1. These two revisions arise out of the same facts and the same suit. They are heard together and can be conveniently disposed off by this common order.

2. The petitioner in these two revisions is said to be the owner of the premises (hereinafter referred to as “the landlord”) bearing Municipal No. 16-5-183 situated at Dabirpura, Hyderabad, (for short ‘the suit premises’). The 1st respondent is the tenant; he will be referred to as such. The second respondent is the proforma party. The tenant filed O.S No. 2064 of 1992 on the file of the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, against the landlord for a perpetual injunction restraining the landlord from interferring with his peaceful possession of the suit premises. In the suit he filed 10 I.A No. 637 of 1992 under Order 39 Rule 1 C.P.C praying the Court to grant interim injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with his peaceful possession. It appears that exparte interim injunction was granted by the trial court in May 1992, which was made absolute after hearing both the, parties on 16-3-1993. Against the said order the landlord filed C.M.A No. 147 of 1993. Alleging that on August 11, 1992, the landlord forcebly dispossessed him from the suit premises in violation of the order of interim injunction granted by the Trial Court on 19-5-1992, the tenant filed I.A No. 896 of 1992 praying, the court to restore him into possession of the suit premises. That I.A was resisted by the landlord alleging that even according to the tenant he was already dispossessed on 16-5-1992 before the filing of the suit (The suit was filed on 19-5-1992). Therefore, the story set up by the tenant is wholly incorrect. Before the trial court, the parties led evidence. The tenant examined two witnesses including himself and marked exhibits A-1 to A-48 whereas the landlord produced two witnesses including himself as R.W 1 and another witness. He also marked exhibits B-1 to B-4. On appreciation of the evidence placed on record the trial court came to the conclusion that the tenant was in possession on the date of the suit and that he was dispossessed from the suit premises by the landlord on August 11, 1992. On those findings, he allowed the I.A and directed restoration of possession of the tenant by order dt. 16-3-1993. Dissatisfied with the said order, the land-lord filed C.M.A No. 65 of 1993. Those two appeals were heard by the learned Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, and were disposed of by a common judgment dated 21st February, 1994. The learned Judge confirmed the findings recorded by the trial court and dismissed the C.M.As Against the order dismissing the C.M.A No. 65 of 1993, the land-lord filed C.R.P No. 910 of 1994; against the judgment dismissing C.M.A 147 of 1993, the land-lord filed C.R.P No. 1079 of 1994.

3. Sri C.P Sarathy, the learned counsel for the petitioner in these C.R.Ps, vehemently contends that Section 144 C.P.C has no application to this case and restoration of possession cannot be ordered and the order under revision is, therefore, without jurisdiction. He further contends that the complaint by the tenant's wife on 16-5-1992 itself clearly establishes that the tenant was already dispossessed on 16-5-1992 and as such he was not in possession on the date of the suit. Therefore, the trial court ought not to have made the interim injunction absolute. He further contends that the case of the plaintiff that he was dispossed on 11-8-1992 has not been established and that the findings recorded by the Courts below are wholly incorrect; if this court should reappraise the evidence it will come to the conclusion that the dispossession was even prior to the suit i.e 16-5-1992; as such, the question of directing the restoration of possession is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. In any event, submits Sri Sarathy, that if this court comes to the conclusion that the order granting restoration of possession is valid in law, the same may be postponed till the suit is disposed of and the tenant is held entitled to perpetual injunction as the wife of the tenant is having an independent house where he is residing at the moment and that the land-lord is residing in the suit house and restoration of suit house to the tenant would cause great dislocation and hardship to the land-lord.

4. Sri M.V Suresh Kumar, the learned counsel for the tenant, on the other hand, contends that the land-lord had taken law into his own hands and forcibly dispossessed the tenant in violation of the interim injunction granted by the trial court and he should not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong by allowing him to continue in possession of the suit premises. As the tenant was forcibly thrown out of the house, he had no option but to seek refuge in the house of his mother-in-law, so it cannot be said that the tenant is already residing in another house comfortably so as to enable the land-lord to continue in the suit house.

5. On these contentions, two questions arise for consideration:

(1) Whether the order of the courts below directing restoration of possession is sustainable under Section 151 C.P.C?

(2) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it would be just and equitable to postpone the implementation of the order of restoration of possession, the order under revision, till the disposal of the suit?

6. Insofar as the first point is concerned, it may be noted at the outset that while exercising power under Section 115 C.P.C, it is not open to this court to go into questions of fact by re-appraising the evidence. Therefore, the revisions will have to be decided on the basis of the findings recorded by the courts below. In this case, there are concurrent findings of both the courts that the tenant was in possession of the suit premises as on the date of the suit i.e, on 19-5-1992. There is also a concurrent finding of the courts below that the tenant was dispossessed forcibly by the land-lord on 11th August, 1992 when the temporary injunction granted by the trial court on 19-5-1992 was inforce. On these facts the point that arises for consideration is whether the trial court is having power to restore possession to the party to a suit or proceedings, who was dispossessed in violation of the order of interim injunction granted in his favour. It needs no emphasis to say that if an order is granted by the court, those who are bound by that order should respect the order and comply with the same. They cannot, at their option, choose to violate the order and if they do so, the court is not powerless to see that the wrong done to a party to the order is remedied and the wrong-doer is made to set right the position and the person who is the victim of the wrong is granted the appropriate remedy. Inherent powers of the court are meant to do substantial justice between the parties. Therefore, if the interest of justice demand, the court under Section 151 C.P.C can restore the possession in case Section 144 C.P.C is not applicable. In the instant case, admittedly Section 144 C.P.C is not applicable. Therefore, the power under Section 151 C.P.C can be exercised to grant restoration of possession. On the basis of the findings referred to above, the order under revision has to be sustained. I am supported in my view by judgment of the. Madras High Court in Ayyammal v. Thangavelu Padavachi (1) AIR 1950 Madras 317. In that case, the question before the High Court was whether under Section 151 C.P.C delivery of possession can be ordered if the delivery of possession in execution of the decree was in contravention of the order of stay granted by a competent court. The Madras High Court upheld the order of the trial court granting re-delivery of possession. That judgment was by the Patna High Court in State of Bihar v. Usha Devi (2) AIR 1956 Patna 455. There, the question before the Patna High Court was whether a party to the proceedings who took possession of a plot of land in dispute, in spite of an order of injunction passed during the pendency of the suit, can be directed to put the party in possession, who was dispossessed in violation of the order. The learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court held that if an order under Order 39 Rule 1 or 2 has been disobeyed and in contravention of that order, the party to the suit has done something for his own advantage and to the prejudice of the other party, it is open to the court under inherent jurisdiction to bring back the party to the position where it originally stood as if the order passed by the court has not been contravened. To the same effect is the judgment of a learned Single Judge of Calcutta High Court in Satish Chandra v. Saila Bala (3) AIR 1978 Calcutta 499. In that case, the learned Judge held that if a party has taken possession of the suit property in breach of injunction, the court has power to restore possession in decree.

7. However, Mr. Sarathy relies on the judgment of the High Court in Begum Janammal v. Seiva Arasu (4) AIR 1988 Madras 174. In that case, the suit of the plaintiff for declaration and permanent injunction was decreed by the trial court. The defendants appealed against the said decree. The decree of the trial court was modified in respect of certain items of the properties by the appellate court. Both the parties went in second appeal before the High Court. Plaintiff filed the second appeal before the High Court and the defendants filed crossed-objections. The second appeal of the plaintiff was dismissed, but the cross-objections of the defendants were allowed dismissing the suit as a whole. Thereafter, the defendants initiated execution proceedings for delivery of possession and demolishing the construction made by the plaintiff. The was resisted by the plaintiff. But the lower court granted the relief to defendants under Section 144 C.P.C In a C.R.P against the order granting relief under Section 144 C.P.C, the High Court held that it is only when a benefit had been obtained by a party pursuant to or in consequence of or under the cover or colour of a decree or order of a court and if such a decree or order was varied, reversed or set aside or modified by the higher court, there could be a restitution within the meaning of Sec. 144 C.P.C In that case, it was not the case of the defendants that the plaintiff obtained possession pursuant to any order or in consequence of or under the colour of any order of the court and as such anything done by the plaintiff including coming into possession of the suit property was an unlawful act and in such a situation, there was no scope for invoking the aid of Section 144 C.P.C and that the remedy for such aggrieved party was only by way of an independent suit. In my view, this judgment has no application to the facts of the case. It is a case where restoration under Section 144 C.P.C was in question and consequently the principle laid down therein has no application to the facts of the present case.

8. So far as the second point is concerned, the request of Mr. Sarathy is that the implementation of the restoration of the possession should be postponed till the decision in the suit is rendered by the trial court. In support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Hemchand v. Subhkaran (5) AIR 1967 Bombay 361. In that case, the suit building was in Bombay. The tenant of the suit building was mostly residing at Ahmedabad. Therein, proceedings were initiated under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act and ex parte decree was passed against the tenant. An application for setting aside the ex parte decree was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal, the ex parte decree was set aside. In the meanwhile, the tenant was dispossessed from the suit building. Therefore, the appellate court also granted restoration of possession which was stayed by the High Court in revision. While confirming the order of the appellate court both on the point of setting aside the ex parte decree as well as holding that the tenant was entitled to restoration of possession, the Bombay High Court held that though normally, where possession had been obtained in pursuance of an order of the Court which was subsequently reversed, the person, who was deprived of the possession on the basis of the order, was entitled to have the status quo before the passing of the order in question restored. Yet in that case, he considered it unnecessary to permit the tenant to have immediate possession of the premises on the ground that by setting aside the ex parte decree, the tenant had a chance to contest the matter but it did not ensure that he would succeed in the suit and as a new tenant had already been inducted into the suit building, if the restoration of possession was ordered, the new tenant's possession would be disturbed during the pendency of the suit. Therefore, till the suit was decided, the learned Judge thought it fit to postpone the implementation of the order of restitution of possession. Insofar as the first ground is concerned, namely, that in a case where an ex parte decree is set aside, the defendant gets a chance to contest the suit, but it would not ensure that he would succeed in the suit and, therefore, no restoration can be ordered; with respect, I am unable to agree with the learned Judge. But so far as the other aspect is concerned, namely, whether on the facts it would be just and proper to postpone restoration of possession, is an order based on the facts in that case and not a ratio. The learned Judge on the facts of that case, considered it fit to order postponement of implementation of the order of restoration. Those circumstances, however, do not obtain in the present case. In the instant case, if the order of implementation of restoration of possession is postponed, it would amount to confering an advantage on the person who had taken law into his own hands, became bold to violate the orders of the Court and resorted to illegal means and obtained possession of the suit premises by highhandedness and thus deprived the tenant of his right to be in possess on which he is entitled to hold till the Cour decides against him. The circumstances of the case in this case, in my view, do not justify postponement of the order of restoration of possession. The mere fact that the tenant is now residing in the mother-in-law's or wife's house, if that be true, is not a ground which would justify the postponement of the implementation of the order under revision.

9. There is only one aspect which still remains to be considered and that is the challenge against the order making interim order absolute. When both the courts have found that the petitioner was in possession of the suit premises as on the date of the suit, in exercise of the revisional power, I cannot re-appraise the evidence to determine afresh whether that finding is correct. In view of the finding, the order passed under revision does not suffer from any illegality muchless from any error of jurisdiction so as to warrant interference of this court.

10. For the above reasons, both the revisions fail and I dismiss them with costs. Time to comply with the order under revision is granted till the end of December, 1994, i.e, 31-12-1994, provided the petitioner gives an undertaking in the trial court that he would vacate the suit premises on or before 31st December 1994.

11. Having regard to the nature of the dispute, I consider it just and appropriate to direct the trial court to dispose of the suit, without being influenced by any observations made by the trial court or the appellate Court or by this court in this order, on or before 30th April, 1995.