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G. Yadi Reddy v. The Management Of Brooke Bond India Ltd., Ghatkesar & Anr. .

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Nov 11, 1993
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Structured Summary of the Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (an erstwhile casual workman) challenged an award of the Labour Court, Hyderabad (ID No. 21 of 1985), which had rejected his claim that his retrenchment by Brooke Bond India Limited was illegal. The appellant alleged that he had been employed as a casual worker from 1969 to 1979. He suffered a motor accident on 24-4-1979 while allegedly on his way to the company, was hospitalized for over six months, and his right leg was amputated. He reported for duty on 10-11-1981 but the company refused to re-employ him.

Conciliation before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour failed and the State Government referred the dispute under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as Industrial Dispute No. 21 of 1985. The reference questioned whether continuing the appellant as a casual worker from 1969 to 1979 and subsequently not employing him without following retrenchment procedure was justified.

At the Labour Court the appellant (WW1) and the company’s Personnel Manager (MW1) gave evidence; documentary exhibits were produced by both sides (fifteen by the appellant and nineteen by the company). The Labour Court examined registers (exhibits M1–M9) and rejected the appellant’s claim that he worked more than 240 days in each year; it disbelieved the appellant's seniority list (exhibit W2) and found that the appellant did not work even as a casual labourer from June 1978 till 1981. The Labour Court held the management's action to be justified.

The appellant’s writ petition (Writ Petition No. 13221 of 1987) seeking quashing of the award was dismissed by a single judge, who nevertheless made a humanitarian observation that the appellant might be considered for any suitable job. As the company expressed inability to provide employment, the appellant filed the present writ appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant qualified as being in "continuous service" for the relevant period under section 25-B(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, so as to attract the protection of section 25-F against retrenchment.
  2. Whether, alternatively, the appellant satisfied the statutory test in section 25-B(2)(a)(ii) — namely whether in any relevant twelve-month period he actually worked not less than 240 days — thereby being deemed in continuous service for one year.
  3. How the expression "cessation of work" in section 25-B(1) ought to be interpreted (from the workman's perspective or otherwise) when a casual worker alleges absence of work despite willingness to work.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The appellant contended that his employment from 1969 onwards as a casual worker fell squarely under section 25-B(1) of the Act and therefore he had "continuous service" within the meaning of that provision.
  • It was argued that the reference itself admitted continuous employment as a casual worker and that the requirement of continuous service under section 25-B(1) was thus satisfied.
  • The appellant (through counsel) further argued that the words “cessation of work” in subsection (1) should be interpreted with reference to the workman’s position — i.e. if the worker was willing to work but not given work, that should not break continuous service.

Respondent's (Company's) Arguments (as recorded)

  • The company contended that mere engagement of a casual worker over a period of years does not automatically satisfy the requirement of "continuous service" under section 25-B(1).
  • It submitted that the appellant had not proved that he actually worked 240 days in any year and therefore could not claim deemed continuous service under section 25-B(2)(a)(ii).
  • The company argued that the appellant could not, having failed on his earlier contention, raise a new plea; and in any event subsection (1) did not apply to his case.
  • Separately, during the hearing the company offered, irrespective of merits, to pay the appellant Rs. 10,000 as a humanitarian measure (a representation made by counsel after taking instructions).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
H.D. Singh v. RBI, (1986) 1 LLJ 127 (S.C.) Establishes that, for computation under sub-section (2) of section 25-B, Sundays and holidays should be taken into account. The court relied on this authority when instructing counsel to include Sundays and holidays in calculating whether the appellant had worked 240 days in any year; after applying that rule the appellant conceded that no year reached the 240-day threshold, leading the court to hold sub-section (2) inapplicable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court structured its analysis around the text and structure of section 25-B and its relationship with section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act:

  1. Interpretation of section 25-B(1):

    The court noted that subsection (1) defines "continuous service for a period" as "uninterrupted service" but expressly includes interruptions on account of sickness, authorised leave, accident, illegal strike, lock-out, or cessation of work not due to any fault of the workman.

    The court emphasized that the phrase "continuous service for a period" must be read in light of subsection (2), which prescribes the duration and method of reckoning (e.g., the 240-day rule). If subsection (1) were read without regard to subsection (2), it would produce absurd results — e.g., a casual labourer employed for a couple of days could claim protection under section 25-F.

    The appellant's argument that "cessation of work" should be interpreted from the worker's perspective (so that willingness to work would preserve continuity) was rejected. The court applied the principle of ejusdem generis: the general phrase "cessation of work" must be read in the context of the specific interruptions listed (illegal strike, lock-out, similar foreseeable events). Thus "cessation of work" was read to include events akin to strikes and lock-outs, not mere lack of available work or the employer's non-provision of work.

    Conclusion: subsection (1) did not apply to the appellant's circumstances.

  2. Applicability of section 25-B(2):

    Subsection (2) deems a workman to be in continuous service for one year if, in the twelve calendar months preceding the relevant date, he actually worked not less than 240 days (in cases other than below-ground mining).

    The court examined the documentary evidence relied upon by the company (registers M1–M9) and found that the appellant's documentary material did not show that he worked 240 days in any year. The court specifically referred to H.D. Singh v. RBI to instruct that Sundays and holidays must be included in the computation. After counsel for the appellant checked the registers including Sundays/holidays, he conceded that in no year did the days of work reach the 240 threshold.

    Conclusion: subsection (2) did not apply; therefore the appellant was not deemed in continuous service for one year and was not entitled to the protections of section 25-F.

  3. Remedy and humanitarian consideration:

    Although the court concluded that the statutory protection against retrenchment under section 25-F did not apply, it enquired whether the company could pay compensation on humanitarian grounds without deciding the merits. The company, through counsel, offered to pay Rs. 10,000 irrespective of merits. The court accepted that offer and directed payment.

  4. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court:

    The court refused oral leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, holding that the case did not involve any substantial question of law of general importance warranting the Supreme Court's consideration.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Writ appeal dismissed. Subject to a humanitarian award, the court directed the management of Brooke Bond India Limited to pay the appellant Rs. 10,000 within two weeks. The court also refused oral leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's claim to statutory protection under section 25-F (and entitlement to retrenchment compensation) was rejected because he failed to establish continuous service under section 25-B(1) and failed to satisfy the 240-day requirement of section 25-B(2). The Labour Court's finding that the appellant did not work from June 1978 till 1981 was affirmed.
  • Humanitarian relief: The company was ordered to pay Rs. 10,000 to the appellant within two weeks; no costs were awarded.
  • Precedential effect: The court indicated that no substantial question of law of general importance arose in the case, refused leave to appeal, and therefore did not indicate the setting of any new binding precedent beyond the interpretative conclusions expressly recorded (i.e., the ejusdem generis reading of "cessation of work" and reliance on H.D. Singh for computation rules).

Note: All statements above are drawn exclusively from the provided court opinion and contain no additional facts or inferences beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

M.N Rao, J.:— This Writ appeal by the unsuccessful workman is from the judgment in Writ Petition No. 13221 of 1987 dismissing his plea for quashing of the award passed by the Labour Court, Hyderabad, in ID No. 21 of 1985 answering in the negative his claim that his retrenchment as casual worker by the management of Brooke Bond India Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘the company’) was illegal.

2. The appellant claimed that from 1969 to 1979 he was employed as a casual worker by the management of the company. He met with a motor accident on 24-4-1979, allegedly when he was on his way to the company, and the accident necessitated his hospitalisation for more than six months and his right leg was amputated. He reported for duty on 10-11-1981 but the management refused to give him employment. The conciliation proceedings initiated before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour ended in failure. Industrial Dispute No. 21 of 1985 was, therefore, taken up for adjudication by the Labour Court Hyderabad, pursuant to the refetence made by the State Government under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The reference as contained in G.O Rt. No. 513 reads as follows:

“Whether the action of management of Brooke Bond (India) Limited, Ghatkesar, Ranga Reddy District, in continuing Shri Yadi Reddy as casual worker for over (1969 onwards to 1979) ten years and subsequently his non-employment in the company without following due procedure for retrenchment of the workman is justified?”

3. The plea of the appellant before the Labour Court was that he worked more than two hundred and forty days in every year and, therefore, he was entitled to retrenchment compensation. The version put forward by the management was that for nearly one year prior to the accident in question no work was entrusted to the appellant as casual worker and therefore, there was no obligation to pay him either retrenchment compensation or reinduct him into service. The appellant gave evidence as WW1 and, on behalf of the company, its Personnel Manager gave evidence as MW1. Fifteen exhibits were brought no record on behalf of the appellant and nineteen exhibits on behalf of the company. The learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, after examining the evidence, both oral and documentary, came to the conclusion that the appellant's version that he has been continuously working for a period of two hundred and forty days since 1969 in every year was falsified by the documentary evidence, exhibits M1 to M9, the work allotment registers maintained by the company. The seniority list, exhibit W2, filed by the appellant was disbelieved. The finding recorded was that from June 1978 till 1981 the appellant did not work even as a casual labourer. In that view, the action of the management was held to be just. Challenging the same, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 13221 of 1987 which was dismissed by a learned single Judge affirming the view taken by the Labour Court. However, the learned single Judge made an observation, on humanitarian considerations, that the appellant may be considered for any suitable job. As the company has expressed its inability to provide the appellant with any job, the present appeal was brought.

4. Shri Surendar Rao, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that the appellant's case falls squarely under section 25-B(1) of the Act. Even according to the reference made to the Labour Court by the State Government under section 10(1) of the Act, it was admitted that the appellant has been in continuous employment as a casual worker with the company and, therefore, the requirement of ‘continuous service’ as contemplated by sub-section (1) of section 25-B of the Act was complied with. Controverting these submissions, Shri Srinivasa Murthy, for the company, says that engaging a casual worker for ten years does not mean that the worker fulfilled the requirement of continuous service under sub-section (1). The appellant's case was that the appellant completed in every year service of more than two hundred and forty days right from 1969 to 1979 and having failed in that contention it is not open to him now to take a new plea. Even assuming that such a plea is maintainable, still his case is not covered by sub-section (1).

5. section 25-B of the Act, omitting the immaterial portions, reads thus:

“Definition of continuous service:—(1) A workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;

(2) Where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer—

(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than—

(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and

(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;

(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than—

(i) ninety five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine;

(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case.

6. A workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer, if retrenched, is entitled to the protection of section 25-F, which is in the following terms:

“Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen:— No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer untill—

(a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;

(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and

(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”

7. There is no dispute that a casual workman also is comprehended by the definition of workman in clause (B) of section 2. Clause (00) of section 2 defines retrenchment as “termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as punishment by way of disciplinary action but does not include” the three categories specified therein. From a reading of section 25-B of the Act it is clear that only cases not falling under sub-section (1) are covered by sub-section (2). The phrase “continuous service for a period” occurring in sub-section (1) does not mean any period however short. That phrase has to be construed in the light of sub-section (2), which lays down the duration of the period and the method of reckoning it otherwise it would lead to bizarre consequences and any workman who was employed as a casual labourer even for a couple of days would get the right to claim the benefit of the protection of section 25-F of the Act, and that was not the intention of Parliament when section 25-B was enacted. Shri Surendar Rao says that the appellant was not given work although he was willing to take up work and so the words “cessation of Work” in sub-section (1) should be interpreted with reference to the workman but not from the point of view of the company. We cannot agree. The words “cessation of work” should be interpreted, in our considered opinion, ejusdem generis which implies that when a particular expression precedes a general expression, the latter should be interpreted in the light of the former. If so interpreted, the expression “cessation of work” should be interpreted in the light of illegal strike or lock-out matters of a similar nature which are not difficult to be foreseen like power failure, imposition of curfew, declaration of bandhs, break-down of law and order and related matters. Merely because a casual worker was willing to work, there is no obligation on the part of the company to provide him with work even if there is no work. Sub-section (1), therefore, has no application to the appellant's case.

8. As regards the applicability of sub-section (2), the evidence on record placed before the Labour Court clearly negatives the appellant's claim. The documentary evidence placed by him before the Labour Court does not show that in any year he has worked for a period of two hundred and forty days. We have asked Shri Surendar Rao to go through the registers, exhibits M1 to M9, and inform us whether in any year, even after including the holidays and Sundays, the number of days during which the appellant worked had come to two hundred and forty days. It is settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in H.D Singh v. RBI (1) 1986 (1) LLJ 127 (S.C) that in the computation of the period under sub-section (2) of section 25-B, Sundays and holidays should be taken into account. After going through the registers, Shri Surendar Rao says that in no year did the figure come anywhere near two hundred and forty days. It is therefore, evident that sub-section (2) does not apply to the appellant.

9. During the course of hearing, we enquired whether it was possible for the company to pay any compensation, on humanitarian grounds, to the appellant without going into the merits of the case. Shri Srinivasa Murthy, after obtaining instructions, has represented that the company was willing to pay rupees ten thousand irrespective of the merits of the case. In view of this, we direct that a sum of rupees ten thousand should be paid by the management of Brooke Bond India Limited, Ghatkesar, Ranga Reddy District, the first respondent in the writ appeal, to the appellant within two weeks from today. Subject to the above, the writ appeal is dismissed. No costs.

10. Soon after the judgment was pronounced, Sri Surender Rao, learned counsel for the appellant sought oral leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In our considered opinion, this case does not involve any substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.

11. Hence, the oral leave is refused.