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C. Panduranga Rao v. V. Shyamala Rao & Anr.
Judgment Summary: T.Ch. Surya Rao, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The judgment concerns two appeals arising from a common judgment dated 16-2-1996 (CCCA Nos. 115/1987 and 106/1985) which in turn challenged a common judgment and decree of the trial Court in O.S. Nos. 16/83 and 17/83 dated 29-6-1985.
Sri C. Panduranga Rao (the appellant) filed O.S. No. 17/83 seeking specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 22-1-1977 executed by Sri V. Syamala Rao. The agreement recited a sale consideration of Rs. 60,000 with an advance payment of Rs. 5,000 and an agreement to pay the balance at registration. The appellant alleged subsequent piecemeal payments totalling Rs. 43,000 and asserted readiness and willingness to perform.
Sri T. Chandra Mouli filed O.S. No. 16/83 seeking eviction and damages for use and occupation, alleging that he purchased the suit property from Sri V. Syamala Rao by registered sale deed dated 31-7-1979 and that the appellant was a tenant in default of rent.
Both suits were tried together. The trial Court (after examining oral and documentary evidence) reached concurrent findings that the appellant was not ready and willing to perform the agreement and had only proved the advance payment of Rs. 5,000, dismissing the appellant's claims in one suit and decreeing the other. On appeal, the learned single Judge concurred on readiness/willingness, accepted an additional payment of Rs. 8,000 (thereby recognizing Rs. 13,000 in total), granted a refund decree of Rs. 13,000, dismissed the claim for specific performance, and confirmed the decree in O.S. No. 16/83 in favour of T. Chandra Mouli. The appellant sought further appeals (LPA Nos. 53/99 and 33/99), which are the subject of this judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant (plaintiff in O.S. No. 17/83) was "always ready and willing" to perform his part of the contract such as to entitle him to the equitable relief of specific performance.
- Whether the appellant proved the alleged piecemeal payments (claimed to total Rs. 43,000 or alternatively Rs. 52,000 in correspondence) so as to establish readiness and willingness to perform.
- Whether time was the essence of the contract and, if so, whether any failure to pay within a particular period barred specific performance (as raised by the appellant).
- Whether the registered sale deed in favour of T. Chandra Mouli made him a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the earlier agreement and thus strengthened his title against the appellant's equitable claim.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant's counsel argued that time was not the essence of the contract, and therefore delay (a time lag of two years and ten months before filing suit) should not defeat the claim for specific performance.
- The appellant asserted that he had paid, in piecemeal, amounts totaling Rs. 43,000 (and in one letter asserted Rs. 52,000) and that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract by paying the balance consideration.
Respondents' Arguments
- One respondent (T. Chandra Mouli) pleaded that he purchased the property by a registered sale deed dated 31-7-1979 and that he was a bona fide purchaser for consideration without knowledge of the earlier agreement in favour of the appellant.
- It was alleged (and found by the courts) that the appellant defaulted in payment of rents as a tenant attorned to the purchaser; and respondents contested the appellant's claims of subsequent payments, pointing to lack of receipts or endorsements and discrepancies in the appellant's own documentary correspondence.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded along the following lines, strictly as set out in the opinion:
- The principal question was factual and equitable: whether the appellant had been at all material times "ready and willing" to perform his contractual obligations, a necessary requirement for specific performance.
- The agreement of sale (Ex. A-1) contained no stipulation requiring payment of the balance by any particular date. The court noted that there was also no evidence of any notice issued by the seller demanding payment so as to make time the essence of the contract (citing Section 55 of the Contract Act in that context). However, the court regarded that question as tangential because the material issue remained readiness and willingness.
- As to the asserted piecemeal payments: except for the Rs. 5,000 advance specifically evidenced by the agreement, the appellant did not produce receipts or necessary endorsements on the agreement of sale to prove subsequent payments. The appellant first gave a break-up of payments in his oral evidence (as P.W.1), and letters authored by him (Ex. B-12) showed inconsistent totals (one letter stated Rs. 52,000), undermining credibility.
- Both the trial Court and the appellate Court disbelieved the appellant's broader payment claims; the appellate Court accepted evidence of an additional Rs. 8,000 (voucher Ex. A-66) over and above the Rs. 5,000 advance and thus granted a refund decree of Rs. 13,000. Apart from that, both courts concluded the appellant failed to prove other payments or possess the necessary wherewithal.
- The court emphasized the well-settled principle that a plaintiff seeking specific performance must plead and prove readiness and willingness to perform throughout (referencing the Indian Contract Act provision mentioned in the judgment as "Section 46 (16?)"). Mere assertion in the plaint is insufficient; cogent evidence is required. The evidence, the court held, negated the appellant's claim of readiness and willingness.
- Because specific performance is an equitable remedy, the court considered equitable doctrines: a claimant must come with clean hands. The appellant's inconsistent statements about the total amount paid (Rs. 43,000 versus Rs. 52,000 at different stages) bore on his equity; the court concluded he had not approached the court with clean hands and therefore was not entitled to specific performance.
- Given the finding that the appellant was not entitled to specific performance, the registered sale deed by Sri V. Syamala Rao in favour of T. Chandra Mouli (the 2nd respondent) was held to be strengthened; the purchaser's claim of being a bona fide purchaser for value without notice supported confirmation of the decree in O.S. No. 16/83.
- On the basis of these concurrent findings of fact and law, the court found no compelling reason to interfere with the conclusions of the trial and appellate Courts and refused admission of the present appeals.
Holding and Implications
Final Disposition: The appeals (LPA Nos. 53/99 and 33/99) were dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs were awarded.
Implications and immediate consequences as stated in the opinion:
- The appellant's suit for specific performance was refused by the appellate Court and the court below; the appellant was not deemed to have established that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement.
- The appellate Court accepted proof of Rs. 13,000 in payments (Rs. 5,000 advance plus Rs. 8,000 evidenced by Ex. A-66) and granted a decree for refund of that amount. The appellant's broader claims of payments totalling Rs. 43,000 (or Rs. 52,000 as mentioned in correspondence) were not proved and were disbelieved.
- The registered sale deed in favour of T. Chandra Mouli was upheld and strengthened by the court's finding that the appellant was not entitled to specific performance; consequently, the decree in O.S. No. 16/83 in favour of the 2nd respondent was confirmed.
- The opinion does not indicate that any new legal precedent was laid down; the decision rests on application of established principles concerning proof of readiness and willingness for specific performance and equitable doctrine (clean hands), and on concurrent factual findings of the trial and appellate Courts.
This summary reproduces and organizes only the information contained in the provided judgment; no facts or legal conclusions have been added beyond what appears in the opinion.
JUDGMENT T.Ch. Surya Rao, J.
1. These two Appeals arise out of a common Judgment dated 16-2-1996 passed by the learned single Judge of this Court in CCCA No. 115/1987 and CCCA No. 106/1985. Those Appeals inturn have been filed against the Common Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court in O.S. Nos. 16/83 and 17/83, dated 29-6-1985.
2. The appellant herein Sri C Panduranga Rao filed the suit O.S. No. 17/83 for specific performance of the suit agreement of sale against Sri V. Syamala Rao and T. Chandra Mouli the respondents herein. It is better to refer the respondents by names to avoid any confusion. Sri T. Chandra Mouli filed the second suit O.S. No. 16/83 for eviction and damages for use and occupation against the appellant. The said Syamala Rao, the original owner of the suit house, is the 1st defendant in O.S. No. 17/83 and the 2nd defendant in O.S. No. l6/83 and lst and 2nd respondent respectively in the corresponding Appeals. The appellant filed the suit O.S. No. 17/83 for specific performance of the suit agreement of sale dated 22-1-1977 executed by the said V. Syamala Rao in his favour on the premise that the said Syamala Rao executed the suit agreement of sale dated 22-1-1977 for a consideration of Rs. 60,000/- and received an amount of Rs. 5,000/- as advance while agreeing to receive the balance sale consideration at the time of registration of the sale deed, and that subsequently the appellant paid some amounts in piecemeal, all put together to an amount of Rs. 43,000/- and that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract by paying the balance sale consideration. Sri T. Chandramouli filed the suit O.S. No. 16/83 on the premise that he purchased the suit property which is a house property from Sri C. Syamala Rao under a registered sale deed dated 31-7-1979 and that the appellant herein was the tenant attorned to him and committed default in paying the rents. Both the suits had been tried together and evidence was recorded in O.S. No. 17/83. Upon considering the oral and documentary evidence adduced on either side, the learned trial Judge dismissed the suit O.S. No. 16/83 of the appellant and decreed the suit O.S. No. 17/83. While dismissing the suit it was found by the trial Court that the appellant was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and his contention that he paid an amount of Rs. 43,000/- in all is not proved except to the extent of the payment of Rs. 5,000/- as advance. In the other suit, he found that Sri T. Chandra Mouli who is the plaintiff therein was the owner of the suit premises and the appellant committed default in payment of rents.
3. In the appeals the learned single Judge of this Court on an overall appreciation of the evidence both oral and documentary adduced in the suit has come to the conclusion that the appellant was never ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and thus concurred with the finding of the lower Court. However, on the issue of the payment of various amounts, the learned Judge accepted the payment of Rs, 8,000/- subsequently while disbelieving the version of the appellant with regard to the payment of other amounts and thus, modified the Judgment of the trial Court by granting a decree for the refund of an amount of Rs. 13,000/- while dismissing the suit for the relief of specific performance of the contract. The decree in other suit O.S. 16/83 was confirmed on the ground that the 2nd respondent was the owner of the house under the sale deed while disbelieving the tenancy. Aggrieved by the said Judgment and Decree, the present Appeals have been sought to be filed as aforesaid.
4. Now, in these appeals the learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the time is not the essence of the contract, and that therefore, the Appellate Court went wrong in not having considered the same. It is his other contention that the appellant paid in all Rs. 43,000/- and merely because of time lag of two years and ten months in filing the suit after the execution of the agreement of sale, it cannot be said that the appellant was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and on that score the relief of specific performance cannot be refused.
5. There is no dispute in regard to the execution of Ex.A-1 suit agreement of sale dated 22-1-1977. We have gone through the contents of the document. There has been no stipulation in the agreement for payment of the balance sale consideration on or before a particular date. It is not the case of Sri V. Syamala Rao that he issued any notice to the appellant demanding the payment of the sale consideration on or before a particular date, thereby making the time as an essence of the contract as ordained in Section 55 of the Contract Act. All this is not germane for consideration, inasmuch as the material issue of fact in this case is as to whether the appellant was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, which issue can be disposed of without adverting to the fact whether time being essence of the contract or not.
6. The appellant claims that he paid several amounts in piecemeal from time to time making in all an amount of Rs. 43,000/-. Except the advance amount of Rs. 5,000/- paid under Ex.A-1 agreement of sale the other payments are not supported by any receipts or by necessary endorsements on the overleaf of the agreement of sale-Ex.A-1. In regard to the subsequent payments, there is any amount of discrepancy emanating from the evidence on record. The appellant has not given the details with reference to the dates of these payments in the plaint. But, in his evidence as P.W.1 for the first time, he has given the break-up for the amount of Rs. 43,000/-. In Ex. B-12 letter written by the appellant to the 1st respondent it has been mentioned that the appellant in all paid an amount of Rs. 52,000/-. There has been no whisper about the alleged piecemeal payments at any point of time; as can be seen from the letters written by the appellant. The entire episode has been set up for the first time after the appellant received Ex.A-3 notice. Generally the payments said to have been made by the appellant which are not supported by any receipts, nor any endorsements on the suit agreement of sale cannot validly be accepted. Now in view of the discrepancy in regard to these payments and the total amount even, it becomes much more difficult for any reasonable and prudent man to accept the same. On an over-all appreciation of the evidence, the trial Court has come to the conclusion that the appellant did not pay any amounts except the advance amount of Rs. 5,000/- But in the appeal the learned single Judge of this Court has come to the conclusion that in addition to the amount of Rs. 5,000/- as advance, the appellant did pay an amount of Rs. 8,000/- subsequently under Ex. A-66 voucher. The fact remains that as regards the other payments, both the Courts have concurrently held that the appellant could not prove the payment of the other amounts and that he was not having necessary wherewithal to pay the alleged payments. We have also gone through the evidence, oral and documentary, and we see no compelling reasons to come to a different conclusion than what has been arrived at concurrently by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court.
7. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that it is not a case of making false statement by the appellant in regard to the payments as alleged, but it is a case at best of not proving the said fact. If it is a case of making a false statement in regard to the payments, it has its own consequences inasmuch as the appellant cannot seek the equitable relief of specific performance on account of his own conduct in making such false statement. Any way it is not the finding of the trial Court, nor that of the 1st appellate Court that the appellant made false statement with regard to the subsequent payments. Whatever it may be, the fact ultimately remains that the appellant failed to show that he paid the amounts time to time to the 1st respondent as alleged by him by any test of preponderance of probability and that takes away the validity of the plea that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
8. By now it is well settled that in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff should plead and prove that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Section 46 (16?) of the Indian Contract Act also ordains the same. Mere taking of a plea in the plaint is not sufficient, the plaintiff should prove with cogent evidence his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract at all material times i.e., from the date of the contract till the date of the suit. The evidence on record negates such a plea.
9. The relief of specific performance is an equitable relief and it is within the discretion of the Court. Of course, the discretion should be exercised on sound principles of law. The party is not entitled to the relief of specific performance as a matter of course even though the execution of the suit agreement of sale is either admitted or proved. He must, therefore, show the equity in himself before seeking the equitable relief of specific performance. The appellant who stated that he paid several amounts in all making an amount of Rs. 43,000/- at one breadth and Rs. 52,000/- at another breadth at two different stages, cannot be said to have approached the Court with the clean hands, therefore he is not entitled to the equitable relief of specific performance. For the above reasons it is not expedient interfere with the concurrent finding of fact that the appellant was never ready and willing to perform his part of the contract as concluded by the trial Court as well as the learned single judge of this Court.
10. Sri V. Syamala Rao executed a registered sale deed in favour of T. Chandra Mouli, who pleaded in his suit that he is a bona fide purchaser for a valid consideration without the knowledge of the suit agreement of sale in favour of the appellant. When it is concluded against the appellant that he was not entitled to an equitable relief of specific performance, the registered sale deed executed by the 1st respondent in favour of the 2nd respondent, therefore, gets automatically strengthened. The trial Court as well as the appellate Court thus decreed the suit of the 2nd respondent O.S. No. 16/83. We see no compelling reasons to differ with the said findings which are well founded.
11. These Appeals cannot, therefore, be admitted. Accordingly, LPA Nos. 53/99 and 33/99 are dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs.
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