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M. Venkateswara Rao And Others v. Secretary, R.T.A, Warangal And Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Dec 16, 1999
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This batch of writ petitions concerns the seizure and continued detention of tourist vehicles by transport authorities following vehicle checks. The petitions were heard together because they raise the same question. The factual narrative set out in one representative petition (W.P. No. 25348 of 1999) is as follows:

  • The petitioner claims to be the registered owner of vehicle No. KA.01.B-1111, which held an All India Tourist permit valid until 12-10-2003 and was authorised to operate in Andhra Pradesh.
  • The vehicle was said to have valid tax paid to the home State and to Andhra Pradesh up to 31-12-1999.
  • The vehicle was engaged by a tourist party from Bangalore to Hyderabad. On 6-12-1999 a checking officer prepared Check Report No. 452041 (dated 7-12-1999), alleging that the vehicle was carrying 35 individual passengers picked up at different places (i.e., not a circular tourist trip), carrying commercial luggage, the driver lacked required qualifications, and permit conditions were violated. The check report estimated a tax liability of Rs. 75,500/-.
  • On the basis of that check report the respondents seized the vehicle purportedly under Section 207(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section 8 of the A.P. Motor Vehicle Taxation Act.
  • The petitioner filed the writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus declaring the seizure and detention arbitrary and illegal and for an order for immediate release of the vehicle.
  • In their counter-affidavit the respondents reiterated the check report allegations and stated that the vehicle was seized under Sec. 207(1) of the M.V. Act and Sec. 8 of the A.P.M.V. Taxation Act; they also stated the petitioner had not approached the competent authority under Sec. 207(2) for release of the vehicle.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a writ of mandamus can be issued by this Court to declare the seizure of vehicles (under Sec. 207(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and Sec. 8 of the A.P. Motor Vehicle Taxation Act) illegal and to order their release, without the petitioners first invoking the alternative remedy under Sec. 207(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  2. If the alternative remedy under Sec. 207(2) is available, what procedural requirements and timelines should the competent authority follow when considering applications for release of vehicles seized under Sec. 207(1)?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners contended that Sec. 8 of the A.P.M.V. Taxation Act had no application because tax had been paid prior to obtaining the special permit and, even if misuse of the permit were alleged, additional tax would only become due after a formal enquiry and assessment. Thus, they argued that immediate seizure and detention under Sec. 8 was not justified.
  • On other allegations in the check report the petitioners denied the facts alleged by the checking officer.
  • Some petitioners relied upon earlier orders of this Court at the admission stage in which vehicles had been ordered released, arguing those orders supported releasing vehicles without approaching the competent authority first.

Respondents' (Government Pleader's) Arguments

  • The Government Pleader contended that a writ of mandamus declaring the seizure illegal did not lie because respondents were empowered to seize vehicles under Sec. 207(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and Sec. 8 of the A.P.M.V. Taxation Act.
  • It was submitted that petitioners were required to first approach the competent authority under Sec. 207(2) for release of the vehicle and that the Court should not enquire into the truth of the allegations in the check report at this stage because such inquiries fall to the competent authority under Sec. 207.
  • The counter-affidavit stated the competent authority was willing to consider release if an application under Sec. 207(2) was filed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nirmala Jagdishchandra Kabra v. The Transport Commissioner (1997 9 SCC 227) Statutory power under Section 207 is to ensure compliance; mandamus cannot be issued when vehicle is seized in purported exercise of power under Sec. 207(1). The Court cited this Apex Court observation to support the position that mandamus cannot be issued to counter a seizure made under Sec. 207(1).
A. Raghunandan v. Assistant Secretary, Gudi Malkapur, Hyderabad (1998 6 ALD 340) Construction of Sec. 207 of the M.V. Act; emphasised that the alternative remedy under Sec. 207(2) should ordinarily be invoked before approaching the High Court, and that many admission-stage orders did not lay down binding principle. The Court relied on this decision to hold that unless the alternative remedy is exhausted it is not proper to entertain the writ petition, and granted liberty to approach the competent authority.
Deputy Commissioner (Prohibition and Excise), Karimnagar v. Shobalal (1996 1 ALT 915) When goods/vehicles are seized under excise law, the High Court should ask why the petitioner did not move the competent authority first; cautioned against ex parte release orders and stressed need for judicial restraint under Article 226 to avoid recycling of seized vehicles. The Court cited the Division Bench's criticism of single-judge release orders, adoption of self-imposed restrictions in exercise of Article 226, and the direction that petitioners should approach the appropriate authority for release.
T. Suryanarayana Murthy v. Secretary, R.T.A., Krishna (1982 (2) APLJ 90 (SN)) Expressed the opinion that seizure of a vehicle by the Transport authority on the highway should be held not justifiable under Section 8 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act where no tax was due at the point of seizure. The Court noted that some admission-stage disposals relied on this case to order release of vehicles where Sec. 8 was held inapplicable because no tax was due at the point of seizure.
Writ Appeal No. 1740 of 1999 (Division Bench) Observed that in light of the allegations and the defence, straightaway ordering release of the vehicle was not in conformity with law and directed the petitioner to approach the authority under Sec. 207(2); required a reasoned order within three days on representation. The Court cited this Division Bench direction as an example where immediate release was refused and petitioners were directed to seek release under Sec. 207(2).
W.P. No. 14331 of 1999 (Division Bench dated 13-7-1999) Held that seizure could be justified under Sec. 207 of the M.V. Act; reference to Sec. 8 does not vitiate seizure; however continued detention may not be justified, and release subject to conditions was ordered. The Court relied on this authority to observe that a seizure under Sec. 207 can be valid even if Sec. 8 is also mentioned, but continued detention might be unjustified and release on conditions can be appropriate.
W.P. No. 15071 of 1999 (order dated 4-8-1999) Disposed at admission stage directing release of vehicle following the decision in T. Suryanarayana Murthy (Sec. 8 inapplicable where no tax due at seizure). The Court observed that some admission-stage orders directed release by following the T. Suryanarayana Murthy approach; noted such disposals did not consider whether mandamus lay to declare seizure illegal.
W.P. No. 14762 of 1997 (Single Judge; adverting to Transport Commissioner circular dated 11-7-1997) The Transport Commissioner's circular required immediate enquiry after seizure, issuance of show-cause notice, direction to release vehicles if owner agreed to pay amounts, and speedy disposal by competent authorities. The Court cited this order and the circular to underline existing administrative directions that competent authorities should promptly conduct enquiries and dispose of release applications without delay.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court set out the legal and procedural matrix and then applied it to the facts and the petitions as follows:

  1. The Court noted that the respondents justified seizure under Sec. 207(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and Sec. 8 of the A.P.M.V. Taxation Act, repeating the allegations of the check report (individual passengers picked up at different places, commercial luggage, deficiencies in driver qualification, mismatch in passenger list, and permit condition violations).
  2. The Court observed that petitioners had not availed themselves of the remedy under Sec. 207(2) (release application to competent authority) in virtually none of the matters, and had directly approached the High Court seeking mandamus to declare the seizure illegal and for release.
  3. Relying on precedent (including the Apex Court in Nirmala Kabra and this Court's decisions like A. Raghunandan and Division Bench authorities), the Court emphasised the well-established position that courts should be cautious in granting extraordinary relief under Article 226 where an alternative statutory remedy (here Sec. 207(2)) exists and has not been invoked.
  4. The Court reviewed various earlier orders — some single-judge admission-stage releases and Division Bench rulings — and distinguished the context: several admission-stage orders did not lay down any binding principle, while Division Bench decisions emphasised that straight release might not be lawful in the face of the allegations and that petitioners should seek relief under Sec. 207(2).
  5. The Court also noted administrative directions (Transport Commissioner circular dated 11-7-1997) which require prompt enquiry, issuance of show-cause notices, and speedy disposal of applications for release, and observed that the competent authority was willing to entertain applications for release if formally filed.
  6. Given the above authorities and the procedural rules, the Court concluded that it was not appropriate to issue a writ of mandamus compelling release or to declare seizures illegal without the statutory process being followed. The Court stated it could not express an opinion on merits of the individual allegations since those are matters for the competent authority to enquire into under Sec. 207.
  7. Consequently, the Court proceeded to prescribe the proper procedure to be followed: applications for release must be made under Sec. 207(2) read with the A.P.M.V. Rules, 1989 (Rule 448-A and Rule 448-B). Rule 448-B requires a memorandum in duplicate with relevant documents and a fee of Rs. 25; sub-rule (2) prescribes which officer should entertain the application depending on cadre. The Court specified that oral applications and applications without the prescribed fee were not permissible.
  8. The Court directed that competent authorities must entertain properly filed applications and dispose of them expeditiously, in any event within 48 hours of filing, pass speaking (reasoned) orders, provide copies of the orders to applicants, and may impose reasonable and practicable conditions for release; continued detention without cause should be avoided.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The writ petitions are disposed of. The Court refused to issue a writ of mandamus to declare the seizures illegal or to direct automatic release; instead, petitioners must invoke the statutory remedy under Section 207(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act and follow the Rules for release applications.

Implications (direct effects on the parties and procedure):

  • Petitioners who seek release of seized vehicles must file an application under Section 207(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act read with the A.P.M.V. Rules, 1989, following Rule 448-A and Rule 448-B (memorandum in duplicate with documents and payment of Rs. 25 fee).
  • Competent authorities are directed to entertain properly filed applications and to dispose of them expeditiously and in any event within 48 hours of filing; they must communicate the order to the applicant and give a speaking (reasoned) order.
  • Competent authorities may impose reasonable and practicable conditions for release. The Court recognised that continued detention should be avoided where it serves no purpose.
  • The Court expressly declined to decide the merits of the allegations in the check reports; those matters are to be examined by the competent authority under Sec. 207.
  • No other relief was granted; the writ petitions were disposed of and costs were not imposed ("No costs").

Note: The Court's order focuses on procedural compliance and directs petitioners to exhaust the statutory remedy before invoking extraordinary writ relief. The opinion does not set out any broader novel legal principle beyond enforcing the statutory process and specifying timelines and procedural particulars for release applications.

Show all summary ...

1. This batch of writ petitions can be disposed of by a common order, as the question that arises for consideration is one and the same. I have elaborately heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Government Pleader for Transport at the admission stage. At their request the matter is taken up for final disposal.

2. Rule Nisi. The petitioners assail the legality and propriety of the action of the respondents in seizing the vehicles on the basis of the check report. To appreciate the controversy, the facts in one writ petition may be noticed.

3. The petitioner in W.P No. 25348 of 1999 claims to be the registered owner of the vehicle bearing No. KA. 01.B-1111. It is stated that the vehicle is covered by an All India Tourist permit granted by the State Transport Authority, Bangalore. The permit is valid upto 12-10-2003. The vehicle is also authorized to operate in the State of Andhra Pradesh. According to the petitioner; the vehicle is covered by valid tax paid to the Home State upto 31-12-1999. It is also covered by valid tax to the State of A.P upto 31-12-1999. It is the case of the petitioner that the vehicle was engaged by a tourist party of Bangalore to visit Hyderabad. The second respondent herein checked the vehicle at about 8-30 a.m on 6-12-1999 at the outskirts of Hyderabad and prepared the check report No. 452041 dated 7-12-1999 in which it is alleged that the vehicle was proceeding from Bangalore to Hyderabad with 35 passengers. It was carrying individual passengers from Bangalore to Hyderabad. All of them are individual passengers. The vehicle did not make circular trip and that the driving licence is not valid since the driver does not know national language without minimum educational qualification and that permit conditions 9B-1 to 12 are violated. According to the second respondent the liability of tax might be Rs. 75,500/-. In the check report, it is further stated that there was commercial luggage in the vehicle. On those allegations, the second respondent herein seized the vehicle of the petitioner in purported exercise of power under Sec. 207 of the Motor Vehicles Act and Sec. 8 of the A.P Motor Vehicle Taxation Act.

4. Aggrieved by the seizure of the vehicle, the present writ petition is filed. The petitioner accordingly prays for a writ of Mandamus declaring the seizure and continued detention of the petitioner's vehicle seized under vehicle check report dated 7-12-1999 as arbitrary and illegal. The petitioner also prays for a consequential direction directing the respondents to release the vehicle of the petitioner forthwith.

5. In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, it is stated that the vehicle was checked under check report No. 452041 and found coming from Bangalore with 35 passengers and the following irregularities were noticed among other things:

(1) Carrying individual passengers picked-up at different places in Bangalore by paying different fares and coming to Hyderabad.

(2) The Driving licence was not produced at the time of check.

(3) Carrying commercial luggage for commercial purpose for hire;

(4) The driver was not having necessary qualification to drive All India Tourist Vehicle.

(5) At the time of check there were 35 passengers whereas the passenger list contained 28 names;

(6) Permit conditions as prescribed for tourist vehicles were not complied.

6. It is categorically stated that the said vehicle was seized under Sec. 207(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Sec. 8 of the A.P.M.V Taxation Act, 1963 and prima facie found that the tax liability would be at Rs. 75,500/-. It is also alleged that the owner has misused the permit and violated the conditions and plied the vehicle as express stage carriage. It is submitted that the list of passengers, the statements taken by the checking officer indicates that the passengers were traveling for various purposes like Business, Visit to relations, official duty, return to home etc. and not for tourism purpose. The other averments made in the counter-affidavit may not be necessary. The very allegations made in the check report are once again reiterated in the counter-affidavit.

7. It is however, stated in the counter-affidavit specifically, that the petitioner has not approached the competent authority under Sec. 207(2) of the M.V Act for the release of the vehicle on production of relevant documents so as to enable the authorities to pass appropriate orders as to release of vehicle on reasonable conditions pending enquiry.

8. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submit that Sec. 8 of the A.P.M.V Taxation Act has no application at all inasmuch as tax has been paid before obtaining the special permit and if additional tax has to be levied on proof of the allegation that the permit was misused or the conditions have been violated, an enquiry has to be conducted by a competent authority and till then it cannot be said that any tax has become due. May be so. As far as the other allegations are concerned, the petitioners merely denied them.

9. Learned Government Pleader would contend that a writ of Mandamus to declare the seizure itself as illegal and arbitrary does not lie, as the respondents are clothed with jurisdiction to seize the vehicle on the grounds stated in Sec. 207(1) of the M.V Act and Sec. 8 of the A.P.M.V Taxation Act. Learned Government Pleader submits that the writ petitioners have to necessarily approach the competent authority under Sec. 207(2) of the M.V Act before approaching this Court. It is further submitted that the Court at this stage cannot make any enquiry with regard to the truth or otherwise of the allegations contained in the check report, as the same may have to be enquired by the competent authority under Sec. 207 of the M.V Act.

10. It may be required to notice that in none of these matters, practically, the petitioners have invoked the jurisdiction of the competent authority under Sec. 207(2) for releasing the vehicle. They have straightaway approached this Court praying for issuance of a writ of Mandamus declaring the seizure itself as illegal.

11. In Nirmala Jagdishchandra Kabra v. The Transport Commissioner . 1997 9 SCC 227 the Apex Court observed that “The statutory power given to the authorized officer under Section 207 is to ensure compliance of the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the mandamus sought for cannot be issued when the vehicle is seized in purported exercise of power under sub-sec. (1) of Section 207.

12. In A. Raghunandan v. Assistant Secretary, Gudi Malkapur, Hyderabad . 1998 6 ALD 340. this Court while construing the very provisions of Sec. 207 of the M.V Act, rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that an aggrieved person need not approach the competent authority under Sec. 207(2) of the Act before approaching this Court, as it is not obligatory for an aggrieved person to invoke the jurisdiction of the competent authority for release of the vehicle under Sec. 207(2) of the Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the orders passed by this Court at the admission stage in support of their contention that the vehicles were directed to be released even though the aggrieved persons have not invoked the jurisdiction of the competent authority under Sec. 207(2) of the Act. This Court in Raghunandan's case observed that such orders were passed by the learned single Judge of the Court in the facts and circumstances of the cases and “no principle as such, was…………laid down”. This Court accordingly disposed of writ petition by holding that unless the alternative remedy is exhausted, it is not proper to entertain the writ petition. Accordingly, liberty was given to the petitioner therein to make an application and the respondents were directed to consider the said application in accordance with law.

13. In Deputy Commissioner (Prohibition and Excise), Karimnagar v. Shobalal . 1996 1 ALT 915 while dealing with the seizure of the vehicle under the Excise and Prohibition Act observed that “the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India observed that it is necessary in all such cases to ask the petitioners why he has not moved the competent Court or the authority before whom the seized goods or vehicles have been produced and why he has chosen to move this Court directly “and further observed that” it has become almost free for all that the moment there is a seizure, this Court's jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is invoked and on such ex parte statements which petitioners make, orders to release the vehicles/goods are passed.” The Division Bench found fault with such orders passed by the learned single Judges. It is observed that “It will also be necessary in all such cases to see that a vehicle used in crime can be recycled and used again and again and unless there is some check created by the appropriate order in this behalf, release may contribute to the repetition of the crime than doing any justice. The Court cannot justify its order unless all these aspects are borne in mind. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution is undoubtedly very wide. But, the Court exercises self-imposed restrictions and applies all relevant considerations which must operate in the mind of the Court while making a judicial order. We are satisfied that the impugned order is not sustainable at all. The same is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed. It shall be open to the writ petitioner-respondent to approach the appropriate authority for the appropriate order for the release of the vehicle”.

14. However, learned Counsel for the petitioners would rely upon number of orders passed by this Court at the admission stage disposing of the writ petitions directing the release of the vehicle on certain conditions. Almost all the writ petitions were disposed of at the admission stage and the question as to whether a writ of Mandamus would lie declaring the very seizure of the vehicles was not considered in any one of those cases. The question as to whether the aggrieved persons can be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India even before approaching the competent authority was not gone into. However, a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 1740 of 1999 observed that “Having regard to the nature of the allegation made against the petitioner and the defence set up by the petitioner, we are of the view that a direction straightaway ordering release of the vehicle is not in conformity with law. The respondent-writ petitioner shall approach the 1st appellant herein and seek release of the vehicle under Section 207(2) of the Act. The 1st appellant shall consider the representation of the writ petitioner and pass a reasoned order in this regard within three days from the date of submission of the representation by the petitioner, excluding the holidays”. Reliance is also placed upon an order passed by this Court in W.P No. 15071 of 1999 dated 4-8-1999 which was disposed of at the admission stage directing the release of the vehicle by following the decision of this Court in T. Suryanarayana Murthy v. Secretary, R.T.A, Krishna, (1982) (2) APLJ 90 (SN), where this Court expressed its opinion that the seizure of the vehicle by the Transport authority on the high way should be held as not justifiable under Sec. 8 of the A.P Motor Vehicles Taxation Act and the provisions of Section 8 of the Act are inapplicable as there was no tax due to the authorities at the point of seizure.

15. However, while adverting to the very same arguments as to the applicability of Sec. 8 of the Taxation Act in such situation, a Division Bench of this Court in W.P No. 14331 of 1999 dated 13-7-1999 observed that “though there is some force in the contention of the learned Counsel, nevertheless, we are of the view that the seizure can be justified under Section 207 of the Motor Vehicles Act”. It is further observed that “The mere fact that reference is also made to Section 8 does not vitiate the act of seizure of the vehicles”. The Court however, further observed that “there would be no justification for the continued detention of the vehicle”. Having said so, the vehicle was directed to be released subject to certain conditions. The other orders upon which reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner do not lay down any principle or law as such.

16. However, a learned single Judge of this Court in W.P No. 14762 of 1997 passed an elaborate order after adverting to the Circular dated 11-7-1997 passed by the Transport Commissioner and refused to interfere in the matter. The Circular dated 11-7-1997 passed by the Transport Commissioner is self-explanatory. Necessary directions are issued in the said Circular directing the competent authority to immediately conduct enquiry after the seizure of the vehicle by issuing necessary show-cause notice. The vehicles were directed to be released, if the registered owner of the vehicle agreed to pay the amounts. The competent authorities were directed to dispose of the applications filed by the petitioners whenever the Court directed the petitioners to approach the authorities for the release of the vehicles. In any case, the matters relating to release of the vehicles under seizure should not be delayed. In the light of those circular instructions, this Court refused to interfere in the matter and accordingly directed all the aggrieved persons to approach the competent authority for release of the vehicles. It is conceded at the Bar by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the respondents have the jurisdiction to seize the vehicle under Sec. 207(1) of the M.V Act on the grounds stated therein. However, it is contended that the respondents cannot seize the vehicle under Sec. 8 of the Taxation Act as in none of the cases, the tax can be said to be due from the petitioners. According to the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, the tax would become due only after it is assessed and demanded. It is not necessary to go into this controversy as observed by a Division Bench of this Court in W.P No. 14331 of 1999 that the seizure can be justified under Sec. 207 of the M.V Act and the mere fact that reference is also made to Sec. 8 does not vitiate the act of seizure of the vehicle.

17. At any rate, it is not possible for this Court to express any opinion whatsoever on the merits of each of the cases, as the same is required to be enquired into by the competent authority.

18. It is also conceded at the Bar that the competent authority has the jurisdiction to pass an appropriate order directing the release of the vehicle in exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 207(2) of the Act. In fact, in the counter-affidavit itself, it is stated that the competent authority is willing to consider the release of the vehicle provided an application is filed under Sec. 207(2) of the Act. Learned Government Pleader submits that in every case, the competent authority is willing to consider the release of the vehicle provided an application is made under Sec. 207(2) of the Act.

19. In such view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that it may not be appropriate to issue Writ of Mandamus compelling the respondents to release the vehicles whenever they are seized subject to such uniform conditions. The aggrieved persons have to necessarily go before the competent authority and ask for release of the vehicle. The application is required to be filed under Sec. 207(2) of the Act read with the A.P.M.V Rules, 1989. Rule 448-A prescribes the procedure for seizing and detaining a Motor Vehicle. Rule 448-B says that an application for release of a vehicle seized and detained under sub-section (1) of Section 207 shall be in the form of a memorandum in duplicate with relevant documents duly enclosing a fee of rupees twenty-five. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 448-B says that the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, of the Region shall entertain application for release of vehicles seized and detailed by his subordinate officers provided that an application shall be made to the Deputy Transport Commissioner in the case of check made by the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority in the cadre of Regional Transport Officer and the Transport Commissioner, if the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority is of the cadre of Deputy Transport Commissioner or Joint Transport Commissioner. Thus it is clear that an application for release of a vehicle seized and detained shall have to be made in accordance with the Rules. In some cases, it is brought to the notice of the Court that oral applications filed by them are not entertained by the authorities. In some other matters, applications are filed but without payment of any fee. Such a course is not permissible.

20. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of various orders passed by this Court and the decisions referred to hereinabove, I am of the considered opinion that a Writ of Mandamus would not lie directing the release of the vehicles, nor the seizure itself can be declared as illegal. The aggrieved persons have to necessarily file application for release of the vehicle seized and detained by the competent authority for the release of the vehicle, if they so desire. Such applications filed in the form of Memorandum in duplicate with relevant documents duly enclosing a fee of rupees twenty-five shall be entertained by the competent authority without any objection whatsoever. All such applications filed by the aggrieved persons shall have to be disposed of by the competent authority as expeditiously as possible at any rate, not later than forty eight hours from the time of filing of such applications. The competent authority shall make available copy of the order passed disposing of the applications so filed by the aggrieved persons. In every case, the competent authority shall pass speaking order, so as to enable the aggrieved persons to question the same, if aggrieved. The competent authority has to consider each individual application on its own merits and take an appropriate decision. It shall be open to the competent authority to impose such reasonable and practicable conditions for the release of the seized vehicles. They shall bear in mind that continued detention of the vehicle seized would serve no purpose. For all the aforesaid reasons, these writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. The respondents are accordingly directed to dispose of the applications filed by the petitioners, if any, within forty eight hours from the time of filing of the applications and communicate the decision to the petitioners. In such of the cases where the applications have not been filed, the petitioners shall file the same and the respondents in the like manner shall dispose of all such applications within forty eight hours in accordance with law. No other relief could be granted to the petitioners.

21. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No costs.