- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Executive Committee, Sbh, Hyderabad & Anr. v. D. Dhaneswara Rao .
Judgment Summary — Bhaskar Rao, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The Executive Committee of the State Bank of Hyderabad (Head Office at Gunfoundry, Hyderabad) and its Managing Director ("the appellants") filed this writ appeal against an order of the learned single Judge dated July 19, 1989. The single Judge had allowed a writ petition and quashed the appellate authority's order dated March 20, 1987, which had confirmed the disciplinary authority's order dated March 31, 1986 removing the respondent (a Branch Manager of the State Bank of Hyderabad) from service.
Material factual allegations were that the respondent, as Branch Manager of the Nallkunta Branch and in charge of disbursing loans to weaker sections, demanded 20% of sanctioned loans as illegal gratification. A charge memo containing three charges was issued. Charge No.1 included six items of corruption; one item alleged payment by Balki Baburao (examined as M.W.3). The Enquiry Officer found that payment of Rs. 887 was established (though the bank alleged Rs. 1,200) and held other charges not proved. The disciplinary authority accepted the enquiry report and removed the respondent; the appellate authority confirmed removal. The respondent petitioned before the High Court; the single Judge held that even the finding of Rs. 887 was not established on the record or admissible evidence, and allowed the writ petition. The appellants appealed to this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court can interfere with the findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution.
- Whether, in service law jurisprudence, the High Court can interfere when orders imposing punishment are challenged before it.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (State Bank of Hyderabad)
- Where a witness (here, Baburao) deposes that he paid some amount as illegal gratification and that evidence is not contradicted by other evidence, that testimony must be accepted; the disciplinary and appellate authorities were justified in accepting it and imposing removal.
- The evidence of Baburao (M.W.3) was admissible and credible; hence the removal was based on evidence on record.
- The High Court exercising judicial review under Article 226 is not an appellate authority on questions of fact and ordinarily should not interfere with factual findings unless they are based on inadmissible evidence or are perverse.
- Because Baburao's evidence cannot be classed as inadmissible, the single Judge erred in allowing the writ petition.
Respondent's Arguments
- The evidence of Baburao is contradicted by Shaik Mahaboob (M.W.12) in his preliminary enquiry statement; appreciation of evidence by the enquiry/disciplinary/appellate authorities should not be perverse and must observe principles of natural justice (even if strict Evidence Act rules do not apply to departmental enquiries).
- The inferences and conclusions drawn by the enquiry/disciplinary/appellate authorities must be reasonable; the learned single Judge correctly found those conclusions to be not proper or reasonable.
- The High Court may interfere under Article 226 where findings are not based on admissible evidence; therefore the single Judge's interference was justified.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Andhra Pradesh v. V. Sree Rama Rao (1964-II-LLJ-150) | The High Court may interfere where departmental proceedings violate natural justice, statutory enquiry modes, are influenced by extraneous/irrelevant considerations, or where conclusions are arbitrary; but if some legal evidence exists, the adequacy/reliability of that evidence is not ordinarily open to challenge under Article 226. | The Court relied on this Constitution Bench authority to state the standard: interference is permissible where there is no legal evidence, inadmissible evidence, perversity, or error of law apparent on the face of the record; but not to re-appreciate evidence where some legal evidence exists. |
| Union Of India v. H.C. Goel (1964-II-LLJ-38) | Similar proposition to Sree Rama Rao regarding the limits of High Court interference with departmental fact-finding under Article 226. | The Court cited the Larger Bench decision as reinforcing the standard that factual findings should not be re-appraised by the High Court unless they are perverse or unsupported by admissible evidence. |
| Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur (1972-I-LLJ-1) | Authority cited for the general principle limiting High Court re-appraisal of departmental findings. | Placed with other decisions to show consistent Supreme Court jurisprudence on when interference is warranted. |
| Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P. (1983-II-LLJ-1) | Authority reinforcing the principles set out in earlier cases about limits of judicial review of departmental findings. | Used as part of the chain of authorities to explain when interference under Article 226 is permissible. |
| State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar (1991-I-LLJ-269) | Authority consistent with the proposition limiting re-appraisal of evidence by the High Court. | Reinforced the standard the Court applied in assessing whether the departmental findings were supportable. |
| R.V. Robertys (1909) IKB (referenced in Wade on Administrative Law) | Definition of "no evidence": where evidence taken as a whole is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding; perverse or unreasonable findings amount to no evidence. | The Court quoted this exposition (via Wade) to explain that a finding based on perverse evidence is equivalent to a finding based on no admissible evidence, thereby justifying interference. |
| J.D. Jain v. Management of State Bank of India (1982-I-LLJ-54) | Principle that departmental enquiries are not strictly bound by formal rules of evidence and that hearsay may be considered in some circumstances. | The Court acknowledged the authority but clarified that despite relaxed evidentiary rules, appreciation must still be reasonable and non-perverse; the case does not preclude interference where appreciation is perverse. |
| Maharashtra State Board of S & H.S. Education v. K.S. Gandhi | Similar authority on admissibility and approach to evidence in departmental enquiries (recognising less formal evidentiary strictness). | The Court relied on this to acknowledge the general rule, but emphasized that reasonable appreciation remains necessary and perverse findings permit interference. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by stating the settled principle that the High Court, under Article 226, is not an appellate body on questions of fact and ordinarily should not reappraise evidence. However, interference is justified where findings are based on no evidence, inadmissible evidence, are perverse, or where there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The Court cited the Constitution Bench decision in State of Andhra Pradesh v. V. Sree Rama Rao and related authorities to set this standard.
Applying that standard to the facts, the Court examined the conflicting testimony: Baburao (M.W.3) gave a prior statement (Ex. M.E.-6) and evidence at enquiry claiming he paid the respondent; the Enquiry Officer found Rs. 887 proved (not Rs. 1,200). Shaik Mahaboob's prior statement (Ex. M.E.-27 and as M.W.12) said he did not attend the bank on the crucial day. In cross-examination Baburao stated he received Rs.1,177 from the cashier and that Mahaboob paid the balance out of the loan amount and asked him to hand over the entire Rs.1,000 to the Manager; Baburao also stated he gave Rs.1,000 to the Manager who was alone. The Court noted that Baburao was neither re-examined by the presenting officer nor was Shaik Mahaboob probed to reconcile his preliminary statement with Baburao's account.
The Court reasoned that, read together, the statements were inconsistent: if Mahaboob had not attended the bank, Baburao could not have obtained Rs.887 from him to make up Rs.1,000 to hand over to the Manager. The Court emphasized that the burden to prove receipt of illegal gratification lay on the Bank; the disciplinary and appellate authorities wrongly shifted the burden to the charged officer to disprove the allegation. Because the authorities reached a conclusion inconsistent with the documentary and testimonial record and shifted the burden improperly, the Court characterized their finding that Baburao paid Rs.1,000 to the charged officer as a perverse appreciation of the evidence.
The Court explained that a finding based on perverse or unreasonable evidence amounts to a finding based on no admissible evidence. Relying on the definition from Wade on Administrative Law (which cites R.V. Robertys), the Court held that where no reasonable tribunal could reach the impugned conclusion on the material, the High Court may interfere under Article 226. While acknowledging authorities that departmental enquiries are not bound by strict rules of evidence and may consider hearsay, the Court reiterated that the ultimate appreciation must be reasonable; if the appreciation is perverse or if material contradictions and omissions are ignored, interference is justified.
Having examined the particulars of the testimony, the Court concluded that the single Judge had properly scrutinized these contradictions and omissions, correctly found the departmental findings to be perverse, and properly interfered.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Holding: The writ appeal filed by the Executive Committee of the State Bank of Hyderabad and its Managing Director fails; the single Judge's order allowing the writ petition (which quashed the appellate authority's order confirming removal) is upheld. The Court dismissed the appeal and ordered no costs.
Implications: The direct effect is that the High Court's decision in favour of the respondent (quashing the order of removal as being based on perverse/inadmissible evidence) stands. The Court reaffirmed the established principle that while departmental enquiries are not bound by strict rules of evidence, the appreciation of evidence must be reasonable; findings based on perverse evidence amount to no admissible evidence and permit High Court interference under Article 226. The judgment did not purport to create a novel legal doctrine beyond applying existing authorities to the facts of this case.
JUDGMENT Bhaskar Rao, J.
1. The Executive Committee of the State Bank of Hyderabad, Head Office at Gunfoundry, Hyderabad and its Managing Director have filed this Writ Appeal assailing the order of the learned single Judge of this Court dated July 19, 1989 allowing the Writ Petition and quashing the order of the appellant authority dated March 20, 1987 confirming the order of removal of the respondent herein passed by the disciplinary authority on March 31, 1986.
2. The facts of the case are that the respondent was working as Branch Manager, State Bank of Hyderabad, Nallkunta Branch, Hyderabad and he was incharge of distribution of loans to weaker sections under the 20 point programme. The allegation against the respondent was that while granting loans to weaker sections he demanded 20% of the loan amount sanctioned towards illegal gratification. As a result of which, a charge memo was issued levelling three charges against the respondent. Thereupon, the respondent filed his explanation. As far as charge No. 1 is concerned, there was an allegation of six items of corruption. Out of that, one item relates to the payment of illegal gratification to the respondent by one Balki Baburao (M.W.3). The Enquiry Officer found that payment of Rs. 887/- was established though the charge was for Rs. 1,200/- and held that the other charges were not proved. After considering the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority accepted the finding of the Enquiry officer, as a result of which the respondent was removed from service. Against that, the respondent preferred an appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority also confirmed the order of the disciplinary authority by a reasoned order dated March 20, 1987. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent filed a Writ Petition. The learned single Judge allowed the Writ Petition holding that payment of illegal gratification of Rs. 887/- is not established and the finding of the enquiry officer, which was accepted by the disciplinary authority and confirmed by the appellate authority, is not based on the evidence apparent on the face of the record and also not based on the admissible evidence. On other points also, the learned single Judge held against the appellants. Assailing the order of the learned single Judge, this appeal is filed.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants, Mr.K. Srinivasa Murthy contended that once a witness states that he paid some amount towards illegal gratification and the same is not contradicted by any other evidence, the same has to be accepted and accordingly the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority accepted the same and imposed the punishment of removal. In this case, M.W.3- Baburao deposed that he paid the amount and his evidence is acceptable. Thus, he contends that the removal from service is based on the evidence on record . He further contends that once the allegations are proved in the enquiry and the same are accepted by the appellate authority, this court will not generally interfere by exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution as an appellate authority. The High Court can only interfere when such finding is based on inadmissible evidence or perverse. In the present case, the evidence of Baburao cannot be said as inadmissible evidence, and therefore, it cannot be said that the removal order is passed without any cogent evidence. Hence the learned single Judge, erred in allowing the writ Petition.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Suresh Kumar, contended that the evidence of Baburao cannot be relied upon as the same was contradicted by one Shaik Mahaboob (M.W. 12) in his statement at the preliminary enquiry he contends that when the evidence is appreciated by the enquiry officer or the disciplinary authority, the appreciation should not be perverse. That appreciation should be according to the principles of natural justice though the provisions of the evidence act are not applicable. The inference and the conclusions to be drawn in pursuance of appreciation of evidence must be reasonable if it is viewed from any angle. In the present case, as rightly pointed out by the learned single Judge, the conclusions drawing by the enquiry officer as well as the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority are not proper and reasonable. It is further contended that the High Court will not generally interfere into the conclusions and findings reached by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority if they are based on admissible evidence. But, when the said findings are not based on admissible evidence, there is no bar to the High Court to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, the learned single Judge has rightly interfered and allowed the Writ Petition. Hence there are no merits in the Writ Appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed.
5. In view of the rival contentions put forth, the questions that arise for consideration are;
1) Whether the High Court can interfere with the findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority and appellate authority while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution; and
2) In the service law jurisprudence, whether the High Court can interfere when the orders imposing punishment are challenged before it.
6. It is well settled principle of law that this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not an appellate authority while reviewing a question of fact. Therefore, the High Court cannot review the evidence and reverse a finding of fact based on evidence. Of course, if the finding is not based on any evidence or is based on inadmissible evidence or there is an error of law apparent on the face of record, there is no bar to this Court to interfere. A similar question fell for consideration before the supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. V. Sree Rama Rao (1964-II-LLJ-150). Speaking for the Constitution Bench, justice Shah observed: Page 154
"The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry of where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrive at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution."
A similar view was taken by the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court in Union Of India v. H.C Goel. (1964-II-LLJ-38). To the same effect, decisions were rendered in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur (1972-I-LLJ-1) Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P. (1983-II-LLJ-1) and State of Ma-harashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar (1991-I-LLJ-269).
7. Keeping in view of the principles laid down in the above judgments, we have to examine the facts of this case.
8. It is the case of the Bank that the respondent received Rs. 1200/- from Baburao towards illegal gratification. But the enquiry Officer found that the respondent received only Rs. 887/- and not Rs. 1200/-. The finding is based on prior statement of Baburao marked as Ex. M.E.-6 at the preliminary enquiry and also in his statement at the enquiry. The other evidence which is relied upon is that of the prior statement of Shaik Mahaboob which is marked as Ex. M.E.-27 and the evidence of the said Shaik Mahabob as M.W. 12. There is also the evidence of the Cashier, P.S. Sarma(D.W.3) on behalf of the charged officer. In an earlier statement given by Shaik Mahaboob in the preliminary enquiry, he stated that on the day when the said Baburao received Rs. 1,000/- from the Bank and who alleged to have paid Rs. 887/- to the Branch Manager (respondent) as gratification, he did not attend the bank as he had to go to his office where he was working as Record Assistant. The relevant portion of the evidence of Shaik Mahaboob reads as follows:
"Then I have written an application for Baburao under signature of Baburao requesting the Branch Manager to sanction an amount of Rs. 1,000/- to pay an advance to the shop and asked Baburao to go to Branch Manager and submit the same. I could not go as it was office time. Afterwards I came to know from Baburao that the B.M. had advanced him an amount of Rs. l,000/-
9. In the cross-examination at the enquiry, it was not elicited by the enquiry officer or the presenting officer that Shaik Mahaboob attended the bank on the crucial day. Naturally, the charge officer kept quite and did not ask Shaik Mahaboob whether he attended the Bank on the crucial day. Baburao, who stated that he paid Rs. 887/- to the Branch Manager (respondent) when he received Rs. 1,000/- from the bank, has further stated in the prior statement M.E. 6 that he received Rs. 1,000/- from the bank and he paid the same to the Branch Manager on that date. He also stated the same thing in the Chief Examination at the enquiry where he was examined as M.W. 3 However, in the Cross- examination, Baburao stated as follows:
"I surrendered the token at the counter and received Rs. l177- from the cashier. I asked Sri Shaik Mahaboob as to why I received only Rs. 1177-. He told me that the balance amount will be passed on to the Branch Manager. Please wait for some time. A short while later Shaik Mahaboob paid me the balance amount out of the loan amount of Rs. 1,000/- and asked me to hand over the entire amount of Rs. 1,000/- to the Bank Manager. I had gone into the Manager's Cabin and gave him the amount of Rs. 1,000/-. He was alone at that time and took my signature on some form. At that time Sri Shaik Mahboob was waiting outside the Manager's cabin."
Baburao was not re-examined on behalf of the Presenting Officer nor was he examined by the enquiry officer to say that Shaik Mahaboob was not present on that day at the bank and that there was no question of his handing over the sum of Rs. 1,000/- into the hands of the charged officer so as to enable him to pay the amount to the Branch Manager.
10. By reading the evidence of Baburao in the chief examination as well as in the cross-examination along with the statement of Shaik Mahaboob in the preliminary enquiry, one has to come to only conclusion that on the day when the said amount was alleged to have been paid to the respondent, Baburao paid Rs. 8877- For that Rs. 1,000/- Baburao has taken Rs. 1177- from the Bank and Rs.887/- from Shaik Mahaboob and in all he has taken Rs. 1,000/- and paid Rs. 1,000/- to the respondent (Branch Manager). But, Shaik Mahaboob stated in his earlier statement that he has not attended the bank on that day as he went to his office. Further Baburao in his cross-examination stated that he has taken Rs. 8877- from Shaik Mahaboob to make the total amount of Rs. l,000/- to be paid to the respondent (Branch Manager). Thus, when Shaik Mahaboob had not attended the Bank on that day, the question of Baburao taking Rs.8877- from Mahaboob does not arise.Thus, the case of Baburao that he paid Rs. 1000/- by taking Rs. 887/- from shaik Mahaboob falls to the ground as the same is not in consonance with the statement of Shaik Mahaboob as well as the statement of Baburao in the cross-examination. The disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority erred in holding that the charged officer ought to have elicited from Baburao or Shaik Mahaboob that Shiak Mahaboob did not attend the Bank on the crucial day. The burden is on the Bank to prove that the charged officer received the illegal gratification. Therefore, the conclusion arrived by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority shifting the burden upon the charged officer, is not correct. The inference drawn by them that Baburao paid the said amount falls within the arena of perverse appreciation of evidence. It is to be noticed that the burden lies on the bank to prove that the charged officer received the same. In case they establish the fact that the charged officer received, then the burden shifts to the charged officer to disprove the same. It is not possible to come to the conclusion by reading the preliminary statement of Baburao and his cross-examination in the enquiry and the statement of Shaik Mahaboob at the preliminary enquiry that Baburao paid the amount to the charged officer after taking Rs. 887/- from Shaik Mahaboob. Therefore, the finding of the disciplinary authority that Baburao paid Rs. 1,000/- to the charged officer, is perverse.
11. It is settled principle of law that perverse evidence cannot be said to be an admissible evidence. A finding based on perverse evidence has to be stated as a finding based on no evidence or is based on inadmissible evidence. Here it is relevant to refer what is the meaning of 'No evidence' from Wade on Administrative Law (Fifth Edition) at Page 287
"No evidence does not mean only a total dearth of evidence. It extends to any case where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding ; or where in other words no Tribunal could reasonably reach that conclusion on that evidence ( R.V.Robertys (1909) IKB page 407 @ 423) This 'no evidence' principle clearly has something in common that the principle that perverse or unreasonable action is authorised and ultra vires".
12. A reading of the above makes it clear the finding based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence or on evidence which is not legal, is perverse and the same amounts to error apparent on the face of the record and the High Court can interfere while exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution.
13. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that strict rules of evidence are not applicable for the departmental enquiries and even hearsay evidence can be taken into consideration. In support of his contention he relied upon decision of the Supreme Court in J.D. Jain v. Management of State Bank of India (1982-I-LLJ-54) and Maharashtra State Board of S & H.S. Education v. K.S. Gandhi . There is no doubt about the principle laid down in the above judgments. But, when the evidence is scrutinised, the inquiring authority and the appellate authority have to appreciate the evidence to come to the conclusion regarding the guilt or otherwise of the delinquent officer and such conclusion must be reasonable. If the appreciation of evidence is perverse or the authorities erred in not properly appreciating the evidence and omit to take into consideration the legal principles in appreciation of the same i.e., laying burden of proof on the delinquent officer or not taking the important contradictions and omissions in the evidence into consideration, the same amounts to perverse appreciation of evidence and the High Court can interfere in such circumstances. In this view of the matter, the High Court can interfere with the findings arrived at by the Disciplinary authority and the appellate authority while exercising the power of judicial review when the order imposing punishment are perverse. We therefore, hold that the learned single. Judge has rightly considered all the aspects of the matter in depth in allowing the writ petition. Hence, it does not warrant interference in appeal.
14. In the result, the writ appeal fails and accordingly it is dismissed. No costs.
Alert