1. These writ petitions have been referred to a Full Bench on the ground that the main point arising therein is the same as the case in W.A No. 144/1986. The point raised in W.A No. 144/1986 is regarding the point of time from which limitation for reference u/S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) would commence. The said Writ Appeal could not be heard by us for other reasons. But inasmuch as the same point is involved here, we propose to decide the same in W.P No. 13203/1985. So far as W.P Nos. 11940, 11764 and 11938 of 1985 are concerned, we shall deal with them separately, at the end of this judgment. We shall first refer to the facts in W.P No. 13203/1985 initially.

2. In W.P No. 13203/85, the relief claimed is for the issue of a writ of Mandamus directing the respondent (the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, Unit I, Sriramsagar Project) to refer to the civil court u/S. 18 of the Act the matter in respect of the compensation in respect of Ac. 50-00 of land covered by the single Award No. 10/1976-1977 dated 9-12-1976. The writ petition in filed on 18-11-1985 by 75 petitioners. It is alleged that the petitioners are owners of Ac. 60-00 of land in Komatpally village, Nandipet Mandal, Armoor Taluk, Nizamabad District and the entire land is submerged in the Sriramsagar Project. It is stated that a meagre compensation of Rs. 2,66,215-44 was awarded in the Award No. 10/76-77 on 9-12-1976. It is further stated that the petitioners are ‘not aware’ as to the date of the award inasmuch as ‘no notice what-so-ever’ was given of the fact of the award being passed. Reliance is placed on S. 12(2) to say that there is a statutory obligation imposed on the Collector under S. 12(2) and the said obligation not having been discharged, limitation has not started under the proviso to S. 18(2) of the Act. It is alleged that as the notice u/S. 12(2) was not served, the petitioners were not in a position to submit any application for reference. Reliance is placed on a Division Bench judgment in Spl. Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition v. L. Sai Reddy, (1983) 2 Andh WR 235 : AIR 1984 Andh Pra 24. In that case is was held that the Land Acquisition Officer is bound to issue and ‘send a copy of the award’ to the claimants and if such a copy is not sent, the limitation under proviso to S. 18(2) of the Act would not commence. It is stated that the petitioners ‘have made several requests’ to the respondent to refer the matter to the Civil Court u/S. 18 but that the respondent has not made any reference and has not given any reply to the ‘requests’ of the petitioners. It is further alleged that when some other villagers sought a reference, the Land Acquisition Officer made a reference and then the Addl. District Judge, Nizamabad enhanced the compensation in O.P No. 2935 of 1981 and batch on 16-12-1983. It is therefore prayed that a writ of Mandamus be issued to the respondent to make a reference.

3. A counter-affidavit is filed by the Special Deputy Collector, stating that the writ petition filed for a reference 8 years after the award is belated. It is pointed out that among the writ petitioners, only a few were the claimants and the award does not show the names of the other petitioners. Such of those who filed claims before the Land Acquisition Officer were ‘served’ with notice of award under S. 12(2) in accordance with the rules prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act and their signatures or thumb impressions were obtained. It is also stated that the said claimants received the compensation, ‘without any protest’ and the statutory requirement is fulfilled. It is always open to the party aggrieved, either to apply for the copy of the award or peruse the same. The notice of award under S. 12(2), it is stated, does not contemplate the service of the copy of the award itself. The notices served in the case give the details of the award i.e, S. No. and sub-division, extent, amount awarded and the names of the persons for whom the award is made. The allegation that the claimants applied for reference is not correct and there were no reminders. The total land covered by the award is Ac. 91-11 guntas and the cases of the petitioners 67 to 75 have been referred under S. 31 to the Civil Court. It is not correct to say that the petitioners are not aware of the award. The petitioners have admitted in para 3 of the writ petition that they did not seek any reference under S. 18. The cases of such of the claimants who filed protest petitions in time have been referred and not the cases of others. Names of petitioners 4, 5, 7, 8, 32, 35, 36 to 38 and 59 are not found in the award. The writ petition is therefore liable to be dismissed.

4. At the hearing of the case, the learned Advocate General has produced the record and it is noticed that not all the writ petitioners are claimants in the award and in respect of those who figured as claimants, notice of award under S. 12(2) in Form 9 (as shown in the Land Acquisition Manual containing the Revenue Board's proceedings) was served on the claimants giving details of Award Number, S. No. or Sub-Division, Extent, Amount and Name of claimant and the thumb impression of the claimant obtained. No protest is recorded therein. The notice requests the claimants to receive the compensation before a particular date and there is no proof of protest by any of the claimants now in the writ petition at any point of time. Admittedly, no application is made by any of the petitioners seeking a reference under S. 18 of the Act. The reason given namely, that no notice under Form 9 was served on the claimants cannot in our opinion, be accepted in view of the above material. We accordingly hold that notice in Form 9 was served on the claimants. These are our findings of fact, based on the record of the case.

5. It is, however, argued for the petitioners that in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Spl. Deputy Collector v. L. Sai Reddy (AIR 1984 Andh Pra 24), it cannot be said that service of Form 9 notice and payment of compensation to the claimants, even if it be without protest, is not sufficient for purposes of S. 12(2) and that unless the award or other essentials viz., the reasons contained in the award, are served on the claimants, limitation under the proviso to S. 18(2) does not commence. As the limitation has not commenced, there can be no objection, it is argued, for directing the respondent to refer the matter under S. 18(1). The notice in Form 9, even if it is to be treated as served on claimants, is ineffective as neither the award nor the reasoning part of the award has been communicated to the claimants as required by the decision in Spl. Deputy Collector v. L. Sai Reddy.

6. On the other hand, it is argued by the learned Advocate General that Form 9, even though it is not made under the rule-making authority of the Government, still it gives the Award No., S. No. or Sub-division, extent amount awarded and name of claimant and these are the main essentials of the Award. The reasoning part of the Award or the Award is not required to be served even though it is so held in Spl. Deputy Collector v. L. Sai Reddy (AIR 1984 Andh Pra 24). The notice in Form 9 being sufficient notice under S. 12(2), the compensation having been received by the claimants as per the receipts containing their thumb impressions and there being no protest at any time, no applications for reference under S. 18(1) can be made and in fact, no applications were filed nor reminders given. The limitation period prescribed in proviso to S. 18(2) has expired long back and no mandamus can be issued straightway to the respondent without any application for reference being filed at any time — whether within the prescribed time or even later and there is no question of extending the time.

7. On the basis of the above contentions and findings arrived at by us, the following point arises for consideration:

“Point Whether for purposes of notice of award under S. 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 it is necessary to serve a copy of the Award or the reasoning part of the Award on the persons interested and whether the service of notice in Form 9 (containing the Award number, S. No. or Sub-division, extent, amount awarded and names of persons for whom the award is made) can be held to be sufficent compliance of S. 12(2) so that the limitation prescribed in the proviso to S. 18(2) can start to run?

8. We shall initially refer to the statutory provisions. Section 18 of the Central Act dealing with ‘Reference to court’ reads as follows:

“S. 18. Reference to Court:— (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.

(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken:

Provided that every such application shall be made,

(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;

(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's Award, whichever period shall first expire.”

9. However, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature passed A.P Act XX of 1959 by which, for clause (b) of proviso to sub-section (2), the following clause is substituted:—

“(b) in other cases within two months from the date of service of the notice from the Collector under Section 12 sub-section (2).”

10. It will be noticed therefore that under the Central Act, the application for reference can be made ‘within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award’ under clause (a). It can also be made under clause (b) within (i) six weeks of the receipt of notice from the Collector under S. 12, sub-section (2) or (ii) within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire. But under the Act, as amended in Andhra Pradesh in the first part of the proviso (b) to S. 18(2), the period is ‘two months’ rather than ‘six weeks’ and so far as the second part of the proviso (b) to S. 18(2) is concerned, the same is altogether dropped. In effect, therefore, the words ‘within six months from the date of the award, whichever period shall first expire do not exist in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The proviso to S. 18(2) therefore reads in A.P as follows:

“S. 18(2): ………

Provided that every application shall be made

(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award,

(b) in other cases, within two months from the date of service of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2).”

11. We are here not concerned with the case of a person who was present or was represented before the Collector at the time when the latter made an award. Therefore we are not concerned with clause (a) of the proviso. We are concerned with clause (b) of the proviso as existing in Andhra Pradesh and this corresponds to the first part of sub-clause (b) of the proviso of the Central Act. As the above said sub-clause (b) of the proviso to S. 18(2) uses the words “from the date of service of the notice from the Collector” under S. 12(2), it becomes necessary to refer to Section 12(2) of the Act. Section 12(2) reads as follows:

“S. 12(2): The Collector shall give immediate notice of award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made.”

12. The crucial question therefore is what is meant by the words ‘notice of award’. As already stated according to the decision in Spl. Deputy Collector, L.A v. L. Sai Reddy (AIR 1984 Andh Pra 24) the Division Bench of this Court took the view that the notice of award in S. 12(2) meant the service of a notice along with a copy of the award. It was observed therein that for the purpose of seeking a reference the person interested “must know on what grounds his claim for a higher amount of compensation has been rejected. He must also know whether the Collector has determined the compensation with reference to the date of notification. If there is a dispute as to the apportionment, on what grounds his claim has been rejected or accepted only in part, as the case may be, should be made known to the claimant.” It was further held that “without knowing the basis on which the lesser amount is awarded, he would not be in a position to seek a reference. The law would not expect the claimant to seek a reference in every case irrespective of whether the amount awarded is reasonable or not.” Finally the Division Bench held (para 4)—

“The Legislature in incorporating sub-section (2) of S. 12 could not have intended only the substance of the award to be intimated to the claimants. In our view the expression ‘notice of award’ occurring in sub-section (2) of S. 12 clearly postulates that the award as such should have been communicted to the claimants”.

The Division Bench then referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604, which in its turn followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500. It is the correctness of the above view that is questioned in the reference.

13. It will be noticed that in the award enquiry under S. 11, the Collecor is to enquire into the objections, if any, which any person interested has stated pursuant to the notice given under S. 9, to the measurement made under S. 8 and to the value of the land at the date of publication of the notification under S. 4, sub-section (1) and into the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation. The Collector then makes an award under his hand of—

“(i) the true area of the land,

(ii) the compensation which, in his opinion, should be allowed for the land, and

(iii) the apportionment of the said compensation amoung all the persons known or believe to be interested in the land…..”

Section 12(1) provides that such an award shall be filed in the Collector's office and shall, except as provided, be final and conclusive evidence of (i) the true area; (ii) value of the land and (iii) apportionment of the compensation and (iv) the persons interested. Section 18(1) of the Act states again that any person interested who has not accepted the award may seek a reference whether his objections be to (i) the measurement of the land; (ii) the amount of compensation and (iii) the persons to whom it is payable and (iv) the apportionment thereof.

14. A reading of the provisions of Sections 9(2), 11(1), 12(1) and 18(1) of the Act in our opinion, show that the enquiry before the Collector for the purpose of making of the award is only in relation to the four items (i) the measurement of the land, (ii) the amount of compensation and (iii) the persons to whom it is payable and (iv) the apportionment thereof, and it is these four items that have to find place in the award published under S. 11 and in the reference under S. 18(1). The award made under S. 11 being in the nature of an offer, if it contains the above factors or items, it must be treated as complete in itself. The purpose in requiring the award to contain reasons, in our view, is meant to be a check on the Collector so that his award may not be arbitrary. The reasons therefore need not be communicated under S. 12(2).

15. It is, however, argued for the writ petitioners, relying on the observations in the decision in Spl. Deputy Collector, L.A v. L. Sai Reddi, (AIR 1984 Andh Pra 24) that it is not sufficient if the notice of award under S. 12(2), (read with proviso (b) to S. 18(2) communicates merely the above three factors and that unless the reasons for the award are also communicated, it is not possible for the person interested to seek a reference mentioning his objections.

16. In our opinion, this argument though attractive on its face, cannot be accepted on a deeper scrutiny of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The award enquiry before the Collector, is only for the purpose of making an offer to the person interested. Though the award must contain reasons it is not necessary that those reasons must be communicacted to the persons interested. This is because once a reference is made to the Court upon an application filed within the time limited by S. 18(2), the Collector in his statement to the Court under S. 19 will then come forward, under sub-clause (d) to S. 19(1) with the grounds on which the amount of compensation is determined. In his statement to the Court he will further mention, for the information of the Court, the situation and extent of the land with particulars of any trees, buildings or standing crop, the name of the persons who he has reason to think are interested in such land and the amount awarded for damages and paid or tenders and the amount of compensation awarded. The Court shall then serve notice under S. 20 of the Act to the persons to file their objections in respect of the area of the land and the amount of compensation. While filing such objections in the Court, after the reference under S. 18 and after notice under S. 20, the persons interested will have the benefit of the grounds communicated to the Court by the Collector under S. 19(1) and they can file effective objections in the civil court. The argument that unless a copy of the award or at least the reasons of the award are communicated to the persons interested under S. 12(2), the said persons cannot claim an effective application for reference under S. 18(1), cannot be accepted. In the application for reference under S. 18(1) it is not necessary for the persons interested to say anything more than that they are objecting to the measurement of land, the amount of compensation or the persons to whom it is payable or the apportionment thereof. Even if they do not mention any particular reasons the application seeking reference under S. 18(1) does not become invalid. They will have a real opportunity before the Court, after the reference and after the Collector's Statement under S. 19(1), when they file their objections in the Court in regard to the area or the amount of compensation or other factors. It is these objections with reasons therefor, then filed that are normally registered as an O.P It is thereafter that the Land Acquisition Officer files a counter thereto in the Court. The scheme of the Act, in our view, is for giving to the interested persons an opportunity to know the reasons for the award when the matter comes before the Court after the reference under S. 18(1) and not at the stage of service of notice of the award under S. 12(2).

17. The above position appears to be clear from two judgments of the Privy Council to which we shall presently refer. In Pramatha Nath v. Secretary of the State, AIR 1930 PC 64 : 57 IA 100: ILR 57 Cal 1148, it was held that the jurisdiction of the civil Court under the Land Acquisition Act is a special one and is strictly limited by the terms of Sections 18, 20 and 21. It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector's award and it is confined to a consideration of that objection. Once therefore it is ascertained that the only objection taken is to the amount of compensation, that alone is the ‘matter’ referred and the Court has no power to determine or consider anything beyond it e.g, question of measurement raised for the first time three years after the references were duly made by the Collector. Referring to S. 18(1) and splitting up the factors into four rather than three, Sir George Lowndes observed as follows:—

“The section clearly specifies four different grounds of objections viz. (i) to the measurement of the land; (ii) to the amount of compensation; (iii) to the persons to whom it is payable; and (iv) to the apportionment. The distinction between objection to area and to amount of compensation are also borne out by other sections of the Act; see Sections 9, 11, 19(d) and 20(c).”

The position is more clearly elaborated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bhagwati v. Ram Kali, AIR 1939 PC 133 : 66 IA 145: ILR 1939 All 460 as follows:

There it is stated while referring to S. 18(1), that the particulars of the reason for the objections are hot required to be given in an application for reference under S. 18(1). The Act requires only the grounds of objection to be given and by ‘grounds’ is meant such of the four grounds mentioned in S. 18(1) as are relied upon and no further particulars are required in order to comply with the terms of the sub-section. Lord Porter observed—

“The difficulty in the present case arises from the form by which the appellant required the Collector to submit the matter to the Judge….

…It was however suggested that the requirement was not complete unless particulars of the reasons for the objections taken were given. But the Act does not require particulars to be given it requires only the grounds of objections to be given and by ‘grounds’ their Lordships think is meant such of the four grounds mentioned in S. 18(1) as are relied upon. The same view as to the meaning of the word ‘grounds’ appear to have been entertained by their Lordships’ Board in Pramatha Nath v. Secretary of State (4).”

18. If there is any doubt, the same, in our opinion, is set at rest by the clear observations of the Privy Council in Mt. Bhagwati v. Ram Kali (AIR 1939 PC 133). Therefore even if an application for reference is made under S. 18(1) without mentioning any reasons for the said objections, such an application is to be treated as valid. All that is required in the said application is to mention the ‘grounds’ of objections by which is meant, the objections in respect of the four factors, viz., (i) the measurement of the land, (ii) the amount of compensation, (iii) the persons to whom it is payable and (iv) the apportionment. No reasons or further particulars are required to be given in the application for reference under S. 18(1). Therefore the entire basis of the contention of the writ petitioners and the entire reasoning in the judgment of the Division Bench in Spl. Deputy Collector, L.A v. L. Sai Reddi (AIR 1984 Andh Pra 24) falls to the ground and cannot be accepted.

19. It is true that the Division Bench relied upon the two decisons of the Supreme Court viz., Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A Officer (AIR 1961 SC 1500) and State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum (AIR 1963 SC 1604). In our view the said decisions of the Supreme Court have been delivered in connection with the second part of the proviso (b) to S. 18(2) available in the Central Act (and in some States) and which part has been dropped in Andhra Pradesh by the A.P Act 20 of 1959. So far as the second part of the proviso (b) to S. 18(2) is concerned, that part uses the words—

“or within six months from the date of the Collector's award whichever period shall first expire.”

It will be noticed that so far as the unamended provisions of the Central Act are concerned (and as in vogue in some States other than Andhra Pradesh) the Supreme Court observed that if the notice under S. 12(2) is not served, it would be open to the persons interested to seek a reference within six months from the date of Collector's award. In such cases because of the absence of notice under S. 12(2), the persons interested are kept in the dark about the file number of the award, the measurement, the amount of compensation, the names of persons to whom the compensation is granted as well as the apportionment. A question had arisen before the Supreme Court whether in such cases, they could be compelled to file their application for reference within six months from the date of filing of the award by the Collector under S. 12(1). It was argued that unless the award itself or the substance of the award was communicated, it will not be possible for any person interested to file any objections even in regard to the four items referred to earlier. The Supreme Court construed the words ‘date of Collector's award’ and interpreted the same to mean date of knowledge of the award by the party affected either actual or constructive. It meant either the date when the award was communicated or was known by him actually or constructively. The above aspect was elaborated a little more in State of Punjab v. Quisar Jehan Begum (AIR 1963 SC 1604). There also the Supreme Court was concerned with the second part of proviso (b) to S. 18(2). Knowledge of the award, their Lordships observed, did not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award had been made, (at 1607 of AIR):

“The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under S. 12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in Court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act, knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award.”

20. It is therefore clear that in cases falling under the second part of proviso (b) to S. 18(2) wherein the words ‘date of the Collector's award’ have been used, it must be the date of the knowledge of the award itself if communicated or the date of knowledge of the “essential contents” thereof. Unfortunately, so far as Andhra Pradesh is concerned, the second part of proviso (b) to S. 18(2) has been omitted by Act 20 of 1959 and therefore it is not possible, so far as Andhra Pradesh is concerned, for the interested persons to rely on the above said two decisions of the Supreme Court and contend that limitation does not start until either the award is communicated or atleast the essential contents thereof are communicated. So far as Andhra Pradesh is concerned, the first part of proviso (b) to S. 18(2) alone governs and limitation will start after the expiry of two months from the date of service of ‘notice from the Collector under S. 12, sub-sec. (2).’ This part of the provision requires interpretation of another set of words i.e ‘notice of award’ in S. 12(2). Those words, in our view, mean notice of the award containing the offer of the Government, such award referring, in terms of S. 11 merely (i) the true area of the land, (ii) the compensation which should be allowed for the land, (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation (iv) the persons known or believed to be interested in the land. If the above four factors are mentioned in the notice of award it would, in our opinion, be sufficient compliance with the provisions of S. 12(2) as to notice of award even though the reasons for the award are not communicated. As already stated an application for reference made under S. 18(1) need not contain the reasons for which the applicant contends that the award is bad. After a reference is called for, the Collector is to give his reasons for the award in his Statement to the Court under S. 19(1). Once the reasons given by the Collector are before the Court as contained in his Statement to the Court given under S. 19, there will be no difficulty for the applicant to file his reasoned objections in the Court by looking into the said Statement.

21. The view of the Division Bench in Spl. Deputy Collector, L.A v. L. Sai Reddi (AIR 1984 Andh Pra 24) that unless the award or the reasoning part of it is communicated, no effective application for reference can be filed under S. 18(1) is, in our view, not correct.

22. In Andhra Pradesh and particularly in this Court, the notice under S. 12(2) is given in Form 9 which is contained in the Land Acquisition Manual. The said Form has been evolved by the proceedings of the Board of Revenue, Madras and is still being followed in Andhra Pradesh. The Form is as follows:

“Form 9.

Notice of award under S. 12(2) of Act 1 of 1894.

The following award has been passed by the undersigned in the matter of the acquisition of the lands noted below and situated in

Village. Taluk. Survey No. & Sub-Division. Extent. Amount Persons to whom awarded, award is made.

is/are hereby informed that he/they should appear either or by an authorised agent before the undersigned within days after the issue of this notice, and receive the amount specified above, failing which the said sum of money will be kept in Revenue deposit and will bear no interest.

Station:

Date:Land Acquisition Officer.

Note:— The paragraph below the statement in this notice should be deleted when the notice is served on those who are not awardees.”

23. We have perused the forms which have been served on the claimants in the present case and we find that Column I further gives the award number also. The above details, in our opinion, would be clearly sufficient compliance with the requirement of ‘notice of award’ contained in S. 12(2) of the Act read with the first part of proviso (b) to S. 18(2).

24. Reliance is however placed by Sri B. Sudarshan Reddy for the writ petitioners on the following passage (in para 7) of Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A Officer (AIR 1961 SC 1500) in the context of S. 12(2):

“This requirement itself postulates the necessity of the communication of the award to the party concerned the Legislature recognised that the making of the award under S. 11 followed by its filing under S. 12(1) would not meet the requirement of justice before bringing the award into force. It thought that the communication of the award to the party concerned was also necessary and so by the use of the mandatory words an obligation is placed on the Collector to communicate the award immediately to the party concerned. It is significant that the section requires the Collector to give notice of the award immediately after making it. This provision lends support to the view which we have taken about the construction of the expression ‘from the date of the Collector's award’ in the proviso to S. 18. It is because communication of the order is regarded by the Legislature as necessary that S. 12(2) has imposed an obligation on the Collector and if the relevant clause in the proviso is read in the light of this statutory requirement it tends to show that the literal and mechanical construction of the said clause would be wholly inappropriate.”

A casual reading of the said passage may, no doubt, suggest that even under S. 12(2), it is necessary to communicate the award to the party. But, in our view, the Supreme Court did not lay down an absolute proposition that a notice containing the details referred to in Form 9 (viz., those containing the award number, the measurement, the extent of compensation and the person to whom it is payable and apportionment) is not sufficient. In our opinion, the words ‘communication of the award’ used in paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Supreme Court do not mean any more than communication of the above said particulars mentioned in Form 9 as contained in the award. It must be noted that the Supreme Court was mainly dealing with the second part of the proviso (b) to S. 18(2). If, by the word ‘award’ is meant nothing more than the four factors mentioned by the Privy Council, the details in Form 9 would, in our view, be sufficient compliance with S. 12(2). The question of submitting reasons for the objections arises, as stated by the Privy Council, only after reference and notice under S. 20(1). It cannot be assumed that the Supreme Court intended to lay down a rule different from the one laid down by the Privy Council earlier.

25. Several decisions of this Court as well as those of other High Court have been cited before us for the view that even under the first part of the proviso (b) to S. 18(2) actual or constructive communication of the award is necessary. These cases, in our view, can be divided into two categories. In these cases falling under both the categories, the Land Acquisition Act as applicable in the relevant State contain both the parts in the proviso (b) to S. 18(2) and not merely the first part as in Andhra Pradesh. In the first category fall cases where no notice what-so-ever has been issued under S. 12(2) as visualised by the first part of proviso (b) to S. 18(2). In the second category fall cases where notice was issued under S. 12(2) without a copy of the award or what the Supreme Court considered to be the essential contents of the award and it was held that the limitation did not start to run.

26. So far as the first category of cases wherein no notice what-so-ever was served under the first part of proviso (b) to S. 18(2) (that is, where no notice under S. 12(2) was served) there is no difficultly in holding that the period of limitation did not start. In this category of cases once it is noted that there is no notice as contemplated under the first part of proviso (b) to S. 18(2) by communication of notice under S. 12(2), it will be incumbent for the authority to bring the knwoledge of the award to the person interested as contemplated in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A Officer (AIR 1961 SC 1500) and in State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum (AIR 1963 SC 1604). Such knowledge should be brought home either actually or constructively as stated in those decisions. Therefore, the first category of cases does not create any difficulty. To this category belong Seshachalam v. District Collector, Guntur, 1955 Andh LT 755 : (AIR 1957 Andh Pra 687); Mahmoddunnisa v. Government of Hyderabad, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 42; C. Venkatramayya v. Land Acquisition Officer, (1968) 1 Andh Pra WR 113; Farhatullah v. Spl. Tahasildar, Land Acquisition, 1975 Andh LT 492; Ram Singh v. State, AIR 1976 Pun & Har 205; Jaswant Rai v. Land Acquisition Collector, P.U.L.D, Mohali, AIR 1989 Pun & Har 261; Ramahari v. L.A Officer, AIR 1969 Ori 198; Gram Seva Mandal v. Collector, Wardha, AIR 1975 Bom 73 and Ghulam Shah v. State of J. & K., AIR 1965 J & K 58. In so far as in the above said decisions the courts held that the communication of the award or its essential contents either actually or constructively was necessary having regard to the second part of proviso (b) to S. 18(2) the said decisions, in our view, are in accord with the two decisions of the Supreme Court above mentioned. These cases as already stated, therefore do not present any difficulty and they do not help the writ petitioners in the present case before us.

27. The difficulty arises in regard to the second category of cases which are the following: Mangilal Jawanmal v. Spl. L.A Officer, AIR 1978 Bom 325; Keshav v. State, AIR 1978 Bom 289; Spl. L.A.O, Ghatap-pabha v. A.K Gadakari, AIR 1973 Mys 22; Rasulkhanji Sardar Mahomad Khanji v. H.P Rathod, (1975) 16 Guj LR 911; R. Hirabhai v. Dy. Collector, L.A & R Panam Project, Godhra, AIR 1985 Guj 170; Ishabhai Umarbhai v. State, AIR 1988 Guj 223; Gopalbhai Becharbhai v. State, AIR 1989 Guj 56. The best exposition of the law supporting the view of the writ petitioners, according to us, is contained in the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Mangilal Jawanmal v. Spl. L.A Officer (AIR 1978 Bom 325). Though a notice in the form prescribed in Anderson's Manual giving three particulars (i.e, true area, amount of compensation and apportionment) was served on the persons interested, it was held, it was not sufficient. In so far as learned Judges applied the two decisions of the Supreme Court earlier referred to, while interpreting the first part of the proviso (b) to S. 18(2), we do not with great respect, accept the said approach, as the Supreme Court cases had occasion to consider only the second part of proviso (b) and not the first part. Again in so far as they stated that the reasons contained in the award should be communicated to the interested persons so that the latter could file an effective reference, we again disagree respectfully, for the said view runs contrary to the two Privy Council cases. In fact, the more important ruling of the Privy Council, namely the one in Mt. Bhagwati v. Ram Kali (AIR 1939 PC 133) was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges. If the learned Judges, however, thought that the provisions of the Bombay Court-Fees Act, 1959 (contained in Art. 15 in Schedule I which required one half of the advalorem Court fee payable on the compensation to be paid at the stage of application for reference) necessitated the communication of reasons, so that the party could decide what to claim in the reference application, the case becomes wholly distinguishable. In fact, at one stage (see para 22) the learned Judges refer to the Court-fee aspect as one of the ‘compelling factors’ for the view they are taking regarding the first part of proviso (b) to S. 18(2). The Bombay decision has to be understood in the light of the pecular provision in the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959. There Art. 15 of Schedule I fixes “one half of ad valoram” as Court-fee in respect of “Application to the Collector for a reference to the Court under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894” and on account of that special provision, the Bombay case is clearly distinguishable. We may, however, add that the said provision in the I Schedule is rather incongruous in the light of the decisions of the Privy Council already referred to. So far as the other ruling in the second category of cases referred to above are concerned, they merely apply the two Supreme Court judgments for construing the first part of proviso (b) without noticing that the Supreme Court was concerned with the second part of the proviso (b) to S. 18(2). We are, therefore, unable to accept their reasoning. We, therefore, dissent respectfully from the rulings in the second category of cases grouped above.

For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that under S. 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended by A.P Act XX/1959) notice of award under proviso (b) to S. 18(2) (which corresponds to the first part of proviso (b) to S. 18(2) in the Central Act, does not mean that it is necessary that the award copy or the reasoning part of the award need to be communicated to the persons interested. If the Form 9 as per the A.P Land Acquisition Manual is served, giving the Award No. the true area acquired, the compensation allowed, the persons known or believed to be interested and the apportionment, it would be sufficient for the commencement of the limitation of two months. Thus in. W.P No. 13203/1985, limitation commenced soon after service of notice in Form 9, and as no application under S. 18(2) was filed, as found by us, no writ of Mandamus can be issued directing reference under S. 18.

29. Coming to the other writ petitions, the position is that the awards in W.P No. 11938/85 are dated 31-10-64, 29-3-1965, 24-8-1965, 22-11-1965, the award in W.P No. 11940/85 is registered in 1962, the award in W.P No. 11764/85 is of 26-2-1960..The writ petitions are filed for issue of a writ of Mandamus in 1985 and none of the petitioners filed any applicaton under S. 18 at any time. No Mandamus can be issued unless the party has filed application under S. 18 in time. There is delay of nearly 20 years in the filing of the writ petitions. The writ petitions are hopelessly belated. The counter reveals that most of the petitioners are not even claimants nor are their names found in the award. The writ petitions, therefore, deserve to be dismissed.

30. All the writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Advocates fee will be Rs. 2,000/- one set.

Petitions dismissed.