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Md. Kamarudjama, Mro, Hanamkonda & Anr. v. Elaboina Ramesh & Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion addresses whether an order or direction issued in a contempt case by a learned single judge while discharging the contemner is appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Several contempt proceedings before learned single judges arose out of earlier writ petitions (W.P. Nos. cited in the opinion). In the cited contempt cases the single judges discharged the contemners but issued directions (sometimes requiring respondents to grant licences, set aside administrative orders, or give effect to prior writ orders). Letters Patent Appeals (L.P.A.) were filed against the orders passed in those contempt matters. The principal appeals considered included L.P.A. No. 21 of 1997 (against C.C. No. 1476 of 1996 arising from W.P. No. 16470 of 1995), related LPA(SR)s (including matters from W.P. Nos. 17296/1995 and 16468/1995), L.P.A. No. 31 of 1998 (against C.C. No. 1374 of 1997 arising from W.P. No. 25302/1996), and L.P.A. No. 98 of 1998 (against C.C. No. 1651 of 1997 arising from W.P. Nos. 2665 and 15022 of 1996). The Court first articulated the legal principles and then applied them to these appeals.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an order passed or direction issued in a contempt case by a learned single judge while discharging the contemner is appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
- What is the scope of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, i.e., whether only judgments affecting the merits (determining rights or liabilities) are appealable under Clause 15.
- Whether directions issued by a single judge to give effect to earlier orders (but not varying them) are appealable, and conversely whether directions that vary or alter the original order are appealable under Clause 15.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (led by the Advocate General)
- When a contempt case is initiated and the learned single judge finds contempt and punishes the contemner, a right of appeal exists under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 to the Division Bench.
- When the learned single judge finds there is no contempt and discharges the contemner, the judge should simply discharge and not issue further orders or directions; if the judge issues orders or directions extraneous to the contempt proceedings, those orders affect the contemners and constitute a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and thus are appealable under that provision.
Respondents' Arguments
- There is no bar for the learned single judge to issue necessary directions even while discharging the contemners; such directions can be issued to give effect to earlier orders where violation is shown but not deliberate.
- Reliance was placed on Noorali Babu Thanewala v. S.H.K.M.M. Shetty (1990) and Hindustan Lever Sramik Karmachari Congress v. Ashish Chakraborty (Calcutta High Court) to support the proposition that single judges may issue directions for enforcement of earlier orders while discharging contemners.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| D.J. Janeja v. Bhajanlal (1988) 3 SCC 26 | Authoritative pronouncement that no appeal lies under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against the discharge of the contemner. | The Court treated this as establishing the settled proposition that Section 19(1) provides no right of appeal against discharge. |
| T. Vasantha Lakshmi v. Principal, APSWR School (1992) 2 APLJ 77 | The decision followed the principle in D.J. Janeja regarding non-appealability of discharge under the Contempt Act. | Cited as one of the subsequent cases following the Supreme Court's dictum and reinforcing the settled proposition. |
| S. Sammaiah v. A.P.S.E.B (1994) 2 ALT 729 | Followed the rule that appeals do not lie under Section 19(1) against discharge of contemner. | Noted as a later decision of this Court following the aforementioned principle. |
| Mohd. Mahmood v. A. Ramalakshman (1995) 1 ALD 94 | Followed the same principle on non-appealability of discharge under the Contempt Act. | Noted as another case of this Court that followed the Supreme Court's dictum. |
| Ch. Vasudeva Sarma v. E.O., T.T.D (1997) 3 ALT 669 | Held that appeals against discharge of contemner are not maintainable under the Contempt of Courts Act and also not maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent; rejected distinction between civil and criminal contempt for such appeals. | The Court cited this Division Bench decision as supporting the proposition that neither Section 19 nor Clause 15 permits appeal against discharge of the contemner. |
| K. Jayalakshmi v. S.R. Sonwalkar (1998) 1 ALD 207 | Held (without detailed reasoning, according to the opinion) that modification of directions in the writ petition by an impugned order is a judgment for the purpose of Clause 15 and is appealable as a civil proceeding. | The opinion noted this case but observed that the Division Bench did not discuss scope of Section 19 or Clause 15 in detail and that the order was passed in the contempt appeal itself. |
| Noorali Babu Thanewala v. S.H.K.M.M. Shetty (1990) 1 SCC 259 (AIR 1990 SC 464) | Authority for the proposition that when an order is passed and violated, the Court can, if violation is not deliberate and circumstances warrant, issue directions to give effect to earlier orders; such directions are consonant with the Contempt of Courts Act. | Respondents relied on this case to support the permissibility of issuing directions while discharging contemners; the Court acknowledged it as authority that enforcement directions consonant with earlier orders are not appealable. |
| Hindustan Lever Sramik Karmachari Congress v. Ashish Chakraborty (1991 Crl. L.J 2890) | Calcutta High Court authority where a single judge issued directions for enforcement of earlier orders in contempt proceedings. | Respondents relied on it; the Court recognized it as support for the view that a single judge may issue directions to enforce earlier orders when appropriate. |
| Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben (1981) 4 SCC 8 (AIR 1981 SC 1786) | Majority principles (paragraph-120) listing categories of single-judge judgments which are appealable under Clause 15 because they affect rights or liabilities (examples include varying/decrees, granting review, orders rejecting plaint, etc.). | The Court relied on the principles in paragraph-120 as guidance to determine when a single-judge order constitutes an appealable "judgment" under Clause 15; specifically invoked items (8) and (10) (varying a decree, granting review) to support that variance/different effect equates to appealability. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by first stating the relevant legal framework: the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 supplements the High Court's plenary powers under Article 215. Under Section 19(1) of the Contempt Act there is a right of appeal when a contemner is punished; conversely, if the contemner is discharged, Section 19(1) provides no right of appeal. The Court treated the Supreme Court's pronouncement in D.J. Janeja v. Bhajanlal and subsequent decisions of this Court as settling that proposition.
The Court then addressed the scope of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It explained that Clause 15 permits appeals from judgments of a single judge only when the judgment affects the merits of the controversy between the parties by determining some right or liability. The nature of the order must be examined to see whether it determines rights or liabilities; such determination may be final, preliminary, or interlocutory.
On the question whether a single judge may issue directions while discharging a contemner, the Court distinguished two situations:
- When directions are issued to give effect to earlier orders (i.e., to enforce previously passed orders) and they do not vary the original orders, those directions are consonant with the Contempt of Courts Act and do not amount to variation of the original order; such directions are not appealable.
- When the single judge issues orders or directions while discharging the contemner that are in variance to the original order — i.e., they are in a different form or have a different effect than the original order — then those orders operate as an adverse judgment affecting rights of the contemner or others. Such orders are treated as "judgments" within the meaning of Clause 15 and are appealable under Clause 15.
The Court relied upon the guidance in Shah Babulal Khimji (paragraph-120) to illustrate instances where single-judge orders are appealable, and specifically noted that orders varying an original order or amounting to review fall within that ambit. The Court concluded that directions merely enforcing original orders are not appealable under Clause 15, whereas directions that vary the original order are appealable.
The Court then applied these principles to the individual appeals:
- L.P.A. No. 21 of 1997 (C.C. No. 1476 of 1996 arising from W.P. No. 16470 of 1995) — the writ order required the respondents to "consider" applications for licences; in the contempt case the single judge directed respondents to "grant" kerosene hawkers licences. The Court found this to be in complete variance with the writ order (i.e., a direct grant rather than a direction to consider) and therefore an adjudication affecting rights. The directions in C.C. No. 1476 of 1996 were set aside.
- LPA (SR) Nos. 7132 and 19760 of 1997 (relating to C.C. Nos. 857 and 1475 of 1996) — similarly found to amount to judgments affecting rights because the contempt orders granted licences rather than directing consideration; delays in filing these LPAs were condoned (C.M.P. Nos. 14260 and 17385 of 1997) and the contempt orders were set aside.
- L.P.A. No. 31 of 1998 (against C.C. No. 1374 of 1997 arising from W.P. No. 25302 of 1996) — the contempt-order directions merely enforced and gave effect to the writ order (setting aside an administrative order passed on wrong interpretation and directing disposal of the application). The Court held these directions were not in variance with the earlier order and therefore did not interfere; L.P.A. No. 31 of 1998 was dismissed.
- L.P.A. No. 98 of 1998 (against C.C. No. 1651 of 1997 arising from W.P. Nos. 2665 and 15022 of 1996) — the single judge's directions concerning continuity of service and attendant pensionary/fringe benefits were held generally to be consonant with the earlier orders, but the Court issued a clarification that while computing leave encashment privilege, the period from 30-7-1975 to 31-10-1994 must be excluded. Thus the appeal was allowed in part to that extent.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Court held that: (a) Orders or directions issued by a learned single judge in contempt proceedings that merely enforce earlier orders in terms and do not vary them are not appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent; and (b) Orders or directions issued by a learned single judge while discharging the contemner that vary or alter the effect of the original order (i.e., produce a different form or different effect) operate as an adverse judgment affecting rights and liabilities and are appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
Implications / Consequences:
- The direct effects on the parties in the appeals decided in this opinion are:
- L.P.A. No. 21 of 1997 and LPA (SR) 365/98 and 366/98: Allowed — the contempt orders that directed grant of licences (in variance to mere consideration) were set aside.
- L.P.A. No. 31 of 1998: Dismissed — the contempt directions were held to enforce earlier orders and not to vary them, so no interference was warranted.
- L.P.A. No. 98 of 1998: Allowed in part — the contempt directions were upheld except that a clarification was issued excluding the period 30-7-1975 to 31-10-1994 from computation of leave encashment privilege.
- Parties were directed to bear their own costs.
- The Court clarified the test for appealability under Clause 15: whether the single-judge order determines rights or liabilities (final, preliminary or interlocutory) and specifically whether the order varies the original order. This distinction was applied to the appeals before the Court to determine which contempt directions were susceptible to a Letters Patent appeal.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B. Subhashan Reddy, J.:— At issue, is an important question whether the order passed or direction issued in Contempt case by a learned single judge while discharging the contemner, is appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent?
2. Normally, the relevant facts of the case are stated and the legal principles are applied. But, in the instant cases, we may have to state the legal principles first and then dispose of the Letters Patent Appeals in the light of the said legal principles enunciated. Under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which is in addition to the plenary powers of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, the High Court is entitled to take up contempt proceedings either suo motu or on initiation of party and decide as to whether there are grounds to exercise the powers to punish the contemner. If the contemner is punished, then there is a right of appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. If a single Judge exercises the said power of contempt, then the order is appealable to the Division Bench and if the Division Bench exercises the original jurisdiction to punish the contemner for contempt, then the appeal lies to the Supreme Court. In the instant cases, contempt cases were heard by the learned single judges. In all the cases, the contemners were discharged, but the learned single judges had issued some directions.
3. If the contemner is discharged, no appeal lies under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The said legal provision itself is clear in that regard and further there is an authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in D.J Janeja v. Bhajanlal (1) (1988) 3 SCC 26. The dicta laid down in the said case by the Supreme Court was followed by this Court in several other cases, the first being in T. Vasantha Lakshmi v. Principal, APSWR School (2) 1992 (2) APLJ 77 which was followed by later Division Benches in S. Sammaiah v. A.P.S.E.B (3) 1994 (2) ALT 729 and Mohd. Mahmood v. A. Ramalakshman (4) 1995 (1) ALD 94. Thus the settled proposition of law is that no appeal lies under the Contempt of Courts Act against the discharge of the Contemner. It was also held by another Division Bench in Ch. Vasudeva Sarma v. E.O, T.T.D (5) 1997 (3) ALT 669 that not only that appeal against discharge of the contemner is not maintainable under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, but no such appeal is also maintainable even under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The argument that there is a distinction between Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt and that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent can be invoked for filing appeal in case of discharge in civil contempt was also repelled by the Division Bench and it was held that Contempt of Courts Act does not make any distinction between Civil and Criminal contempts in preferring appeals and that unless contemner is punished, be it civil or criminal, Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act is inapplicable and so also Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Thus, there is a clear pronouncement that against the discharge of the Contempt neither Sec. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act nor Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provide an appeal.
4. Then a further question arises as to whether the parties affected are remediless when an order is passed or directions issued by the learned single judge while discharging the contemners in Civil contempts. There is a Division Bench judgment in K. Jayalakshmi v. S.R Sonwalkar (6) 1998 (1) ALD 207 in this regard. But, there is neither discussion nor reasoning to support the view. What all said was-we are sufficiently persuaded to hold that modification of the directions in the writ petition by the impugned order in itself is a judgment for the purpose of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Court and is appealable accordingly as an appeal in a civil proceeding. We accordingly entertain the appeal and consider whether, in exercise of the power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India or under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the Court can extend its jurisdiction to enter into validity of the directions, which are allegedly violated and set aside the same or modify the same”. In the said case, there was an order of a learned single judge of this Court for appointment of the petitioner therein on compassionate grounds and as the same was not done, there was a contempt case and the Contemner had pleaded that there was a settlement inter se the petitioner therein and the Singareni Collieries Company Limited, as such, the order of the Court was not complied with and then the learned single Judge while discharging the contemner, ordered payment of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation in lieu of compassionate employment. The Division Bench has set aside the said direction on the ground that such an order is not warranted in a proceeding under Article 215 of the Constitution read with Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act and the impugned judgment of the learned single judge containing the above direction was set aside directing the appellant to demonstrate before the learned single judge before whom the contempt proceedings were initiated. But, here, the Division Bench did not deal the case as a Letters Patent Appeal, but the order was passed in the Contempt Appeal itself without going into the scope of either Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act or Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
5. The question then arises is as to what is the scope of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent?
6. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent reads:
“Appeal from the Court of original jurisdiction to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction: And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at (Madras), (Bombay), Fort William in Bengal from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of a revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act (on or after the first day of February, 1929) in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to us, Our heirs or successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.”
7. It is to be noted that any party affected by the judgment of the learned single judge can invoke Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Then a further question arises as to what is the ‘judgment’ and whether any and every judgment of the learned single judge is appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Now, the legal position is well settled that only such judgments which affect the merits of the controversy between the parties are appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and it is for the Court to find out whether the order passed by the learned single Judge affects the merits of the action between the parties by determining some right or liability. The nature of the order will have to be examined to ascertain whether there has been a determination of right or liability. Such determination of right or liability may be either final or preliminary or interlocutory.
8. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate General, led the arguments for the appellants in L.P.A No. 21 of 1997 and the related appeals on behalf of the officials (contemners) in LPA SRs mentioned above and the other learned counsel appearing for the appellants in other appeals have adopted his arguments. The learned Advocate General submits that when a contempt case is initiated and when the learned Single Judge finds that the contempt is made out, power to punish for contempt can be exercised and then there is a right of appeal provided to the Division Bench under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and on the other hand when the learned single Judge finds that there is no contempt made out, he has to simply discharge the contemner and no further orders or directions can be issued and if any such orders or directions issued, which are extraneous to the contempt proceedings, the same affect the contemners and it is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and as such, it is appealable under the said provision.
9. Countering the argument of the learned Advocate General, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submit that there is no bar for the learned single Judge to issue necessary directions even while discharging the contemners and they rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Noorali Babu Thanewala v. S.H.K.M.M Shetty (7) (1990) 1 SCC 259 : AIR 1990 SC 464 as also the Judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Hindustan Lever Sramik Karmachari Congress v. Ashish Chakraborty (8) 1991 Crl. L.J 2890. In the Supreme Court Judgment - Noorali Babul's case (7 supra) there was an undertaking by a tenant to vacate the suit premises within the time stipulated, but the tenant having obtained the said order did not vacate and contempt proceedings were initiated to give effect to the undertaking. In Hindustan Lever's case (8 supra), the elections were directed to be conducted to the Executive Committee of Hindustan Lever Sramik Karmachari Congress as per the programme drawn by the two Special Officers in accordance with the direction given by the Court of the Additional District Judge, Alipore. But, there was an obstruction caused by the contemners in the conduct of the said elections and on contempt proceedings being initiated, a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court had issued directions for the enforcement of the orders earlier passed to conduct the elections.
10. It is needless to mention that when an order is passed by the Court and if the same is violated and if the said violation is brought to the notice of the Court and should the Court find that the violation is not deliberate and circumstances are stated to the satisfaction of the Court that the violation of the order was not deliberate, the Court can issue directions to give effect to the orders earlier passed and such an order passed is in consonance with the scheme of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and such directions issued to give effect to the earlier orders, in terms thereof, cannot be termed as in variation of the orders originally passed and as such, cannot be found fault with and are not appealable.
11. But a different consideration arises when orders or directions are issued while discharging the contemner and when such orders or directions are at variation to the orders originally passed, then such orders or directions issued which are in a different form and having different effect than the original orders passed, affect the contemner and become a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Even though there is no direct judgment on this point, a clear guidance is there in the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben (9) (1981) 4 SCC 8 : AIR 1981 SC 1786 in which 2 judges of 3-judge Bench (majority) laid down some principles in paragraph-120, which, however, may not be called exhaustive, but throw light in the controversy involved in these Letters Patent Appeals and for deciding the proposition mentioned supra and strengthens our reasoning mentioned above. It may be relevant to extract the principles stated by the Supreme Court in paragraph-120.
(1) An order granting leave to amend the plaint by introducing a new cause of action which completely alters the nature of the suit and takes away a vested right of limitation or any other valuable right accrued to the defendant.
(2) An order rejecting the plaint.
(3) An order refusing leave to defend the suit in an action under Order 37 C.P.C
(4) An order rescinding leave of the trial judge granted by him under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.
(5) An order deciding a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the suit on the ground of limitation, absence of notice under Section 80, bar against competency of the suit against the defendant even though the suit is kept alive.
(6) An order rejecting an application for a judgment on admission under Order 12 Rule 6.
(7) An order refusing to add necessary parties in a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(8) An order varying or amending a decree.
(9) An order refusing leave to sue informa pauperis.
(10) An order granting review.
(11) An order allowing withdrawal of the suit with liberty to file a fresh one.
(12) An order holding that the defendants are not agriculturists within the meaning of the special law.
(13) An order staying or refusing to stay a suit under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(14) An order granting or refusing to stay execution of the decree.
(15) An order deciding payment of Court-Fees against the plaintiff.
12. Any order passed or directions issued in variance to the original order passed results in varying the original order and it can also be termed as a review of the original order coming within the ambit of instances Nos. 8 and 10 stated in the above legal principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in paragraph-120 of the judgment in Shah Babulal Khimji's case (9 supra). As such, we hold that while no appeal is maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against an order or direction issued by the learned single Judge for enforcing the original order passed in terms thereof, while discharging the contemner, any orders passed or directions issued, which are in variance to the original order passed, operate as an adverse judgment affecting the rights of the contemner or any party in place of the contemner and thus is appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
13. Now we proceed to consider each of the cases in the light of the legal principles enunciated in the above paragraph.
14. L.P.A No. 21 of 1997 is directed against C.C No. 1476 of 1996, which arose out of the order passed in W.P No. 16470 of 1995. In W.P No. 16470 of 1995, between Elaboina Ramesh v. Mandal Revenue Officer, Hanamkonda and District Collector, Warangal, the order dated 26-7-1995 of the learned single Judge is to the following effect:
“The Writ Petition is disposed of with a direction to the respondents to consider the application of the petitioners for grant of licences along with others, before 31-08-1995.”
15. The matter related to the issuance of retail kerosene licence to the petitioners. But, such a direction straight away was not granted; but a direction was granted as mentioned above to consider the case of the petitioners. Coming to the Contempt Case, the learned Judge held:
“I hold that the petitioners are entitled to a similar direction and therefore, I direct the respondents to grant kerosene hawkers licences to the petitioners, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. With this direction, the contempt case is closed.”
16. This order was passed by the learned single Judge on the ground that for similarly situated, licence has been granted.
17. C.M.P No. 14260 of 1997 in L.P.A (SR) No. 7132 of 1997 against Contempt Case No. 857 of 1996 between The Commissioner of Civil Supplies v. G. Raghu, is filed for condonation of delay of 22 days in filing the L.P.A against the orders in C.C No. 857 of 1996. The complaint is similar to the one in L.P.A 21 of 1997. Contempt Case No. 857 of 1996 arose out of the orders passed in W.P No. 17296 of 1995. By order dated 2-8-1995 passed in W.P No. 17296 of 1995, the learned single Judge held:
“The writ petition is disposed of with a direction to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioners for issue of Kerosene Hawkers Licence before 31-8-1995.”
18. C.M.P No. 17385 of 1997 in LPA (SR) No. 19760 of 1997 is filed to condone the delay of 13 days in filing the L.P.A against the order passed in Contempt Case No. 1475 of 1996, between (1) Mohd. Kamrudjama, Mandal Revenue Officer, Hanamkonda, (2) Ambareesh, District Collector, Warangal and L. Rajaiah & others. The said contempt case arose out of the order dated 26-7-1995 passed in W.P No. 16468 of 1995. In the said contempt case, the learned Judge held:
“I hold that the petitioners are entitled to a similar direction and, therefore, I direct the respondents to grant kerosene hawkers licences to the petitioners within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.”
19. In the writ petition, the learned Judge passed the order on 26-7-1995 (W.P No. 16468 of 1995) to the following effect:
“The Writ Petition is disposed of with a direction to the respondents to consider the application of the petitioners for grant of licences along with others, before 31-8-1995.”
20. L.P.A No. 31 of 1998 is filed by respondent No. 3 in Contempt Case No. 1374 of 1997, which arose out of the order passed in W.P No. 25302 of 1996 by the learned Single Judge. In W.P No. 25302 of 1996, the relief granted is to the following effect:
“Having made the legal position clear, the Joint Collector is directed to pass appropriate order on the representation filed by the petitioner, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, failing which, serious view of the matter will be taken.”
21. In Contempt Case No. 1374 of 1997, the learned single Judge held:
“Now, as the Contemnor realised the mistake committed by her and expressed unconditional apology to this Court, I am inclined to drop the contempt proceedings. Accordingly, the rule issued is recalled.
As far as the order of the Joint Collector dated 18-10-1997 is concerned, as the Joint Collector herself admitted that this order was passed on wrong interpretation of the order of this court, the same has to be set aside. Accordingly, the order of the Joint Collector dated 18-10-1997 is set aside and the present Joint Collector is directed to dispose of the application filed by the petitioner for inclusion of the name of the petitioner in B. Form licence of the cinema theatre within two weeks from the date of receipt of this order.”
22. L.P.A No. 98 of 1998 is directed against the Contempt Case No. 1651 of 1997, which in turn arose out of the judgment rendered on 12-6-1997 in W.P Nos. 2665 and 15022 of 1996. In the writ petitions, the order, which was passed, was to the following effect:
“A writ of Mandamus shall issue to the management of the Life Insurance Corporation to promote the petitioner to the cadre of Higher Grade Assistant with effect from 1-2-1997, the date on which the others including the juniors of the petitioners were promoted to that cadre, with all consequential reliefs, pecuniary and otherwise.”
23. This was appealed against in W.A No. 940 of 1997, which explained the order of the learned Single Judge to the effect that the said order of the learned single Judge cannot be understood to mean any consequential reliefs pecuniary or otherwise to which the petitioner-respondent is found eligible would be paid to him in the shape of wages for any period prior to 1-11-1994 and the petitioner will not, thus, be entitled to claim any wage relief whether in the shape of increments i.e pecuniary relief for the period he was out of employment prior to 1-11-1994. In fact, this is not the first litigation, but is sequel to the litigation in earlier W.P No. 14273 of 1990, in which the petitioner was directed to be reinstated without back wages, which was affirmed in two Writ Appeals W.A Nos. 1304 of 1994 and 171 of 1995 by both the Management and the employee, i.e, appellant and respondents in the instant case. In the said judgment, the Division Bench held as follows:
“For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons that there is no serious misconduct of misappropriation or insubordination, we are of the considered view that the harshest punishment of removal is uncalled for. Hence, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the learned single Judge in W.P No. 14273 of 1990 holding that the charges 3 and 5 are proved after giving cogent and convincing reasons, does not warrant interference. Accordingly, the same is confirmed. In the circumstances, as rightly held by the learned single Judge, the petitioner is entitled for reinstatement from 1-11-1994 with continuity of service but without back wages. We make it clear that the continuity of service is only for the purpose of payment of increments only.”
24. When action for contempt was initiated in C.C No. 1651 of 1997, the learned Single Judge has passed the following Order on 23-2-1998:
“Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Advocate General appearing for the Management-LIC.
There seems to be a doubt in the mind of the 1st respondent whether the continuity of services ordered by this court in favour of the petitioner should be taken into account for all practical purposes, that is to say, fixation of pension, payment of gratuity and leave encashment and other service benefits. There cannot be any doubt in anybody's mind having regard to the judgments of this Court that the petitioner should be deemed to have been in service all through and on that basis the fringe and pensionary benefits should be extended to him.
At the time of hearing Sri J. Sudheer, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the letter dated 3-11-1997 issued by the 1st respondent would reveal that the continuity of services ordered by this Court would not be extended to the petitioner for aforementioned purposes. Elaborating this submission, the learned counsel submitted that the petitioner is primarily concerned about the quantum of pension to be paid to him on superannuation; the gratuity to be paid to him under the service rules and the leave encashment privilege. Since the grievance of the petitioner centres around these three important rights, I think that the ends of justice would be met by directing the respondents to take into account the continuity of services of the petitioner for fixation of pension, the quantum of pension to be paid to the petitioner on superannuation, in determining the quantum of gratuity payable to the petitioner on superannuation and the leave encashment right of the petitioner. The respondents are directed accordingly.
Having perused the counter affidavits of Respondents 1 and 2, I am not satisfied that there was any deliberate, intentional disobedience of the court order and it seems that the stand taken by the 1st respondent in his letter dated 3-11-1997 was primarily based on legal advice. Therefore, it is not expedient to take any further steps to punish the respondent.
In the result, the Contempt Case is closed subject to the above terms and directions. No costs.”
25. C.M.P No. 23265 of 1998 has been filed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India to restrain the respondent (S.S Rajan) from realisation of terminal benefits for the period between 30-7-1975 to 31-10-1994, during which period he was out of service and also other statutory benefits for that period from the Regional Commissioner. In view of what is stated supra, we hold that the directions issued by the learned single Judge in C.C No. 1651 of 1997, which is the subject matter of L.P.A No. 98 of 1998, are in consonance with the orders passed in W.P Nos. 2665 and 15022 of 1996. But, a clarification need be issued that while computing the leave encasshment privilege, the period from 30-7-1975 to 31-10-1994 has to be excluded. Insofar as L.P.A No. 31 of 1998 is concerned, we found that the directions issued in C.C No. 1374 of 1997 by the learned single Judge are not in variance to the order passed in W.P No. 25302 of 1996 and the orders in C.C No. 1374 of 1997 were passed only to enforce the orders in W.P No. 25302 of 1996; as such, we do not find any ground to interfere with the said order. Coming to L.P.A No. 21 of 1997, the directions issued in C.C No. 1476 of 1996 are in complete variance to the directions issued in W.P No. 16470 of 1995. From what is extracted, it is clear that in the writ petition, the order was to consider the application of the petitioner for grant of licence and coming to the order in the contempt case, there is a clear and absolute direction to grant the licence. Similar is the situation in LPA (SR) Nos. 7132 and 19760 of 1997. We found that the orders passed in C.C No. 1476 of 1996, which is the subject matter of LPA (SR) No. 19760 of 1997, amount to judgment affecting the rights of the contemners (Government, as the contemners are the officials of the Government). The said directions contained in C.C No. 1476 of 1996 are set aside. Situation being same in LPA (SR) Nos. 7132 and 19760 of 1997, as there are condone delay petitions-C.M.P Nos. 14260 and 17385 of 1997 - we condone the delay and set aside the orders passed in C.C Nos. 857 and 1475 of 1996.
26. In the result, while L.P.A No. 21 of 1997 and LPA (SR) 365/98 and 366/98 are allowed, L.P.A No. 31 of 1998 is dismissed. L.P.A No. 98 of 1998 is allowed in part to the extent indicated above, i.e, relating to the leave encashment privilege for the period from 30-7-1975 to 31-10-1994. We direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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