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R. Venkat Reddy v. State Of A.P Rep. By Dy Sp, Acb, Ananthapur .

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Apr 26, 1991
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summarized Legal Opinion — Revision in CC No. 1/89

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision was filed by A-1 in CC No. 1/89 on the file of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, challenging confirmation of his conviction under Section 193 IPC and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for three years with a fine of Rs. 3,000/-, as confirmed by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad.

The underlying events, as deposed by prosecution witnesses, arose from a complaint by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB) Anantapur Range. The complaint alleged that Sub-Inspector M. Narayana Reddy demanded bribes from A-2 (Raghava Rao) and that A-1 paid Rs. 350 to the SI to secure release of Velluka Reddy. ACB registered a case (Cr No. 19.ACB/Kurnool/84) under Section 161 IPC and Sections 5(2) and 5(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and conducted an investigation including an unsuccessful attempt to trap the SI.

During disciplinary proceedings before the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings (Tribunal) numbered 47/86, A-1 (examined as PW 1) gave pre-trial evidence on 16-1-87 but recanted during cross-examination on 17-1-87, supporting the charged SI and contradicting his earlier sworn evidence. A-2 also contradicted earlier statements. The Tribunal's member observed contradictions, issued show-cause notices, and referred the matter to the Government for action. Pursuant to that reference, the Deputy Superintendent of Police filed a charge-sheet against A-1 and A-2 under Section 193 IPC (perjury).

At trial the prosecution examined witnesses (PWs 1 to 3) and marked Exhibits P1–P5. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 193 IPC and imposed the sentence noted above. On appeal, the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, confirmed the conviction and sentence against A-1; A-2 was acquitted on a separate appeal. A-1 then filed the present revision challenging his conviction and sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings is a "Court" within the meaning of Section 195(2)(b) / Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure such that the tribunal itself (and not a police officer) must file any complaint for an offence committed before it (here, perjury under Section 193 IPC).
  2. Whether trying an offence punishable with imprisonment up to seven years under summons procedure (instead of warrant procedure) vitiates the trial and renders the proceedings illegal or merely irregular.
  3. Whether a concession or omission made on behalf of the accused during an appeal is binding on a revisional court, i.e., whether the revisional court may reconsider points not pressed on appeal due to concession.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (A-1) Arguments

  • The Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings is a "Court" within the meaning of Section 195(2)(b) CrPC; therefore the Deputy Superintendent of Police had no competence to file a charge-sheet for an offence (perjury) allegedly committed before that Tribunal — the Tribunal itself should have filed any complaint under Section 195 procedure.
  • The offence under Section 193 IPC is punishable with up to seven years' imprisonment and is therefore triable as a warrant case; in this matter the accused was tried under the summons procedure, so the trial is vitiated and the conviction must be set aside.
  • A concession or failure to press the point in the appellate court does not preclude the revisional court from considering the matter on merits; reliance placed on precedent that a wrong concession is not binding on appellate/revisional courts.

Respondent / Public Prosecutor's Arguments

  • Admitted that the offence under Section 193 IPC is triable as a warrant case, but argued the trial under summons procedure did not cause prejudice to the accused and therefore is not vitiated; absent shown prejudice the proceedings remain valid.
  • Point that summons procedure was used was raised before the appellate court but not pressed as a ground to attack conviction; therefore, it was not open for the petitioner to raise that ground in this revision.
  • Even if the trial were held to be vitiated, the matter ought to be remanded to the trial court for retrial (since the offence is one of perjury), rather than acquitting the accused outright.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhairam v. Justice P.B. Lentin, (1988) 4 SCC 419 : AIR 1988 SC 2267 A Commission of Inquiry is not a "Court" for the purposes of Section 195; bodies/tribunals having quasi-judicial trappings are not necessarily courts unless declared so by statute. The court applied the principle to hold that the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings was not shown to be a "Court" for Section 195 purposes; therefore the Deputy Superintendent of Police could file the charge-sheet.
Public Prosecutor v. Chitikina Subbanna, AIR 1947 Mad. 239 A concession wrongly made on behalf of the accused does not bind the appellate court; the appellate (and revisional) court can set aside a conviction based on such a concession and consider the case on merits. The court relied on this authority to hold that the revisional court may consider the merits despite concessions made in the appellate proceedings; the petitioner could press the question of improper procedure in revision.
Re Narayana, AIR 1962 AP 166 Affirmation of the proposition that a wrong concession by the accused or advocate does not bind the appellate court and that the court may examine matters on merits. The court noted this decision as a supporting precedent for the same proposition and applied it in allowing reconsideration in revision despite earlier concessions on appeal.
State v. Bhaskaran Nair, AIR 1971 Kerala 188 The procedural differences between warrant and summons cases are substantial; treating a warrant case as a summons case gives rise to an almost indefeasible presumption of prejudice because many valuable rights in warrant procedure are unavailable in summons procedure. The court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that trying an offence triable as a warrant case under summons procedure vitiates the trial because it deprives the accused of substantial rights.
Public Prosecutor v. Vaijnath, AIR 1971 AP 48 The trial of a warrant case under summons procedure amounts to an illegality (and not merely an irregularity curable under Section 537 CrPC or its equivalents). The court cited this Division Bench decision to reinforce the finding that the trial conducted under summons procedure in a warrant case was illegal and vitiated the proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two principal analytical stages:

  1. On whether the Tribunal is a "Court" under Section 195 CrPC:

    The petitioner contended the Tribunal was such a "Court" and so procedural requirements of Section 195 should have been followed (i.e., the court itself should have filed any complaint). The court examined Section 195(3) (definition of "Court") and observed that no provision was shown to declare the disciplinary Tribunal to be a "Court" for Section 195 purposes. The court relied on Bhairam v. Justice P.B. Lentin to explain that quasi-judicial bodies or commissions that have legal trappings and can administer oaths are not necessarily "Courts" unless the statute declares them to be such. Applying that principle, the court found no force in the petitioner's contention that the Tribunal was a "Court" for Section 195; consequently the Deputy Superintendent of Police was competent to file the charge-sheet.

  2. On whether trial under summons procedure in an offence triable as a warrant case vitiates the trial:

    The court accepted that Section 193 IPC (perjury) carries a maximum sentence of up to seven years and thus is a warrant-triable offence under the Code. The trial court, however, tried the accused under the summons procedure. The court explained the substantive differences between warrant and summons procedures: warrant procedure (for graver offences) provides more detailed safeguards and substantial rights to the accused (e.g., framing of charge, right to reserve cross-examination), which are not available in summons procedure. These rights are linked to protection under Article 21 of the Constitution.

    The court rejected the Public Prosecutor's contention that absence of demonstrated prejudice meant the trial was not vitiated, holding that trying a warrant case by summons procedure deprives the accused of statutory benefits and opportunities and thus is not a mere curable irregularity. The court relied on State v. Bhaskaran Nair and Public Prosecutor v. Vaijnath to conclude that there is an almost indefeasible presumption of prejudice and that such a trial constitutes an illegality. Accordingly, the court held the trial was vitiated.

    The Public Prosecutor's submission that the matter should be remanded for retrial was considered. The court declined remand, noting that the offence occurred "some time between 1988 and 1987" and observing that in view of the long lapse of time the case was not fit for remand for fresh trial.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The revisional court ALLOWED the revision. It set aside the conviction and sentence of the petitioner (A-1) under Section 193 IPC and ordered that any fine paid be refunded to the petitioner.

Implications and Consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner's conviction and sentence were quashed; any fine paid was to be refunded. The matter was not remanded for fresh trial.
  • On legal principles: The court reaffirmed that a disciplinary tribunal is not to be treated as a "Court" for Section 195 purposes in the absence of statutory declaration that it is a court, relying on Bhairam. The court also reaffirmed the principle (as applied in the cited authorities) that trying an offence triable as a warrant case under summons procedure is an illegality that vitiates the trial because it deprives the accused of statutory protections; the absence of shown prejudice does not cure this defect.
  • No statement was made in the opinion that a new legal principle or precedent was being created; the decision was made by applying existing authorities to the facts of the case.

Note: This summary is limited strictly to the material and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond the text were introduced.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a revision filed by A-1 in CC No. 1/89 on the file of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Hyderabad against confirmation of his conviction u/s. 193 IPC and sentence to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 3000/- by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad.

2. The facts of the case as deposed to by the material prosecution witnesses are: The Deputy Superintendent of Police Anti Corruption Bureau Anantapur Range filed a complaint alleging that the 2nd accused Raghava Rao who, as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner herein was acquitted by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge Hyderabad on a separate appeal filed by him reported to the Inspector of Police ACB at Anantapur on 14-11-84 that one M. Narayana Reddy SI of Police of Patnam Police Station, Kadiri Taluk was demanding a bribe of Rs. 2,000/- from him. It was also alleged by A-2 that the said Sub-Inspector also demanded Rs. 2,500/- towards illegal gratification for release of Velluka Reddy and when an amount of Rs. 350/- was paid by A-1 to the SI of Police the said Velluka Reddy was released. A-2 made a further allegation that he was wrongfully detained by the said S.I of Police from 12-11-84 to 13-11-84 and when he promised to pay Rs. 1000/- within four or five days the said SI of Police released him, and that since he was unwilling to pay the bribe he was reporting the matter to the ACB. On the said report of A-2 a case in Cr No. 19.ACB/Kurnool/84 u/s. 161 IPC and u/s. 5(2) and Sec. 5(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was registered against the SI of Police a regular investigation was initiated and the 2nd accused was sent to him with ‘ten’ hundred rupee notes to trap him but the same could not be successful as the SI of Police was not available in the police station. It is further alleged in the complaint that a case Before the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) was filed and the same was numbered as 47/86 and during the course of inquiry of the said case, A-1 was examined as PW 1 on 16-1-87 and cross-examined on 17-1-87 while A-2 was examined on 17-1-87. A-4 in his examination-in-chief on oath on 16-1-87 deposed that he paid Rs. 350/- to the SI of Police Narayana Reddy by way of bribe to release his relative Velluka Reddy. However A-1 who was cross-examined on oath on 17-1-87 resiled from his earlier evidence in chief-examination on oath and contradicted his own statements in chief-examination by deposing in cross-examination that what all he deposed on 16-1-87 is false and what all he is deposing on 17-1-87 is true and thereby he supported the SI of Police against whom a charge of bribe is levelled. Thus the petitioner herein turned hostile to the prosecution. So he was cross examined by the prosecution, but he supported the SI of Police the charged officer. After completion of enquiry, the learned Member of the Tribunal observed in his order dated 27-2-87 that both the accused contradicted their statements. A-1 contradicted his own statement in Chief-examination given on oath whereas A-2 deliberately contradicted his earlier report given to the police with a view to help the charged officer and they have committed an offence of perjury. The learned Member of the Tribunal issued a show-cause notice to both the accused to explain why action should not be taken against them. Though the accused received notices on 17-3-87 they did not choose to reply. Then the member of the tribunal addressed the Government to take action against the accused for an offence of perjury. In pursuance of that, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused u/s. 193 IPC by the Deputy Superintendent of Police.

3. The prosecution in all examined P.Ws 1 to 3 and marked Ex. P1 to P-5. When questioned as to the commission of offence they denied the same. The trial court after considering the entire material on record convicted the accused as stated supra. On appeal by A-1 the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge Hyderabad confirmed the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court against him. However, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner on a separate appeal by A-2 he was acquitted of the charges framed against him. A-1, petitioner herein filed this revision challenging the conviction and sentence confirmed against him.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, contends that the Tribunal for Disciplinary proceedings is a ‘Court’ within the meaning of Section 195(2)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that therefore the Deputy Superintendent of Police cannot file a chargesheet against the accused as the Tribunal itself has to file a complaint. It must be noted that the offence u/s. 193, IPC is an offence against the public justice. Therefore, complaint for the said offense cannot be filed by any other authority, except by the court when the offence is committed Before the Court. According to Section 195(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the term “Court” is defined as a—Civil, Revenue or Criminal court and includes a Tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal procedure. In such a case the complaint has to be filed by the court itself following the procedure laid down u/s. 195, Cr. PC No provision declaring the ‘Tribunal’ herein to be a ‘Court’ or equivalent to a court for the purpose of Section 195, Cr. PC is brought to my notice. Interpreting a similar situation the Supreme Court in Bhairam v. Justice P.B Lentin (1988) 4 SCC 419 : AIR 1988 SC 2267 held that a Commission of Inquiry is not a Court to be so called. A Commission is obviously appointed by the appropriate Government “for the information of its mind” in order for it to decide as to the course of action to be followed. It is, therefore, a fact finding body not required to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and has no adjudicatory functions. The Government is not bound to accept its recommendations or act upon its findings. The mere fact that the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character and it has the power of administer an oath will not impart to it the status of a court. It is a familiar feature of modern legislation to set up bodies and tribunal, and entrust them with work of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative character, but they are not Courts in the accepted sence of that term, though they may possess some of the trappings of a court. In my view, the same proposition applies to the tribunal for disciplinary proceedings.

5. Further it is also not brought to my notice that there is any provision in the disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal Act declaring the tribunal as the Court for the purpose of Section 195, Cr. P.C Therefore, I see no force in the contention.

6. It is contended by Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the offence u/s. 193, IPC is an offence punishable with seven years rigorous imprisonment and therefore the same has to be tried as a warrant case. But in the present case the accused has been tried under summons procedure and therefore the entire proceedings are vitiated and illegal. On that count itself, the learned counsel submits, the accused is entitled for acquittal. The learned Public Prosecutor submitting that it is a fact that the case is triable as a warrant case, contended that though the accused was tried under summons procedure and proceedings are valid since no prejudice is caused to the accused. He points out that unless some prejudice is shown to have been caused to the accused it cannot be said that the trial is vitiated. Further it is submitted that though this point was raised before the appellate court the same was not sought to be made a ground to assail the conviction and sentence and therefore it is not open to the petitioner to press that point in the revision for purposes of urging that the proceedings stand vitiated on this ground. It is pertinent to notice that in paragraph-17 of the judgment of the appellate court, it is observed as follows:

“The learned counsel has also submitted, in the passing that though an offence under Sec. 193, IPC is a warrant case, but the learned trial judge was tried it by summons case procedure, but since he did not seek to assail the conviction of the appellant on this ground I do not consider it necessary to go into this question”.

7. Thus, Before the appellate court, as submitted, the conviction of the petitioner (A-1) was not assailed on the ground of trying the accused under summons procedure instead of under warrant procedure. The learned counsel for the petitioner now contends that the concession made on behalf of the accused during the course of the appeal is not binding at the revision stage. In this regard he relied upon a decision in Public Prosecutor v. Chitikina Subbanna AIR 1947 Mad. 239 wherein it was held;

“A concession wrongly made on behalf of the accused cannot stand in the way of the appellate court setting aside a conviction based on such a concession: similarly, a concession wrongly made by the public prosecutor should not stand in the way of an appeal against an acquittal based on that concession being allowed. There is no distinction as regards the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal between an appeal from an order of acquittal and an appeal from a conviction”.

8. The above proposition of law was also accepted and followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Re Narayana AIR 1962 AP 166. It is thus clear that a wrong concession made by the accused or the advocate for the accused, will not bind the appellate court and it is open to such court to consider the case on merits and that this proposition extends even to revisions. The learned counsel submits that the revisional court, therefore, can consider the case on merits irrespective of the concessions made by the advocate for the accused or the public prosecutor in the course of appeal. I see sufficient force in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

9. The main question therefore that is to be considered in this revision, is whether the trial of an accused under summons procedure instead of under warrant procedure renders the trial vitiated.

10. In this case the petitioner, A-1 was charged for the offence under sec. 193 of the Indian Penal Code for which the maximum sentence prescribed is rigorous imprisonment upto seven years. It being so, the offence is triable under warrant procedure. However, the court below tried the case, under summons procedure. In this case the complaint was filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police at the instance of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings. Therefore it is to be treated as a case instituted otherwise than on a police report attracting the procedure laid down under Secs. 244 to 248 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The benefits available to the accused under the warrant procedure are not wholly open in summons procedure to the accused. The legislature with great care and caution provided a particular procedure for warrant cases as the accused therein has to face a grave charge for which the punishment prescribed is more than two years. In summons case the punishment prescribed is less than two years and therefore the procedure prescribed thereunder is almost simple and comparatively summary is nature. Therefore, the benefits made available by the legislature to the accused tried under warrant procedure and different and varied. As such, in cases where the accused was tried under summons procedure instead of under warrant procedure, he suffers deprivation of opportunities and benefits available other wise under the warrant procedure. Every right of the accused is well knit in the Code of Criminal Procedure in order to link it with the protection available under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, mandatory for the Courts to follow meticulously the procedure either warrant or summons prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure in trying the accused, lest it may attract the consequences that flow from violation of the mandatory procedure prescribed by law culminating in deprivation of the fundamental fight guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India.

11. The contention of the learned Public Prosecutor that there is no prejudice caused to the accused to render the trial vitiated is not acceptable since it does deprive him of certain benefits and opportunities available under the warrant procedure. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon a decision of the Kerala High Court in State v. Bhaskaran Nair AIR 1971 Kerala 188 where it was held;

“The procedures prescribed for warrant and summons cases are entirely different. The procedure prescribed for summons cases is simpler and speedier than that prescribed for warrant cases. Warrant cases as they deal with offences graver than those in summons cases cannot be tried in the same simple and speedy fashion as summons cases. Greater opportunities for defenced are offered to the accused in a warrant case than in a summons case. Unlike in a summons case a charge has to be framed in a warrant case and the accused has also a right to reserve cross examination of the prosecution witness till a last stage. These are substantial and valuable rights which an accused has if the procedure in prescribed in Chapter XXI is followed and he cannot be deprived of them. The difference between the two forms of trial is not therefore merely one of form importing mere irregularity curable under Section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On the other hand, it is so vital that there is an almost indefeasible presumption of prejudice to the accused if a warrant case is tried as a summons case.

12. The learned counsel took me through another decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Public Prosecutor v. Vaijnath AIR 1971 AP page 48 wherein also it is held that the trial of a warrant case under summons procedure amounts to an illegality and not an irregularity curable under sec. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 (equivalent to sec. 465 Cr PC of 1973)

13. Therefore, the Court below has committed an illegality in trying the warrant case under summons procedure and deprived the accused of the benefits available under warrant procedure. Accordingly, the trial of the accused is vitiated. The learned Public Persecutor next contended that even if the trial is vitiated, the matter has to be remanded to the Court below for trial afresh as the offence is one of perjury. In this case the offence took place some time between 1988 and 1987. In view of this long lapse of time, I do not think this case to be a fit and proper one for remand to the court below for trial afresh.

14. In the result, the revision is allowed by setting aside the conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner. The fine amount, if paid, shall be refunded to the petitioner.