given by the applicant for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding upon him.

(4) Subject to the provision of sub-rule (3), the Court may make an ex parte order for stay of execution pending the hearing of the application.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-rules, where the appellant fails to make the deposit or furnish the security specified in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1, the Court shall not make an order staying the execution of the decree."

6. It is also necessary to note certain facts. That during the pendency of the suit, there was no injunction and according to the plaintiff, he has been using the alternative way for ingress and egress to his fields, which is being disputed by the defendant. Be that as it may, His Lordship Justice K. Ramaswamy (as he then was) in RAMACHANDRA REDDY's case held that the decree for perpetual injunction is an executable decree when Order 41 Rule 5(1) is read with Order 21 Rule 32(1) of Civil Procedure Code. In the said decision, His Lordship K. Ramaswamy, J. observed as follows:

"Therefore, the question is whether a decree of perpetual injunction is an executable decree or not ?The lower court assailed that it is not executable and therefore Order 41, Rule 5(1) does not apply. I am unable to agree with the lower court. Order 21, Rule 32 adumbrates that where a party against whom a decree for............................for an injunction, has been passed, has had an opportunity of obeying the decree and has willfully failed to obey it, the decree may be enforced...........................for an injunction by his detention in the civil prison, or by the attachment of his property, or by both. Therefore, a decree for perpetual injunction is clearly an executable decree under Order 21, Rule 32(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. The decree is clearly an executable decree and, therefore, comes within the sweep of "execution of such decree" couched under Order 41, Rule 5(1) of the Code. Thus, I hold that the appellate court, in an appropriate case, if the facts and circumstances so warrant, may order stay of the execution of such decree for perpetual injunction."

7. In POTHURU VENKATA RAMA RAJU's case (1 supra), a learned single Judge of this Court held that the decree for perpetual injunction is not an executable one, and therefore, it cannot be stayed under Order 41 Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code. But, however, he records that it can be suspended keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said decision, which are relevant, are extracted below:

"9. It has to be borne in mind that there is any amount of difference between a decree for recovery of money or a decree for possession on one hand and a decree for perpetual injunction on the other. In the former cases, the decrees are executable and whenever an appeal is filed, interim stay is granted with a view to maintain the status quo between the parties. Order 41 Rule 5 C.P.C. empowers an appellate Court to pass such an order in respect of such decrees. Whereas in the latter cases, the decree comes into force the moment it is pronounced by the trial judge and there is no question of stay of such a decree. It is noteworthy than in cases of decree for perpetual injunction it is the contravention if any that becomes executable and it is the act of disobedience of the decrees that gives rise to cause of action for invoking Order XXI Rule 32 C.P.C. Otherwise there is no question of executing such a decree unlike in the former cases. To dilate further in all decrees for possession or demolition of structures or payment of money, when once the decree is executed it will be difficult to restore the parties to the previous position and there is every likelihood of third parties interests being set in and many more complications are likely to arise. To avoid such contingencies, Order 41 Rule 5 C.P.C. requires stay of execution in such executable decrees. I, therefore, find force in the contention of Sri Chandrasekhar that the decree for perpetual injunction in a case of this type is not executable and question of stay of such decrees does not arise.

10. It is another thing that judgments and decrees for perpetual injunction are suspended in appropriate cases. For that purpose, it is necessary that the evidence on record is drawn into and it has to be seen whether the appellant-petitioner has any chance of success. In the case on hand, the Revision Petitioner has raised several contentions in the counter, but none of them are looked into. It is noteworthy that the evidence adduced by the Revision Petitioner in support of his case has been set out in so many words and evidently the trial Court appears to have passed the decree for perpetual injunction on the basis of that evidence. I do not think that the learned Sub-Judge would have easily brushed aside such evidence if he had perused the same, though superficially, as the matter under consideration was only an interlocutory application. Nevertheless, it was incumbent upon the lower Court to have considered whether the decree which was sought to be suspended or stayed, as the case may be, was such that it was not supported by any evidence whatsoever. In these circumstances, I have to observe that there is no proper application of mind on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to any of the matters in controversy and that impugned order is, therefore, liable to be set aside."

8. In POKALA POLAIAH's case (2 supra), a learned single Judge of this Court observed as follows:

"When a decree of permanent injunction is issued after recording a finding in favour of a party in possession of the property, instead of impairing of such a right by the adversary, after reviewing the same in the appellate Court with the materials available in the case records, a fresh order of temporary injunction will have to be issued under Order XXXIX Rule 2 of C.P.C. and not by passing an order of stay under Order XLI, Rule 5 (2) Civil Procedure Code. It is said that such an order may not always be exhaustive and in a given case even the power of the Court under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code can be exercised. All these exercises require reasoning, materials, finding and the rule of discharge of the judicial mind. The impugned order is arbitrary at least on the face of it without following any of these exercises and cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny."

9. The facts of the said case are not applicable in to the case on hand. The Supreme Court in somewhat similar circumstances In MOOL CHAND YADAV's case (4 supra) observed as follows"

"We heard Mr. S.N. Kacker, learned counsel for the appellants, and the respondents appeared by Caveat through Mr. Manoj Swarup, Advocate. We are not inclined to examine any contention on merits at present, but we would like to take notice of the emerging situation if the operation of the order under appeal is not suspended during the pendency of the appeal. If the F.A.F.O. is allowed obviously Mool Chand Yadav would be entitled to continue in possession. Now, if the order is not suspended in order to avoid any action in contempt pending the appeal, Mool Chand Yadav would have to vacate the room and handover the possession to the respondents in obedience to the Court's order. We are in full agreement with Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned Advocate for respondents, that the Court's order cannot be flouted and even a covert disrespect to Court's order cannot be tolerated. But, if orders are challenged and the appeals are pending, one cannot permit a swinging pendulum continuously taking place during the pendency of the appeal. Mr. Manoj Swarup may be wholly right in submitting that there is intentional flouting of the Court's order. We are not interdicting that finding. But, judicial approach requires that during the pendency of the appeal, the operation of an order having serious civil consequences must be suspended. More so when appeal is admitted. Previous history of litigation cannot be overlooked. And it is not seriously disputed that the whole of the building, Hari Bhawan, except one room in dispute is in possession of the Corporation. We accordingly suspend the operation of the order dated August 6, 1982 directing the appellants to hand over the possession of the room to the respondents till the disposal of the first appeal against the order pending in the High Court of Allahabad. Mr. Manoj Swarup requests that both the earlier and later appeals should be heard together as early as possible. We order accordingly and request the High Court, if it considers proper in its own discretion to hear both the appeals expeditiously as possible in order to avoid the continuance of the boiling situation. The appeal stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs."

10. The question whether a decree for perpetual injunction is an executable decree or not fell for consideration before this Court as early as in 1984 in RAMACHANDRA REDDY's case (3 supra) in which it was categorically held that the decree for perpetual injunction is an executable decree and the appellate Court has power to grant stay depending upon the facts of the case. But, however, in the later case in POTHURU VENKATA RAMA RAJU (1 supra) dealt with by V. Bhaskara Rao, J. (as he then was), the decision in RAMACHANDRA REDDY's case (3 supra) was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge and he accepted the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the decree of perpetual injunction is not executable and therefore, the question of stay of the said decree does not arise. However, he held that the said decree can be suspended in appropriate cases. The Supreme Court has considered the aspect of grant of stay of decree of perpetual injunction by the appellate Court in MOOL CHAND YADAV's case (4 supra) and held that if any order having serious civil consequences is passed, it is always open to the appellate Court to stay the Judgment pending disposal of the appeal. Therefore, the decision rendered in POTHURU VENKATA RAMA RAJU's case (1 supra) directly conflicts with the decision of the Supreme Court in MOOL CHAND YADVA's case (4 supra) and also the earlier decision of this Court in RAMACHANDRA REDDY's case (3 supra) was not brought to his notice. It is to be noted that when a decision is rendered without considering the law laid down by the Supreme Court on that point, the same has to be treated as per incurium. Admittedly, in the instant case, decree was granted declaring the easementary right in favour of the plaintiff and by virtue of the same, injunction was granted. If the plaintiff is allowed to utilize the land of the defendant pending the appeal, it would cause loss to the defendant and the appellate Court has also observed this aspect in its order, which reads:

"But, in the instant case, admittedly, the defendant is in possession of the disputed passage during pendency of the suit and that the plaintiff has got alternative passage on the western side which is a public puntha and that the plaintiff has been using the same for ingress and egress all these years. I, therefore, find much force in the contention of the petitioner/defendant that if the plaintiff is allowed by virtue of the decree to pass through the suit passage, the plaintiff may cause loss to the bode and loss to the land of the defendant and the defendant may suffer irreparable loss."

11. Keeping in view the dicta laid down by this Court and also the Supreme Court in the above decisions, I am of the view that the impugned order cannot be interfered with. Moreover, the appellate Court only exercised the discretion keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and such a discretionary order, unless it is illegal and impermissible, cannot be interfered with. Under these circumstances, I do not find any merit in this revision.

Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. The lower appellate Court is directed to proceed with the appeal expeditiously and dispose of the same within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No order as to costs.