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Talasila Sandhya v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Trans. Corpn. And Another

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Oct 1, 1997
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Judgment (B.K. Somasekhara, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the decision of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Krishna at Vijayawada in O.P. No. 263 of 1986 dated 20.2.1990. The claimant-appellant had claimed Rs. 2,00,000 under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, alleging injuries and disabilities caused by the rash and negligent driving of A.P.S.R.T.C. bus AAZ 5835 by respondent No. 2 (the driver). A similar petition, O.P. No. 265 of 1986, was filed by Ratala Bhamini.

The accident occurred on 22.4.1986 at about 10–11 a.m. on the Machilipatnam–Vijayawada road near Ashoknagar, Vijayawada, when the claimant and another girl (both coming from the northern side) were crossing the road toward the southern side near a tailoring shop and a lorry parked on the northern side. The Tribunal, after inquiry, concluded that rash and negligent driving by the bus-driver was not established. While the Tribunal found claimants entitled to some compensation generally assessed at Rs. 1,16,000, the Tribunal reduced the award in the present petition to Rs. 7,500 under "no fault" liability (section 92-A of the Act) because of its finding on negligence; the other petition was dismissed. Only the claimant in O.P. No. 263 of 1986 appealed the award.

The driver (respondent No. 2) had been prosecuted in C.C. No. 42 of 1987 under section 338 IPC and was acquitted, the certified copy of that judgment being produced (Exh. B-1).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of vehicle AAZ 5835 (Issue No. 1 before the Tribunal)?
  2. Whether, in view of the findings and attendant circumstances, the claimant-appellant is entitled to the compensation assessed (Rs. 1,16,000) and interest on that amount?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The claimant (PW 3) and the other girl (PW 2) testified that the bus hit them while they were crossing the road after passing a lorry from behind; the medical evidence supports severe injuries and disabilities to PW 3.
  • The Tribunal's acceptance of the driver's version and reduction of compensation to no-fault liability was challenged by the claimant.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents (including respondent No. 2, the driver) contended that the two girls suddenly emerged from behind the parked lorry while crossing and that the driver was driving slowly (about 15 km/h), blowing the horn, and applied brakes on seeing them at about 20 yards; as such, the accident was not due to rash or negligent driving.
  • The respondent Corporation argued before the appellate court that the claimant was not entitled to interest on future expenditure, relying on Supreme Court decisions (R.D. Hattangadi and Atma Ram Mittal) and asserting delay was not their fault; thus, interest should not be allowed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ailaiah v. State of A.P., 1994 (2) ALT (Cri.) 519 Authority that a girl aged up to 18 years is to be treated as a child for relevant purposes. The court relied on this decision to observe that PW 2 (aged 13) and PW 3 (aged 6) were child witnesses and thus entitled to protections under section 118 of the Evidence Act; the Tribunal ought to have followed the procedure applicable to child witnesses.
Srinivasa v. Parasiva Murthy, 1976 ACJ 45 (Karnataka) Principle that there cannot be negligence or contributory negligence imputed to a child of tender age. The court noted this settled position and observed it is "equally applicable to some extent to PW 3 also," criticizing the Tribunal for drawing inferences of contributory negligence against the child witnesses.
R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd., 1995 ACJ 366 (SC) Holdings relied upon to argue that interest cannot be allowed on future expenditure and to address when respondents are not liable for delay caused by the court. Respondents relied on this case to oppose interest; the court considered the submission but nonetheless awarded interest at a capped rate (12% p.a.) given the claimant's youth and assistance by guardian.
Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia, (1988) 4 SCC 284 : AIR 1988 SC 2031 Authority discussed for the proposition that interest should not be allowed on future expenditure and on liability for delay not attributable to respondents. Respondents relied on this authority to oppose interest; the court distinguished the circumstances and allowed interest at a rate not exceeding 12% p.a., taking the claimant's age and guardian assistance into account.
General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corpn. v. Susamma Thomas, 1994 ACJ 1 (SC) Supreme Court directions regarding deposit of awarded amounts in motor accident claims contexts. The appellate court conditioned its award subject to depositing the amount in the light of directions given in this decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a focused appraisal of the Tribunal's evaluation of evidence and applied principles of evidence as follows:

  1. Evidence before the Tribunal: The Tribunal's finding on Issue No. 1 turned on the oral testimony of the claimants (PWs 2 and 3) and the testimony of respondent No. 2 (RW 1). The Tribunal found inconsistencies in the claimants' testimonies but accepted the driver's version that the girls suddenly emerged from behind a parked lorry and that the driver, driving slowly, could not stop.
  2. Treatment of child witnesses and section 118 Evidence Act: The court criticized the Tribunal for failing to apply the procedural protections required by section 118 of the Evidence Act when dealing with child witnesses (PW 3 aged 6, and PW 2 aged 13). The Judge held that the Presiding Officer should have satisfied himself, by appropriate questioning and by recording a certificate, that the child witness understood the questions and could give rational reasons; administering oath without following the section was an error.
  3. Weight given to the driver's testimony and missing corroboration: The Tribunal was faulted for giving undue weight to the driver's testimony without supporting documentary or corroborative evidence. The court noted the driver did not produce a police report (which, if lodged, might have contained relevant particulars), did not call the conductor (who allegedly took PW 3 to hospital), and did not examine passengers. The absence of spot mahazar, spot sketch, or brake marks before the Tribunal was highlighted.
  4. Application of res ipsa loquitur and section 106 Evidence Act principles: The court observed that the circumstances (serious injuries occurring in broad daylight in a township) invited application of the doctrine that "the thing speaks for itself" (res ipsa loquitur), thereby shifting a significant evidentiary burden on the driver. The driver was characterized as the person best able to explain the cause and therefore having special means of knowledge under the principle embodied in section 106 of the Evidence Act.
  5. On contributory negligence and children: Relying on settled law (cited Srinivasa), the court emphasized that contributory negligence cannot generally be imputed to very young children; this made the Tribunal's inference against the child witnesses problematic.
  6. Conclusion from the analysis: Considering the Tribunal's procedural and evidential errors (failure to follow section 118 protections, undue acceptance of uncorroborated driver testimony, lack of investigation into corroborative material, and failure to apply the presumption principles), the appellate court concluded that the Tribunal's finding that the accident was not due to rash or negligent driving could not be supported.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED; THE TRIBUNAL'S FINDING ON ISSUE NO. 1 IS SET ASIDE AND THE CLAIMANT-APPELLANT IS AWARDED Rs. 1,16,000 WITH INTEREST AT 12% PER ANNUM FROM THE DATE OF PETITION UNTIL PAYMENT.

Consequences and directions given by the court:

  • The respondents are to be jointly and severally liable for the awarded amount and interest.
  • There shall be no order as to costs.
  • The award is made subject to depositing the amount in accordance with directions given by the Supreme Court in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corpn. v. Susamma Thomas (1994 ACJ 1 (SC)).

Broader implications:

The court reversed the Tribunal's factual and legal conclusions on the record before it and reinstated the compensation assessment. The opinion does not purport to create a new legal precedent; rather, it applies existing principles concerning child witnesses, burden of proof where the defendant (driver) is best placed to explain the accident, and the availability of interest on awards in the special circumstances of this case (claimant's age and representation by a guardian).


End of summary — prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

B.K Somasekhara, J.:— The decision of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Krishna at Vijayawada in O.P No. 263 of 1986 dated 20.2.1990 is challenged by the claimant-appellant, who had laid a claim under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short ‘the Act’) for recovery of Rs. 2,00,000, alleging that she suffered injuries and disabilities due to the rash and negligent driving of the A.P.S.R.T.C bus AAZ 5835 by the driver (respondent No. 2). The respondents resisted the claim. There was another similar petition filed by one Ratala Bhamini in O.P No. 265 of 1986. After an inquiry the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the allegation of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by the respondent No. 2 was not established and although it was found that the claimants in both the petitions were entitled to recover certain amounts, in the present case Rs. 7,500 were awarded for no fault liability under section 92-A of the Act, and whereas the other petition was dismissed. Only the claimant in O.P No. 263 of 1986 has challenged the award and the final decision in the matter.

2. Learned counsel for the appellant tried to challenge the award, whereas the learned advocate for the respondent No. 1 did her best to support the award. The accident occurred on 22.4.1986 at 11 a.m on Machilipatnam-Vijayawada road while the claimant and another petitioner Ratala Bhamini were crossing the road from northern side to southern side near Ashoknagar at Vijayawada, and while the respondent No. 2 was driving the A.P.S.R.T.C bus AAZ 5835 from eastern direction, i.e, on the Machilipatnam side towards Vijayawada. Issue No. 1 dealt with the question relating to the allegation of rash and negligent driving of the bus by the respondent No. 2, driver and to read:

“(1) Whether the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle AAZ 5835?”

3. Out of the evidence produced before the Tribunal, the testimony of the claimants in the two petitions, viz., PWs 2 and 3 (PW 3 is the appellant herein) and the testimony of RW 1 (respondent No. 2) were the basis for the Tribunal to record the finding on issue No. 1 in the negative. The Tribunal has found from such evidence that PWs 2 and 3 are the two girls related to each other, had their house on the southern side of the road, there was a tailoring shop on the northern side of the road, the two girls had gone to tailoring shop at the relevant time, and while crossing the road from northern side to southern side from behind the lorry, which was parked on the northern side of the road near the tailoring shop, they were hit by the A.P.S.R.T.C bus driven by the respondent No. 2, driver. The testimony of PWs 2 and 3 in relation to certain matters is found to be little inconsistent. However, as a whole the evidence coming out as above is noted. Even according to the respondent No. 2, driver, while he was driving the vehicle near the place of the accident, PWs 2 and 3 suddenly emerged from behind the lorry from the northern side while crossing the road and thus, the accident occurred. However, his theory that the girls had a fall and sustained injuries is not accepted. The medical evidence in the case in addition to the testimony of PWs 2 and 3 justifies the finding that PW 3, the claimant-appellant, had sustained severe injuries leading to disabilities and supports the circumstances that the bus hit the two girls in the course of the accident and it was not merely a fall while crossing the road. The Tribunal in such a situation accepted the defence of the respondents that the accident was not due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus by the respondent No. 2 but it was due to PWs 2 and 3 suddenly emerging from behind a lorry parked on the road while crossing the road from northern side to southern side. The Tribunal has dealt with the question in paras 9 to 16 of the judgment. In sum and substance, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the lorry was parked on the northern side of the road near the tailoring shop, the bus was moving from eastern side to western side and PWs 2 and 3, after going to the tailoring shop on the northern side, were crossing the road to go to their house and suddenly emerged from behind the lorry and in spite of the respondent No. 2 trying to stop the bus from a distance of 20 yards, he could not have stopped it in such a situation. The Tribunal has also found that the respondent No. 2, who was prosecuted in C.C No. 42 of 1987 for the offence punishable under section 338, Indian Penal Code on the file of the Special Judicial Magistrate of II Class, Vijayawada, was acquitted as disclosed from Exh. B-1, certified copy of the judgment, and as a whole, issue No. 1 was held against the claimants.

4. In a situation like this, it is the appreciation of evidence by the Tribunal which should yield the result. There is only ocular evidence in the case in relation to the question of negligence comprising the testimony of PWs 2 and 3, the victims of the accident wherein PW 2 was aged 13 years and PW 3 was aged 6 years at the relevant time. Both of them have consistently stated that the bus hit them while they were crossing the road after passing the lorry from behind. They have denied the defence theory as above. As against that, the testimony of the respondent No. 2 is to the effect that while he was driving the vehicle slowly at the rate of 15 km. per hour and blowing horn, the claimants suddenly ran across the road from behind the lorry which was on his right side and when he saw the claimants at a distance of 20 yards, he applied the brakes and stopped the bus and actually they did not come into contact with the bus and PW 3 was found to be fallen on the ground and PW 2 was found standing near PW 3. According to him, the conductor took PW 3 to the hospital, whereas he went to police station and gave a report. This is the evidence which was before the Tribunal for appreciation.

5. The Tribunal has made a note that having due regard to the age of the two claimants, there has been some inconsistency in their testimony. The Tribunal has totally ignored the implications of section 118 of the Evidence Act to deal with the evidence of a child witness. PW 3 being a child witness, although a claimant in the case, was to be dealt with under section 118 of the Evidence Act. Although the Evidence Act is said to be not technically applicable to the proceedings before a Tribunal, the principles of evidence and the law of evidence are held to be applicable as the wisdom and the reasoning of a human being have to flow from the logic in the rule of evidence. When the Tribunal has to deal with a child witness like PW 3, the Presiding Officer was bound to put questions and satisfy himself that the witness was capable of understanding the questions and was able to give rational reasons and it was necessary to append a certificate in that regard in the evidence. The deposition of PW 3 does not show that any such procedure was followed. It is mandatory under section 118 of the Evidence Act that the court should satisfy about the understanding of the questions by the witness and there is rationality in answering questions due to tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind or any other cause of the same kind [P. 1797, Vol. 2, Sarkar on Evidence, 1994 reprint]. In the absence of such a record, the Tribunal could not have dealt with the testimony of such a witness to draw inferences against the same. Surprisingly, the Tribunal has also administered oath to PW 3, who is a child witness, without following section 118 of the Evidence Act who is not expected to be punished for ‘perjury’ for taking false oath. With such evidence, the Tribunal has drawn inferences against the witness. Furthermore, even the PW 2, who was aged 13 years at the relevant time, is a child within the meaning of section 2, sub-clause (h) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and technically speaking, she was also entitled to the benefit of section 118 of the Evidence Act. A girl aged up to 18 years is held to be a child by a Division Bench of this court in Ailaiah v. State of A.P, 1994 (2) ALT (Cri.) 519 (to which I was a member). Even in regard to her, the Tribunal was bound to follow the procedure contemplated under section 118 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, while appreciating the evidence the Tribunal fell into serious legal error to draw inference against PWs 2 and 3 under the circumstances.

6. As regards the testimony of the respondent No. 2, the Tribunal has given lot of weight due to certain circumstances, viz., that the two girls were crossing the road from one direction to the other and emerged from behind the lorry which was parked there, whereas the respondent No. 2 was driving the vehicle slowly at a distance of 20 yards and, therefore, he could not stop. Surprisingly, the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal has given prima facie value to the testimony of the driver of the bus, who was to satisfy the court about his diligence in driving the vehicle and he did all that was necessary for a reasonable and prudent man who ought to have exercised such a care at the relevant time. The manner in which the accident occurred leading to serious injuries to PW 3 shows that but for the negligence of the driver the accident would not have occurred. The accident occurred during broad daylight at 10 a.m or 11 a.m on the road in the township of Vijayawada. At that hour, normally, it is expected that there will be heavy traffic and people will be crossing the roads for various reasons. Therefore, by operating the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the accident which itself spoke about the negligence of the respondent No. 2, the burden to prove that there was no negligence on his part was quite heavy on him. Since the driver was the best person to say as to how the accident occurred, he should be presumed to have the special means of knowledge regarding the cause of the accident even from the principle to be borrowed from section 106 of the Evidence Act. In such a situation, the question is whether his testimony itself was sufficient to exonerate him of the prima facie negligence on his part. The so-called report given by him to the police after the accident was not before the Tribunal. If he had really lodged a report, it would have contained the reasons for the cause of the accident and the care and the diligence which the driver exercised at the relevant time. For the reasons best known to him, he has not taken pains to either produce or keep such a document before the court. Admittedly, the conductor of the bus was there, who is said to have taken PW 3 to the hospital and he was not examined to corroborate the testimony of the respondent No. 2, the driver. It was a passenger bus, where there must have been passengers. Even the police might have examined some passengers during investigation and none of them was examined by the respondents to corroborate the testimony of RW 1. With all this, the Tribunal has believed the testimony of the respondent No. 2, driver. It is well settled that there cannot be any negligence or contributory negligence as against a child of tender age [Srinivasa v. Parasiva Murthy, 1976 ACJ 45 (Karnataka)]. It is equally applicable to some extent to PW 3 also. It is also settled that in the absence of any documentary evidence or corroborative evidence, the court has to consider the circumstantial evidence and consider the totality of the circumstances to draw inferences. That is not done by the Tribunal. The Tribunal appears to have been impressed by the circumstance that the driver of the vehicle, on seeing the two girls crossing the road from a distance of 20 yards, applied brakes and stopped the vehicle. There is no evidence in support of it. Neither the spot mahajar nor the spot sketch being part of the criminal proceedings were before the Tribunal to know whether any brake marks were available at the spot, whether there were indications on the spot to know as to whether the bus was stopped after hitting the two girls and as to whether the girls were found to be fallen after the accident and the location of the lorry, road, etc. Added to this, the circumstance of the driver not giving report to police or any report made by him to official superiors and failure to examine the conductor or the passengers of the bus are obstructive of any favourable circumstance, if existing in support of the driver's version. If a driver in charge of a bus and the passengers therein and while driving the bus on a road in a broad daylight cannot stop the bus within a distance of 20 yards on seeing the two girls crossing the road, it is inevitably to be recorded about his want of competence to be entrusted with such a public transport. Circumstances are not uncommon that the vehicles will be and can be stopped in few seconds, however, subject to the consequences of the vehicle like skidding, drawing, rolling, crawling, toppling, etc., regarding which marks will be left on the road. Nothing of the kind is found in this case. Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal on issue No. 1 that the accident had occurred not due to the rash and negligent driving of the respondent No. 2 cannot be supported.

7. The Tribunal has assessed the compensation at Rs. 1,16,000 insofar as the claimant-appellant is concerned. It was rejected and reduced to Rs. 7,500 as no fault liability only due to the finding on issue No. 1 in favour of the driver. Now that the finding is going to be set aside, the appellant-claimant should be awarded that amount as compensation, particularly when there is no cross-appeal or cross-objections or any acceptable argument challenging such a finding.

8. Regarding awarding of interest, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent Corporation that the claimant-appellant is not entitled to any interest relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in R.D Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd., 1995 ACJ 366 (SC) and Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia., (1988) 4 SCC 284 : AIR 1988 SC 2031, wherein it was held that no interest can be allowed on future expenditure and secondly, if the delay in disposal was not due to the respondents and when it is due to the delay by the court. In this case, on the face of it, the appellant had not taken steps to expedite the matter and clearly the respondents were at no fault for the delay. However, in the nature of the case the claimant being quite young and being assisted by the guardian cannot be totally deprived of the interest, the rate of which cannot exceed 12 per cent per annum under the circumstances.

9. In the result, the award of the Tribunal is set aside. The appeal is allowed and the following award is passed. The claimant-appellant shall be entitled to recover Rs. 1,16,000 with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of petition till the date of payment, regarding which the liability of the respondents shall be joint and several. There shall be no order as to costs. This shall be subject to depositing the amount in the light of the directions given by the Supreme Court in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corpn. v. Susamma Thomas, 1994 ACJ 1 (SC).

10. Appeal allowed.