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Public Prosecutor, High Court Of A.P, Hyd. v. Kundavaram Chandrachari .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent was accused No. 13 in C.C. No. 370 of 1990 before the IVth Additional District Munsif Magistrate, Chittoor. He filed Crl. M.P. No. 2101 of 1990 seeking discharge under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The learned Magistrate allowed the application by an order dated 15-10-1991, discharging the respondent. The present matter is an attack on that order by way of criminal revision.
The background facts (as stated in the opinion) concern alleged theft and misappropriation of valuables offered by pilgrims into the Hundi at Tirumala. Collections are counted at "Parakamani." The accused (A-1 to A-13) were staff of the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams; it was alleged some conspired to misappropriate valuables by secreting jewellery in bags of coins on 9-3-1990 and 10-3-1990. Approximately 300 grams of gold ornaments were discovered on inspection. The respondent (A-13) worked as an appraiser in the treasury and was alleged to have helped receive, convert and dispose of stolen property. The accused were charged by C.B. C.I.D. under Section 120-B read with Sections 409 and 418 IPC. The Magistrate considered the police charge-sheet and Section 173 materials and additionally summoned and considered Exhibits C-1 to C-7, concluding there was no material against A-13 to frame a charge and discharging him.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the learned Magistrate's approach in discharging the respondent was contrary to the legal requirements of Sections 239 and 240 of the Code, by assessing the veracity and weighing the evidence at the stage of framing charge.
- Whether the Magistrate was empowered under Section 239 of the Code to summon documents (Exs. C-1 to C-7) and consider them in the enquiry for discharging an accused.
- Whether, in view of a charge of conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC (where no overt act need be attributed), a discharge was justified when the Magistrate found no specific overt act against the respondent.
Arguments of the Parties
Public Prosecutor's Arguments
- The learned Magistrate's approach was contrary to legal requirements under Sections 239 and 240 of the Code because he was not entitled to appreciate the veracity of the contents of documents before him at that stage.
- The Magistrate was not empowered to summon documents (Exs. C-1 to C-7) and consider them under Section 239 of the Code for the purpose of discharging an accused.
Counsel for the Respondent's Arguments
- The Magistrate's duty includes examining documents before him and, if necessary, summoning documents to make an enquiry about the truth of the allegations prior to framing the charge.
- In doing so the Magistrate is empowered to weigh and sift the material on record to decide whether there are cogent reasons to discharge an accused, and the High Court in revisional jurisdiction should be slow to interfere with such orders.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh | At the initial stage of trial (Sections 227/228) the court should not meticulously judge the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence proposed by the prosecution; the enquiry is whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed, not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. | The court applied the principle to hold that the same standard applies to Sections 239 and 240 (warrant cases): a Magistrate must not undertake an elaborate enquiry to marshall evidence or weigh credibility when deciding whether to frame a charge. |
| Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal ((1979) 3 SCC) | Reiterated the principle in Ramesh Singh regarding the limited scope of enquiry at the stage of framing charge under Sections analogous to 227/228. | The court relied on this reaffirmation to reinforce that the Magistrate erred by conducting a detailed appraisal of evidence when deciding discharge under Section 239. |
| Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia | Section 227 (and by analogy other similar provisions) provides that the Judge shall discharge when there is no sufficient ground for proceeding; the enquiry is limited to whether evidentiary material, if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime; elaborate sifting is not required. | The court used this exposition to state that the Magistrate should not delve deep or weigh evidence beyond determining whether prima facie grounds exist to proceed; hence the Magistrate's detailed weighing was impermissible. |
| Niranjan Singh K. S. Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya | While the Magistrate may sift evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether facts emerging from the record/documents constitute the offence, he must not marshal evidence as at the conclusion of a trial; the enquiry is limited to whether there is sufficient ground to frame a charge. | The court cited this case to acknowledge that limited sifting is permissible but emphasized that the learned Magistrate exceeded that limited enquiry and improperly marshalled and weighed evidence in discharging the accused. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first identified the applicable legal standard by reference to Supreme Court authority (Ramesh Singh and subsequent cases): the Magistrate's enquiry under Sections 239 and 240 is analogous to that under Sections 227 and 228 and is therefore a limited, prima facie enquiry. At this stage the Court should determine whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding to trial, not whether the accused is guilty or to weigh evidence with the precision of a trial court.
The court examined the learned Magistrate's order and findings. The Magistrate had summoned Exhibits C-1 to C-7 (challans and related documents about Parakamani procedure) and considered them together with statements under Section 161 and other materials produced under Section 173(2). The Magistrate critically examined witness testimony (L.W.s 11 and 12, L.W. 2, vigilance and guard officers), raised doubts about their conduct, and made detailed factual conclusions about the impossibility of theft in the circumstances and that no overt act was attributable to the respondent (A-13). He thus concluded there was no material against A-13 and discharged him.
Applying the cited precedents, the court found this approach erroneous: the Magistrate had effectively marshalled, sifted and weighed evidence and judged veracity—conduct not permissible at the stage of deciding discharge under Section 239. The court emphasized that conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC (a charge in the case) does not require the attribution of a specific overt act in the chargesheet; therefore the Magistrate's reliance on the absence of overt acts to absolve A-13 was legally unsound.
The court noted a subsidiary contention—whether the Magistrate was within jurisdiction to summon Exs. C-1 to C-7 and consider them under Section 239—but explicitly stated that it need not decide that question given the conclusion reached on the principal error of law. The court held that there was sufficient material on record to proceed against the respondent and that it was not a case lacking prima facie grounds.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court set aside the order of discharge passed by the learned Magistrate, directed that appropriate charge(s) be framed against the respondent, and allowed the criminal revision. The Crl. Revision Case was allowed and the revision was permitted.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The respondent's discharge is vacated; the lower court is directed to frame appropriate charge(s) and the trial is to proceed in accordance with law.
- Legal consequence: The court reaffirmed the principle that at the stage of deciding discharge under Sections 239/240 the Magistrate must not marshal and weigh evidence as at trial; the enquiry is limited to whether prima facie grounds exist to proceed. The opinion applied existing Supreme Court authority to these provisions, but did not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying settled law.
ORDER
1. The respondent is accused No. 13 in C. C. No. 370 of 1990 on the file of the IVth Additional District Munsif Magistrate, Chittoor. He filed Crl. M.P. No. 2101 of 1990 for discharging him under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short, `the Code') The learned Magistrate by his order dated 15-10-1991, allowed the application, discharging the respondent. The said order is assailed in this case.
2. The brief facts, which are necessary for the limited purpose of considering the validity of the order are stated hereunder :
. It is common knowledge that countless offerings by pilgrims comprising of gold, jewellery and coins that pour every day into the Hundi of Lord Venkateswara are kept in the temple at Tirumala. The place of the counting of the Hundi collections is called Parakamani. The accused in the case are some of the staff of the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams kept on duty to perform the onerous functions of counting the huge collections.' It is alleged that A-1 to A-13 and some others entered into a conspiracy to commit theft and misappropriate the gold and other valuables from the Hundi offerings. A-7 and A-8, who are the Attenders, with the connivance of A-1 secreted some gold jewellery in the bags containing only coins, on 9-3-1990 and 10-3-1990. About 300 grams of gold ornaments were detected when, on suspicion, the bags containing coins were checked. A-13, the respondent herein, worked as appraiser in the treasury of Tirumla Tirupathi Devasthanams at Tirupathi. He used to help the other accused is receiving, converting and disposing of the stolen property. Thereafter they distributed the booty among themselves. On these allegations A-1 to A-13 were charged by C.B. C.I.D. under S. 120-B read with Ss. 409 and 418 of I.P.C. The learned Magistrate, not only considered the charge sheet, and the documents sent by the Police under Section 173 of the Code, but also took into consideration Exs. C-1 to C-7, which were summoned by him, and held that there was no material against A-13, to frame a charge.
3. It is now contended, forcefully, by the learned Public Prosecutor that the approach of the learned Magistrate is contrary to legal requirements as contemplated under sections 239 and 240 of the code and that the Magistrate is not entitled to appreciate as to the veracity of the contents of the documents before him. It was also contended that the Magistrate is not empowered to summon the documents i.e., Exs. C-1 to C-7 and consider the same under section 239 of the code. On the other hand, the counsel for the respondent argued that the duty of the Magistrate is not only to examine the documents before him but also to summon the documents, if necessary to make an enquiry whether there was any truth in the allegations, before framing the charge and in doing so he is empowered to weigh and sift the material on record and that the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction will be slow to interfere with the order passed containing cogent reasons.
4. The Supreme Court, in State Of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh., , considering the parameters of the enquiry by the Court under Ss. 227 of 228 of the Code, observed as follows (Para 4) :
"..... Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment, which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law goverining the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, than there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. ..... ..... there was whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there was sufficient ground for conviction, ....."
5. The provisions of Ss. 239 and 240 of the Code relating to the trial of warrant cases, with which we are concerned in the instant case, are similar to Ss. 227 and 228 of the Code, which relate to the trial of the cases triable exclusively in Sessions Court. The law enumerated above, therefore, applies with equal force to the nature of enquiry under Ss. 239 and 240 of the Code. The decision in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC : (1979 Cri LJ 154), reiterated what has been stated in Ramesh Singh case, . In Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, , Jagannatha Shetty, J, approving the principle laid down in the above two decision, observed that "..... In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The `ground' in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The Court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the Court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into."
6. The decision cited by the respondent's counsel in Niranjan Singh K. S. Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, , does into rule differently. Approving the principle laid down in Ramesh Singh case, and Prafulla Kumar Samal, , it has been observed that (Para 6 of 1990 Cri LJ 1869)
"..... Can he marshall the evidence found on the record of the case and in the documents placed before him as he would do on the conclusion of the evidence adduced by the prosecution after the charge is framed ? It is obvious that since he is at the stage of deciding whether or not there exists sufficient grounds for framing the charge, his enquiry must necessarily be limited to deciding if the facts emerging from the record and documents constitute the offence with which the accused is charged. At that stage he may sift the evidence for that limited purpose but he is not required to marshal the evidence with a view to separating the grain from the chaff. All that he is called upon to consider is whether there is sufficient ground to frame the charge and for this limited purpose he must weigh the material on record as well as the documents relied on by the prosecution. ....."
7. The function of the Magistrate therefore under section 239 of the code is not to marshall the evidence and judge the truth, veracity and effect of such evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce and what weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. If there is strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it has to pass an order under section 240 of the code.
8. In the context of the law laid down by the Supreme Court it has to be considered whether the learned Magistrate was right in discharging A-13, the respondent herein. The learned Magistrate summoned Exs. C-1 to C-7 to ascertain the procedure that is adopted in Parakamani. These are not the documents which have been sent by the police under Section 173(2) of the Code. Exs. C-1 to C-4 are the challans dated 9-3-1990 which disclosed the items that were entered into the challan register. Ex. C-6 is another challan which disclosed that gold was discovered not only on the date of occurrence but also on previous and subsequent occasions. The Magistrate considered Exs. C-1 to C-7 along with the 161 statements of L.W.s 1 and 2, 11 and 12 and other documents forwarded under Section 173(2) of the Code and in so doing he examined the truth or otherwise of the evidence of the witnesses. The evidence of L.Ws. 11 and 12 was discussed thoroughly observing, "L.Ws. 11 and 12 state that they know about the plan and process and then what made them not to report the matter to the higher authorities before ? Why they kept quiet until the offence came to light and why did not the Vigilance Officers and Guards who are on duty on the date of offence, not shown as accused. All these doubts are unanswerable and create doubts and disclose mischief played by L.W. 2." Again the Magistrate, while discussing the procedure at Parakamani, observed that if by mistake the gold and other valuables might have been found in Parakamani at Tirupathi, they would be separated and accounted in challan and since the bags were sealed and kept in tight security there will not be any possibility for theft. The ornaments are separated from the coin bags though, some, by mistake might be found in them. He again observed that there was no question of theft as the bags were in the custody of the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams. Again, after extracting Ss. 409 and 418 of I.P.C. it was observed that no specific overt act has been attributed to presume that he was directly or indirectly responsible for the said offences. Ultimately he concluded that there was no material against A-13 "as no overt act is attributed against the petitioner". It is therefore seen that the learned Magistrate has not only considered the allegations as they are but he has marshelled and sifted the evidence to judge the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence, which is not permissible at that stage. He has also enumerated various "points" for discharging the accused. On a reading of the points it is plain that he has weighed the evidence of witnesses, not to find whether grounds exist for proceeding against the petitioner and other accused (sic) satisfy himself about their guilt. He found fault with L.W. 2, Vigilance Guard Officer that he and other guard officers watching the process at Parakamani did not perform their duties properly and presumed that they should be held responsible for the offence. He also found that it was impossible for any one to commit the offence in the circumstances of the case and that L. Ws. 11 and 12 are also responsible for the offence, if any. He also observed that A-13 was only an Appraiser and if he finds any articles by mistake in Tirupathi Parakamani they would be deposited in the bank. Whether the jewellery found in the bags was by mistake or by design in pursuance of a conspiracy, is the gravamen of the prosecution's case. The Magistrate cannot brush aside the basis of the incident as a mistake. The reasoning of the learned Magistrate is clearly erroneous. He has forgotten that conspiracy is the main offence with which the petitioner and other accused are charged. Under Section 120-B I.P.C., no overt act need be attributed in the chargesheet. Whether the accused are liable for offence of conspiracy and misappropriation and other offences, has to be decided during the trial. The approach of the Magistrate is contrary to law laid down by the Supreme Court and the order of discharge passed by him is liable to be set aside.
9. The next contention of the learned Public Prosecutor is whether the Court was within its jurisdiction in summoning Exs. C-1 to C-7 and examining the same to exercise its power under section 239 of the code. This question need not be decided in the view I have taken above. From a reading of the order I find that there is sufficient material on record to proceed against the respondent. It is not a case where there are no grounds to believe, `prima facie' that the respondent is responsible for the offences.
10. I, therefore, set aside the order of discharge and direct the Court below that appropriate charge or charges will be framed against the respondent and the trial will proceed further in accordance with law. The Crl. Revision Case is allowed.
11. Revision allowed.
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