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Garware Capital Markets Limited, Bombay v. Jaswal Granites Limited, Hyderabad
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant challenged an order of the learned Company Judge that refused to admit an application under Sections 433(e), 434 read with Section 439(b) of the Companies Act, 1956 seeking winding up of the respondent company.
The appellant alleged that it had advanced an inter-corporate deposit of Rs. 1.00 crore to the respondent on 16-5-1995, repayable within 90 days. By 10-8-1995 the respondent had repaid Rs. 80.00 lakhs and requested a 60-day extension for the balance. The respondent thereafter did not clear the remaining amount despite demands, leading to the winding up application.
At the admission stage the respondent contested the application, asserting that because it had repaid Rs. 80.00 lakhs the appellant should have released securities proportionately, and that the appellant's refusal made the respondent incapable of raising funds on the securities, which resulted in non-payment. The respondent also claimed that the pledged share certificates had fallen greatly in value and that, instead of winding up, it should receive compensation.
The learned Company Judge concluded that the appellant had not disclosed the respondent's request for proportionate release of securities and that this conduct could have misled the court; taking exception to the appellant's conduct, the Company Judge dismissed the winding up application.
On appeal, with the consent of both parties the matter was heard at the admission stage. The appeal arises from the refusal to admit the winding up petition and challenges the legal position on proportionate release of pledged securities and whether a prima facie case for winding up under Section 433(e) was made out.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the creditor (appellant) is obliged to release pledged securities proportionately upon partial repayment, or whether the creditor may retain the entire pledged security until full repayment of the loan.
- Whether the facts — including partial repayment, requests for extension, dishonoured cheques and communication between the parties — established a prima facie case that the respondent company was unable to pay its debts and thus warranted admission of a winding up petition under Section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956.
- Whether the learned Company Judge correctly dismissed the winding up application on the ground that the appellant failed to disclose the respondent's prior request for proportionate release of securities, thereby potentially misleading the court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant advanced the inter-corporate deposit secured by pledged shares and had a lien to hold the entire securities until the total loan was repaid; there was no contractual stipulation to release securities proportionately on partial repayment.
- It was not part of the contract between the parties that pledged securities must be progressively released in proportion to amounts repaid; the pledge was given as security for the entire loan.
- The appellant relied on authority (including Goverdhandas Goculdas Tejpal v. The Bank of Bengal) to support the position that a creditor's right to hold security until full repayment is superior to any claim by a surety or pledgor for proportionate release.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent contended it had repaid Rs. 80.00 lakhs and thus the appellant was obligated to release securities proportionately; the appellant refused, which impeded the respondent's ability to raise money on the held-up securities and led to non-payment of the balance.
- The respondent argued that the pledged share certificates had fallen in value (allegedly from Rs. 150.00 lakhs to Rs. 20.00 lakhs) and submitted that instead of winding up the respondent company, the appellant should pay compensation to make good the loss.
- At the admission stage the respondent relied on the alleged non-disclosure by the appellant of the request for proportionate release, which the Company Judge accepted as a basis to dismiss the petition.
Learned Company Judge's Findings (as stated in the opinion)
- The Company Judge took the view that the appellant had not disclosed the respondent's request for proportionate release of pledged securities and that such non-disclosure could have misled the Court at admission, and, taking exception to the appellant's conduct, dismissed the winding up application.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Goverdhandas Goculdas Tejpal v. The Bank of Bengal, ILR XV Bombay 48 | Authority rejecting a contention that a creditor must release securities proportionately where the pledge covered the whole debt; relied on to support creditor's right to hold security until full repayment. | The court accepted the appellant's reliance on this decision to support the proposition that a pledge given for the total loan permits the creditor to retain all securities until the entire debt is discharged. |
| Ellis v. Emmanuel, L.R.I Ex. D., 157 (observation of Justice Blackburn quoted) | Statement that the class of cases does not establish a general doctrine requiring rateable distribution of dividends/proceeds to sureties, and that where a guarantee is for a continuing floating balance limited in amount it should be construed to cover a part only of the debt; addresses equity between creditor and surety. | The court cited and approved the observation (as cited in Goverdhandas) to explain the equitable principles balancing creditor and surety and to reject respondent's contention for proportionate release. |
| Duncan, Fox v. North and South Wales Bank, L.R., 6 App Cas. 1 | Discusses the creditor's superior right to hold security until the debt is paid and the principles of indemnifying or protecting the surety. | The court referred to this authority in considering the balance of equities and to support the proposition that the creditor's right to hold pledged security until full repayment is paramount. |
| Gedye v. Matson, 25 Beav 310 | Affirms that the creditor's right to hold security is superior to that of a surety. | The court cited this case to reinforce the conclusion that the creditor's right to retain pledged securities until the loan is repaid surpasses any claim for proportionate release by the debtor or surety. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first reconstructed the relevant facts from the parties' correspondence: the loan of Rs. 1 crore on 16-5-1995; repayment of Rs. 80.00 lakhs by 10-8-1995; subsequent requests by the respondent for extensions and communications about Income-tax Department prohibitory orders preventing immediate payment; a first request for proportionate release of security was made on 16-9-1995; further communications and dishonour of cheques followed; and a registered call notice was issued by the appellant under Section 434 of the Companies Act and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
On the legal question whether proportionate release of pledged securities was due to the respondent, the court observed:
- There was no stipulation in the loan transaction that pledged certificates would be released proportionately upon partial repayment.
- If such a right were to be recognized it would have to arise from the contract terms, from general principles of contract law, or from an accepted commercial practice; none of these were shown or pleaded in the record.
- The correspondence indicates the pledge was made as security for the total amount. Shareholders' letters explicitly confirmed that, in case of default, their shares would be transferred to the appellant without recourse.
The court relied on authorities (Goverdhandas Goculdas Tejpal and the other cited cases) establishing that a creditor's right to hold security until the whole debt is paid is paramount to any claim by a surety or pledgor for proportional distributions. The court quoted the observation from Ellis v. Emmanuel (via the Goverdhandas decision) explaining that equity does not generally require a creditor to apportion dividends to sureties unless the guarantee's construction so requires.
Applying these principles, the court concluded that the appellant had the right to retain the pledge until the whole loan was repaid and that the respondent had no contractual or legal right to demand proportionate release of securities with partial payment.
On the issue of whether a prima facie case for winding up under Section 433(e) was made out, the court noted the actions and communications (requests for extension, dishonoured cheques, registered call notice under Section 434 and Section 138) and the respondent's subsequent acknowledgement of the debt while still insisting on proportionate release. Taking these facts together, the court found that, prima facie, the respondent had not been able to clear its debts and that the appellant was entitled to file an application under Section 433(e).
Finally, the court addressed the learned Company Judge's dismissal that had been based on alleged non-disclosure by the appellant. The appellate court, having considered the correspondence timeline and the legal principles, disagreed with the dismissal and concluded the application should have been admitted.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned Company Judge is set aside. The winding up application is directed to be admitted, registered and to proceed in accordance with law.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The respondent's company faces admission of the winding up petition under Section 433(e); the wound-up process will proceed as per statutory requirements.
- On the specific legal question, the court affirmed that where pledged securities were given as collateral for the total loan and no contractual or established commercial practice requires proportionate release, the creditor may retain the entire pledged security until the full indebtedness is discharged. The opinion applies existing authorities to that effect but does not purport to lay down any broader novel precedent beyond application of those authorities to the facts before the court.
- The opinion does not state any broader policy change; it confines its decision to the facts and the cited authorities, noting that no right to proportionate release arose on the facts and documents placed before the court.
Lingaraja Rath, J.:— The appellant has preferred this appeal assailing the order of the learned Company Judge refusing to admit the application under Section 433(e), 434 read with Section 439(b) of the Companies Act, 1956 seeking winding up of the respondent company.
2. The appellant came with the case of having advanced, at the request of the respondent company, an inter corporate deposit of Rs. 1.00 crore on 16-5-1995 to the respondent with repayment promise within 90 days. On 10-8-1995 there was a request by the respondent for extension of the deposit by 60 days. The respondent had repaid by that time, Rs. 80.00 lakhs, but since thereafter they did not clear the balance in spite of several demands, the application for winding up was filed. The application was contested at the admission stage by the respondent taking the stand that since they had paid Rs. 80.00 lakhs, the appellant was to release the securities held by it proportionately but that it had refused to do so. Such conduct of the appellant made the respondent incapable of raising money on the held up securities as a consequence of which the amounts were not paid. It was also urged that the securities, which were share certificates held by the Managing Director and others and had been pledged with the appellant, had fallen in value from Rs. 150.00 lakhs to Rs. 20.00 lakhs and as such instead of winding up, the appellant should pay compensation to the respondent to make good the loss. The learned Company Judge after hearing both the sides took the view of the appellant having not disclosed the request made by the respondent for release of proportionate security the Court could have been misled in admitting the application for winding up, and as such taking exception to the conduct of the appellant, dismissed the application.
3. The respondent has appeared in the appeal through Mr. S. Ravi and with the consent of both the parties this appeal has been fully heard at the admission stage and hence the appeal is formally admitted and is also heard and disposed of now.
4. Mr. C. Kodanda Ram, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the view taken by the learned Company Judge of the appellant having a duty to release securities proportionately to the amounts repaid is not correct and that the appellant has a lien to hold the entire securities until the total loan was repaid as the loan was advanced on the securities furnished as a whole, and that it is not a part of the stipulation between the parties that the securities must be progressively released in proportion to the amounts repaid.
5. It is conceded by Mr. S. Ravi that in the loan transaction there was no stipulation of proportionate release of the pledged certificates when amounts are repaid. A loan contracted and paid is subject to the terms and conditions settled between the parties as part of the contract. If the contract does not stipulate steps to be taken as are contended by the respondent, a right of proportionate release of the shares on payments being made must be found in the general principles of law governing contracts or as an accepted commercial practice. No such interpretation of law has been brought to our notice and indeed no such general commercial practice has also been pleaded. On the other hand, the correspondence between the parties would reveal the pledge being made for the total amount of the loan. The letter of the respondent on 16-5-1995 from the Executive Director of the respondent enclosed inter alia letters of the share-holders placing the shares as collateral security for the loan of Rs. 100.00 lakhs. All the shareholders in their respective letters, confirmed that in case of default their shares would be transferred to the appellant company on presentation by the respondent company without any recourse to the shareholders. Mr. Kodanda Ram has rightly placed reliance on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Goverdhandas Goculdas Tejpal v. The Bank of Bengal, ILR XV Bombay 48 in which a similar contention raised was negatived. Rejecting the argument his Lordship cited with approval the observation of Justice Blackburn in Ellis v. Emmanuel, L.R.I Ex. D., 157 that
“I think that the class of cases referred to do not lay down any general doctrine that where there is a surety, with a limit on the amount of his liability, for the whole of a debt exceeding that limit, he is entitled to the benefit of a rateable proportion of the dividends paid on the whole debt; but only that where the surety has given a continuing guarantee, limited in amount, to secure the floating balance which may from time to time be due from the principal to the creditor, the guarantee is as between the surety and the creditor to be construed, both at law and in equity as applicable to a part only of the debt, co-extensive with the amount of his guarantee; and this upon the ground, at first confined to equity, but afterwards extended to law, that it is inequitable in the creditor, who is at liberty to increase the balance or not, to increase it at the expense of the surety.”
6. Considering the question of balancing the equities of a surety and a credit vis-a-vis the principal debtor, it was observed that the equity between the creditor and the surety is for the creditor not to do anything to deprive the surety of his right. The application of the principle to indemnify the surety was decided in Duncan, Fox v. North and South Wales Bank, L.R, 6 App Cas. 1 at p. 13. That case itself yielded the reading “that the creditor's right to hold his security until his whole debt is paid is paramount to the surety's claim upon such securities, which only arises when the creditor's claim against such securities has been satisfied. In Gedye v. Matson, 25 Beav 310 the creditor's right is laid down as being superior to that of the surety.” We must, accordingly hold that the creditor has a right to hold on to the pledge until the whole of the loan has been repaid. The pledge is made as a security for the entire loan and there cannot be a right in the debtor to get proportionate release of the securities in accordance with the repayment of the loan.
7. Section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956 states the circumstances under which the Company may be wound up. Out of the different circumstances enumerated, sub-clause (e) provides, when the company is unable to pay its debts, as one of such circumstances. Section 434 provides when the company would be deemed as being unable to pay its debts”. Sub-clause (a) of Section 434 is as follows:
“If a creditor, by assignment or otherwise, to whom the company is indebted in a sum exceeding five hundred rupees then due, has served on the company, by causing it to be delivered at its registered office, by registered post or otherwise, a demand under his hand requiring the company to pay the sum so due and the company has for three weeks thereafter neglected to pay the sum, or to secure or compound for it to the reasonable satisfaction of the creditor;”
8. From the correspondence between the parties it is seen that on 10-8-1995 the respondent made a request to the appellant for extension of the time for payment by 60 days. A fax message was sent by the appellant regarding non-receipt of Rs. 20.00 lakhs. On 28-8-1995 the respondent sent a communication replying to the fax message, that the decision of the appellant not to give the inter corporate deposit would be a big disaster for the respondent company, that the amount to be repaid was in the Bank but that due to the survey conducted by the Income-tax Department the Banks were under prohibitory orders for one week. It was urged that immediately on lifting up of the orders they would send the amount to the appellant. Meanwhile, an appeal was made by the respondent to revolve the previous amount repaid so that during times of difficulties their factory does not stop. On 2-9-1995 the respondent sent a fax message to the appellant that the prohibitory orders were still continuing and that they have been fervently appealing to the Income-tax department orally and in writing for lifting of the ban. Their business came to a total stand still and hence they requested the appellant to give some more time so that they could repay the balance of the inter corporate deposit with interest. They reported that at the moment they were helpless and looked forward to the appellant's kindness and understanding. On 6-9-1995 a fax message was released by the respondent requesting the appellant not to deposit the cheques which had been kept as security earlier. On 16-9-1995 the respondent addressed a letter to roll-over the inter corporate deposit for Rs. 20.00 lakhs and the entire interest accrued for another 90 days, and to release the security for the amounts already paid. It was for the first time that such a request was made for proportionate release of the security. Such a stand had not been taken earlier. On 5-11-1995 again another letter was sent requesting for further 90 days time for repayment of Rs. 20.00 lakhs with interest. On 18-11-1995 the appellant sent a reply disagreeing to release the security but indicating their co-operation for pledging the security with any other party as per the instructions of the respondent. But the offer was not availed of and instead the respondent insisted through different correspondences for release of the security which, we have already found, was an untenable position. On 15-12-1995 the appellant presented the cheques of the respondent for an amount of Rs. 2,78,925/- which had been issued by the respondent on 19-11-1995, for encashment. But the cheques were dishonoured which fact the appellant communicated to the respondent on 27-12-1995. On 8-1-1996 a registered call notice was issued by the appellant under Section 434 of the Companies Act and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The reply of the respondent on 4-3-1996 was an acknowledgment of the debt but sticking to their stand for release of the securities proportionately. The appellant sent the pledged snares for transfer in their favour but the respondent has not effected the transfers. The resume of the facts would show, prima facie, of their being a case of the respondent having not been able to clear off the debts. In such circumstance the appellants had a right to file an application under Section 433(e) of the Companies Act. Since such a prima facie case has been made out, the application is entitled to be considered as to whether a winding up proceeding is warranted.
9. In the result the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the learned Company Judge is set aside. The application is directed to be admitted and registered and proceed with in accordance with law.
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