JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, C.J.

1. The vires of Section 52 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2000 is in question in these petitions.

2. The petitioners herein intend to covert their petrol vehicles into diesel vehicles by replacing petrol engine with a diesel engine. A Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 5501 of 2001, disposed of on 18-4-2001 has held that although such substitution of a petrol engine by a diesel engine is not permissible under the main provision it is so in terms of the proviso appended thereto.

3. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties would contend that with a view to attract the rigour of subsection (1) of section 52 it must be shown that the entire basic feature of the vehicle is being changed. Reliance in this connection has been placed on T.K. Radhamani v. Joint Regional Transport Officer, Mattancherry, , and A.Narayana Rao v. Assistant Secretary, RTA, Sec 'Bad, . It was submitted that the word "modification" should be given a wide meaning inasmuch as in a case where a vehicle meets with an accident and the engine becomes usuable the same can in no circumstances be changed. In this connection our attention has also been drawn to the proviso appended to Sub-section (3) of Section 52 of the Act.

4. For the purpose of considering the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners it may be profitable to notice the history of the legislation.

5. Section 32 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 reads thus:

Alteration in motor vehicle :--(1) No owner of a motor vehicle shall so alter the vehicle that the particulars contained in the certificate of registration are no longer accurate, unless-

(a) he has given notice to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction he resides of the alteration he proposes to make; and

(b) he has obtained the approval of the registering authority to make such alteration:

Provided that it shall not be necessary to obtain such approval for making any change in the unladen weight of the motor vehicle consequent on the addition or removal of fittings or accessories, if such change doe not exceed two percent of the weight entered in the certificate of registration.

(2) Where a registering authority has received notice under Sub-section (1) it shall, within seven days of the receipt thereof, communicate, by post, to the owner of the vehicle its approval to the proposed alteration or otherwise:

Provided that where the owner of the motor vehicle has not received any such communication within the said period of seven days, the approval of such authority to the proposed alteration be deemed to have been given.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), a State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette authorise, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the notification, the owners of not less than ten transport vehicles to alter any vehicle owned by them so as to change its engine number by replacing the engine thereof without the approval of the registering authority.

(4) Where any alteration has been made in a motor vehicle either with the approval of the registering authority given or deemed to have been given under Sub-section (2) or by reason of any change in its engine number without such approval under Subsection (3), the owner of the vehicle shall, within fourteen days of the making of the alteration, report the alteration to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction he resides and shall forward the certificate of registration to that authority together with the prescribed fee in order that particulars of the alteration may be entered therein.

(5) A registering authority other than the original registering authority making any such entry shall communicate the details of entry to the original registering authority.

6. A bare perusal of the said provision would clearly show that merely an application was required to be fifed and in the event such an application is not disposed of within a specified period, such permission would be deemed to have been granted.

7. Section 52 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'the 1988 Act'), as it stood prior to the impugned amendment, provides:

Alteration in motor vehicle :--(1) No owner of a motor vehicle shall so alter the vehicle that the particulars contained in the certificate of registration are no longer accurate, unless-

(a) he has given notice to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction he has the residence or the place of business where the vehicle in normally kept, as the case may be, of the alteration he proposes to make; and

(b) he has obtained the approval of that registering authority to make such alteration;

Provided that it shall not be necessary to obtain such approval for making any change in the unladen weight of the motor vehicle consequent on the addition or removal of fitting or accessories, if such change does not exceed two per cent of the weight entered in the certificate of registration.

Provided further that modification of the engine, or any part thereof, of a vehicle for facilitating its operation by a different type of fuel or source of energy including battery, compressed natural gas, solar power or any other fuel or source of energy other than liquid petroleum gas shall be treated as an alteration but that shall be subject to such conditions as may be prescribed.

(2) Where a registering authority receives a notice under Sub-section (1), it shall, within seven days of the receipt thereof, communicate, by post, to the owner of the vehicle its approval to the proposed alteration or otherwise:

Provided that where the owner of the motor vehicle has not received any such communication within the said period of seven days, the approval of such authority to the proposed alteration shall be deemed to have been given.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), a State Government may, by notification in Official Gazette, authorise, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the notification, the owners of not less than ten transport vehicles to alter any vehicle owned by them so as to replace the engine thereof without the approval of the registering authority.

(4) Where any alteration has been made in a motor vehicle either with the approval of registering authority given or deemed to have been given under Subsection (2) or by reason of replacement of its engine without such approval under Sub-section (3), the owner of the vehicle shall, within fourteen days of the making of the alteration, report the alteration to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction he resides and shall forward the certificate of registration to that authority together with the prescribed fee in order that particulars of the alteration may be entered therein.

(5) A registering authority other than the original registering authority making any such entry shall communicate the details of the entry to the original registering authority.

(6) No person holding a vehicle under a hire-purchase agreement shall make any alteration to the vehicle for which approval of the registering authority is required under Sub-section (1), except with the written consent of the registered owner.

Explanation :--For the purposes of this section, "alteration", means a change in the structure of a vehicle which results in change in its feature.

8. Thus in terms of the aforementioned provision, there could be circumstances where alterations without obtaining prior permission also could be made.

9. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 52 of the 1988 Act, as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2000 reads thus:

(1) No owner of a motor vehicle shall so alter the vehicle that the particulars contained in the certificate of registration are at variance with those originally specified by the manufacturer.

Provided that where the owner of a motor vehicle makes modification of the engine, or any part thereof, of a vehicle for facilitating its operation by different type of fuel or source of energy including battery, compressed natural gas, solar power, liquid petroleum gas or any other fuel or source of energy, by fitment of a conversion kit, such modification shall be carried out subject to such conditions as may be prescribed :

Provided further that the Central Government may prescribe specifications, conditions for approval, retrofitment and other related matters for such conversion kits.

Provided also that the Central Government may grant exemption for alteration of vehicles in a manner other than specified above, for any specific purpose.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1) a State Government may by notification in the official gazette, authorise, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the notification, and permit any person owning not less than ten transport vehicles to alter any vehicle owned by him so as to replace the engine thereof with engine of the same make and type, without the approval of registering authority.

10. The changes effected by the Parliament in a phased manner clearly go to show that whereas the earlier provisions were merely regulatory, a prohibition has been imposed with a little elbow space therein.

11. The first Proviso appended to Subsection (1) of Section 52 of the 1988 Act is not happily worded. But as it well known the proviso has three functions. In 5". Sundaram Pilial and Ors. v. Kousalaya Devi and Ors., , it has been held:

.....what is the scope of a proviso and what is the ambit of an Explanation either to a proviso or to any other statutory provision. We shall first take up the question of the nature, scope and extent of a proviso. The well established rule of interpretation of a proviso is that a proviso may have three separate functions. Normally, a proviso is meant to be an exception to something within the main enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. In other words, a proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify or set at naught the real object of the main enactment. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule.....In short, generally speaking, a proviso is intended to limit the enacted provision so as to except something which would have otherwise been within it or in some measure to modify the enacting clause. Sometimes a proviso may be embedded in the main provision and becomes an integral part of it so as to amount to a substantive provision itself.

So far as a general principle of construction of a proviso is concerned, it has been broadly stated that the function of a proviso is to limit the main part of the S and a proviso may serve four different purposes:

(1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment;

(2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable;

(3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and (4) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision.

12. Section 52(1) prohibits alteration of vehicle as regards the particulars contained in the certificate of registration which are at variance with those originally specified by the manufacturer. It is not in dispute that certificate of registration contains many particulars. Specifications of the manufacturer find place in some of the particulars.

13. By reason of the proviso appended to Sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the 1988 Act a modification of the engine or any part thereof is permissible. Such modification of engine may be made for facilitating its operation by different types of fuel or source of energy as specified therein. But such modification has to be made only by fitting a conversion kit. Such modification is also required to be carried out subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. The proviso, therefore, confines itself to the modification of engine and not the total change of the engine. Rule 47 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 deals with making of an application for registration of motor vehicles in Form 20. Rule 48 thereof deals with issuance of certificate of registration in Form 23. The relevant clauses of Forms 20 and 23 provide thus:

Application for registration of a motor vehicle

7. Class of vehicle

8. The motor vehicle is

(a) a new vehicle,

(b) ex-army vehicle

(c) imported vehicle

9. Type of body

10. Type of vehicle

11. Maker's name

12. Month and year of manufacture

13. Number of cylinders

14. Horse power

15. Cubic capacity

16. Maker's classification or if not known, wheel base:

17. Chassis No.

18. Engine No.

19. Seating capacity

20. Fuel used in the engine

21. Unladen weight

22. Particulars of previous registration and registered number (if any).

Additional particulars to be completed only in the case of transport vehicles other than motor cab.

Certificate of Registration Brief description of vehicle Purchased from the Dealer Name and Address:

Class of vehicle:

The motor vehicle is

(a) a new vehicle,

(b) ex-army vehicle

(c) imported vehicle

(d) Migration from other States

2. Maker's name

3. Type of body

4. Month and year of manufacture

5. Number of cylinders

6. Chassis number

7. Engine number

8. Fuel used in the engine

9. Horse power

10. Cubic capacity

11. Maker's Classification

12. Wheel base

13. Seating capacity (including driver)

14. Unladen weight

14. By reason of substitution of petrol engine by a diesel engine an alteration in the basic feature takes place which is contrary to the specifications issued by the original manufacturer of the vehicle. By substitution of a petrol engine by a diesel engine, several changes including the laden weight as also changes in the aerodynamic feature take place. By reason thereof more pollution may also be caused inasmuch as it is a common knowledge that except in certain situations for the purpose of running the vehicle at a lesser cost, the petrol engines are replaced by second-hand used diesel engines.

15. The second proviso appended to Sub-section (1) of Section 52 only empowers the Central Government to grant exemptions for alterations of vehicle for any specific purpose. An application for alterations of the vehicle for any purpose whatsoever can thus be entertained only by the Central Government. Such purpose may include the purpose which has been referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioners viz., change of engine where the engine gets damaged by way of accident or otherwise and becomes absolutely unusable.

16. Sub-section (2) of Section 52 provides for an enabling clause. It seems to achieve a limited object. It does not apply to individual cases and applies only to those persons who own not less than 10 transport vehicles. Sub-section (2), therefore, cannot be applied in a case where a person intends to alter the vehicle by changing the engine.

17. For interpreting the word "alterations" within the meaning of subsection (1) of section 52, one has to refer to the explanation appended to Sub-section (5) thereof which reads:

a change in the structure of a vehicle which results in a change in its basic feature.

18. The word "alter" is not to be read in isolation. It is to be read together with the particulars contained in the certificate of registration.

19. In T.K.Radhamani's case (supra) a Division Bench of the kerala High Court was concerned with the question as regards quantum of tax. If a person who alters a vehicle whereby the number of seating capacity is reduced resulting in reduction of the revenue of the State, would not come within the purview of Sub-section (1) of Section 52 only because seating arrangement is to be changed.

20. A learned single Judge of this Court in A. Narayana Rao 's case (supra) merely followed the aforementioned decision. The said decisions are not, therefore, applicable in the instant case.

21. In this case the legislative competence of the Central Government to make the amendment is not in question. The provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 52 inserted by the Amendment, Act, 2000 must be read as to fulfil the object and purpose of the Act. As noticed hereinbefore, the phraseology used in the Section may not be happy or the section may not be happily worded but we have to give a purposive meaning thereto. If the word "alteration" is read in the manner as suggested by the learned Counsel for the petitioners we would not be able to give effect to the words "particulars contained in the certificate of registration are at variance with those originally specified by the manufacturer". The changes in the structure of a vehicle resulting in change in its basic feature must not be at Variance with the certificate of registration.

22. It is a well settled principle of law that where the law is not clear, recourse must be taken to purposive interpretation. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless Co, , it was held:

Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has- a place and everything is in its place.

23. In Anantha Kumar Bej v. State of West Bengal, 1999 (4) SLR 661, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has noticed the authorities as regards purposive construction in the following terms:

It is a well settled principles of law that despite absence of a rule, the Selection Committee is entitled to short list the candidates. Rule 9 (c)(ii) of the rules only gives a statutory recognition to the aforementioned service jurisprudence. In a case of this nature, therefore, the doctrine of purposive interpretation should be invoked, and in such a situation the word 'written test' must be held to be incorporated with the word 'interview'. The answer to the question posed in this appeal, thus in the opinion of this Court, should be rendered in affirmative as otherwise the word 'written examination' would become totally otiose. Such a construction is permissible by taking recourse to the doctrine of stained construction, as has been elaborately dealt in by Francis Bennion in his statutory interpretation.

24. In Francis Bennion Statutory Interpretation, Second edition, as regards the rule of 'purposive construction', it has been stated at Section 304 as under:

A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by-

(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-literal construction),

(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-strained construction).

25. In D.P.P, v, Schildkamp, (1971) AC 1, it was held that the rule that severance may be effected even where the 'blue pencil' technique, is impracticable.

26. In Jones v. Wrotham Park Settled Estates, (1980) AC 74 at page 105, the law is stated in the following term:-

.....I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a Court of justice is engaged remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it. Kammins Ballrooms Company Limited v. Zenith Investmerts (Torquay) Limited (1971 AC 850) provides an instance of this; but in that case the three conditions that must be fulfilled in order to justify this course were satisfied. First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent that the draftsman and parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with an eventually that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be . achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainly what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law. Unless this third condition is fulfilled any attempt by a Court of justice to repair the omission in the Act cannot be justified as an exercise of its jurisdiction to determine what is the meaning of a written law which Parliament has passed.

27. It is a well known principle of construction of statutes that all words employed therein must be given their full meaning unless the same results in absurdity. In Gurudevatta Vksss Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra, , it has been held:

Further we wish to clarify that it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some construed according to heir grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the law-giver. .....

28. In Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowear, , the rule of addition of word had been held to be permissible in the following words :-

We are of the view that having regard to the pattern in which Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act is enacted and also the context, the words 'if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family, which are found in Sub-Clause (ii) of Section 10(3)(a) of the Act have to be read also into Sub-clause (iii) of Section 10 (3Xa) of the Act. Sub-Clauses (ii) and (iii) both deal with the non-residential buildings. They could have been enacted as one Sub-clause by adding a conjunction 'and' between the said two Sub-clauses, in which event the cause would have read thus: in case it is a non-residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use, if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family and if he or any member of his family is not occupying any such building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own; and in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord of member of his family is carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own. If the two Sub-clauses are not so read, it would lead to an absurd result.

29. As noticed hereinbefore the contention of the Parliament in making amendment is clear and unambiguous. It intended to suppress a mischief. The authorities no longer exercise a power of mere regulation but also prohibition.

30. The proviso appended to subsection (1) of section 52 thus must be read in restricted way particularly having regard to the fact that the word "manufacturer" therein has been used in relation to an engine and not substitution of one by the other. It is also well known that a writ Court cannot question the legislative policy of the State. It may cause some hardship to some citizens in certain situations but that, in our opinion, would not render the provision unconstitutional. In Devi Prasad v. Government of A.P., , it was held that mere hardship without anything arbitrary in the rule does not call for judicial intervention, especially when it flows that of a policy which is not basically illegal.

31. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in these writ petitions which are dismissed. But, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.