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K.C Kusuma Kumari, G... v. Government Of A.P, I...
Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The writ petition challenges the revisional order of the 1st respondent dated 11.8.1997 (No. 4211/M.II(1)/97). The factual matrix, as asserted by the petitioner, is as follows:
- One Mr. R. Muralimohan Reddy obtained a quarry lease for black granite (1.5 hectares) in Sy. No. 56 of Timmapalli village, Gudipalem Mandal, Chittoor District for the period 18.10.1979 to 17.10.1984.
- Mr. Reddy applied for renewal on 19.7.1984 (for 18.10.1984 to 17.10.1989). Because the renewal application was not disposed of, it was treated as deemed rejection under the A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 (1966 Rules). Mr. Reddy preferred a revision under rule 35A and filed W.P. 11033/86, obtaining interim directions permitting quarry operations. That writ was finally disposed of on 15.2.1989 with a direction permitting operations until establishment of a cutting and polishing unit by 24.4.1990.
- On 11.7.1989 Mr. Reddy submitted a second renewal application for 18.10.1989 to 17.10.1994; it was not disposed of and he filed W.P. 568/90 and obtained interim orders. W.P. 568/90 was dismissed as infructuous on 2.4.1997.
- Mr. Reddy executed a General Power of Attorney (GPA) in favour of the petitioner on 22.7.1994. On 16.7.1994 Mr. Reddy applied for a third renewal for a restricted extent (1.00 hectare). Mr. Reddy died on 29.4.1995, leaving a wife and son (the 6th respondent contends there was also a daughter).
- After the death of Mr. Reddy, the petitioner on 11.3.1996, purportedly as GPA-holder of Mr. Reddy, sought renewal of the lease for the full extent of 1.5 hectares. This application was filed beyond the statutory period for renewal and after the death of the principal; that fact is admitted in the record.
- On 20.7.1995 the wife and son of the deceased executed a GPA in favour of the petitioner. The Director of Mines and Geology responded to the 16.7.1994 application by granting a quarry lease in favour of Mr. Reddy for a further period of 15 years (order dated 9.1.1997).
- The 6th respondent, who had on 21.12.1995 applied for a quarry lease in the same survey numbers for 2 hectares (including the 1.5 hectares granted to Mr. Reddy), challenged the Director's 9.1.1997 order by W.P. 1723/97, and was relegated by this Court to seek revision under Rule 35A. The 6th respondent thereafter preferred a revision, which resulted in the revisional order impugned in the present petition (1st respondent's order dated 11.8.1997).
- There is some dispute about adequacy of opportunity given to the petitioner in the revision, but the revisional record shows the petitioner participated in the hearing. The revisional order set aside the Director's 9.1.1997 grant on multiple grounds.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Director of Mines and Geology's order dated 9.1.1997 granting a third renewal/quarry lease in favour of (late) Mr. Reddy is valid where the earlier lease had expired and no valid renewal had been granted after 17.10.1984.
- Whether a GPA-holder (the petitioner) can validly represent a deceased principal (Mr. Reddy) after the principal's death and thereby seek renewal or grant of a quarry lease on the principal's behalf.
- Whether Rule 25A of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (Rule 25A) can be invoked (by direct application or by referential adoption) to enable legal representatives of a deceased applicant/lessee to step into the shoes of that applicant/lessee in respect of minor minerals governed by the A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966.
- Whether the revisional order of the State Government (1st respondent) dated 11.8.1997 setting aside the Director's 9.1.1997 order is sustainable on the recorded grounds.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner, as GPA-holder for the wife and son of late Mr. Reddy, was entitled to consideration for a third renewal of the initial lease granted in 1979.
- Alternatively, it was contended that the Director's grant dated 9.1.1997 could be sustained by reading Rule 25A of the 1960 Rules into the 1966 Rules (referential adoption) to allow legal representatives to step into the deceased applicant's shoes.
- Further alternatively, the petitioner argued that Mr. Reddy's 16.7.1994 application should be treated as an application for grant of a fresh quarry lease (even if no entitlement to a third renewal existed) and that the principles underlying Rule 25A could sustain the grant in favour of Mr. Reddy's legal representatives (and thus in the hands of the petitioner as their GPA-holder).
Respondents' Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments in opposition; the record does, however, reflect that the 6th respondent challenged the Director's 9.1.1997 order and pursued revision under Rule 35A, ultimately resulting in the revisional order impugned in this writ petition.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Aligarh Muslim University v Mansoor Ali Khan | Cited for the proposition that procedural inadequacies (such as alleged inadequacy of opportunity) will not vitiate an order unless the aggrieved party demonstrates real and substantial prejudice. | The Court relied on this principle to hold that any claimed inadequacy of opportunity pleaded but not demonstrated would not affect the validity of the revisional order; the petitioner must show real and substantial prejudice. |
| M.C. Mehta v Union of India | Cited in the context of the same principle: requirement to demonstrate real and substantial prejudice before invalidating an administrative order for procedural irregularity. | Referenced alongside other authorities to support the proposition that failure to show real and substantial prejudice will not render the revisional order void. |
| State of U.P. v Harendra Aurora, AIR 2001 SCW 2029 | Cited for the same principle concerning procedural irregularities and the need to demonstrate prejudice. | Used by the Court as part of the authorities establishing that the revisional order should not be set aside for procedural lapse unless prejudice is shown. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a chronological and textual analysis of the lease history, the applications for renewal, the effect of interim judicial directions, the impact of Mr. Reddy's death, and the interplay between central Rules (1960 Rules) and State Rules (1966 Rules). The reasoning proceeded in discrete steps:
-
Lease history and interim directions:
The only undisputed, valid lease on record was the original grant for 18.10.1979 to 17.10.1984. Subsequent continuance of quarry operations by Mr. Reddy was pursuant to interim orders of this Court in W.P. No. 11033/86 and W.P. 568/90; those interim directions do not equate to a substantive grant of renewal. With the dismissal of W.P. 568/90 as infructuous on 2.4.1997 the interim protection dissolved.
-
Abatement of applications on death and effect on GPA:
Mr. Reddy's application dated 30.7.1994 for a third renewal abated on his death (29.4.1995). The petitioner's representation dated 11.3.1996 was made purportedly on behalf of Mr. Reddy as his GPA-holder, but a GPA-holder's authority is co-extensive with the principal and extinguishes on the principal's death. Therefore the 11.3.1996 representation was inoperative in law as a representation on behalf of Mr. Reddy.
-
Whether a post-death GPA or new GPA could cure the defect:
The Court observed that the widow and son executed a GPA in favour of the petitioner on 20.7.1995; however, the representation dated 11.3.1996 was drafted as if on behalf of late Mr. Reddy (not on behalf of his legal heirs). Had the representation been clearly made on behalf of the legal heirs, it might have raised distinct questions about their entitlement; but the record did not show such representation. The petitioner therefore could not validly represent a deceased person by relying on the earlier GPA executed while Mr. Reddy was alive.
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Applicability of Rule 25A of the 1960 Rules to minor minerals governed by the 1966 Rules:
Rule 25A (text reproduced in the opinion) permits legal representatives to be deemed applicants/grantees where an application or grant dies before completion of formalities. The Court analyzed the legislative scheme: the 1960 Rules were made by the Central Government under Section 13 of the A.P. Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957; the 1966 Rules were made by the State under Section 15 of the Act. Section 14 of the Act excludes application of Sections 4 to 13 to minor minerals. Therefore, rules made under Section 13 (central rules) do not automatically apply to minor minerals governed by the State Rules. The Court found no express or implied adoption of Rule 25A into the 1966 Rules. Consequently Rule 25A of the 1960 Rules could not be applied to enable legal heirs of an applicant/lessee under the 1966 Rules to step into the applicant's shoes.
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Absence of any valid renewal application capable of supporting the Director's grant:
Given that no valid renewal existed beyond 17.10.1984, and Mr. Reddy's applications abated on his death (and post-death representation by the petitioner was legally ineffective), there was no valid application for renewal or for a fresh grant in the name of Mr. Reddy or his representatives that could legally support the Director's order dated 9.1.1997.
-
Status of the 6th respondent's application:
After 17.10.1984, the only application on record for the relevant area was that of the 6th respondent dated 21.12.1995, which the Court noted was entitled to consideration under Rule 12 of the 1966 Rules. In those circumstances the Director could not lawfully have granted renewal to Mr. Reddy.
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Validity of the revisional order:
The revisional order of the Government (1st respondent) allowed the revision on multiple grounds: (a) the first renewal application by Mr. Reddy had been rejected on 5.12.1984 as time-barred and that rejection stood final; (b) the third renewal application abated on Mr. Reddy's death and the petitioner's application on behalf of the deceased was incompetent; and (c) the Director had granted renewal for an area beyond that applied for by Mr. Reddy. The Court found these conclusions to be based on rational appreciation of evidence and a cogent legal analysis.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Court upheld the revisional conclusions that the Director of Mines and Geology's order dated 9.1.1997 granting a quarry lease/third renewal in favour of (late) Mr. Reddy was void and inoperative, and that the revisional order of the Government setting aside that grant was based on a rational appreciation of the facts and law.
Implications (direct effects on the parties):
- The Director's order dated 9.1.1997 granting a quarry lease/third renewal to (late) Mr. Reddy for 1.5 hectares is declared wholly incompetent and void, and was set aside in revision.
- There was, after 17.10.1984, no valid renewals in favour of Mr. Reddy that could support the Director's 9.1.1997 grant; consequently, the 6th respondent's application dated 21.12.1995 remained the only application on record for consideration under Rule 12 of the 1966 Rules.
- The Court did not indicate that any new legal principle or precedent was being laid down beyond applying existing rules and authorities to the facts; the decision turns on the statutory scheme, the absence of adoption of Rule 25A into the 1966 Rules, and the legal consequences of abatement on death and extinguishment of GPA authority.
Additional Observations Noted by the Court
The Court stated it would decide the substantive merits of the revisional order without resolving whether any irregularity in opportunity denied to the petitioner vitiated the revisional order, because the petitioner had not demonstrated real and substantial prejudice as required by the authorities cited.
End of summary based exclusively on the material contained in the provided opinion.
1. The revisional order of the 1st respondent dated 11.8.1997 bearing No. 4211/M.II(1)/97, is assailed in this writ petition.
2. The chronology of facts as asserted by the petitioner, leading to the order impugned is set out briefly as under:
3. One Mr. R. Muralimohan Reddy made an application for grant of quarry lease of black granite in an extent of 1.5 Hectares in Sy. No. 56 of Timmapalli village, Gudipalem Mandal, Chittoor District. Eventually quarry lease was granted for the period 18.10.1979 to 17.10.1984. Mr. Reddy submitted an application for renewal for a period of 5 years on 19.7.1984, for the period from 18.10.1984 to 17.10.1989. This renewal application was not disposed of and since under the statutory environment of the A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 (for short '1966 Rules') such non-disposal is to be treated as a deemed rejection, Mr. Reddy preferred a revision to the State Government under rule 35a of the 1966 rules. While so, he filed W.P. 11033/86 inter alia seeking to continue quarry operations. By an interim direction dated 12.8.1986 this court permitted Mr. Reddy to carry on quarry operations. This writ petition was disposed of on 15.2.1989 with a direction permitting the lessee to operate quarrying till the establishment of a cutting and polishing unit on or before 24.4.1990. It may be noted that despite renewal even if granted being only for a period up to 17.10.1989, the quarry operations even beyond the period for which renewal was sought by Mr. Reddy.
4. Be that as it may, on 11.7.1989 Mr. Reddy submitted an application for second renewal for the period from 18.10.1989 to 17.10.1994, assuming a first renewal qua the interim directions of this court in W.P. 11033/86. This second renewal application also not having been disposed of, Mr. Reddy filed W.P. 568/90 and obtained an interim order to continue the quarry operations. Noticing that the period for which the 2nd renewal was sought also expired by 17.10.1994, this writ petition was dismissed by this court as infructuous on 2.4.1997.
5. On 22.7.1994 Mr. Reddy executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of the petitioner herein. Earlier on 16.7.1994, Mr. Reddy made an application for 3rd renewal for a restricted extent of 1.00 Hct, as against 1.5 Hct, in respect of which he had initial lease and in respect of which extent he continued quarrying even beyond the period of initial grant, by virtue of interim or final orders of this court. On 29.4.1995 Mr. Reddy died leaving behind as legal representatives a wife and a son. The 6th respondent herein however asserts that Mr. Reddy also had a daughter who was his legal representative too along with his wife and son.
6. After the death of Mr. Reddy, the petitioner by a representation dt 11.3.1996 sought renewal of the lease, for the third time, for the entire extent of 1.5 Hct, as against 1 Hct, for which third renewal was sought by Mr. Reddy during his life time on 16.7.1994. It requires to be noticed that this application dt 11.3.96 preferred by the writ petitioner purportedly on behalf of Mr. Reddy and as his GPA Holder was filed beyond the period within which a renewal could be sought under the statutory environment as also by a GPA holder subsequent to the death of the principal. That this is so is an admitted position.
7. On 20.7.1995 after the demise of the original lessee Mr. Reddy, the wife and the son executed G.P.A in favour of the petitioner. Responding to the application for third renewal dated 16.7.1994, the Director of Mines and Geology granted quarry lease in favour of Mr. Reddy for a further period of 15 years in an extent of 1.5 Hct.
8. On 7.2.1997 and 15.2.1997 the wife and the son of late Mr. Reddy addressed the Assistant Director, Mines and Geology concerned stating that they are filing affidavits, duly attested by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Chittoor, declaring themselves respectively as legal heirs.
9. Meanwhile on 21.12.1995, the 6th respondent filed an application for grant of a quarry lease for an extent of 2 Hct, in the same Sy. Nos. , in respect of which Mr. Reddy was granted quarry lease and the extent applied for by the 6th respondent included the extent of 1.5 Hct, granted on lease to late Mr. Reddy.
10. After noticing the orders dt 9.1.1997 of the 3rd respondent granting 3rd renewal in favour of Mr. Reddy, the 6th respondent filed W.P. 1723/97, challenging the order dt 9.1.1997 of the 3rd respondent. This court disposed of the said writ petition on 25.2.1997 relegating the 6th respondent to pursue the available remedies under Rule 35A of the 1966 Rules, by way of revision. During the pendency of this writ petition itself, the 6th respondent preferred a revision. Notices on this revision application were issued initially to Mr. Reddy, the grantee of the lease under the orders of the 3rd respondent dt 9.1.1997 and thereafter on coming to know of his demise also to the petitioner. There is some dispute as to whether adequate opportunity was provided to the petitioner in the matter of considering the revision, but the fact remains that the revisional record discloses the participation of the writ petitioner in the hearing of the revision petition. Be that as it may, having regard to the adjudication on the substance of the petitioner's entitlement to a third renewal or having regard to the entitlement of the legal representatives of Late Mr Reddy for a right or legitimate expectation for a third renewal, any inadequacy of opportunity pleaded but not demonstrated before this court by the petitioner would not effect the vitality of the revisional order passed by the State Government without the petitioner demonstrating a real and substantial prejudice suffered, vide - Aligarh Muslim University v Mansoor Ali Khan, , M.C. Mehta v Union of India, , State of U.P. v Harendra Aurora, AIR 2001 SCW 2029.
11. In the circumstances I am inclined to adjudicate upon the order of the 1st respondent dt 11.8.1997,impugned in this writ petition, on its substantive merits without divagating on the issue as to whether the order is vitiated on account of any irregularity in affording adequate opportunity to the petitioner.
12. The substance of the grievance of the writ petition is founded upon his assertion that as the GPA Holder of the wife and son of Late Mr. Reddy, he is entitled to the consideration for a third renewal of the initial lease granted in the year 1979 and that the grant of third renewal by the order of the Director of Mines and
13. Geology dated 9.1.1997 in favour of Mr. Reddy could be sustained on the basis of a referential adoption of Rule 25A of the Mineral Concession Rules 1960 (for short '1960 Rules') as being implicated in to the silence of 1966 Rules. Alternatively Mr. Seshasai, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the application of Late Reddy dt 16.7.1994 should be construed as an application for grant of quarry lease even assuming that there was no entitlement for a 3rd renewal and even if so construed the grant of quarry lease by the order of the 3rd respondent dt 9.1.1997 could be sustained as the grant of a fresh lease and on the application of principles underlying rule 25a of the 1960 rules the grant in favour of Late Reddy could be sustained in the hands of Late Reddy's legal representatives - his wife and son, and therefore in the hands of the petitioner-their GPA Holder.
14. Analysis of the contentions:
After the determination of the first lease period with effect from 17.10.1989 no further renewal of lease has been granted to Mr. Reddy. He continued quarrying operations in the leased premises pursuant to the interim directions of this court in W.P. No. 11033/86 and thereafter interim directions in W.P. 568/90. With the dismissal of W.P.568/90 as infructuous, by the order of this court dt 2.4.1997 the interim direction in that writ petition also stood dissolved in the absence of any adjudication or determination by this court declaring that the petitioner is entitled to a renewal. Factually Mr. Reddy was granted a renewal neither in the first instance nor in the 2nd instance. The only valid lease granted was for the period from 18.10.1979 to 17.10.1984. He had no lease thereafter. In the circumstances neither the application of Mr. Reddy dt 30.7.1994 during his life time seeking 3rd renewal for a restricted extent of 1 Hct, or the application of the petitioner herein on behalf of Mr. Reddy dt 11.3.1996 for the full extent of 1.5 Hct, could have been considered as an application for renewal; there being no lease whatsoever in favour of the petitioner beyond 17.10.1984. Be that as it may, the representation of the petitioner dt 11.3.1996 as GPA Holder of Mr. Reddy subsequent to the demise of Mr. Reddy on 29.4.1995, was no representation in the eye of law on behalf of Mr. Reddy. The power held by the petitioner was co-extensive with Mr. Reddy and stood extinguished on his death.
15. Sri Sesha Sai, learned counsel for the petitioner would, however, contend that after the demise of Mr. Reddy, his legal heirs - his widow and son, executed a GPA in favour of the petitioner on 29.7.1995 and that in view of this power the representation of the petitioner dt 11.3.1996 could be sustained. This contention does not commend itself to this court. The representation dt 11.3.1996 is seen to have been made on behalf of Late Mr. Reddy and not on behalf of his legal heirs. If a representation had been made on behalf of the legal heirs seeking 3rd renewal, it could have fallen for consideration whether the legal heirs of the deceased - former lessee, are entitled to a renewal or even whether there is an entitlement for a 3rd renewal. In any view of the matter, the petitioner could not have made representation, valid in law, on behalf of a person who died on the date of making of such a representation.
16. Sri Sai, learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the provisions of Rule 25A of the 1960 Rules to urge entitlement for the widow and son of Late Mr. Reddy to the lease and the right to seek renewal thereof.
17. rule 25a of the 1960 rules reads as under:
25.A Status of the grant on the death of application for mining lease: (1) Where an application for grant or renewal of mining lease dies before the order granting him a mining lease or its renewal is passed, the application for the grant or renewal of a mining lease shall be deemed to have been made by his Legal Representatives (2) In case of an application in respect of whom an order granting or renewing a mining lease is passed, but who dies before the deed referred to in sub-rule (1) of Rule 31 is executed, the order shall be deemed to have been passed in the name of the Legal Representatives of the deceased.
18. It is to be noticed that this provision enabling the legal heirs to step into the shoes of an applicant or grantee o a lease occurs in the 1960 Rules. These Rules are made by the Government of India under the provisions of Sec. 13 of the A.P. Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Development) Act 1957 (for short 'the Act') whereas the 1966 Rules are made by the State of Andhra Pradesh under the power available qua Sec. 15 of the Act. Sec. 14 of the Act excludes the application of Sections 4 to 13 to minor minerals. Therefore, neither the provisions of Sec. 13 nor any Rules made by the Central Government under the power available under Section 13 of the Act could ipso facto be applicable to legal heirs of a deceased lessee of a minor mineral. It was and is of course open to the State Government to have either incorporate a rule such as rule 25a of the 1960 rules into the 1966 rules or to have adopted the provisions of the said Rules by reference for the purpose of felicity of drafting. From the text and structure of the 1966 Rules it is clear that no such adoption is made either expressly or by any necessary implication. Thus it is, that the provisions of Rule 25A of the 1960 Rules cannot enable the legal heirs of an applicant for a quarry lease or an existing leaseholder to step into shoes of such applicant or leaseholder.
19. As already analysed the application by Mr. Reddy dt 30.7.1994 stood abated with his demise on 29.4.95. The application on behalf of Late Mr. Reddy by the petitioner dt 11.3.1996 is inoperative on account of the extinguishment of the writ petitioner's power under the GPA, on the death of Mr. Reddy on 29.4.1995.
20. On the analysis above, there is thus no application for renewal validly made, recognisable in law, which could legally found the grant of renewal in favour of Mr. Reddy or for that matter his legal heirs. In the circumstances the order of the 3rd respondent dt 9.1.1997 is void and inoperative.
21. It is alternatively contended on behalf of the petitioner that the application of Mr. Reddy dt 30.7.1994 could, even if there was no provision fora 3rd renewal, be considered as an application for fresh grant of quarry lease and on this contention it is urged that the order of the 3rd respondent dt 9.1.1997 could be sustained. Whether the application of Mr. Reddy dt 30.7.1994, during his life time, is to be treated as an application for third renewal or as an application for grant of quarry lease, the fact remains that the application abated with his death on 29.4.1995. The application dt 11.3.96 by the petitioner on behalf of Mr. Reddy as his duly constituted GPA Holder could not have been considered as an application for afresh quarry lease either, as with the demise of Mr. Reddy on 29.4.1995 the petitioner had no manner of entitlement in law to represent Late Reddy qua the GPA executed by Late Mr. Reddy during his life time on 22.7.1994.
22. On the above analysis after 17.10.1984, which is the date up to which Mr. Reddy had a valid lease pursuant to the grant of lease in the first instance, there was on record only the quarry lease application of the 6th respondent dt 21.12.1995, which was entitled to consideration by the official respondents under Rule 12 of the 1966 Rules. In the light of this circumstances the application of the 6th respondent which was the sole application, in the absence of any valid application for a quarry lease or a renewal on behalf of Mr. Reddy, as analysed above, the official respondents could not have granted a renewal in favour of Mr. Reddy as was done by the 3rd respondent by the order dt 9.1.1997.
23. The validity of the impugned revisional order of the 1st respondent in the circumstances adverted to above, falls to be considered in the factual matrix recorded above. A revision of the 6th respondent against the order of the 3rd respondent dt 9.1.1997 granting a 3rd renewal to Mr. Reddy was allowed by the Government on a plurality of grounds : Firstly for the reason recorded that the first renewal application submitted by Mr. Reddy was itself rejected by the Government on 5.12.1984 as having been made beyond the time, which orders not having been adjudicated nor set aside became final. Mr. Reddy has thus no lease beyond 17.12.1984. Secondly the revisional order records the 3rd renewal application of Mr. Reddy as having abated with the death of Mr. Reddy on 29.5.1995 and the application of the petitioner on behalf of Late Reddy for 3rd renewal was incompetent consequent on the death of Mr. Reddy. Thirdly that the Director, Mines and Geology has granted renewal for an area beyond that applied for by Mr. Reddy.
24. As is apparent from the aforesaid analysis of the chronology of events and facts, the order of the 3rd respondent - Director of Mines and Geology, 9.1.1997 granting a quarry lease in favour of Mr. Reddy in an extent of 1.5 Hct, was wholly incompetent and void. This order has been set aside in revision and it is seen from the revisional order that the conclusions are based on a rational appreciation of evidence, relevant facts and on a cogent analysis of the legal position.
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