B.P Jeevan Reddy, J.:— The question referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in holding that the leaf springs manufactured by the assessee-company do not fall within the meaning of the expression ‘machinery’ in item No. 8 of the Ninth Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961, i.e, ‘industrial and agricultural machinery’?”

2. The relevant assessment years are 1976-77 and 1977-78. The question in short is whether the machinery of the assessee employed for manufacturing leaf springs can be held to be machinery installed for the purpose of manufacture or production of any one or more of the articles or things specified in items Nos. 1 to 24 in the Ninth Schedule to the Act, in particular in the manufacture or production of “(8) industrial and agricultural machinery” within the meaning of clause (vi) of sub-section (1) of section 32 of the Income-tax Act. (It may be noted that this clause has since been omitted by the Taxation Laws (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1986, with effect from April 1, 1988). The assessee says that it has to be so held and, on that basis held entitled to initial depreciation. Its claim has been negatived by the authorities under the Act, including the Tribunal. The Tribunal has held that the “leaf springs” manufactured by the assessee cannot be called “machinery”, for the reason that a leaf spring does not generate power, nor is it capable of evoking, modifying, applying or directing natural forces—a test evolved by the Privy Council in Corporation of Calcutta v. Chairman of the Cossipore and Chitpore Municipality, AIR 1922 PC 27. The said view of the Tribunal is challenged herein. Leaf springs manufactured by the assessee are used in the manufacture of trucks, cars, and other motor vehicles. They are placed above the axles connecting the wheels. They take the weight of the superstructure, protecting it from shocks and bumps during the course of movement. The question is, can they be called “industrial machinery”, as contended by the assessee. The expression “machinery” is not defined in the Act. The earliest decision which dealt with the meaning of the said word is of the Privy Council in Corporation of Calcutta v. Chairman of the Cossipore and Chitpore Municipality, AIR 1922 PC 27. This case arose under the Bengal Municipal Act. The question there was whether a steel-tank with its supporting structure for storage of water is “machinery”. The Privy Council observed in the first instance that the determination of the said question, viz., whether a particular thing is “machinery” or not, must, to a large extent, depend upon the special facts of each particular case, and that no exhaustive definition is possible or advisable. All the same, they observed as follows (at p. 32):

“If their Lordships were obliged to run the hazard of the attempt they would be inclined to say that the word ‘machinery’ when used in ordinary language prima facie means some mechanical contrivances which by themselves or in combination with one or more other mechanical contrivances, by the combined movement and interdependent operation of their respective parts generate power or evoke, modify, apply or direct natural forces with the object in each case of effecting so definite and specific a result…”

3. It is this definition which was applied by the Tribunal and it was held that leaf springs cannot be brought within the said definition.

4. In The State Of Mysore…* v. M.H.V Rao…., [1964] 15 STC 540, the Mysore High Court considered the question whether “cottage basin” used in a silk industry for spinning and reeling silk is “machinery” within the meaning of that term in the Mysore Sales Tax Act. It was found that the apparatus called “cottage basin” was “a complicated iron apparatus, built on an iron stand”, and that it required some training and some degree of skill to operate it; it was operated by turning the main wheel by hand, and that the revolutions to which the main wheel is put to, are transmitted to other smaller wheels and spinning achieved as in the case of a “Charaka”. The Mysore High Court, applying the definition of “machinery” given in the Privy Council decision aforesaid, held that the said contrivance called “cottage basin” is a machinery.

5. In Industrial Machinery Mfgrs. Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, [1965] 16 STC 380, the Gujarat High Court had to consider whether “humidifiers” used by cotton textile mills installed to maintain a certain humidity for the purpose of increasing the strength of yarn, avoiding breakages of yarn and improving the quality of yarn and which are essential to the modern textile industry, are “machinery” within the meaning of a particular entry in the Bombay Sales Tax Act. It was found that without the humidifiers it was not possible for any textile mill to run according to the modern technique. Again, applying the definition evolved by the Privy Council in the aforesaid case, it was held that “humidifiers” are machinery. The reasoning behind the said conclusion appears from the following observations (at p. 384):

“Manufacture of goods means the process of converting raw materials into finished goods and whatever machinery is required for converting raw materials into finished goods would be machinery used in the manufacture of such goods. Every item of machinery which has a use in the manufacture of finished goods, which plays some role in the process of manufacture of finished goods and without which manufacture of finished goods would not be possible would be machinery used in the manufacture of such goods. Such machinery would be an essential and integral part of the plant which manufactures finished goods and would certainly satisfy the description that it is machinery used in the manufacture of finished goods…”

6. In State of Gujarat v. Minu Chemical Pvt. Ltd., [1982] 50 STC 339, it was held by another Bench of the Gujarat High Court that an article to be machinery must either be a completed machine or a number of completed machines, or parts or members of a machine which, when they are assembled, form a complete machine. The assessee therein was carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling chemicals. During the relevant accounting year, the assessee purchased certain articles and in the course of the assessment proceedings under the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, claimed set-off in respect of the amount of tax paid by it on the purchase of the above articles on the ground that the said articles were “machinery” used by it in the manufacture of goods for sale. It is in this manner that the question arose whether the articles purchased by the assessee constituted “machinery”. The Division Bench referred to the literal meaning of the word “machinery” in English dictionaries, and to the decision of the Privy Council referred to above, and held that inasmuch as the articles in question are found to be parts of the plant which consists of a processing unit, those articles must be treated as machinery.

7. In Ambica Wood Works v. State of Gujarat, [1979] 43 STC 338, again a decision of the Gujarat High Court, it was held that “screen printing block tables” of wood manufactured by the assessee and sold to textile mills are “machinery”. It was found that the wooden tables supplied by the assessee, 42 metres in length and 60 inches in width covered with buff-leather, were fixed on the site to facilitate even printing on the cloth. It was found that the tables were brought in loose condition and assembled on the site by the suppliers. Steam pipes were fitted below the tables so as to supply the necessary heat for purposes of drying the prints instantaneously. It was also found that there was a machine for mixing colours mechanically so as to obtain the necessary consistency of colours. It was noted that the cloth is spread on the tables and with the help of screen print frames by moving hand-rolls, necessary designs are imprinted and there is an instantaneous drying of the printing on the cloth. In other words, the table supplied by the assessee became an integral part of the machinery which was employed in screen printing. In the circumstances, it was held that having regard to the size of the tables, the object for which they were sold and the use to which they were put and more particularly having regard to the fact that the tables had been fitted with steam pipes acting as instantaneous driers, the entire assembly of the table, pipes, screen printing and the rolls was nothing else but a machinery. It was further observed that some solid structure with no moving parts cannot be treated as machinery.

8. It would be evident that all the decisions dealing with the meaning of the expression “machinery” have drawn inspiration from the decision of the Privy Council, referred to supra. It has also been held that a part of machinery is also machinery. But, what appears to be essential is that there must be some mechanical contrivances which by themselves or in combination with one or more other mechanical contrivances, by the combined movement and interdependent operation of their respective parts generate power or evoke, modify, apply or direct natural forces. Now, can it be said in this case that a motor vehicle—whether it be a lorry or a car — is machinery? If we can call it machinery, any and every part of it would also be called machinery. Applying the test of common parlance, we find it difficult to say that a truck or a car is machinery. The other basis upon which the question can be approached is, whether “leaf springs” are contrivances. It is difficult to say that a leaf spring can be called a contrivance, much less does it satisfy the various requirements mentioned in the definition. A leaf spring by itself does not generate power, nor is it capable of evoking, modifying, applying or directing natural forces, within the meaning of the said definition. It is only meant to take the load and to cushion the bumps and shocks which a vehicle takes during its movement. We are, therefore, unable to say that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that leaf springs do not constitute “industrial machinery” within the meaning of item No. 8 of the Ninth Schedule to the Act and that, hence, the machinery employed for manufacturing them is not entitled to initial depreciation provided by section 32(1)(vi) of the Act. We find no error of law in the approach adopted or the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal. For the above reasons, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative, i.e, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.

9. No costs.