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M/S. Montari Industries Ltd., New Delhi v. M/S. Sri Tirumala Venkateswara Agencies & Ors.

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Oct 29, 1999
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary (Bench: S.V. Maruthi, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Montari Industries Limited, New Delhi (manufacturer of pesticides and insecticides), filed O.S. No. 134/88 for recovery of Rs. 5,06,565.76 with interest at 18% p.a. from 1-10-1988 and costs. The 1st defendant was a partnership firm (defendants 2–5 being partners) that purchased goods from the plaintiff and had become indebted to the plaintiff to the tune of Rs. 6,67,342.80 by 31-8-1987.

On 20-6-1987 a meeting produced an agreement under which the defendants were to return unsold stock (approx. Rs. 3,67,413.61) and pay the outstanding amount; post-dated cheques were issued. The 6th defendant acted as mediator and defendants 2–5 purportedly agreed to deposit title deeds of certain properties (worth approx. Rs. 8,00,000) with the mediator, creating a charge in favour of the plaintiff as security; in case of default the title holders would sell the property to satisfy the debt. The defendants failed to honour the agreement; notices were issued by the plaintiff and a bank guarantee for Rs. 1,00,000 was invoked.

As on 30-9-1988 the plaintiff claimed Rs. 4,12,415.20 (principal) and Rs. 94,150.50 (interest) due from defendants 1 to 5. During the suit the 5th defendant died and his legal representatives were not brought on record. Defendants 1 and 2 filed a written statement adopted by defendants 3 and 4 and denied liability.

At trial the Subordinate Judge (Bhimavaram) framed nine issues, the plaintiff examined PW 1 and the defendants examined PWs 1–9; exhibits A1–A8 (plaintiff), B1–B10 (defendants) and X1–X22 (witness documents) were marked. The trial Court dismissed the suit on two principal grounds: (1) Ex. A3 (the defendants' undertaking) was treated as a bond and could not be adjudicated upon for want of stamp duty and registration despite being admitted in evidence; and (2) the suit was held to have abated because the legal representatives of the deceased 5th defendant were not brought on record. The plaintiff appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit abates in the absence of the legal representatives of the 5th defendant who died during the pendency of the suit (i.e., whether the creditor can continue the suit against the firm without joining the deceased partner's representatives).
  2. Whether Ex. A3 (the written undertaking by the partners) is a mortgage by deposit of title deeds or a bond, and whether it is admissible in evidence despite any question of stamp duty and registration.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Counsel: Sri D.V. Reddy)

  • The suit does not abate; Order XXX Rule 1 read with Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits a suit to be filed in the name of the firm and without impleading the legal representatives of a deceased partner.
  • Ex. A3 is an undertaking by partners to repay money; although it recites deposit of title deeds worth Rs. 8,00,000, the title deeds were not actually deposited—hence the instrument is neither a mortgage nor requires stamp duty or registration.

Respondents' Arguments (Counsel: Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy)

  • When a suit is instituted impleading all partners and a decree is sought against all, the suit abates in the absence of legal representatives of a deceased partner.
  • Ex. A3 is inadmissible in evidence because it is, in substance, a mortgage deed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maharani Mandalsa Devi v. M. Ramanarain Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1965 SC 1718 Explains Order 30 (esp. Rule 1 and Rule 4) CPC: a suit may be brought against a firm in the firm name without joining the legal representative of a deceased partner; decree binds the partnership and surviving partners but not the separate property of the deceased. The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to conclude that the suit does not abate on the death of a partner and that the decree in a firm-name suit cannot be enforced against the separate property of the deceased partner.
Rodriguez v. Speyer Brothers, 1919 AC 59 (cited in text) Establishes that a suit by or against a firm in its firm name is, in reality, a suit by or against the individual partners composing the firm. Used to support the principle that a firm-name suit effectively sues the individual partners and thus the firm-name device does not change the identity of parties sued.
Western National Bank of City of New York v. Perez, Triana and Co., (1891) 1 QB 304 Explains that a firm's name is a convenient method of denoting the persons composing the firm; suing in the firm name sues the individual partners. Quoted to reinforce the understanding that firm-name suits operate against the persons who comprised the firm at the accrual of cause of action.
Ellis v. Wadeson, (1899) 1 QB 714 On death of a partner before action, if the action is brought in firm's name without adding legal representatives, judgment can be obtained only against surviving partners and partnership assets; a dead person cannot be sued. Applied to explain the consequences of a partner's death: the action remains competent but relief cannot be enforced against the deceased partner's separate estate unless his legal personal representatives are added.
Alagappa v. Narayanan, AIR 1932 Madras 765 Authority cited for the proposition that if a document is admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, it cannot later be excluded on the ground of insufficient stamping. Relied upon to support the conclusion that Ex. A3, having been admitted and marked, could not be thereafter disallowed for want of stamp duty.
Vishram Arjun v. I. Shankariah, AIR 1957 AP 784 Similar proposition regarding the effect of admission of a document in evidence on later objections relating to stamping. Used as supporting authority for treating an admitted instrument as usable in proof despite later challenge on stamping grounds.
Javer Chand v. Pukhraj Surana, AIR 1961 SC 1655 Authority cited concerning the legal effect of admitting a document in evidence and the limits of later objections based on stamp duty. Cited to support the principle that the finality of admission prevents later objection on stamping when the document is already in evidence.
P. Narasimhaswamy Patrudu v. Bank of Baroda, AIR 1982 AP 240 Addresses admissibility issues where the document was not admitted in evidence. The court distinguished this case as not relevant here because, in that precedent, the document had not been admitted in evidence—unlike Ex. A3 which was admitted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two principal analytical strands: (A) abatement and the effect of a partner's death on a firm-name suit; and (B) the character and admissibility of Ex. A3.

(A) Abatement and Firm-Name Suits

  • The court considered Order XXX Rule 1 read with Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and applied the law as explained in Maharani Mandalsa Devi v. M. Ramanarain Pvt. Ltd. The established principle is that a suit may be maintained in the firm name even if a partner who was a partner at the time the cause of action accrued is dead at the time of institution.
  • The court explained that a suit in the firm name effectively sues all partners who comprised the firm at the relevant time; however a decree in such a suit cannot be made binding on the separate property of a deceased partner who is not represented in the proceedings.
  • Applying those principles to the present facts, the court held that the plaintiff could continue the suit against the firm and surviving partners notwithstanding the death of the 5th defendant and the absence of his legal representatives; therefore the suit did not abate.

(B) Character and Admissibility of Ex. A3

  • The court examined the terms of Ex. A3: it contained a detailed installment payment schedule for Rs. 6,67,342.20, an agreement to pay interest at 18% from 1-9-1987, and a recital that title deeds to agricultural lands, house sites and other properties worth approx. Rs. 8,00,000 were being deposited with Mr. P. Subba Raju creating a charge in favour of the plaintiff, together with signatures of partners and two witnesses.
  • Factually, the evidence showed that the title deeds referred to in Ex. A3 were not in the possession of the plaintiff but with the mediator (a third party), i.e., the documents were not actually deposited with the plaintiff. The court concluded that Ex. A3 therefore could not be treated as a mortgage by deposit of title deeds.
  • The absence of actual deposit meant that registration and stamp-duty consequences applicable to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds did not arise in this situation.
  • The court then considered whether Ex. A3 was a bond under Section 2(5) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The definition cited specifies that an instrument attested by a witness and not payable to order or bearer, whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another, is a bond. The first part of Ex. A3 (the undertaking to pay) and the attestation by witnesses constituted a bond prima facie. The court therefore affirmed the trial judge's view that Ex. A3 was a bond.
  • On admissibility, the court reasoned that Ex. A3 had been admitted in evidence and marked. Once an instrument is admitted and marked in evidence, it is not open to the parties to raise a fresh objection later that the instrument is not duly stamped; the court relied on authorities (Alagappa v. Narayanan; Vishram Arjun; Javer Chand) to support this principle. The court distinguished P. Narasimhaswamy Patrudu v. Bank of Baroda because, in that case, the document had not been admitted.
  • Consequently, Ex. A3 was treated as admissible evidence despite the objection that it was a bond and notwithstanding stamping/registration arguments raised at trial.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge dated 20-1-1993 are set aside; the matter is remanded to the trial Court with directions to dispose of the suit within six months from receipt of records and a copy of the judgment. The court fee is to be refunded; costs will abide the result of the suit.

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties: the trial Court's dismissal is vacated and the suit will proceed de novo in accordance with the remand directions; the plaintiff's suit does not abate by reason of the death of the 5th defendant (insofar as proceedings against the firm and surviving partners are concerned).
  • The court held that Ex. A3 is a bond but, because it was admitted in evidence, the objection based on stamp duty/registration could not be entertained subsequently; Ex. A3 remains admissible and usable in proof.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel legal principle; it applies settled provisions of Order XXX (CPC) and established authorities on admissibility of documents once admitted. The court did not state any broader transformative precedent beyond applying cited authorities to the facts at hand.

This summary is limited to and derived solely from the content of the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion has been added.

Show all summary ...

S.V Maruthi, J.:— This is the plaintiff's appeal against the judgment and decree in O.S No. 134/88 dated 20-1-1993 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Bhimavaram. The plaintiff-Montari Industries Limited, New Delhi, filed the said suit for recovery of Rs. 5,06,565-76 ps with interest at 18% p.a from 1-10-1988 till realisation and for costs.

2. It is not necessary to refer to the averments in the plaint and in the written statement in extenso for the purpose of disposing of this Appeal. Suffice to say that the plaintiff is a company incorporated at New Delhi and is a manufacturer of pesticides and insecticides. The 1st defendant is a partnership firm with defendants 2 to 5 as its partners. The 1 defendant is a dealer in fertilizers and pesticides and purchases pesticides and insecticides from the plaintiff for the purpose of retail shop. The 151 defendant purchased the goods from the plaintiff and failed to pay the amount and became due to the tune of Rs. 6,67,342-80 by 31 August, 1987. The plaintiff stopped further supplies and in a meeting held on 20-6-1987 at Secunderabad between the Managing Partner of the defendants' firm and the plaintiff, an agreement was reached under which the defendants' firm has to return the unsold stock to the tune of Rs. 3,67,413-61 ps and pay an amount of Rs. 6,67,342-80 ps after giving credit to the miscellaneous payments. Pursuant to the said agreement, the 1 defendant issued post dated cheques. The 6th defendant agreed to be the mediator and defendants 2 to 5 agreed to deposit their title deeds in respect of their personal agricultural lands and house sites as well as other properties to the tune of Rs. 8,00,0007/- with the 6 defendant and to create a 1 charge on the said properties in favour of the plaintiff. It was also agreed that in case of default for payment of any installment, the title holders of the property shall sell the property and clear the amount due to the plaintiff. The defendants failed to honour the agreement. They deposited the title deeds of boiled rice mill units in the name and style of Sri Tirumala Srinivasa Paddy Boiling Plant, Peda Kapavaram, Akividu Taluk, belonging to the 2nd defendant directly with the plaintiff. The plaintiff issued notices on 11-2-1988 and 16-3-1988 drawing the attention of the 181 defendant to the amount due and the 1 defendant promised to hypothecate the landed property of defendants 2 to 5 by 18-4-1988. However, the 1 respondent had not honoured the agreement. The plaintiff, therefore, requested the Manager of the Canara Bank, Bhimavaram, to invoke the bank guarantee to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/- issued by the 1 defendant in favour of the plaintiff. Thus, an amount of Rs. 4,12,415-20 ps towards the principal amount and Rs. 94,150-50 towards interest as on 30-9-1988 became due form the defendants 1 to 5 to the plaintiff. Pending disposal of the suit, the 5 defendant died and his legal representatives were not brought on record. Defendants 1 and 2 filed a written statement which was adopted by defendants 3 and 4. The defendants denied their liability under the agreement.

3. On the basis of the respective pleadings, the Subordinate Judge framed as many as 9 issues. The plaintiff examined PW 1 while the defendants examined P.Ws 1 to 9. The plaintiff marked Exs. A1 to A8, the defendants marked Exs. B1 to B10 and for witnesses Ex. X 1 to X 22 were marked. On the basis of the respective pleadings and the evidence, both oral and documentary, the trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that Ex. A3 underwhich the defendants have given an undertaking to pay the amounts on 31-8-1987 is a bond and cannot be looked into for want of stamp duty and registration though it was admitted in the evidence. It was held that the suit is abated as the legal representatives of the 5 defendant were not brought on record. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff filed the present appeal.

4. Hereinafter the parties will be referred to as the appellant and the respondents.

5. The learned Counsel Sri D.V Reddy appearing for the appellant contended that the suit is not abated and is maintainable as under Order XXX Rule 1 read with Rule 4 of C.P.C a suit can be filed in the name of the firm and without impleading the legal representatives of the deceased partner. The Counsel submitted that Ex. A.3 is admissible in evidence as it is only an undertaking given by the partners undertaking to repay the amount and though it is stated in the said undertaking that the respondents are depositing the title deeds of the partners in respect of their agricultural lands and house sites worth Rs. 8-00 lakhs, the documents were not actually deposited. Therefore, it is neither a bond nor a mortgage. Hence, stamp duty or registration is not required. While the learned Counsel for the respondents Sri VLNGK Murthy contended that when a suit is filed impleading all the partners and a decree is sought for against all the partners, the suit abates in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased partner. He also submitted that the document is inadmissible in evidence as it is a mortgage deed.

6. The question, therefore, is whether the whole suit abates in the absence of legal representatives of the deceased 5 defendant who died during the pendency of the suit. It is now well settled that under Order XXX Rule 1 read with Rule 4 of C.P.C a suit can be filed against a firm and a decree can be obtained against the assets of the firm including the shares of the deceased partner in the assets of the firm without impleading the legal representatives of the deceased partner. The only embargo is that the decree holder cannot proceed against the personal properties of the deceased partner on record. In this context, we may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Maharani Mandalsa Devi v. M. Ramanarain Pvt. Ltd., (1) AIR 1965 SC 1718, wherein it was held as follows:

“……..The persons who are individually called partners are collectively called a firm, and the name under which their business is carried on is called the firm name, see Sec. 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Order30 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in India to sue or to be sued in the name of the firm of which they were partners at the time of the accrual of the cause of action. Rule 1 shows that the individual partners she or are sued in their collective firm name. Rule 2 provides that on disclosure of the names of the partners of the plaintiff firm, the suit proceeds as if they are named as plaintiffs in the plaint. Rule 6 provides that the persons sued in the firm name must appear individually in their own names. A suit by or in the name of a firm is thus really a suit by or in the name of all its partners, see Rodriguez v. Speyer Brothers, (2) 1919 AC 59, (1961) 1 SCR 982 at pp. 328, 329, 330. So also a suit against the firm is really a suit against all the partners of the firm. In Western National Bank of City of New York v. Perez, Triana and Co. (3) (1891-1 QB 304 at p. 314), Lindley, L.J, said:

‘When a firm's name is used, it is only a convenient method of denoting those persons who compose the firm at the time when that name is used and a plaintiff who sues partners in the name of their firm in turth sues them individually, just as much as if he had set out all their names.’

………Again, take a case where the creditor of a film institutes a suit against a firm and one of its partners at the time of the accrual of the cause of action is dead at the time of the institution of the suit. The suit against the firm is really a suit against all the partners who were its partners at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, including the dead partner. Order 30, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables the creditor to institute the suit against the firm in the firm name without joining the legal representative of the deceased partner. The suit is, therefore, competent but no suit can be instituted nor can a decree be obtained against a dead person. The decree passed in such a suit will, therefore, bind the partnership and all the surviving partners, but will not affect the separate property of the deceased partner. In Ellis v. Wadeson (4) (1899) 1 QB 714 at p. 718, Romer, L.J observed:

‘Now consider the question of death. Suppose a partner dies before action brought, and an action is brought against the firm in the firm's name. The dead man is not a party to the action, so far as his private estate is concerned, for a dead man cannot be sued, though the legal personal representative of a dead man can be sued in a proper case. In that case the action would be an action solely against the surviving partners.…If the legal personal representatives of a deceased partner are not added expressly as defendants, and the action is brought against the firm in the firm's name, then judgment can only be obtained as against the surviving partners and be enforced against them and against the partnership assets’.

“The above illustrations show that a suit may be brought under the provisions of Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure against a firm of which a partner is not capable of being sued or being adjudged a debtor, and in such a suit a decree\enforceable against the other partners and the partnership assets may be passed. Now, in the instant case, respondent No. 1 sued the firm of Jagatsons International Corporation under the provisions of Order of the Code of Civil Procedure. The assets of the firm and also all its partners jointly and severally are liable to satisfy the debts of the firm. Even the Maharaja of Sirmur is jointly and severally liable for the debts of the firm: only the institution of a suit against him without the consent of the Central Government is barred by Sec. 86 read with Sec. 87-B of the Code of Civil Procedure. As the suit was instituted without the requisite consent of the Central Government, no decree could be passed in the suit against the Maharaja of Sirmur. But the suit against the firm other than the Maharaja of Sirmur was competent, and a decree could be passed against the firm other than the Maharaja of Sirmur, and such a decree could be executed against the partnership property and against the other partners by following the procedure of Order 21, rule 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”

7. As regards the question whether Ex. A3 is a mortgage deed or Bond, it is necessary to refer to the terms under Ex. A3. Under this document, the defendants undertook to pay an amount of Rs. 6,67,342-20 ps by means of DDs in 5 installment - 1 installment of Rs. 1-00 lakh to be paid before 15-9-1987, 2 installment of Rs. 50,000/- before 31-10-1987, 3rd installment of Rs. 1-00 lakh before 30-11-1987, 4 installment of Rs. 2-00 lakhs before 31-12-1987 and the balance amount in the 5th installment before 31-1-1988. They further agreed to pay interest at 18% per annum on the total amount outstanding from 1-9-1987 till the entire principal amount is cleared. The document is signed by all the defendants. On the 2 page, it is recited that they are depositing the title deeds of the partners in respect of their agricultural lands and house sites and other properties worth approx. Rs. 8-00 lakhs with one Mr. P. Subba Raju, Managing Partner of Montari Industries Ltd. New Delhi creating 1 charge in favour of Montari Industries Ltd., by way of security of the principal amount outstanding which can be sold by the owners and proceeds credited to Montari Industries Ltd. It also enables the said Subba Raju to dispose of the properties in default of payment of installments by the partners. Two witnesses have also signed along with the partners. From the evidence we find that the documents of title deeds mentioned in Ex. A3 are not with the plaintiff, but with the mediator, a third party. Since the documents are not deposited actually, Ex. A3 cannot be said to be a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. When once it is not a mortgage by deposit of title deeds, the question of stamp 5 duty and registration does not arise.

8. The next question is whether Ex. A3 is a Bond. Under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 a bond is defined under Section 2(5). The relevant portion of the definition reads as 10 follows:

“(b) Any instrument attested by a witness and not payable to Order or bearer, whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another”

9. From a reading of the definition it is clear that an instrument under which a person obliges to pay money to another and which is attested by a witness is a bond and the said payment is not to order or bearer. The 1 part of the document viz., Ex. A-3 prima facie establishes that it is a bond though under the 2 part the parties state that they are depositing the title deeds which in fact as not been clone. It is an undertaking given by the partners to pay the money attested by witnesses and, therefore, it is a bond. We affirm the view of the learned Subordinate Judge that Ex. A3 is a bond. Further, the document was admitted in evidence. When once the document is admitted and marked in evidence, it cannot be questioned at a later stage on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped and the natural consequences of that admission which has become final must also follow. It is not open to the Court to say that though the document is marked as an exhibit in a case, it would not look into it and it would not make use of it in the appreciation or would not allow a decree to be passed on such document. (Refer Alagappa v. Narayanan, (5) AIR 1932 Madras 765; Vishram Arjun v. I. Shankariah, (6) AIR 1957 AP 784; Javer Chand v. Pukhraj Surana, (7) AIR 1961 SC 1655. The Judgment in P. Narasimhaswamy Patrudu v. Bank of Baroda, (8) AIR 1982 AP 240; is not relevant to the facts of the present case as in the said case the document was not admitted at all in the evidence.

10. From the above, it follows that the suit does not abate and Ex. A3 is admissible in evidence. The appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remanded to the trial Court with a direction to dispose of the suit within 6 months from the date of receipt of records and a copy of this judgment. The Court fee is directed to be refunded and the cost will abide the result of the suit.