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Smt. Mary Sai Kumari v. Regional Manager And Disciplinary Authority And Anr.

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Sep 15, 1994
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a Scheduled Caste woman from a very poor economic background who failed her SSC (10th class) examination in 1975, registered with the employment exchange in 1978 and reappeared for SSC in October 1982. She passed SSC in third division but was unaware that passing SSC disqualified her from subordinate posts (such as Sweeper/Attender) under the respondents' recruitment circular. She received an appointment as Sweeper-cum-Waterwoman in late 1983, was first appointed temporarily in February 1984 and made permanent effective 16-9-1984. On 16-11-1985 she was issued a show-cause notice alleging wilful suppression of her SSC pass (which, according to the respondents' rules, disqualified her for the post). An enquiry officer reported adversely; the disciplinary authority discharged her from service. The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the discharge and alleged violations of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. The writ petition was admitted and a stay of the discharge order was granted, which remains in force. The present opinion decides that writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a "better qualification" (i.e., passing SSC) can operate as a disqualification for appointment to subordinate posts and, if so, whether that disqualification is constitutionally valid.
  2. Whether the impugned discharge based on alleged suppression of the petitioner’s SSC pass violated the petitioner’s fundamental rights under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution.
  3. Whether the recruitment circular (and related executive instruction) that disqualifies persons who have passed SSC from subordinate posts (and in some instances from clerical posts unless first division) is reasonable, rational and constitutionally sustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • There was no wilful suppression by the petitioner of the fact that she had passed SSC so as to justify the harsh punishment of discharge.
  • The discharge infringes fundamental rights under Article 21 (right to life and livelihood) and the equality guarantees under Articles 14 and 16.
  • The petitioner is economically poor, a member of a Scheduled Caste, and the loss of employment deprives her and her family of livelihood; these facts are not controverted.
  • The petitioner’s counsel relied on Supreme Court precedents (including H.D. Singh v. RBI and Y. Srinivasa Rao v. J. Veeraiah) and an unreported Division Bench decision of the Orissa High Court (OJC No. 1456/84) to support the contention that treating a better qualification as a disqualification can be arbitrary and unconstitutional.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The petitioner wilfully suppressed the fact of having passed SSC; a pass in SSC is a disqualification for the subordinate post under the recruitment rules/circulars, and the petitioner represented herself as having failed to secure employment.
  • The suppression constitutes misconduct justifying discharge; the disciplinary process complied with due procedure and therefore does not violate Articles 14, 16 or 21.
  • The respondents relied on Supreme Court authority (R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmaiah; State of A.P. v. V. Sadanandam; J. Rangaswamy v. Govt. of A.P.) and on the bank’s executive instructions / circular No. 72 governing recruitment to contend that prescribed qualifications and exclusions are within executive discretion and permissible.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India (1985) 4 SCC 201 : A.I.R. 1986 SC 132 Condemnation of treating a better qualification as a disqualification; observed that denying employment because a person became better qualified is improper, particularly in context of unemployment. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that treating a higher/better qualification as a disqualification is objectionable and to reinforce the conclusion that the circular’s disqualification is arbitrary.
Y. Srinivasa Rao v. J. Veeraiah (1992) 3 SCC 63 : A.I.R. 1993 SC 929 Held that a policy preferring less-educated persons over better-qualified persons (treating better qualification as disqualification) is arbitrary and violative of Article 14. The Court relied on this decision to show judicial disapproval of policies that impose a premium on ignorance and to support the conclusion that the impugned circular is arbitrary vis-à-vis equality guarantees.
R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmaiah (1972) 1 SCC 409 : A.I.R. 1972 SC 1767 Principle that appointments made in infraction of rules are illegal and cannot be subsequently ratified. Raised by respondents in support of the proposition that illegal appointments cannot be validated; the Court observed this decision but indicated that these authorities were not directly pertinent to the specific equality issue under Articles 14 and 16.
State of A.P. v. V. Sadanandam (1989 Supp (1) SCC 574) : A.I.R. 1989 SC 2060 Mode of recruitment and the categories from which recruitment is made are matters of executive policy; courts should not substitute their judgment for executive policy on recruitment mode. Relied upon by respondents to urge deference to executive choices in recruitment; the Court noted the principle but concluded that the present controversy required scrutiny under Articles 14 and 16 and that those authorities were not directly decisive of the equality question here.
J. Rangaswamy v. Govt. of A.P. (1990) 1 SCC 288 : A.I.R. 1990 SC 535 Relevance of qualifications is primarily for the recruiting authority to consider; courts should not substitute their view on the adequacy of qualifications. Respondents cited this to argue that qualification criteria are for authorities; the Court recorded the citation but treated the present equality and reasonableness challenge as distinct and not fully controlled by that principle.
General Manager, Southern Railway v. Personnel Officer (Reservation), Southern Railway A.I.R. 1962 SC 36 Article 16 covers 'matters relating to employment or appointment' broadly; an arbitrary imposition that excludes consideration on merits violates Article 16. The Court invoked this decision to interpret Article 16 and to support the proposition that arbitrary constraints preventing merit-based consideration contravene equality guarantees.
Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (1991 Supp (1) SCC 600) : A.I.R. 1991 SC 101 Service regulations must be reasonable, fair and not arbitrary; right to life includes right to livelihood; right to livelihood is a fundamental aspect protected by Article 21. The Court used this authority to reinforce that recruitment rules which affect livelihood must be reasonable and that an arbitrary exclusion can engage Article 21 alongside Articles 14 and 16.
Orissa High Court, Division Bench, OJC No. 1456/84 (unreported) Decision in a materially similar case where passing 10th class was a disqualification for an Attender post in State Bank of India; the High Court held such action arbitrary and set aside the termination. The Court cited this unreported decision as supporting precedent for the proposition that treating a better qualification as a disqualification for subordinate posts can be arbitrary and set aside.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded from the factual matrix: the petitioner had passed SSC in third division and was later appointed to a subordinate post; she was discharged after a disciplinary enquiry which found she had wilfully suppressed that she had passed SSC. The respondents' recruitment circular disqualifies candidates who have passed SSC from subordinate cadre appointments; for clerical cadre it requires at least first division for eligibility.

The Court analyzed the constitutional implications in three linked steps:

  1. Constitutional status of the employer and legal regime: The State Bank of India is treated as a "State" under Article 12, and so its recruitment circular and executive instructions must conform to fundamental rights in Part III, particularly Articles 14, 16 and 21.
  2. Article 21 and livelihood: The Court reiterated that Article 21 embraces more than mere survival and includes right to live with dignity and the right to livelihood. Depriving public employment in a manner that is not reasonable, fair and just may violate Article 21, particularly where the post is the sole source of subsistence for a person in a vulnerable situation.
  3. Reasonableness and nexus for qualifications (Articles 14 and 16): The Court scrutinized the circular's rule that a pass in SSC (even in third division) disqualifies a person from subordinate posts and, simultaneously, that only a first division pass suffices for clerical posts. The Court held that qualification conditions must bear a reasonable relation to the suitability for the post and must have a rational nexus to the object they seek to achieve. If a rule excludes a person from both subordinate and clerical cadres (as the petitioner was excluded from both by virtue of her third-division pass), that produces an arbitrary result with no intelligible nexus to legitimate aims of recruitment.

The Court reviewed relevant precedents that denounce policies which treat higher qualification as a disqualification (H.D. Singh; Y. Srinivasa Rao) and those that emphasize reasonableness of service regulations and the constitutional protection of livelihood (Delhi Transport Corp.). The respondents' reliance on authorities that favor executive flexibility in recruitment (State of A.P. v. V. Sadanandam; J. Rangaswamy) was acknowledged, but the Court distinguished them on the ground that the narrow equality and reasonableness question required different scrutiny.

Applying these legal principles to the facts, the Court found the circular's combined effects (excluding the petitioner from both subordinate posts and clerical posts) to be arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair, thereby infringing Articles 14 and 16; because the loss of employment also implicated livelihood, Article 21 was engaged. On that basis, the impugned order of discharge was held to be violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court concluded that the impugned order of discharge is violative of the equality guarantees under Articles 14 and 16 and of the right to life (including livelihood) under Article 21, and accordingly set aside the impugned order.

Core Ruling: The impugned order is violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and is accordingly set aside.

Immediate consequences for the parties: The writ petition was allowed and the discharge order was set aside. The opinion records that there will be no costs. The decision directly affects the petitioner (who challenged the discharge) and the respondents (whose disciplinary order was quashed).

Broader implications: The Court applied existing Supreme Court precedents to reaffirm that recruitment qualifications must bear a rational relation to the post and that treating a better qualification as a disqualification can be arbitrary and unconstitutional. The opinion does not state that it is laying down an entirely new precedent beyond the application of the cited authorities.

Disposition

The writ petition is allowed. No costs.

Show all summary ...

1. Can a better qualification be a disqualification? It should not be and that is the universal approach. But, in our country, in some cases, better qualification is an handicap and in the instant case is a glaring example of the same.

2. The petitioner is a scheduled caste woman whose economical condition was very poor and whose parents could not afford to educate her any further beyond 10th class (SSC). She had failed in 10th class (SSC) examination held in the year 1975. Poor economic condition forced her to remain in that state and obviously, she could not seek employment at that age and that too with that qualification of SSC fail. Hoping to get atleast a Sweeper or an Attendees post, she registered her name with employment exchange during the year 1978 bearing registration No. 928/78. But, even after waiting for four years, she did not get a call. During October, 1982, she again appeared SSC examination with a fond hope of getting some employment, if she passes SSC examination. She did pass SSC examination, but only in 3rd class. But, poor girl did not know that she was incurring disqualification to hold the post of an Attender or Sweeper in the establishment of the respondents by passing SSC examination. During the end of 1983, she got a call for appointment to a post of Sweeper-cum-Waterwoman in the Office of the respondents. She was appointed initially in February, 1984 on temporary basis and was made permanent in that post with effect from 16-9-1984. But, that lasted only just over an year, as on 16-11-1985, she was visited with show-cause notice calling her to explain as to why she should not be discharged from service on the ground that she suppressed of having passed the SSC examination. While SSC fail is a qualification for appointment, a pass in SSC is a disqualification for that post. In the said disciplinary action, the enquiry officer submitted adverse reports stating that even though the petitioner had passed SSC as on the date of her interview, she had suppressed that fact and in the form filled up for appointment, she had declared to have failed in SSC, but by that time, she had already passed SSC and as such, this wilful suppression to get employment amounts to misconduct and basing on the said report, the disciplinary authority has held her of having committed mis-conduct mentioned above and inflicted the punishment of discharge from service and the result is this writ petition and the writ petition having been admitted, stay of operation of the impugned order of discharge was granted by this court and the same is holding the field even on this day. Mr. C.V Mohan Reddy, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that there was no wilful suppression of any fact so as to warrant the inflictment of the harshest punishment of discharge from the post which results in deprivation of livelihood of herself and family members. He further submits that not only the fundamental right under Article 21 is violated, but also the equality clause enshrined under Articles 14 and 16. He cited the judicial precedents rendered by the Supreme Court in H.D Singh v. Reserve Bank of India (1) (1985) 4 SCC 201 : A.I.R 1986 SC 132, Y. Srinivasa Rao v. J. Veeraiah (2) (1992) 3 SCC 63 : A.I.R 1993 SC 929 and also on an unreported judgment of the Division Bench of Orissa High Court in OJC No. 1456/84 in support of his arguments.

3. On the other hand, Mr. K. Srinivasa Murthy, the learned counsel for the respondents stresses on the suppression of the factum of petitioner having passed SSC which is a disqualification under the rules relating to recruitment and the petitioner had wilfully stated to have failed in SSC only to secure job knowing fully well that a disciosure of a pass in SSC would disqualify her for holding the said post and as such, it is a clear case of mis-conduct and further submitted that in view of the same, there is no violation of either equality clause under Articles 14 or 16 or Article 21 of the Constitution as by following due procedure, the impugned order of discharge has been passed. In support of his argument he has cited the decisions in R.N Najundappa v. T. Thimmaiah (3) (1972) 1 SCC 409 : A.I.R 1972 SC 1767; State of A.P v. V. Sadanandam (4) 1989 Supp (1) SCC 574 : A.I.R 1989 SC 2060; and J. Rangaswamy v. Govt. of A.P (5) (1990) 1 SCC 288 : A.I.R 1990 SC 535; and also the executive instructions issued by the State Bank of India contained in circular No. 72 relating to recruitment to the posts.

4. State Bank of India was constituted under State Bank of India Act, 1955. It is needless to mention that the State Bank of India is a ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution. As such, employment therein is a public employment. The above statute confers rule making power, but no rules have been framed relating to recruitment to services. The circular mentioned above governs the situation. The said power cannot be placed on the same pedestal like executive power vested in the State under Article 162 of Indian Constitution. Nevertheless, in the absence of any statutory rule, the above circular governs the procedure relating to recruitment and other service conditions applicable to the bank staff. But like any other enactment, statutory rule, notification or order, the validity of the above circular hinges on its conforming to the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-III of the Constitution. The relevant are the equality clause enshrined under Article 14 ??? the genus and Article 16 being its species and the right to life guaranteed under Article 21.

5. The petitioner has pleaded that she belongs to scheduled caste and that she has married and has got 4 children and husband who is unemployed and she has to feed the entire family? out of the income of her employment as Sweeper-cum-Waterwoman in the service of the respondents. The above averments in the writ affidavit are not controverted. In these days of acute unemployment and the struggle for existence due to population explosion, it is difficult for the petitioner, particularly at this juncture, to get any alternative employment. As evident from the writ affidavit, she was aged 28 years at the time of filing of writ petition. Now she would be 35 years old. She is economically poor, down-trodden belonging to scheduled caste. Throwing her out of employment would surely deprive herself and members of her family of their livelihood. The expression ‘life’ under Article 21 of the Constitution is not static and because of the judicial activism of the Supreme Court, its horizon is widened to a large extent. It is now settled that right to life enshrined in Article 21 means something more than survival or animal existence, it includes the right to live with human dignity, a right to have minimum subsistence allowance during suspension pending disciplinary action, includes all those aspects of life which go to make ??? life meaningful, complete and worthliving. As right to life includes right to livelihood and as the public employment is the source of living, the same cannot be taken away by any procedure which is not reasonable, fair and just. By extending that, public employment cannot be denied by prescribing the qualification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. May be that the State may not be made liable to provide employment to each and every one. But once posts are available and are notified, there is a fundamental right to apply or the same and the said fundamental right can be curtailed only by prescription of reasonable conditions. If the condition or requirement is unreasonable or arbitrary, per force, a person's right to livelihood falling within the ambit of right to life is deprived, as the said aspirant is totally excluded even from consideration. To test this again, one has to traverse to Article 14 in general and 16 in particular and if the conditions or qualifications prescribed are reasonable and not arbitrary, then Article 21 cannot be pressed into service. On the other hand, the treasonable condition or requirement will not only incur the wrath of Articles 14 and 16, but also the Article 21.

6. In the respondent-bank, the staff is divided as subordinate cadre and clerical cadre. Chapter 23 deals with recruitment to subordinate cadre. The subordinate cadre comprises of Messengers, Sweepers, Waterboy. Cash Coolie, Watchman, Armed Guards, Drivers, Electricians, Lift cum-Helper, Diesel Mechanic, Lift Mechanic Operator, Wireman-cum-Watchman etc. Waterboy necessarily includes Waterwoman Para 23(2) prescribes eligibility criteria and presently we are concerned only with the non-messengeral posts like Sweeper, Waterboy etc. For these posts, there is no minimum qualification prescribed, but a candidate should be able to read and write. The language necessarily differs from State to State. However, there is an embargo stating that no candidate who has passed SSC/SSLC or its equivalent examination is entitled to appointment in the subordinate cadre. If the same is tested on the touchstone of Articles 14 and 16, and if it is found to be valid then as an inevitable corollary, this writ petition should fail or otherwise, it has to succeed. In R.N Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmaiah (3 Supra), the Supreme Court held that if the appointment was illegal and in infraction of the rules, the same cannot be ratified at all. In State of A.P v. V. Sadanandam (4 Supra), it was held by the Supreme Court that the mode of recruitment and the category from which recruitment to a service should be made are all matters ??? are exclusively within the domain of the executive and it is not for the judicial bodies to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the executive in choosing the mode of recruitment or the categories from which the recruitment should be made as they are all matters of policf decisions falling exclusively within the purview of the executive. In J. Rangaswamy v. Govt. of A.P (5 Supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with an appointment to the post of Professor in Radiological Physics for which doctorate in Physics was prescribed as a qualification and repelling the contention of the petitioner therein that diploma in Radiological Physics was more than sufficient, the Supreme Court held that the relevance of the qualifications is the consideration for the authorities concerned and not for the courts.

7. None of the above decisions are pertinent to the point in question as the question here is as to whether there is infraction of the equality clause enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

8. In General Manager, Southern Railway, v. Personnel Officer (Reservation), Southern Railway (6) A.I.R 1962 SC 36, it was held that the expression ‘matters relating to employment or appointment’ in Article 16 would include all matters in relation to employment, both prior and subsequent, such as, initial appointment, conditions of service pertaining to the office to which the appointment is made including the age of superannuation. It was further held that this guarantee under Article 16 is violated where the Government imposes an arbitrary ??? upon the appointment or re-appointment of a particular individual in the sense that even though he applies for a post, his application will not be considered on the merits and as such, has no relation to his suitability to the appointment to that post. In Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C Mazdoor Congress (7) 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : A.I.R 1991 SC 101, it was held by the Supreme Court that service regulations should be reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary, fanciful and unjust. It was also held that the right to life includes right to livelihood, that the right to livelihood cannot hang on to the fancies of individuals in authority and that public employment is not a bounty from them nor can its survival be at their mercy and that the income is the foundation of many fundamental rights and when work is the sole source of income, the right to work becomes as much fundamental. In H.D Singh v. Reserve Bank of India (1 Supra), considering a similar question where better qualification was treated as a disqualification, the Supreme Court in a strongly worded judgment repelled the said contention stating “It has disturbed us to find that the appellant was denied job because he has become better qualified. Perhaps, the Reserve Bank of India and its officers are not aware of the grave unemployment problem facing the youth of this country and also not aware of the fact that graduates, both boys and girls, sweep our roads and post-graduates in hundreds, if not in thousands, apply for the posts of peons”. Similar is the decision of the Supreme Court in Y. Srinivasa Rao v. J. Veeraiah (2 Supra) where better qualification was a disqualification under the rules relating to the appointment of a fairprice shop dealer. In the policy framed by the Government, preference was given to less educated persons. Such policy was held to oe arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the Supreme Court pounced on the said policy, holding:

“The decision to prefer an uneducated person over an educated person amounts to allowing premium on ignorance, in-competence and consequently inefficiency. The only fault of the appellant is to have pursued his studies beyond 10th class of his school. If he had discontinued his career as a student even earlier, say after passing 7th or 8th class, he would have been running the shop today. This clearly amounts to gross arbitrariness and, therefore, illegal discrimination. Pursuing this line, the State will have to be going in search of a more inefficient person and we do not know where this process would end. If we assume that since a better qualified person has got a better chance to succeed in life, an intelligent applicant who can run the shop efficiently should be rejected and a dim ??? fellow should be selected. This is an absurd situation.”

9. Toeing the same line is the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of Orissa High Court in OJC No. 1456/84. Dealing with exactly similar contention where the petitioner therein had passed 10th class which was a disqualification for recruitment to the post of an Attender in the State Bank of India which is the respondent in the instant case and considering the same circular, the Orissa High Court held that such action was arbitrary and the termination of the petitioner was set aside.

10. Under the above circular for recruitment to clerical cadre, a pass in 10th class (SSC/SSLC) is the basic qualification, but a mere pass will not do. Only a first division pass is the qualification and a pass in second division or 3rd division in SSC/SSLC is a disqualification for applying to the post of a clerical cadre. It is astonishing to note that a pass in second or third division in SSC/SSLC which is a disqualification to apply to the post of clerical cadre can also be a disqualification for holding the subordinate cadre. Indisputably, the respondents are entitled to lay down qualifications for appointment to a post, but the conditions or requisites so laid down must have reasonable relation to the suitability for a post or for employment in the public service in general, namely, in the interests or discipline. There should be nexus for the object to be achieved. The prescription of qualification should be rational. If the argument of the respondents that not only the minimum qualification, but the maximum qualification can be prescribed to the post of subordinate cadre is accepted for the jobs, particularly, that of Attender, Sweeper, Waterwoman etc. which are menial, it can only be stretched to a point where the qualification of a candidate entitles him to a dignified post like clerical cadre. If such a provision is made, then certainly, equality clause is not violated as the petitioner would not have been deprived to apply to a clerical cadre post. But the petitioner was precluded from applying to a clerical cadre post, as she has passed SSC in 3rd division. If she was not entitled to be considered to a clerical cadre post, certainly, she was entitled to apply and to be considered for the subordinate cadre. There is no reasonableness in denying her to apply for the posts both in the subordinate cadre and the clerical cadre. The reasonableness can be stretched upto the point where the petitioner was eligible to apply for a clerical cadre post and then disqualifying her because of higher qualification to apply for a lower menial post, as the same could be rational. But, in the instant case, if the above circular is upheld, the petitioner would not be entitled either to a subordinate cadre or a clerical cadre. Such an action will be totally arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair and is a clear infraction of Article 14 in general and 16 in particular and necessarily, Article 21 also comes into play. In view of what is stated supra, I hold that the impugned order is violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and is accordingly set aside.

11. The writ petition is allowed.

12. No costs.