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Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd.

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Oct 26, 1987
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Judgment Summary — B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

These are two references made under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act concerning seven specific questions arising from the assessments of Vazir Sultan Tobacco Company Limited (the assessee) for the assessment years 1972-73 and 1973-74. The questions relate to whether certain items (repairs to buildings allotted to employees, ownership and treatment of buildings occupied by senior employees, replacement of crockery, reimbursement of medical expenses, concessional loans to employees, classification of rental income, and expenditure on sweeper/watchmen/gardener) should be treated as perquisites or be disallowable under the Income-tax Act (notably sections 22 and 40A(5)).

Procedurally, an Income-tax Officer sought to include notional income from buildings allocated to employees under the head "Income from house property." The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the assessee's contention that the buildings were business assets; the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (following an earlier decision in the same assessee's case) rejected the Department's contention; the present reference to the court followed. An earlier decision of this Court (R.C. No. 120 of 1982 dated April 14, 1987 — Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Company Ltd., [1988] 169 ITR 324) had already resolved four of the seven questions either for or against the assessee.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the cost of repairs to buildings taken on lease by the assessee or buildings of its own allotted to its employees could be treated as a perquisite for the purpose of section 40A(5) of the Income-tax Act?
  2. Whether buildings owned by the assessee and allowed to be occupied by some highly-paid employees could be treated as the business assets of the assessee for the purpose of section 40A(5)?
  3. Whether expenditure incurred for replacement of crockery used by the employees in the buildings allotted to them could be treated as a separate perquisite for the purpose of computing the disallowance under section 40A(5)?
  4. Whether reimbursement of medical expenses came within the meaning of section 40A(5)?
  5. Whether the difference between the concessional rate of interest and the prevailing market rate of interest on loans advanced to employees was a perquisite under section 40A(5)?
  6. Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that rental income from buildings owned by the assessee was to be treated as income from business?
  7. Whether expenditure on account of sweeper, watchmen and gardener could be considered as perquisite for the purpose of section 40A(5)?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The buildings allotted to directors and senior executives are occupied for the purposes of the assessee's business and therefore fall within the exception in section 22 of the Income-tax Act; their notional income should not be charged under "Income from house property."
  • The buildings are business assets and are used to promote the assessee's business (analogy to housing workers close to factory to improve productivity and welfare).
  • No expenditure (in the sense contemplated by section 40A(5)) is said to have been incurred by giving loans at concessional rates to employees; therefore section 40A(5) does not apply to disallow any difference between concessional and market rates.

Revenue's Arguments

  • The Income-tax Officer maintained that a notional annual value of the properties should be determined and included in the assessee's income under the head "Income from house property."
  • As regards concessional loans, the Department argued that the difference between the concessional rate and prevailing market rate should be disallowed under section 40A(5) — the argument rests on the hypothetical that, if not lent to employees, the funds would have been invested (for example, in fixed deposits) and earned higher interest.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R.C. No. 120 of 1982 dated April 14, 1987 — Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Company Ltd., [1988] 169 ITR 324 Previously decided questions concerning whether certain expenditures/perquisites were chargeable or disallowable under section 40A(5) and related issues for this assessee. The Court relied on that earlier judgment to conclude Questions Nos. 1, 4 and 7 in favour of the assessee and Question No. 3 against the assessee; it therefore treated those issues as settled by precedent.
Earlier decision of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in the case of this assessee (unnamed in text) Interpretation that buildings allotted to employees of the company were to be treated as occupied for business purposes and treatment of rental income as income from business. The Tribunal's earlier view was followed by the Tribunal in the present appeal and accepted by this Court in answering Questions Nos. 6 and 2 in favour of the assessee (i.e., buildings are business assets and income is not to be treated under "Income from house property").

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded issue by issue, guided strictly by the statutory language of the relevant provisions and by prior decisions already applicable to the present proceedings.

On Questions Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 7: The Court observed that four of the seven questions were already concluded by an earlier decision of this Court (R.C. No. 120 of 1982). Specifically, Questions Nos. 1, 4 and 7 were to be answered in favour of the assessee pursuant to that earlier judgment, while Question No. 3 was concluded against the assessee. The Court thus treated those matters as settled by precedent and did not reanalyse them afresh in this opinion.

On Question No. 6 (rental income treated as income from business) and Question No. 2 (whether buildings are business assets):

  • The Court examined the text of section 22 of the Income-tax Act, which excludes from "Income from house property" those portions of property occupied by the assessee for the purposes of business or profession chargeable to income-tax.
  • The Court accepted the assessee's contention that occupation of the buildings by employees (directors and senior executives) amounted to occupation by the assessee for business purposes. It reasoned that a corporate assessee's provision of accommodation to its employees is occupation by the assessee for the purpose of section 22.
  • To illustrate the business purpose, the Court used an analogy: if an assessee provides housing to workers so they are nearer the factory and thereby improves productivity and welfare, that housing is clearly provided for business purposes. The Court held that the same logic applies to senior executives and directors, who are equally necessary for the proper and successful running of the organisation.
  • Accordingly, the Court concluded that the income from such houses cannot be treated as income from property under section 22 and that the properties are business assets of the assessee.

On Question No. 5 (concessional loans and section 40A(5)):

  • The Court analyzed the language of section 40A(5), which contemplates disallowance where the assessee incurs expenditure that results directly or indirectly in payment of salary or in provision of perquisites to employees, and where ceilings prescribed are exceeded.
  • The assessee argued that no "expenditure" (in the sense required by section 40A(5)) was actually incurred by providing loans at concessional rates; therefore the subsection did not apply. The Revenue argued that the difference between concessional interest and market interest should be treated as a disallowable perquisite — reasoning that if the money had not been lent it would have earned higher interest in a bank fixed deposit (i.e., a hypothetical opportunity cost).
  • The Court rejected the Revenue's reliance on that hypothetical or fictive approach. It held that importing a fiction (that the funds would have been invested and earned higher interest) into subsection (5) is not supported by the language of the provision. Subsection (5) applies when an assessee claims a deduction on the basis that money was spent in providing a salary or perquisite; only then do the ceilings and disallowance rules apply.
  • The Court acknowledged that the facility of concessional loans could be abused in some cases (for example, banks lending to employees at near-zero rates while lending to others at much higher rates), but stated that the remedy for such abuse lies in other measures — administrative control of public corporations or legislative amendment to the Income-tax Act — and not by stretching the language of section 40A(5).
  • On that basis, the Court answered Question No. 5 in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

The Court concluded its analysis with the procedural observation that there would be no order as to costs.

Holding and Implications

Core holdings:

  • Questions Nos. 1, 4 and 7: Answered in favour of the assessee pursuant to this Court's earlier decision (R.C. No. 120 of 1982, Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Company Ltd., [1988] 169 ITR 324).
  • Question No. 3: Answered against the assessee pursuant to the same earlier decision.
  • Question No. 6: Answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee — the buildings allotted to employees are occupied by the assessee for business purposes and therefore their income is not chargeable under the head "Income from house property."
  • Question No. 2: Answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee — the buildings are business assets of the assessee.
  • Question No. 5: Answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee — the difference between concessional and market interest on loans to employees is not a perquisite disallowable under section 40A(5) on the facts and with reference to the statutory language.

Implications: The direct effects of the decision are (1) the assessee need not have notional rental income from the buildings treated as "Income from house property" where the buildings are occupied by employees for business purposes; (2) such buildings are to be treated as business assets; and (3) concessional housing loans to employees, on the basis and in the manner considered, do not trigger disallowance under section 40A(5) by imputing a hypothetical lost interest. The Court noted the possibility of abuse of concessional lending but indicated that the appropriate remedy is administrative control or legislative amendment, not reinterpretation of section 40A(5).

Disposition: There shall be no order as to costs.

Show all summary ...

B.P Jeevan Reddy, J.:— In these two references made under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, seven questions arise for our consideration. They are:

“1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the cost of repairs to the buildings taken on lease by the assessee or on the buildings of its own and allotted to its employees could be treated as perquisite for the purpose of section 40A(5) of the Income-tax Act?

2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the buildings owned by the assessee and allowed to be occupied by some highly-paid employees could be treated as the business assets of the assessee for the purpose of section 40A(5)?

3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the expenditure incurred for replacement of crockery used by the employees in the buildings allotted to them could be treated as a separate perquisite for the purpose of computing the disallowance under section 40A(5)?

4. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the reimbursement of medical expenses did not come within the meaning of section 40A(5)?

5. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the difference between the concessional rate of interest and the prevailing market rate of interest on the loans advanced to the employees was not a perquisite under section 40A(5)?

6. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the rental income from the buildings owned by the assessee was to be treated as income from business?

7. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the expenditure on account of sweeper, watchmen and gardener could not be considered as perquisite for the purpose of section 40A(5)?”

2. The assessee is the Vazir Sultan Tobacco Company Limited, a public limited company, engaged in the manufacture of cigarettes and other tobacco products. The assessment years are 1972-73 and 1973-74. We may straightaway say that out of the seven questions referred to us, four questions are concluded one way or the other by an earlier decision of this court. Questions Nos. 1, 4 and 7 have to be answered in favour of the assessee in view of our judgment in R.C No. 120 of 1982 dated April 14, 1987 (Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Company Ltd., [1988] 169 ITR 324), pertaining to this very assessee.

3. By virtue of the very same decision, question No. 3 has to be answered against the assessee. Thus, questions Nos. 2, 5 and 6 alone survive for our consideration. Among these three questions, again questions Nos. 2 and 6 go together. We have to answer question No. 6 first and the answer to question No. 2 will follow as a consequence. We shall, therefore, first take up question No. 6.

4. The assessee owns certain buildings which it allots for the occupation of its directors and other senior executives. It does not collect any rent from them. They are given free of rent. The Income-tax Officer felt that the notional income from these properties should be determined and included in the income of the assessee under the head “Income from property”. The assessee's contention, however, was that these buildings are business assets of the company and are being used for its business purpose and hence the income therefrom cannot be so included. The Income-tax Officer rejected the said contention. But, on appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld it. On further appeal, the Tribunal, following its earlier decision in the case of this very assessee, rejected the Department's contention, whereupon the present reference was obtained.

5. We have to consider this question on the language of section 22 of the Income-tax Act, which reads as follows:

“The annual value of property consisting of any buildings or lands appurtenant thereto of which the assessee is the owner, other than such portions of such property as he may occupy for the purposes of any business or profession carried on by him the profits of which are chargeable to income-tax shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head ‘Income from house property’.”

6. The assessee's contention is that these properties are occupied by the assessee for the purpose of its own business and hence they fall within the exception contained in section 22 of the Act. The question is whether the assessee is right in its contention. We have also perused the earlier decision of the Tribunal which was followed in the present case and we are satisfied that the Tribunal was right in holding that these properties are occupied by the assessee for its own business purposes. The assessee is a corporate body and the occupation of the buildings by its employees as licensees is undoubtedly occupation by the assessee for the purpose of section 22 of the Act. It must also be said that the occupation by its employees is for the purpose of the assessee's business. With a view to illustrate the proposition, we may take a slightly different example. Take a case where an assessee builds a number of houses or a colony for the purpose of accommodating its workers. The idea is that the workers should be nearer to the factory or should be housed in hygienic and proper conditions so as to improve their productivity, health and their commitment to the employer.

7. No rent is collected from such workers, though, according to the terms of employment, the assessee is under no obligation to provide such houses. It is done only with a view to keep the workers happy, in good cheer and in good humour. In such a case, the purpose of such allotment is undoubtedly a business purpose, for it ultimately goes to promote the assessee's business. Now, how does it make any difference if a similar arrangement is made for the directors or senior executives? After all, workers and senior executives are also necessary for a proper and successful running of an organisation. It must, therefore, be held that the occupation of the houses by its employees is for the business purpose of the assessee. If so, the income from such houses cannot be treated as income from property and included in the assessee's total income. Accordingly, we answer question No. 6 in the affirmative, i.e, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

8. Once we answer question No. 6 in the above manner, the answer to question No. 2 should also be in the affirmative. Indeed, the assessee has treated the said buildings as business assets. Accordingly, question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative, i.e, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

9. So far as question No. 5 is concerned, what is happening is that again with a view to keep its employees happy and satisfied, the assessee has been giving loans to them at a concessional rate of interest. The loans are given to employees to build their own houses. If they build the houses and live in them themselves, the rate of interest is 6% and if they let out the houses, the interest will be charged at 9% per annum. The Department says that the difference between the concessional rate of interest and the prevailing market rate of interest should be disallowed under section 40A(5) of the Act. On this question too, the Tribunal, following its earlier decision, held in favour of the assessee. This question has to be answered with reference to the language employed in sub-section (5) of section 40A of the Act. In so far as it is relevant, the provision reads thus:

“40A.(5)(a) Where the assessee—

(i) incurs any expenditure which results directly or indirectly in the payment of any salary to an employee or a former employee, or

(ii) incurs any expenditure which results directly or indirectly in the provision of any perquisite (whether convertible into money or not) to an employee or incurs directly or indirectly any expenditure or is entitled to any allowance in respect of any assets of the assessee used by an employee either wholly or partly for his own purposes or benefit,

then, subject to the provisions of clause (b), so much of such expenditure or allowance as is in excess of the limit specified in respect thereof in clause (c) shall not be allowed as a deduction: …………”

10. It would be evident from a perusal of sub-section (5) that it contemplates disallowance of certain expenditure incurred by the assessee which it claims as a deduction. Certain ceilings are fixed in the case of such expenditure. The assessee's contention is that it has not incurred any expenditure by giving the loans to its employees at a concessional rate of interest and, therefore, the said provision has no application. On the other hand, learned standing eounsel for the Revenue says that if this money had not been lent to the employees at a concessional rate of interest, it would have earned interest at a higher rate had it been put in fixed deposit in a bank. But, this argument involves importing a fiction into sub-section (5) of section 40A of the Act. We must assume that this money, if not lent to the employees, would have been put in a fixed deposit or would have been invested in some other profitable manner and then say that the difference amount should be disallowed. We do not think that the language of sub-section (5) of section 40A of the Act provides for or permits such a course. Sub-section (5) applies where an assessee claims a certain deduction saying that he has spent that money in providing, directly or indirectly, either as salary to an employee or in the provision of perquisite to an employee. Only then do the ceilings prescribed in the said sub-section come into play. It is true that in some cases this facility may be abused. We know public corporations like banks lending money to their own employess at practically no interest, say for example, one or two per cent. interest per annum, whereas those very banks lend to people at rates of interest ranging from 13% to 19% per annum. But the remedy for that must lie elsewhere, either in the proper control of the public corporations or in the amendment of the Income-tax Act, as the case may be. As the provision of law of section 40A(5) of the Act now stands, it is not possible to answer the said question in the manner suggested by the Department. Accordingly, we answer question No. 5 in the affirmative, i.e, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

11. There shall be no order as to costs.