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Pagadala Pedda Yadaiah & Ors. v. K. Annapurnamma & Ors.

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Aug 10, 2001
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondents 1 and 2 were plaintiffs in Original Suit (OS) No. 23/95 before the Senior Civil Judge, Bhongir, Nalgonda District, seeking specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 10.10.1995. Respondents 3 and 4 and the revision petitioners were defendants in that suit.

The suit was decreed ex parte on 6.3.1998. The operative part of the decree directed the defendants to execute a regular sale deed in favour of Plaintiff No.1 on receipt of the balance sale consideration and to deliver vacant physical possession within three months of the decree.

The decree thus required the plaintiffs to pay the balance sale consideration within a period that would enable the defendants to execute the sale deed and give possession by 5.6.1998. The plaintiffs did not deposit the amount by that date.

On 16.12.1999 (more than 1½ years after the decretal time expired) the plaintiffs filed an Execution Petition (E.P.). The court below numbered the E.P. and on 19.1.2000 directed the plaintiffs to deposit the balance sale consideration in court on or before 8.3.2000. The plaintiffs then filed an interlocutory application (E.A. 19/2000) on 3.4.2000 seeking to set off costs against the balance sale consideration; that application was ordered without notice to the defendants. The revision petitioners challenged the order in the E.P. (CRP 1498/2000) and the E.A. (CRP 1500/2000).

Separately, the revision petitioners had filed an application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act for rescission of the agreement dated 10.10.1995; that application was pending.

The court heard senior counsel and counsel for the parties before delivering the common order disposing of the revisions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an Execution Petition filed after the time fixed by the decretal order (here, after 5.6.1998) and without any application for extension of time could properly be entertained.
  2. Whether the executing court could, by its order dated 19.1.2000, direct deposit of the balance sale consideration by 8.3.2000 — effectively enlarging the time fixed by the decree — particularly when that order was passed without notice to the judgment-debtors (the revision petitioners herein).
  3. Whether the order dated 3.4.2000 in E.A. 19/2000 permitting the decree-holders to set off awarded costs against the balance sale consideration, and having been passed without notice to the revision petitioners, constituted a material irregularity and illegality amenable to revision under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioners' (Appellants') Arguments

  • The Execution Petition (E.P.) filed on 16.12.1999 was barred by the expiry of the time prescribed in the decree (which required payment by 5.6.1998) and no application for extension of time had been filed or granted; therefore the E.P. could not have been entertained.
  • The order dated 19.1.2000 in the E.P. directing deposit of the balance consideration by 8.3.2000 contravened the terms of the decree and was passed without notice to the petitioners, rendering it illegal.
  • The order dated 3.4.2000 in E.A. 19/2000 permitting setting off of costs against the balance sale consideration (and made without notice to the petitioners) was a material irregularity and illegality subject to revision under Section 115 CPC.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the plaintiffs' (respondents') legal arguments in support of the orders under challenge beyond the procedural steps they took (instituting the E.P. and E.A.).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Bai Karimabibi v Abdereliman Sayad Banu, AIR 1923 BOM 26 Decree for specific performance is capable of being executed by either party; distinct character of such decrees. Cited as authority for the proposition that a decree for specific performance is not solely in favour of the plaintiff but is capable of execution by either side.
Haramba Chandra Maitra v Jyotish Chandra Sinha, AIR 1932 CAL 579 Supports the characterisation of specific performance decrees as having a distinct (bilateral) character. Used to reinforce the general statement about the nature of specific performance decrees.
H.I. Trust vs Haridas Mundhra, AIR 1972 SC 1826 Authority on the nature/character of decrees for specific performance. Cited as part of the line of authorities establishing the special character of specific performance decrees.
Mohammadali Sahib v Abdul Khadir Saheb, (1930) 59 MAD LJ 351 Principle that the court which passes a decree for specific performance retains control over the decree and may, in appropriate circumstances, extend the time fixed in the decree. Relied upon as part of the discussion that a decree for specific performance is not necessarily final and the court may exercise continuing control.
Peari Sundari Dassee v Hari Charan Mozumdar Chowdhry, (1888) ILR 15 CAL 211 Early authority treating a decree for specific performance as not final in the virtual sense (preliminary decree character). Filed into the narrative that specific performance decrees may be preliminary in nature.
Someshwar Dayal v Widow of Lalman Shah Listed among authorities illustrating that a decree for specific performance may be preliminary in character. Used as part of the authority-ensemble supporting the "preliminary decree" characterization.
Anandilal Poddar v Gunedra Kr. Roy Cited in support of the view that a specific performance decree can be seen as preliminary in nature. Part of the cited support for the proposition that courts retain control over such decrees.
Tribeni Tewary v Ramratan Nonia Also cited in the context of the preliminary/declaratory aspects of specific performance decrees. Referenced to show consistency of precedent on the nature of specific performance decrees.
Cherukuri Venkata Rao v Brahmojosyula Bala Gangadhara Sharma & Ors, 1987(2) ALT 229 Comparative analysis of Sec.28 Specific Relief Act and Order 21 Rule 32 CPC: both remedies available; Sec.28 is salutary; when no time in decree, EP maintainable within 12 years (Limitation Act art. 136) and Sec.28 allows relief within reasonable time. Relied upon for the proposition that while Order 21 EP and Sec.28 applications are both available, Sec.28 is designed to avoid multiplicity and may be more salutary; introduced the “reasonable time” and 12-year outer limit considerations.
M. Sakuntala Devi v V. Sakuntala & Others Analysis of Sec.28: although Sec.28 recognises the power to extend time in limited senses, it does not expressly confer a power to extend time and time is of the essence in contracts for purchase of immovable property; relief in equity may not be available to a defaulting purchaser to extend time where the decree stipulated a period. Used to support the proposition that when a decree stipulates a time for payment of purchase money, that time cannot necessarily be extended; courts have held time to be of the essence and relief may be refused to defaulting purchasers.
Pankoj Kumar Bhattacharjee v Manmatha Nath Vidyabhushan Bhattacharjee (Calcutta HC) Where a decree specifically prescribes time for payment, the decree-holder cannot come at any time to pay; reasonable time is not applicable when decree prescribes time; court may extend time considering the decree-holder's attitude, but absence of any application for extension can justify rescission. Cited to show that when a decree fixes a time limit, the decree-holder cannot pay at any time and that the absence of any application for extension in proceedings for rescission may justify rescission of the contract and decree.
K.S. Vidyanadam v Vairavan Referred to as authority relevant to refusal to grant extension where there is inaction or clear violation of decretal terms. Relied upon in the discussion of Supreme Court decisions where total inaction by plaintiffs prevented grant of extension; used in the chain of authorities culminating in the decision in V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v C. Alagappan.
V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v C. Alagappan & Another Supreme Court decision applying Sec.28 principles: found no application for extension and total inaction by plaintiffs for over 2½ years; held that plaintiffs had not made out a case for extension and allowed the appeals of judgment-debtors. Used as a key precedent illustrating that prolonged inaction by the decree-holder and absence of an application for enlargement of time justify refusal to extend time and allow rescission or interference in favour of the judgment-debtor.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a stepwise analysis, beginning with the decretal terms and moving to the applicable legal principles and precedents.

  1. Decretal obligation and time-frame: The decree required payment of the balance sale consideration within such period as would oblige and enable the judgment-debtor to execute the sale deed within three months from 6.3.1998 — effectively prescribing performance by 5.6.1998. Because the obligation to execute the sale deed arises only upon receipt of the consideration, the plaintiffs were deemed bound to pay before 5.6.1998.
  2. Plaintiffs' non-compliance: The plaintiffs did not deposit the balance consideration by the stipulated date and did not institute any application for extension of time.
  3. Competing authorities on court's power to extend time: The court reviewed authorities showing two strands:
    • One line of authorities (e.g., Mohammadali Sahib and other older decisions) shows that the court that passes a decree for specific performance retains control over the decree and, in some circumstances, may extend time; the decree is in some respects preliminary.
    • Another line (notably M. Sakuntala Devi, Pankoj Kumar Bhattacharjee and later Supreme Court decisions) emphasises that when a decree expressly prescribes a time for payment of purchase money, time is of the essence and relief in equity to extend time for a defaulting purchaser is not necessarily available; further, where no application for extension has been made, rescission or refusal to extend may be justified.
  4. Application of comparative analysis: The court cited Cherukuri Venkata Rao for the proposition that both an execution petition under Order 21 and an application under Section 28(3) of the Specific Relief Act are available remedies, but Section 28 is better suited to avoid multiplicity and allows equitable considerations like “reasonable time” to govern where no time is prescribed. Cherukuri also explained the 12-year outer limit for an E.P. under Article 136 (Limitation Act) and that “reasonable time” is a fact-specific enquiry.
  5. Synthesis and conclusion for the present facts: Drawing on the authorities, the court concluded that where a decree prescribes a specific time for payment, the decree-holder cannot seek to enforce the decree at any time without regard to the time fixed. The plaintiffs had neither complied with the time fixed (5.6.1998) nor applied for an extension. Given this inaction and the absence of any application for enlargement, the executing court could not, of its own motion and without giving notice to the judgment-debtors, enlarge the time and permit deposit by 8.3.2000.
  6. Procedural fairness: The court emphasised that both impugned orders were passed without notice and opportunity to the revision petitioners (the judgment-debtors). The lack of notice compounded the illegality and material irregularity of the orders.
  7. Result of the analysis: On the combined basis of the decretal terms, the absence of an application for extension, the precedents emphasizing that time fixed by decree must be obeyed unless properly extended, and the absence of notice to the petitioners, the court found both impugned orders to be vitiated by gross illegality and material irregularity.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The impugned orders of the court below dated 19.1.2000 (in E.P. 4/2000) and 3.4.2000 (in E.A. 19/2000 in E.P. 4/2000) are invalidated and are set aside.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The orders that had (a) extended the time for deposit of the balance sale consideration to 8.3.2000 and (b) permitted set-off of costs against the balance consideration (both orders having been passed without notice) are quashed. The revision petitioners (judgment-debtors) thereby succeed in having those orders set aside.
  • On broader precedent: The opinion applies and synthesises existing case law but does not purport to lay down a new, sweeping rule beyond the principles cited; it resolves the matter by applying established principles to the facts before the court. (No statement in the opinion suggests that a new precedent was created beyond the decision in the present revisions.)
Show all summary ...

1. Since common issues are involved and between same parties these revisions are considered together and disposed of by this common order.

2. Respondents 1 and 2 herein are the plaintiffs in OS 23/95 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Bhongir, Nalgonda District. The suit has been filed for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 10.10.1995. Respondents 3 and 4 herein and the revision petitioners are the defendants in the suit.

3. The suit was decreed on 6.3.1998 ex parte. The decree to the extent relevant and material for the purpose of these revisions, reads as under:

"2. That the defendants do hereby directed to executed a regular sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff No.1 in respect of the suit schedule property on receipt of balance sale consideration and also deliver the physical and vacant possession of the suit schedule property to the plaintiff no.1, within three months."

4. In terms of the decree above, the plaintiffs are required to pay the balance sale consideration within a period that would enable and obligate the defendants to execute a regular sale deed and deliver vacant physical possession of the suit schedule property, within three months i.e., before 5.6.1998.

5. The plaintiffs did not deposit the amount, but on 16.12.99, more than 11/2 years after the expiry of the time ordained in the decree, filed an Execution Petition for execution of the decree. The court below numbered the E.P. on 19.1.2000 and passed an order directing the plaintiffs to deposit the balance sale consideration in the court on or before 8.3.2000. Against this order CRP 1498/2000 is instituted. On 3.4.2000 the plaintiffs instituted an application E.A. 19/2000 seeking setting off of the costs awarded against the balance sale consideration payable by them under the decree. This application was ordered, without notice to the defendants - the revision petitioners herein. CRP 1500/2000 is directed against the order in E.A. 19/2000.

6. Meanwhile, the revision petitioners filed an application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act for rescission of the agreement of sale dated 10.10.95, which is pending.

7. Heard Sri K. Ramakrishna Reddy, learned Senior Counsel instructed by Mr. B. Mahinder Reddy and Sri O. Manohar Reddy learned counsel for the disputant parties.

8. The petitioners assail the orders of court below, in brief, as under:

A) The E.P., having been instituted on 16.12.99 more than 11/2 years of the expiry of time stipulated in the decree for deposit of sale consideration (5.6.98) and without any application for extension of time having been filed or granted, could not have been entertained.

B) The order of the court below dated. 19.1.2000 in the E.P. directing the plaintiffs to deposit the balance sale consideration by 8.3.2000, contrary to the terms of the decree and passed even without notice to the petitioners herein is illegal.

C) The order of the court below dated 3.4.2000 in E.A. 19/2000 permitting the plaintiffs to avail setting off of the costs awarded to them against the balance sale consideration payable under the decree, even without notice to the petitioners herein constitutes a material irregularity and illegality revisable under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

9. A decree for specific performance has a distinct character. It is a decree in favour of both the plaintiff and the defendant in the suit and is capable of being executed by either - vide Bai Karimabibi v Abdereliman Sayad Banu, AIR 1923 BOM 26; Haramba Chandra Maitra v Jyotish Chandra Sinha, AIR 1932 CAL 579; H.I. Trust vs Haridas Mundhra, AIR 1972 SC 1826.

10. The court which passes a decree for specific performance retains control over the decree even after passing of the decree. It has thus been held that the court which passed a decree for specific performance has the power to extend the time fixed in the decree for the reason that the court retains control over the decree and the contract between the parties is not extinguished by the passing of a decree for specific performance. In that sense the decree passed in a suit for specific performance is not a final decree and the suit must be deemed to be pending even after the decree - vide Mohammadali Sahib v Abdul Khadir Saheb, (1930) 59 MAD LJ 351; Peari Sundari Dassee v Hari Charan Mozumdar Chowdhry, (1888) ILR 15 CAL 211; Someshwar Dayal v Widow of Lalman Shah, . In the virtual sense, therefore, a decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree - vide Anandilal Poddar v Gunedra Kr. Roy, ; Tribeni Tewary v Ramratan Nonia, .

11. On a comparative analysis of the provisions of Sec.28 of the Specific Relief Act and Order 21 Rule 32 CPC, Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy (as His Lordship then was) speaking for a Division Bench of this court in Cherukuri Venkata Rao v Brahmojosyula Bala Gangadhara Sharma and others, 1987(2) ALT 229 held that both an E.P. under Order 21 of CPC as well as an application under Section 28(3) of the Specific Relief Act are available to the plaintiff for enforcement of a decree for specific performance, but the provisions of Sec.28 which are designed to obviate multiplicity of the proceedings are more salutory. It was held that where no time is prescribed in the decree for the performance of the reciprocal obligations thereunder, then and in such a case an E.P. is maintainable if it is instituted within 12 years in view of Art. 136 of the Limitation Act and if it is instituted under Section 28(3) of the Specific Relief Act, within a reasonable time even though no period of limitation is prescribed thereunder. This is so in view of the fact that grant of relief under Specific Relief Act is based on equity, fair play and good conscience. Even in case of an E.P. while 12 years is the outer limit, any application for execution preferred technically within a period of 12 years cannot automatically be held to be filed with reasonable deligence. The application should be filed much sooner and within a reasonable time. "What is reasonable time" is a question of fact to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case.

12. In an apposite fact situation Justice Chinnappa Reddy (as His Lordship then was) speaking for a Division Bench of this court in M. Sakuntala Devi v V. Sakuntala and Others, analyzing the provisions of Sec.28 of the Specific Relief Act, which provides for rescission, in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property, the specific performance of which has been granted, and further provides for consequences of such rescission, held that though the provisions recognise the power of the Court to extend the time prescribed by the decree for payment of purchase money, it does not expressly confer any power on the Court to extend time. It does not also purport to prescribe the conditions subject to which the Court may allow further time than that prescribed in the decree for payment of the purchase money. This court ruled that it is equally well settled that in a contract for purchase of immovable property time is to be considered to be of essence and relief cannot be granted in equity to the defaulting purchaser. It must thus follow that where a Court grants a decree for specific performance of an agreement to reconvey immovable property and stipulates a time for payment of purchase money, such time cannot later be extended.

13. Dealing with a fact situation arising under the Specific Relief Act 1877, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Pankoj Kumar Bhattacharjee v Manmatha Nath Vidyabhushan Bhattacharjee, held that where a decree for specific performance specifically provides for payment of balance of purchase money within certain time it is not open to the decree holder to come at any time to pay money and ask for enforcement of the decree. No question of payment within reasonable time arises in such a case. The Calcutta High Court also held that the court may, however, extend the time taking into consideration the attitude of the decree holder. However, the court clearly ruled that where a decree holder has not made any application for extension of time at any stage of the proceedings instituted for rescission, an order rescinding the contract and the decree for specific performance is justified. The court specifically held that even in the absence of any specific provision of power to fix a time limit for the performance of the plaintiff's obligation, under Specific Relief Act 1877, the prescription of a time limit is valid and the parties must act in conformity to the time fixed.

14. In a case the respondent-decree holder filed an application for execution of the decree for specific performance of contract 5 years after the decree of the Trial Court and 3 years after the dismissal of the appeals by the High Court. In one of the cases balance of consideration amount was deposited much after the period granted in the decree and in the other no amount of balance consideration was at all deposited. The appellant judgment debtor contested the E.P. on the ground that the decree holder failed to deposit the balance amount of consideration in terms of the decree. The executing court dismissed the E.P. holding that the amount of balance consideration was not paid within the time stipulated under the decree. In the revisions against these orders instituted by the respondent-decree holders the High Court remitted the matter to the executing court with a direction to treat the application as an Interlocutory Application in the E.P. and to dispose of them in accordance with law. Aggrieved thereby the appellant-judgment debtors preferred appeals to the Supreme Court. Considering the provisions of Sec.28 of the Specific Relief Act, the Supreme Court found that no application has been preferred by the respondents-decree holders before the trial court seeking extension of time to deposit the balance amount under the decrees. It further found that the case before it is not of a mere delay but total inaction on the part of the plaintiff for over 2 1/2 years, in clear violation of the terms of agreement and of the decree. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in K.S. Vidyanadam v Vairavan, , the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs had not made out a case for interference by way of extension of time. The appeals preferred by the judgment debtors were accordingly allowed - V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v C. Alagappan and Another, .

15. In the case on hand a true and fair construction of the decretal terms must posit an obligation on the plaintiff to pay the balance sale consideration within such period as would obligate and enable the judgment debtor to execute the sale deed within three months from the date of the decree i.e., within three months from 6.3.98. Since the obligation of the judgment debtor to execute the sale deed springs into operation on receipt of the balance sale consideration, the plaintiffs-respondents 1 and 2 herein, must be held obligated, in terms of the decree, to pay the balance sale consideration prior to 5.6.98.

16. We are, in this case, not concerned with an application of the respondents 1 and 2 seeking extension of time for payment of purchase money, in an application preferred by the petitioners herein for rescission of the agreement of sale, instituted in OS 23/95. In fact the plaintiffs have not instituted any application for extension of time.

17. The decree in this case clearly requires the payment of balance sale consideration within 5.6.98. This time frame has not been adhered to by the plaintiffs. Neither was an application for extension of time made. In the circumstances the court below could not have itself and even without notice to the petitioners herein, granted time to deposit the balance sale consideration on or before 8.3.2000.

18. On an analysis of the principles culled out from the decisions noticed hereinabove, it is clear that the orders of the court below dated 19.1.200 and 3.4.2000 in E.P. 4/2000 and E.A. 19/2000 in E.P. 4/2000, respectively, directing the decree holders (Respondents 1 and 2 herein) to deposit the balance sale consideration on or before 8.3.2000 and allowing the application seeking setting off of the costs awarded against the balance sale consideration payable, suffer from vice of gross illegality and material irregularity. In the absence of any application filed for enlargement of the time for deposit of balance sale consideration, the court below could not have, of its own accord, enlarged the time for payment of the balance sale consideration, as it did by its order dated 19.1.2000. Both the orders also suffer from the irretrievable error of having been passed without notice and opportunity to the petitioners-judgment debtors. The orders thus call for invalidation and are accordingly set aside.