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T. Rama Rao v. Income-Tax Officer.
Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The three writ petitions arise under the Income-tax Act, 1961. Tallam Rama Rao is the assessee in all three matters. There were concluded assessment orders for the years 1975-76 (concluded 5 March 1976), 1976-77 (concluded 30 September 1977) and 1977-78 (concluded 28 October 1978). An “audit note” later alleged that the assessee had not disclosed his minor daughter Rama Devi's income (she had been inducted as a minor partner in one or more partnership firms) in the returns for those years. The Income-tax Officer construed the audit note as information under clause (b) of section 147 and sought reassessment; that order was reversed on appeal and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, by order dated 22 March 1983, dismissed the Revenue's appeal and concluded the “former proceedings.”
Subsequently, on 8 December 1986 the Income-tax Officer issued notices seeking to reopen the assessments again, this time invoking clause (a) of section 147 on the ground that the assessee “failed” to disclose the minor daughter's income as required. The assessee sought relief under article 226 of the Constitution, asserting that in view of the Appellate Tribunal's order the Income-tax Officer no longer had jurisdiction to reopen the assessments and seeking interdiction/prohibition and quashing of the impugned proceedings. The Revenue opposed the writs, asserting that the issue raised in the impugned proceedings had not been determined earlier and that the Income-tax Officer had recorded reasons under clause (a) of section 147 and was within his power.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Income-tax Officer has jurisdiction to reopen the three assessment orders under clause (a) of section 147 in respect of alleged failure to disclose the minor daughter's income, in view of the earlier Appellate Tribunal order that had dismissed the Revenue's attempt to reopen under clause (b) of section 147.
- Whether the assessee is estopped from permitting re-litigation (i.e., whether estoppel arises) because of the earlier proceedings and the Appellate Tribunal's order dated 22 March 1983.
- Whether the question raised is one of jurisdiction, propriety, or estoppel (the court raised the distinction between these).
- Whether the assessee in fact “failed” to disclose his minor daughter's income for the three assessment years.
Arguments of the Parties
Assessee's Arguments
- The matters involve the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer and, in view of the Appellate Tribunal's order of 22 March 1983, the Income-tax Officer should be interdicted from reopening the three assessment orders.
- The assessee sought a writ of prohibition under article 226 on the basis that the Tribunal's order concluded the former proceedings and therefore the Income-tax Officer had no jurisdiction to reopen the assessments.
- The assessee argued that it would be more efficacious for the court to quash the impugned proceedings under article 226 than to require the assessee to pursue relief through the hierarchy of appeals and then approach this court.
Revenue's Arguments
- The assessee failed to disclose particulars of income relating to the minor daughter for the three assessment years, and this omission justified reopening under clause (a) of section 147.
- The Income-tax Officer recorded reasons as required under clause (a) of section 147 and served the impugned notices; therefore, the Officer is within his power to reopen since the specific issue raised now was not determined in the earlier proceedings.
- The Revenue implicitly contended that the earlier proceedings dealt with clause (b) of section 147 and did not decide the question whether clause (a) applied, so estoppel or lack of jurisdiction did not arise as a bar to fresh proceedings.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bracegirdle v. Oxley, [1947] 1 KB 349 | Definition of "primary facts": primary facts are observed and proved by testimony; determination of primary facts is a question of fact. | The court used this to explain the distinction between primary facts and inferences and to show that whether a case falls under clause (a) or (b) of s.147 is not a primary/fundamental fact. |
| Hoystead v. Commr. of Taxation, [1926] AC 155 | Principle that admission of a fact fundamental to a decision cannot be withdrawn; estoppel by earlier admission/assumption settles rights and prevents fresh litigation on a different assumption. | The court relied on the Privy Council's articulation to explain when estoppel arises (i.e., where a fundamental fact was admitted or decided) and contrasted that with the present case where the earlier proceedings did not decide the present issue. |
| Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. v. ITO, [1978] 114 ITR 404 (AP) | Similar ratio: "The admission of a fundamental fact or primary fact cannot be withdrawn..." | The court cited this earlier decision (one of the judges' own) to support the proposition about admissions of fundamental or primary facts and estoppel principles. |
| ITO v. Madnani Engineering Works Ltd., [1979] 118 ITR 1 (SC) | Whether the Income-tax Officer's belief/reasons to reopen were well founded; court scrutinized the affidavit to determine if reasons to believe were established. | The assessee relied on this authority; the court acknowledged the case but noted the factual distinctions and did not treat it as controlling for the instant facts. |
| ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das, [1976] 103 ITR 437 (SC) | Change of opinion by the Income-tax Officer, if an earlier inference was erroneous, does not alone justify reopening the assessment. | The court acknowledged the principle that mere change of opinion is not sufficient to reopen; it considered this principle in assessing whether earlier proceedings had decided the question now raised. |
| Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay v. Balvantrai S. Jain, [1969] 72 ITR 59 | Letters considered after assessment did not amount to failure to disclose fully and truly material facts. | The court noted this Bombay decision to show that certain subsequent materials did not necessarily constitute non-disclosure; it treated the authority as illustrating distinctions from the present facts. |
| Mrigendra Shum Sher Jung Bahadur Rana v. ITO, [1980] 123 ITR 329 (Delhi HC) | Tribunal not justified in law in reopening the assessment on facts in that case. | The court cited the decision as another instance where reassessment was not upheld on facts, again to be distinguished from the instant proceedings. |
| CIT v. P.K. Kochammu Amma, Peroke, [1980] 125 ITR 624 (SC) | Failure to disclose, where a note appended to the return showed amounts representing shares of husband and minor daughter, constituted breach of obligation under s.139(1). | The court observed that this Supreme Court decision held non-disclosure to be a breach of statutory duty in its facts, but expressly stated that those cases had no application to the facts of the instant case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court approached the matter by first addressing the framing of the question before it. It informed the assessee that it was inexpedient to decide a "common question" under article 226 in certain terms, and then considered whether the present challenge raised a question of jurisdiction, propriety, or estoppel.
The court observed that the earlier Appellate Tribunal proceedings had concerned the exercise of power under clause (b) of section 147 (the Tribunal had dismissed the Revenue's appeal on 22 March 1983), which concluded those "former proceedings." However, the Income-tax Officer later invoked clause (a) of section 147, recording reasons that the assessee had "failed" to disclose the minor daughter's income and serving notices on 8 December 1986. The assessee argued that the Tribunal's earlier order precluded reopening and that the Officer lacked jurisdiction.
The court analyzed the distinction between jurisdiction and estoppel. It concluded that the question was not one of jurisdiction; it might touch estoppel, but estoppel would arise only if a fundamental or primary fact had been decided or admitted in the former proceedings. The court therefore examined whether the earlier proceedings had decided the precise issue now sought to be raised; it found they had not. The Tribunal's earlier decision was that clause (b) could not be invoked on those materials (i.e., no case to invoke clause (b)), but that did not constitute an adjudication determining that clause (a) could not now be invoked.
To frame the legal distinction, the court relied on authorities explaining "primary facts" and "fundamental facts" (Bracegirdle and Hoystead) and the principle that admissions of a fundamental fact cannot be withdrawn to start fresh litigation. Applying those principles, the court explained that the determination whether a case arises under clause (b) or clause (a) of section 147 is not a primary or fundamental fact; because the earlier proceedings did not decide the present question, estoppel did not automatically arise. The court emphasized that the present case involved a conceptual error in understanding what the Tribunal had decided.
The court also considered and cited a range of precedents relied on by the parties (both to explicate the legal principles about when reassessment is permissible and to note factual distinctions). It noted authorities that stand for the proposition that mere change of opinion by the Income-tax Officer is not sufficient to reopen assessments and decisions where purported post-assessment materials did not amount to non-disclosure; it also noted a decision where non-disclosure in the return was held to be a breach of s.139(1). The court concluded that those authorities were distinguishable or not applicable to the facts before it.
On balance, because the earlier proceedings had decided only that clause (b) could not be invoked on the materials then before the department, and because clause (a) was not decided in those prior proceedings, the court held that the assessee had not established a case for interference under article 226 on estoppel or jurisdiction grounds.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petitions were dismissed. The court's core ruling may be summarized as: DISMISSED.
Immediate effect on the parties:
- The writ petitions filed by the assessee fail and are dismissed with costs;
- Advocate's fee of Rs. 150 is awarded in each petition.
Implications: The opinion confines itself to the facts of the case and the application of established principles (distinguishing primary/fundamental facts, estoppel and the different clauses of section 147). The court did not purport to lay down a new principle of law beyond applying and distinguishing existing authorities; accordingly, no broader precedent-making statement beyond the application to these facts is articulated in the opinion.
This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added or inferred beyond what appears in that opinion.
Raghuvir, J.:— The three writ petitions arise under the Income-tax Act, 1961. Tallam Rama Rao is the assessee in all the three cases. He averred earlier to the impugned proceedings, that the Income-tax Officer, Rajahmundry, was ordered not to reopen assessment orders by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal on March 22, 1983, in I.T.A Nos. 718 to 721.Hyd/1982. The assessment order for 1975-76 was concluded on March 5, 1976; 1976-77 order was concluded on September 30, 1977, and 1977-78 on October 28, 1978. Notwithstanding the order of the Appellate Tribunal, it is complained that the Income-tax Officer, in the impugned proceedings, is seeking to reopen the orders.
2. We have informed the assessee that it is inexpedient to decide the common question raised under article 226 of the Constitution. The assessee argued that the issues raised involve the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer. Further, it was urged that, in view of the order of the Appellate Tribunal of March 22, 1983, the Income-tax Officer should be interdicted from reopening the three assessment orders. We are of the view that the question raised is not one of jurisdiction. The question may touch upon estoppel.
3. As to estoppel, we hold that no case is made out by the assessee for interference by this court under article 226 of the Constitution. We now state the facts and reasons for arriving at that conclusion.
4. Rama Devi is the daughter of the assessee. She was married while a minor, on April 7, 1972, in Madde family. She is now called M. Rama Devi. She was inducted in two partnership firms where the assessee is a partner. One of the two is Durga Stainless Steel Stores. The partnership firm was formed on April 15, 1972. Rama Devi was inducted on April 1, 1973, as a minor partner. Sri Raja Metal Industries is another firm where also she was inducted as a partner. (The particulars of formation and induction of the minor are not available on record). Soon after the three assessment orders referred to earlier were concluded, in an “audit note” it was alleged by the Revenue that the assessee for the relevant years did not disclose his minor daughter's income in the respective three returns. The Income-tax Officer construed the audit report as “information” within the meaning of clause (b) of section 147 of the Act and reopened the assessments for the three years. The order of the Income-tax Officer was reversed on appeal. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, on March 22, 1983, dismissed the appeal. The application under section 256(1) made by the Revenue was dismissed. Thus, by the order of the Appellate Tribunal, the “former proceedings” were concluded.
5. The Tribunal, in the former proceedings, held:
“The Allahabad High Court held that the information that has come to the possession of the Income-tax Officer from the assessment of the firm cannot be regarded as information from a formal source. It would only amount to a fresh look on the facts already on record, and since it was not open to the Income-tax Officer to have a fresh look and change his opinion, it was held that the reassessment proceedings were invalid.” In the impugned proceedings, on December 8, 1986, under clause (a) of section 147, the Income-tax Officer is seeking to reopen the proceedings on the ground that the assessee “failed” to disclose the income of the minor daughter which he was obliged to disclose under Chapter V, Part I, as per the form and as required in (B) of column 12. In view of the order of March 22, 1983 of the Appellate Tribunal, the assessee asserts that the Income-tax Officer has no jurisdiction, and, therefore, a writ of prohibition is sought by the assessee under article 226 of the Constitution. The assessee urged that it is far more efficacious on the above facts to quash the proceedings by this court than for the assessee to work out relief in the hierarchy of appeals and by reference to this court. The Revenue averred that the assessee failed to disclose particulars of income relating to the minor in regard to the three assessment years. The Income-tax Officer as required under clause (a) of section 147 recorded reasons for reopening the three assessments and served the impugned notices. In these circumstances, the Income-tax Officer is within his power to reopen the proceedings as the issue raised now was not determined in the earlier proceedings.
We may note that in view of the earlier proceedings under clause (b) of section 147, a question may arise — we take care to emphasise “may arise” —whether it is proper for the Income-tax Officer to initiate proceedings under clause (a). This question in such a form is a question of propriety rather than of jurisdiction or of estoppel as explained immediately.
We consider that the case illustrates a conceptual error in the understanding of the order in the former proceedings and, therefore, we determine the question raised under article 226 of the Constitution of India.
The issue raised is whether the assessee “failed” to disclose the income of his minor daughter in the earlier three returns, and, therefore, under clause (a) of section 147 of the Act, the impugned proceedings are initiated, and whether the Income-tax Officer has jurisdiction to reopen the assessment orders concluded earlier.
We see, in the former proceedings, that the issue raised by the Revenue in the instant proceedings was not decided. What was decided earlier was that no case was made out to invoke the power under clause (b) of section 147. Had the issue been decided—(a) estoppel in law would have arisen, (b) but not question of jurisdiction. This aspect we desire to explain with reference to the decided cases. In the two questions, (a) and (b), the determination of facts is at times called a “fundamental fact” or a “primary fact”. Whether a case under clause (b) of section 147 arose, or the case arose under clause (a) of section 147, is neither a fundamental fact nor a primary fact.
We now turn to the meaning of the two expressions. What is a primary fact is explained in Bracegirdle v. Oxley, [1947] 1 KB 349 at p. 358: “… Primary facts are facts which are observed by the witnesses and proved by testimony; conclusions from those facts are inferences deduced by a process of reasoning from them. The determination of primary facts is always a question of fact. It is essentially a matter for the Tribunal which sees the witnesses to assess their credibility and to decide the primary facts which depend on them.” What is a fundamental factor a primary fact was explained by the Privy Council in Hoystead v. Commr. of Taxation, [1926] AC 155, a case from Australia. We may refer to the facts in the Australian case.
Charles Campbell, a merchant in Melbourne, died. Seven children survived him. In his last testament, he created a trust for twenty-one years. On expiration of the period, the trustees were to divide the corpus among the children. The children of the deceased took the parents' share. The issue came to be decided in the case under the Land Tax Assessment Act, 1910-1916. In the assessment order for 1918-1919 under the Act, the trustees claimed seven deductions of 5,000£. Six deductions of 5,000£ were allowed. The Revenue raised the self-same question in a different form in the assessment for 1920-1921. The Privy Council observed (at p. 163): “It amounts to this —that in the former case it was not a matter of decision that the appellants were joint owners, but was a matter of admission”. It was explained that Campbell's six children were not joint owners was admitted by the Revenue and six deductions were ordered. In the subsequent proceedings, in the assessment order for 1920-1921 between the same parties, the question again was raised by the Revenue. The Privy Council held (at p. 165): “In the opinion of their Lordships, it is settled, first, that the admission of a fact fundamental to the decision arrived at cannot be withdrawn and a fresh litigation started, with a view to obtaining another judgment upon a different assumption of fact; secondly, the same principle applies not only to an erroneous admission of a fundamental fact, but to an erroneous assumption as to the legal quality of that fact. Parties are not permitted to begin fresh litigations because of new views they may entertain of the law of the case, or new versions which they present as to what should be a proper apprehension by the court of the legal result either of the construction of the documents or the weight of certain circumstances. If this were permitted, litigation would have no end, except when legal ingenuity is exhausted. It is a principle of law that this cannot be permitted, and there is abundant authority reiterating that principle. Thirdly, the same principle — namely, that of setting to rest rights of litigants, applies to the case where a point, fundamental to the decision, taken or assumed by the plaintiff and traversable by the defendant, has not been traversed. In that case also, a defendant is bound by the judgment, although it may be true enough that subsequent light or ingenuity might suggest some traverse which had not been taken. The same principle of setting parties' right to rest applies and estoppel occurs.” Similar is the ratio in a case decided by one of us (Raghuvir J.) in Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. v. ITO, [1978] 114 ITR 404, 407 (AP). “The admission of a fundamental fact or primary fact cannot be withdrawn and on fresh litigation cannot be started with a view to obtain another assessment upon different assumption of facts.”
6. The assessee relied on the decision in ITO v. Madnani Engineering Works Ltd., [1979] 118 ITR 1 (SC) to support his contention. The issue in that case was whether the belief of the Income-tax Officer was well founded. The court held (at p. 6): “We are, therefore, not at all satisfied on the affidavit that the Income-tax Officer had reasons to believe that a part of the income of the respondent had escaped assessment by reason of its failure to make a true and full disclosure of the material facts.” In ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das, [1976] 103 ITR 437 (SC), the second case cited, it was held (headnote): “If an Income-tax Officer draws an inference which appears subsequently to be erroneous, mere change of opinion with regard to that inference would not justify initiation of action for reopening assessment.” In Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay v. Balvantrai S. Jain, [1969] 72 ITR 59 a case from Bombay, relied on by the assessee, the facts showed that two letters written in 1950 and 1952, by which time the assessment for the year 1944-45 was completed, were considered, and it was held (at p. 70): “It cannot be said, therefore, that any recitals in these letters amounted to failure to disclose fully and truly the material facts.” In Mrigendra Shum Sher Jung Bahadur Rana v. ITO, [1980] 123 ITR 329, the Delhi High Court held that the Tribunal was not justified in law in reopening the assessment on facts. In CIT v. P.K Kochammu Amma, Peroke, [1980] 125 ITR 624 (SC), in view of a note appended to the return, it was held, the amounts representing the shares of the husband and minor daughter of the asses-see in the profits of the two partnership firms had to be shown. The asses-see failed to disclose these amounts in the return. That failure was held to be a breach of obligation imposed by section 139, sub-section (1). The above cases have no application to the facts of the instant case.
7. The writ petitions, for all the aforesaid reasons, fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 150 in each.
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