- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Polavarapu Jagadiswara Rao v. Kondapaturi Venkateswarlu And Another
Structured Summary of the Judicial Order (Quashing Petition)
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition was filed seeking to quash the criminal proceedings in C.C. No. 6 of 1989 on the file of the 2nd Additional Munsif Magistrate, Chirala. The petitioner served as Principal of V.R.S. and Y.R.N. College, Chirala from 1966 until 31-3-1989. The respondent-complainant is an Upper Division Clerk (U.D.C.) employed at the same college. The complainant filed a criminal complaint under Sections 406 and 408 of the Indian Penal Code alleging that the petitioner misappropriated college funds amounting to approximately Rs. 9,71,101/- during the petitioner's tenure as Principal. The present petition challenged the competency and propriety of the criminal proceedings arising from that complaint.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the complainant (an employee of the college) had locus standi to file the complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C., or whether only the management of the college or the Government could initiate prosecution.
- Whether the exceptions in Sections 195 to 199, Cr.P.C., operate to oust the jurisdiction of the criminal court in the present case (i.e., do those provisions require a particular class of complainant that would render the present complaint incompetent).
- Whether the complainant should have proceeded under Section 154 Cr.P.C. (informing the police) instead of filing a complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C., and whether the availability of Section 154 precludes resort to Section 200.
- Whether the Magistrate, upon receipt of the complaint under Section 200, Cr.P.C., was obliged to refer the matter to the police under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C., or whether the Magistrate could take cognizance directly under Section 190(1)(a) or exercise his discretion under Section 202.
- Whether the proceedings should be quashed because the complaint was allegedly false or contradicted by an audit report (the audit report allegedly does not recite misappropriation by the petitioner).
- Whether the precedent relied upon by petitioner's counsel (State of Assam v. Abdul Noor) required quashing of the proceedings in the present factual matrix.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. S. Venkata Reddy)
- The complainant lacks locus standi to file the complaint because he is not the aggrieved party; if any prosecution is to be launched it should be by the College Management or the Government.
- Because a citizen can inform the police under Section 154 Cr.P.C., the complainant should have adopted that route (to avoid vindictiveness) and not filed a complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C.; the present complaint should therefore be quashed.
- Even if a complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. is maintainable, the Magistrate should have referred the matter to the police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for investigation before taking cognizance.
- The complaint is false because an audit report (produced by the petitioner) allegedly does not record any misappropriation by the petitioner; therefore proceedings based on a false complaint ought to be quashed.
- Reliance was placed on a Supreme Court decision (State of Assam v. Abdul Noor) where proceedings were quashed because the factual allegations were completely repelled by the victim's affidavit; by analogy the petitioner's counsel argued quashing should follow here.
Respondent-complainant's Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| G. Narasimham v. T. V. Chokkappa | Affirmed the general rule that a complaint can be filed by anyone (not necessarily the aggrieved person); highlighted S.198 Cr.P.C. as an exception in defamation cases where only the aggrieved person may complain and that S.198 is mandatory for such offences. | Used to explain that, subject to statutory exceptions (Ss.195–199), any citizen may set criminal law in motion; distinguished defamation context where S.198 requires the complainant be the aggrieved person. |
| Vishwa Mitter v. O. P. Peddar | Reiterated that as a general rule a Magistrate may take cognizance regardless of complainant's qualifications, but where statute prescribes complainant eligibility the Magistrate must ensure compliance before taking cognizance. | Applied to support the proposition that the Magistrate was competent to take cognizance in the present case because no statutory provision (from Ss.195–199) deprived a private citizen of the right to file the complaint under consideration. |
| A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak | Stated the well-recognised principle that anyone can set criminal law in motion except where the statute indicates otherwise; locus standi is generally alien to criminal jurisprudence unless explicitly provided by statute. | Relied on to reinforce the general principle that absence of a statutory limitation means any citizen may file a criminal complaint; supported the rejection of the locus standi objection in the present matter. |
| State of Assam v. Abdul Noor | Example where proceedings were quashed because the complaint's allegations were completely repelled by the victim's affidavit, making continuation of proceedings inappropriate. | The court considered this authority but distinguished it on facts: in Abdul Noor the complaint was effectively negated by the victim's affidavit; the present case's facts were held to be materially different, so Abdul Noor was inapplicable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (particularly Chapters XV and provisions Ss. 190, 200, 202, 154, 156 and the group Ss. 195–199) and applied settled principles from the cited Supreme Court authorities. The reasoning proceeded in several discrete steps, each based on textually stated law and the factual record before the court:
- The court set out the statutory framework: Section 200 Cr.P.C. contemplates magistrate-recorded sworn statements on a complaint; Section 202 allows the Magistrate, after following Section 200, either to inquire himself or to direct police investigation under Section 156; Section 190 enumerates modes of taking cognizance (including private complaints). The court noted that Chapter XV does not require that a complaint be filed only by the aggrieved person.
- The court analysed Ss. 195–199 Cr.P.C. as the statutory exceptions to the general rule. It observed that S.195 relates to specific IPC sections enumerated therein; S.196 applies to particular offences listed in that section; S.197 concerns prosecution of public servants and requires sanction; S.198/199 prescribe aggrieved-person requirements for certain matrimonial and defamation offences. Because the offences alleged in the present complaint are Sections 406 and 405 IPC and the accused was not a public servant, none of Ss.195–199 applied.
- Based on the above, the court held that the general principle (any citizen may file a complaint) governed the case; therefore the locus standi objection raised by the petitioner lacked merit and was rejected.
- On the submission that the complainant should have utilised Section 154 Cr.P.C. (informing the police) rather than filing a complaint, the court explained that both routes (informing the police under Section 154 and filing a complaint under Section 200) are legally available to a private citizen. The mere availability of Section 154 does not preclude resort to Section 200; consequently the argument did not support quashing.
- On whether the Magistrate was obliged to refer the complaint to the police under Section 156(3), the court analysed the discretion conferred by Section 202. The Magistrate must scrutinise the complaint and any sworn statements and then decide whether to take cognizance under Section 190(1)(a), to postpone issuance of process under Section 202, to inquire himself, or to refer the case for police investigation. If, after applying his mind to the material, the Magistrate concludes there is sufficient basis to take cognizance, referral under Section 156(3) is unnecessary. In the present case the court found no indication that the Magistrate had failed to apply his mind before taking cognizance.
- The court considered the petitioner's reliance on State of Assam v. Abdul Noor but distinguished that authority because in Abdul Noor the complaint's allegations were directly and completely repelled by the victim's affidavit — a factual situation not present here.
- Regarding the audit report contention (that the report did not mention misappropriation by the petitioner and thus the complaint was false), the court stated that while the petitioner produced the report, a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings is not the appropriate forum to appreciate evidence in detail; evaluation of such evidentiary disputes is the function of the trial court.
On the basis of the above statutory interpretation and application of authority, the court concluded there were no grounds to quash the proceedings.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition to quash the proceedings is dismissed.
Implications
- The criminal proceedings in C.C. No. 6 of 1989 before the 2nd Additional Munsif Magistrate, Chirala, stand and are not quashed by this order; the trial court retains jurisdiction to proceed.
- The court rejected the locus standi challenge, holding that no statutory provision (from Ss.195–199 Cr.P.C.) ousts a private citizen's right to file a complaint in the circumstances of this case.
- The order confirms that a Magistrate has discretion under Section 202 Cr.P.C. to either take cognizance or to refer for police investigation under Section 156(3), and that a referral is not mandatory where the Magistrate, after applying his mind to the complaint and sworn statements, finds material sufficient to take cognizance.
- No broader legal principle or novel precedent was laid down by this decision; the court applied existing statutory provisions and settled authorities to the facts and limited its relief to dismissal of the quashing petition.
End of summary. This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided judicial order and does not add information that was not present in the opinion.
ORDER
1. This is a petition filed to quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 6 of 1989 on the file of the 2nd Addl. Munsif Magistrate, Chirala.
2. The brief facts of the case are : The petitioner herein worked as a Principal of the V.R.S. and Y.R.N. College, Chirala during 1966 to 31-3-1989. The respondent-complainant is working as a U.D.C. (Upper Division Clerk) in the same college. He filed a complaint u/Ss. 406 and 408, I.P.C. against the petitioner in the Court below alleging that the respondent misappropriated funds of the college running to about Rs. 9,71,101/- during the period he worked in the College as the Principal.
3. The main contention of Mr. S. Venkata Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the complainant has no locus standi to file the complaint since he is not the aggrieved party and that if at all it is for the Management of the College or the Government to launch any prosecution against the petitioner.
4. To deal with this contention it is first necessary to make a reference to the relevant provisions in Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. providing for filing of complaints and the procedure to be adopted in relation thereof. S. 200, Cr.P.C., envisages examination of the complainant and the witnesses present and recording their sworn statement by the Magistrate before taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint. U/S. 202, Cr.P.C., after following the procedure envisaged by a S. 200 and if he is competent to try the offence complained of the Magistrate may either inquire into the case himself or direct investigation to be made by the Police u/S. 156, Cr.P.C., after postponing the issue of process. It is nowhere stated in Chapter XV that the complaint has to be filed by the aggrieved person alone. Further S. 190, Cr.P.C., empower the Court having jurisdiction to try the offence to take cognizance of the offence (i) on receiving a complaint from a private citizen, (ii) on receiving a report from police or (iii) on receiving information from any person other than police or (iv) upon his own knowledge. Thus, the scheme of the Code permits taking cognizance of an offence, whether or not the complaint is filed by the aggrieved party, after following the procedure according to law. The exception to this principle is provided in Ss. 195 to 199, Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court in G. Narasimham v. T. V. Chokkappa, while holding that the general rule is that a complaint can be filed by anybody whether he is an aggrieved person or not, observed that S. 198, Cr.P.C., is an exception by way of modification to that rule permitting only an aggrieved person to move a magistrate in cases of defamation. The Supreme Court further held that the S. 198 is mandatory so that if a magistrate were to take cognizance of the offence of defamation on a complaint filed by one who is not an aggrieved person, the trial and conviction would be vitiated. In Vishwa Mitter v. O. P. Peddar, the view of the Supreme Court is to the same effect, viz., the Magistrate would be as a general rule competent to take cognizance of the offence irrespective of the qualifications or eligibility of the complainant to file the complaint. However, where a provision to the contrary, presently Ss. 195 to 199, Cr.P.C., is made in any statute, which may indicate the qualification or eligibility of a complainant to file the complaint, the Magistrate before taking cognizance is entitled and has power to inquire whether the complainant satisfies the eligibility criteria. In A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, the Supreme Court reiterated its view (at page 651; 1984 Cri LJ) :-
"It is well recognised principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary ......... Locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statute creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complainant, by necessary implication the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision."
As stated supra, the only exception to the general rule that any one can set the criminal law into motion and that locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence is indicated in Ss. 195 to 199, Cr.P.C.
5. It is, therefore, necessary to examine whether Ss. 195 to 199, Cr.P.C., are attracted in the present case so as to oust the jurisdiction of the criminal Court in entertaining the above calendar case. S. 195 while prescribing the qualification to the complainant as a particular authority or party named in it, confines its operation to the specified sections, viz. 172 to 188, 193 to 196, 199, 200, 205 to 211, 463, 471, 475 or 476 of the I.P.C. Similarly, S. 196, Cr.P.C., confines the offences for its operation to Ss. 153-A, 295-A, 505, 108-A, 153-B and 120-B of the I.P.C. S. 197. Cr.P.C., refers to prosecution of public servants and mandates prior sanction of the Central or State Government. Then, Ss. 198 and 199 respectively refer to offences relating to marriages and defamation and prescribe a qualification to the complainant by stating that he should be the aggrieved person. The offences complained of in the instant case are u/Ss. 406 and 405. I.P.C., and the accused-petitioner was not, admittedly, a public servant to attract S. 197, Cr.P.C. Thus, none of the Ss. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C., govern the case on hand and therefore it is the general principle, viz. any citizen can file a complaint u/S. 200, Cr.P.C., before a competent Magistrate, that holds the field. Accordingly the contention based on the concept of locus standi is without merit and accordingly rejected.
6. The learned counsel next contended that when a citizen can make a written or oral report to the police so as to set the law in motion and this course would eliminate the vindicativeness, inasmuch as the agency of police being an independant one would file the charge-sheet after investigation if only there is a prima facie case for purposes of prosecution, the respondent complainant would have opted that course and not having done so, the present proceedings are liable to be quashed. No doubt, u/S. 154, Cr.P.C., every citizen is entitled to give information to the police regarding the commission of the cognizable offence, on receipt of which the police would make investigation into the offence u/S. 156, Cr.P.C., and may file a charge-sheet if there is a prima facie case found out or file a referred report otherwise. It is thus seen that the police are empowered to receive the information regarding an offence, investigate into it and file a charge-sheet or a referred report. At the same time, the Legislature enacted specific provisions enabling a private citizen to move the Court direct by filing a complaint u/S. 200, Cr.P.C., on receipt of which the Magistrate would record sworn statements of the complainant and witnesses, if any, present and if satisfied that there exists a prima facie case would take cognizance of the offence u/S. 190(1)(a), Cr.P.C. He is also empowered to postpone the issue of process against the accused u/S. 202, Cr.P.C. in which event he may inquire into the case direct himself or refer the case to the police for investigation. Thus, both the courses u/S. 154 and u/S. 200, Cr.P.C. are open and available to a private citizen and therefore simply because there is a right u/S. 154, Cr.P.C., consequent upon which the police would investigate, it cannot be said that the right u/S. 200, Cr.P.C. is not available for purposes of taking recourse. Accordingly I see no force in this contention also.
6A. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even if a complaint is filed u/S. 200, Cr.P.C., the Court below before taking cognizance of the offence ought to have referred the same to the police u/S. 156(3), Cr.P.C., so that after investigation the Court would have had before it the required material to find out whether or not there is a prima facie case to take cognizance of the offence. As noted supra, on receipt of a complaint u/S. 200, Cr.P.C., the Magistrate shall record the sworn statements of the complainant and the witnesses, if any, present and (i) may take cognizance of the offence u/S. 190(1)(a) and issue process, or (ii) postpone the issue of process u/S. 202 and (a) inquire into the case himself or (b) direct investigation by police. Thus, the discretion u/S. 202, Cr.P.C., lies with the Magistrate either to inquire into the case himself or direct investigation by the police. It is also open to the Magistrate to issue or postpone issue of process. While exercising his discretion, the Magistrate scrutinises the complaint, the sworn statement of the complainant and also of those recorded from the witnesses, if any, and then arrives at a decision as to whether to take cognizance of the offence u/S. 190(1)(a) or to postpone issue of process u/S. 202, Cr.P.C. or to refer the case to the police u/S. 156(3), Cr.P.C. for investigation. It is only in case of deciding that the material is not sufficient to take cognizance of the offence he may refer the matter to the police u/S. 156(3) for purposes of investigation. Therefore, when once the Magistrate after scrutinising the complaint, the sworn statements and other material comes to the conclusion that he can take cognizance of the offence, there is no need to have a resort to S. 156(3). In the present case, as per the allegations made in the complaint and other material available, it cannot be said that the Magistrate has not applied his mind properly in taking cognizance of the offence.
7. The learned counsel in support of his submission that the proceedings in the calendar case are to be quashed sought to place reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Assam Abdul Noor, . That is a case where a complaint was filed alleging that one Ahmed in collusion with a Doctor and nurse caused forcible abortion on a minor girl by name Amina Khatoon. There, the very girl Amina Khatoon gave a statement that she married one Noor and conceived by him and that she wanted to go back to the house of her master Ahmed and live there. In those circumstances since the very complaint as to forcible abortion was completely repelled by the affidavit of Amina, the proceedings arising out the said complaint were quashed. The facts of that case are, thus, totally different and have no application to the present ones.
8. The learned counsel lastly contended that in the complaint filed there is an allegation that one Brahmiah submitted an audit report in which there is a reference to the misappropriation commited by the petitioner, but actually the said report does not recite any such misappropriation by the petitioner and therefore the very complaint is false warranting the proceedings arising thereunder liable to be quashed. The learned counsel also produced the said report. This court while exercising jurisdiction u/S. 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings, I am of the opinion, would not appreciate the evidence inasmuch as it is the function of the trial Court.
9. In view of the above, I find no ground to quash the proceedings sought for. The petition is accordingly dismissed.
10. Petition dismissed.
Alert