Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

T.K Kodandaram v. The State Of A.P And Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Nov 27, 1992
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The application was filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr. P.C.) seeking to quash: (a) the proceedings connected with the Magistrate's order dated 25-1-1989 in C.C(SR) No. 138 of 1989 on the file of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad; and (b) the First Information Report dated 25-1-1989 in Crime No. 23 of 1989 of Marredpally Police Station, Secunderabad.

The petitioner (Sri T.K. Kodandaram, in person) contended that a private complainant must be examined under S. 200, Cr. P.C. before the Magistrate can refer the matter to the police, and that the Station House Officer's registration of the case was illegal because a private complaint cannot be converted into a police case under S. 190(1)(b), Cr. P.C.

Material facts: P. Anjinamma was the owner of premises at West Marredpally alleged to have bequeathed the house to his daughter under a registered Will dated 4-1-1980; the petitioner claims to manage the property. The fourth respondent filed a private complaint (C.C(SR) No. 138 of 1989) alleging offences under Ss. 120-B, 465, 471, 474 read with 420 and 418 IPC. The Metropolitan Magistrate, on 25-1-1989, referred the complaint to the police under S. 156(3), Cr. P.C. The police registered Crime No. 23 of 1989 and issued an F.I.R. The petitioner alleges mala fide registration and challenges both the Magistrate's order and the resulting F.I.R.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Metropolitan Magistrate's order dated 25-1-1989, passed without examining the complainant under S. 200, Cr. P.C., and referring the complaint under S. 156(3), Cr. P.C. to the police for investigation and report, is legal.
  2. Whether the F.I.R. issued by the Station House Officer on 25-1-1989 on the basis of the complaint referred by the Magistrate is liable to be quashed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Sri T.K. Kodandaram)

  • Unless the complainant is examined under S. 200, Cr. P.C., the Magistrate cannot refer the complaint to the police; therefore the Magistrate's order dated 25-1-1989 referring the complaint to police is illegal and all consequential proceedings should be quashed.
  • The Station House Officer's registration of the complaint was illegal because a private complaint cannot be converted into a police case under S. 190(1)(b), Cr. P.C.; therefore the F.I.R. dated 25-1-1989 (Crime No. 23 of 1989) should be quashed.

Respondent / State Arguments

  • The learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the Magistrate's order was in accordance with law and that the Magistrate strictly followed the procedure contemplated by the Cr. P.C. He further submitted that at the stage of police investigation the High Court should not interfere.
  • Sri L. Nageswara Rao, counsel for the fourth respondent, adopted the arguments of the Public Prosecutor and submitted that the criminal petition was without merit and should be dismissed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 459 : AIR 1977 SC 2401 Defines the limits of a Magistrate's power to order investigation under S. 156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage and outlines alternatives available to a Magistrate when considering a complaint (including requirement to comply with S. 200 before issuing process where cognizance is taken). The court relied on the principles laid down to explain that a Magistrate can order investigation under S.156(3) only at the pre-cognizance stage and summarized the alternatives available to a Magistrate when handling a private complaint.
H.S. Bains v. The State (Union Territory of Chandigarh), (1980) 4 SCC 631 : AIR 1980 SC 1883 Re-affirmation of the principles regarding S.156(3) and the stage at which a Magistrate may order police investigation versus taking cognizance under Chapter XIV/XV. Used by the court to confirm and reaffirm the principles from Tula Ram about pre-cognizance investigation under S.156(3).
D. Lakshminarayana v. V. Narayana, (1976) 3 SCC 252 : AIR 1976 SC 1672 Explains that S.156(3) operates at the pre-cognizance stage and is distinct from S.202 (post-cognizance), and that once a Magistrate takes cognizance under Chapter XV he cannot revert to S.156(3). The court relied on this decision extensively to explain the distinction between pre- and post-cognizance powers and to conclude that ordering investigation under S.156(3) without examining the complainant is permissible if the Magistrate has not taken cognizance.
Raghbir Singh v. State of Haryana, 1990 (1) Crimes 600 (Punjab & Haryana High Court) Held by a single Judge that a Magistrate could send a complaint to police for investigation but could not direct the police to register the case; relied upon earlier local decisions. The court reviewed this decision, explained why it was not helpful to the petitioner, and disagreed with the view that it precludes police registration of a case based on a Magistrate's order under S.156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage.
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992 SC 604 Established that the sine qua non for recording an FIR is information disclosing a cognizable offence under S.154(1), and that the officer-in-charge has no option but to register such information. The court applied this principle to hold that once police receive information disclosing a cognizable offence they are bound to register a case and investigate; thus registration by the Station House Officer on receipt of the Magistrate's order was proper.
P. Jagadiswararao v. K. Yenkateswarlu, 1991 (1) ALT 70 : 1991 Cri LJ 1419 Held that both routes—information under S.154 (to the police) and complaint under S.200 (to a Magistrate)—are available to a citizen; police will investigate under S.156 on receipt of information. The court noted this case but observed that it did not advance the petitioner's contention; it reiterated that both mechanisms are available and that S.154 does not negate S.200.
Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad, AIR (32) 1945 PC 18 Privy Council held that the police have a statutory right under Ss.154 and 156 to investigate offences and that the High Court should not interfere under inherent powers during the course of investigation. The court cited this authority for the proposition that interference by the High Court at the stage of police investigation (prior to charge-sheet/ cognizance) is generally inappropriate.
Ramlal Yadav v. State of U.P., Crimes 1989 (2) 491 : 1989 Cri LJ 1013 Allahabad High Court held that the High Court's power under S.482 to quash an FIR should be exercised with reference to proceedings after filing of a charge-sheet or a complaint and not during the investigation prior to filing of a charge-sheet. The court relied on this precedent to support the proposition that the High Court should not quash proceedings at the investigation stage and thus declined to exercise its inherent powers under S.482 at that stage.
Jai Singh v. Nand Lal (Chandigarh Cr Cases 1987) and Rattan Amol Singh v. State of Punjab, 1988 (1) Rec Cri Rep 144 Referenced in the Punjab & Haryana High Court decision discussed (Raghbir Singh) as authorities relied upon by that Court. These were mentioned as part of the background to the Raghbir Singh decision; the present court observed that Raghbir Singh and the precedents it followed did not aid the petitioner's case in the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a step-by-step analysis grounded in the statutory scheme of the Cr. P.C. and the precedents cited in the record.

  1. The court first examined the text and purpose of Section 200, Cr. P.C., noting that a Magistrate "taking cognizance of an offence on complaint" is required to examine the complainant and witnesses (unless the complaint is in writing and falls within stated provisos), and that the substance of such examination must be reduced to writing and signed.
  2. It then considered Section 156, Cr. P.C., emphasizing subsection (3), which authorizes a Magistrate empowered under S.190 to order police investigation of a cognizable case. The court highlighted the distinction between S.156(3) (pre-cognizance police investigation) and S.202 (post-cognizance inquiries), noting their operation at different stages.
  3. Relying on leading decisions (notably Tula Ram and D. Lakshminarayana), the court explained the established principle that a Magistrate may either: (a) take cognizance under Chapter XV and proceed under S.200 (examining complainant) and S.204 (issuing process) or (b) at the pre-cognizance stage order an investigation by police under S.156(3). If the Magistrate properly orders an investigation at the pre-cognizance stage, the procedural requirements of S.200 (examination of complainant) are unnecessary prior to that referral.
  4. Applying that framework to the present record, the court found that the Magistrate had not taken cognizance under Chapter XV but had ordered investigation at the pre-cognizance stage under S.156(3). Because the Magistrate was exercising his discretion to send the complaint to the police before taking cognizance, the omission to examine the complainant under S.200 did not render the order illegal.
  5. On the second issue (quashing of the F.I.R.), the court reviewed S.154 and the principle from State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal that an officer-in-charge must register information which discloses a cognizable offence. The court emphasized that once police receive such information they are bound to register, investigate, and report.
  6. The court considered the Punjab & Haryana High Court decision in Raghbir Singh (which held a Magistrate could send a complaint for investigation but not order police registration) and explained why that decision did not assist the petitioner: the present case involved a pre-cognizance order under S.156(3), which authorizes referral for police investigation and does not preclude the police from registering a case on receipt of such information.
  7. The court rejected the petitioner's submission that a private complaint is converted into a police report case thereby depriving the accused of limitations or other defenses. It held that ordering investigation under S.156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage does not convert proceedings into S.190(1)(b) police-initiated cognizance; any questions relating to limitation or other defenses remain open for consideration when cognizance is taken.
  8. Finally, the court observed established authorities (including Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad and Ramlal Yadav) to the effect that High Courts should not ordinarily use inherent powers under S.482 to quash an FIR or criminal proceedings at the stage of investigation prior to filing of a charge-sheet.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition was dismissed. The court held that the Magistrate's order dated 25-1-1989 referring the complaint to the police under S.156(3), Cr. P.C. was not illegal despite the complainant not having been examined under S.200, Cr. P.C., because the Magistrate had not taken cognizance and had acted at the pre-cognizance stage. The court also held that the registration of the F.I.R. by the Station House Officer on receipt of the referred complaint was proper under S.154 and S.156 and was not liable to be quashed at the investigation stage.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The impugned order of the Magistrate is not quashed and the petitioner's application under S.482 is dismissed; the FIR registered by the police pursuant to the Magistrate's referral stands and investigation may proceed.
  • Procedural consequence: The High Court declined to exercise its inherent powers to quash at the investigation stage, reaffirming the principle that interference under S.482 is inappropriate before filing of a charge-sheet or before cognizance is taken.
  • Precedential effect: The court applied established statutory interpretation and existing case law to the facts; the opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond affirming the settled distinction between pre-cognizance investigation under S.156(3) and post-cognizance inquiry under S.202. No novel precedent was created by this judgment.

Disposition: Petition dismissed.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an application, filed under S. 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure (for short Cr. P.C) praying to quash the proceedings connected with the order dated 25-1-1989 in S.C(SR) No. 138 of 1989 on the file of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad and consequently the F.I.R dated 25-1-1989 in Crime No. 23 of 1989 of Marredpally Police Station, Secunderabad.

2. Sri T.K Kodandaram, the party in person urged the following two contentions:

(1) Unless the complainant is examined under S. 200, Cr. P.C the learned Magistrate cannot refer the case to the police for investigation, so the order dated 25-1-1989 referring the complaint to police is illegal and all consequential proceedings are liable to be quashed.

(2) The action of the Station House Officer, Marredpally Police Station, Secunderabad, (third respondent herein) in registering the complaint is illegal as a private complaint cannot be converted into a police case under S. 190(1)(b), Cr. P.C, so the F.I.R issued by the third respondent on 25-1-1989 in Crime No. 23 of 1989 of Marredpally Police Station, has to be quashed.

3. The learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that the order passed by the learned Magistrate is in accordance with law and he had strictly followed the procedure contemplated by the Code of Criminal Procedure. His further submission is that at the state of investigation the High Court will not interfere with the investigation by the police, Sri L. Nageswara Rao, the learned counsel for the fourth respondent adopts the arguments of the Public Prosecutor and submits that the criminal petition is without merit and the same may be dismissed. On these contentions the questions that arise for consideration are:

(1) Whether the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate, dated 25-1-1989 passed without examining the complainant under S. 200, Cr. P.C and referring the complaint under S. 156(3), Cr. P.C to police for investigation and report is legal.

(2) Whether the F.I.R issued by the third respondent on 25-1-1989 on the basis of the referred complaint is liable to be quashed.

4. To answer these questions, it would be necessary to refer to the facts giving rise to this application. One P. Anjinamma was the owner of premises bearing Municipal No. 10-2-91, situated at West Marredpally, Secunderabad. It is the case of the petitioner that the said P. Anjinamma had bequeathed the said house in favour of his daughter Smt. P. Urmila wife of the petitioner under a registered Will dated 4-1-1980; she entrusted the management of the said house to the petitioner and he is looking after the same. He invested an amount of Rs. 50,000/- for repairs and refurnishing and let out the down stairs portion to three tenants and upstairs portion of the said premises to a voluntary organisation “WEAVERS”. The fourth respondent who is alleged to have given up his Hindu faith and thus lost right to inherit the property from his parents, filed a complaint against the petitioner under Ss. 120-B, 465, 471, 474 read with 420 and 418 I.P.C in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad. That was numbered as C.C(SR) No. 138 of 1989 on the file of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad. The grievance of the petitioner is that when the petitioner appeared before the learned Magistrate he refused to hear the petitioner and on 25-1-1989 passed order for investigation by and report of the police under S. 156(3), Cr. P.C even without examining the complainant (fourth respondent). The Inspector of Police, Marredpally (sixth respondent herein) registered the case as Crime No. 23 of 1989 under Ss. 120-B, 465, 471, 474 read with 420 and 418, I.P.C on the basis of the said order of the learned Magistrate referring the complaint to police treating it as information under S. 154, Cr. P.C and issued F.I.R, which is alleged to be mala fide.

5. First I shall take up the first question. Chapter XV of Cr. P.C deals with ‘Complaints to Magistrates’. It contains four sections (Ss. 200 to 203). Here we are concerned with S. 200. It reads as follows:

“A Magistrate taking cognizance of an Offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate:

Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses—

(a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; or

(b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under S. 192;

Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under S. 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-examine them”.

6. A perusal of the Section extracted above, makes it clear that a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence under a complaint has to examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any. It further provides that the substance of such examination should be reduced to writing and be signed by the complainant, witnesses and Magistrate. The first proviso says that the complainant and witnesses need not be examined when the complaint is made in writing and when a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; and if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under S. 192. The second proviso dispenses with the examination of the complainant and the witnesses by the latter Magistrate, if the Magistrate making over the case has already examined them.

7. It is also relevant to refer to S. 156, Cr. P.C here, which deals with the power of the Police Officers to investigate cognizable cases and which is in the following terms:

(1) Any Officer in charge of a Police Station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.

(2) No proceeding of a Police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under S. 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned.”

8. From a perusal of sub-sec. (3) it is clear that a Magistrate empowered under S. 190 has discretion to order investigation about any cognizable case to the Police. S. 190 which falls in Chapter XIV, deals with cognizance of offences by Magistrates. It says that subject to the provisions of Chapter XIV any Magistrate of the First Class or any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered in that behalf under sub-sec. (2), may take cognizance of any offence—

(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;

(b) upon a police report of such facts; and

(c) upon information received from any person other than a Police Officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.

9. In Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 459 : AIR 1977 SC 2401 : 1978 Cri LJ 8 the question before the Supreme Court was, where a Magistrate orders investigation by the Police before taking cognizance under S. 156(3), Cr. P.C, has he power to issue notice to the complainant, record his statement and statement of his witnesses and issue process under S. 204, Cr. P.C? After discussing scope of Ss. 156(3), 190(1)(a), 200, 202 and 204, their Lordships laid down the following proposition:

“(1) A Magistrate can order investigation under S. 156(3) only at the pre-cognizance stage, that is to say, before taking cognizance under Ss. 190, 200 and 204 and where a Magistrate decides to take cognizance under the provisions of Chapter 14 he is not entitled in law to order any investigation under S. 156(3) though in cases not falling within the proviso to S. 202 he can order an investigation by the police which would be in the nature of an enquiry as contemplated by S. 202 of the Code.

(2) Where a Magistrate chooses to take cognizance he can adopt any of the following alternatives:

(a) He can peruse the complaint and if satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can straightway issue process to the accused but before he does so he must comply with the requirements of S. 200 and record the evidence of the complainant or his witnesses.

(b) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by himself.

(c) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by any other person or an investigation by the Police.

(3) In case the Magistrate after considering the statement of the complainant and the witnesses or as a result of the investigation and the enquiry ordered is not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can dismiss the complaint.

(4) Where a Magistrate orders investigation by the police before taking cognizance under S. 156(3) of the Code and receives the report thereupon he Can act on the report and discharge the accused or straightway issue process against the accused or apply his mind to the complaint filed before him and take action under S. 190 of the Code.

10. They are re-affirmed in H.S Bains v. The State (Union Territory of Chandigarh), (1980) 4 SCC 631 : AIR 1980 SC 1883 : 1980 Cri LJ 1308.

11. In D. Lakshminarayana v. V. Narayana, (1976) 3 SCC 252 : AIR 1976 SC 1672 : 1976 Cri LJ 1361, the question which fell for consideration of the Supreme Court was, “whether in view of the first proviso to S. 202(1) of Cr. P.C, a Magistrate who received a complaint, disclosing an offence exclusively triable by the Court of Session, is debarred from sending the same to the police for investigation under S. 156(3), Cr. P.C”.

12. In that case, on 26-7-1975 the first respondent made a complaint before the J.F.C.M Dharmavaram against the appellants alleging that they committed offences under Ss. 147, 148, 149, 307, 395, 448, 378 and 302 of the I.P.C The learned Magistrate forwarded the complaint under S. 156(3) to the police for investigation and report. The appellants filed an application under S. 482, Cr. P.C in our High Court praying that the order of the learned Magistrate be quashed as being illegal. That petition was dismissed by the High Court on October 20, 1975. The correctness of the order of the High Court was questioned in the Supreme Court. In para 17 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed—

“Section 156(3) occurs in Chapter XII, under the caption: “Information to the police and their powers to investigate”, while S. 202 is in Chapter XV which bears the heading “Of complaints to Magistrate”. The power to order police investigation under S. 156(3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by S. 202(1). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage, the second at the post-cognizance stage when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the power under S. 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under S. 190(1)(a). But if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to switch back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of S. 156(3). It may be noted further that an order made under sub-section (3) of S. 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under S. 156(1). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under S. 156 and ends with a report or charge-sheet under S. 173. On the other hand, S. 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered under S. 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that section, an investigation “for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Thus the object of an investigation under S. 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him.”

13. It was held in that case that the Magistrate did not apply his mind to the complaint for deciding whether or not there was sufficient ground for proceeding, but only ordered investigation under S. 156(3) and did not bring into motion the machinery of Chapter XV, he did not examine the complainant or his witnesses under S. 200, Cr. P.C which was the first step in the procedure prescribed under that Chapter and that the question of taking the next step of that procedure envisaged in S. 202 did not arise. Approving the action of the Magistrate it was observed that instead of taking cognizance of the offence, he had, in the exercise of his discretion, sent the complaint for investigation by police under S. 156.

14. From the above discussion it follows that on a private complaint the Magistrate may either take cognizance of the alleged offence under S. 190(1)(a) or (c) in which case he has to follow the procedure under Chapter XV commencing by examining the complainant and his witnesses, if any, under S. 200, Cr. P.C or order investigation and report by police into the alleged offence under S. 156(3) in which case he need not examine the complainant or his witnesses under S. 200, Cr. P.C before passing the order. Thus, power under S. 156(3) can be exercised by a Magistrate only at the pre-cognizance stage but if he takes cognizance of the alleged offence by following the procedure postulated in Chapter XV, he cannot resort to S. 156(3), Cr. P.C but he has to have recourse to S. 202, Cr. P.C for post-cognizance investigation.

15. From a perusal of the record of the Magistrate in this case, it is clear that the Magistrate has not taken cognizance of the offence and that at the pre-cognizance stage he had ordered investigation into the case. Therefore, the impugned order of the learned Magistrate dated 25-1-1989 cannot be said to be illegal so as to quash it under inherent powers of the High Court under S. 482, Cr. P.C

16. Now we come to the second point. Relying upon the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Raghbir Singh… v. State Of Haryana…, 1990 (1) Crimes 600, the petitioner submits that registration of the case by the police on the basis (of) the complaint referred by the Magistrate is illegal and the F.I.R issued by the third respondent on 25-1-1989 has to be quashed. It may be necessary to refer to provisions of S. 154, Cr. P.C which provides that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in chage of a Police Station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in that behalf. A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith to the informant.

17. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992 SC 604 : 1992 Cri LJ 527. The Supreme Court laid down that—

“The condition which is sine qua non for recording a First Information Report is that there must be an information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer-in-charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of S. 154(1) the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say to register a case on the basis of such information.”

18. Thus, it is clear that once the police comes to know of commission of cognizable offence, it is bound to register a case, investigate and report the same to the Magistrate forthwith.

19. In Raghbir Singh's case (supra) a learned single Judge of the Haryana High Court held that the learned Magistrate can send the complaint to the police for investigation, but not for registration of the case. In that case a private complaint filed after about 28-30 years of the alleged offences was forwarded by the learned Magistrate under S. 156(3) of Cr. P.C to the concerned Station House Officer of the police for registration of the case and investigation. In respect of the direction of the learned Magistrate to register the case, the learned Judge held that the Magistrate could not send the case for registration. In coming to that conclusion the learned Judge followed two cases of that Court in Jai Singh v. Nand Lal, 1987 Chandigarh Cr Cases 644, and Rattan Amol Singh v. State of Punjab, 1988 (1) Rec Cri Rep 144 and observed,—

“that the view of this Court in fact based on Supreme Court observations in D. Lakshminarayana v. V. Narayana (supra)”.

20. Observation of the Supreme Court relied upon is, however, not quoted. So far as I could see the only relevant observation is:

“Thus the object of an investigation under S. 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him”.

21. This observation relates to order of Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV wherein investigation was ordered under S. 202 after cognizance of the offence had already been taken. In that context it was observed that the object of investigation was not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him. It cannot be applied to investigation ordered under S. 156(3) before taking cognizance of the offence. For this reason, with respect I am unable to agree with the opinion expressed by the learned Judge. However the learned Judge has further held that in terms of S. 156(3) the Court could send the complaint to police for investigation. In the instant case the learned X Metropolitan Magistrate sent the complaint for investigation which is in accordance with the provisions of S. 156(3), Cr. P.C Hence this case is of no assistance to the petitioner.

22. In P. Jagadiswararao v. K. Yenkateswarlu, 1991 (1) ALT 70 : 1991 Cri LJ 1419, our High Court has held that under S. 154, Cr. P.C every citizen is entitled to give information to the police regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, on receipt of which, the police would make investigation into the offence under S. 156, Cr. P.C and may file a charge-sheet if there is a prima facie case found out or file a referred report otherwise. The learned single Judge observed that the legislature enacted specific provisions enabling a private citizen to move the Court direct by filing a complaint under S. 200, Cr. P.C on receipt of which, the Magistrate would record sworn statements of the complainant and witnesses, if any, present and if satisfied that there exists a prima facie case would take cognizance of the offence under S. 190(1)(a), Cr. P.C and that he is also empowered to postpone the issue of process against the accused under S. 202, Cr. P.C in which event he may inquire into the case direct himself or refer the case to the police for investigation. Thus, both the courses under S. 154 and under S. 200, Cr. P.C are open and available to a private citizen. Thus observing the learned Judge held that simply because there was a right under S. 154, Cr. P.C consequent upon which the police would investigate, it cannot be said that the right under S. 200, Cr. P.C is not available for purposes of taking recourse. In my view this case has no relevance to the point in issue.

23. The petitioner further submits that a private complaint cannot be converted into a case upon police report and that the objections as to limitation or otherwise would not be available to him. I am afraid, I cannot accept this contention. When on a private complaint a Magistrate orders investigation and report by the police under S. 156(3), Cr. P.C it cannot be said that it amounts to converting the case into one under S. 190(1)(b). This is only at pre-cognizance stage. After the report is submitted by the police to the Magistrate pursuant to the order under S. 156(3), as the proceedings have been initiated under S. 190(1)(a), the case will not get converted into one under S. 190(1)(b) on the ground that the police registered F.I.R on the basis of the order of the Magistrates referring the complaint for investigation anil report. And when the Magistrate decides to take cognizance of the offence all questions with regard to limitation or otherwise will be open for consideration by the Magistrate.

24. Merely because investigation has been ordered by the Magistrate under S. 156(3), Cr. P.C it cannot be said that the accused would have no right to raise objection with regard to limitation or otherwise at appropriate stage.

25. It is now well settled that this Court will not exercise its inherent powers to quash the proceedings at the stage of investigation prior to filing of charge-sheet or before taking cognizance of the complaint.

26. In Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad, AIR (32) 1945 PC 18 : 1945 (46) Cri LJ 413, the Privy Council laid down that police have statutory right under Ss. 154 and 156 to investigate the offences and the High Court cannot interfere in exercise of inherent powers under S. 482, Cr. P.C and that interference can only be made when the charge is preferred before the Court.

27. In Ramlal Yadav v. State of U.P, Crimes 1989 (2) 491 : 1989 Cri LJ 1013, application under S. 482, Cr. P.C was filed praying that the F.I.R and the investigation on its basis be quashed. A Special Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the power of the High Court under S. 482, Cr. P.C to quash an F.I.R or a complaint had to be exercised with reference to proceedings in the court after filing of a charge-sheet or a complaint and not with reference to investigation prior to filing of the charge-sheet.

28. In this case, it has been noticed above, that the Magistrate has not taken cognizance of the offence alleged in the private complaint, so the question of exercising power under S. 482, Cr. P.C does not arise.

29. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated above, I do not find any merit in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed.

30. Petition dismissed.