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S. Goverdhan v. Rani Laxmidevamma College Of Arts, Commerce And Science, Wanaparthy .

Andhra Pradesh High Court

Oct 29, 1982

Judgment

Subsequent
References

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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking a mandamus directing the first respondent (a college) to admit him to the first year B.Com. course in Telugu medium for the academic year 1982-1983. The petitioner applied for admission on 15-7-1982 and had obtained 488 marks in the qualifying (intermediate) examination. He alleged that a candidate with 427 marks had been admitted while he was denied admission. The petitioner asserted that he belongs to a backward class and that reservation rules were not implemented, invoking Articles 15(4) and 46 of the Constitution. He also relied on the college's affiliation to Osmania University and its grant-in-aid status (since 1-4-1980) to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226.

The principal of the college filed a counter-affidavit denying entitlement. The college contended it is not an "authority" under Article 12 and therefore not amenable to writ; that the director of higher education is the appellate authority (and the petitioner had already appealed to that authority); and that the petitioner had a break in studies (having passed intermediate in June 1981 but not studied in 1981-82) contrary to brochure guidelines giving preference to students without any break. The college further alleged the petitioner had created disturbances on 27-7-1982 inside college premises, that a criminal case (CR No.126/82 under Sections 452 and 353 IPC) was registered against him, and that Director of Higher Education instructions required rustication of such students pending the case. The college also stated that all seats were filled and admissions closed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the petitioner was entitled to admission to first year B.Com. (Telugu medium) for 1982-83 where he scored 488 marks while another candidate with lesser marks had been admitted.
Whether a college rule or guideline that gives preference to candidates who completed intermediate "without any break" is valid and within the college's rule-making power (i.e., whether that rule is ultra vires).
Whether a student against whom a criminal case is pending (for disturbances within the college) may be denied admission pursuant to instructions by the Director of Higher Education requiring rustication pending the outcome of the case.
Whether the aided, affiliated college qualifies as an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution so that a writ under Article 226 may be issued against it.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

There is no governmental regulation or instruction restricting admission to only those students who passed the qualifying examination without any break; therefore the college's rule preferring "no-gap" students is ultra vires the rule-making power.
There is no rule issued by the Director of Higher Education barring admission to students with pending criminal cases; hence the college cannot rely on such a bar.
The college is aided by the government, regulated by statutes, rules and government instructions, and therefore is controlled by the government and can be treated as an agent of the State; consequently a writ under Article 226 lies against it.

Respondent (College)'s Arguments

The college contended it does not fall within the definition of "authority" under Article 12 and therefore a writ petition is not maintainable against it.
The Director of Higher Education is the appellate authority under the Education Code and rules; the petitioner had already appealed to the Director, so the writ petition should not be entertained.
The college relied on brochure Guideline 3 (sub-clause 7) which gives preference to students who completed intermediate without any break, and the petitioner had a gap in studies (passed intermediate in June 1981 but did not study in 1981-82); thus he is not on par with regular students.
There was heavy rush for admissions; only those who passed in one attempt without any gap were given admission; the petitioner had caused disturbances on 27-7-1982 inside the college, a crime was registered (CR No.126/82 under ss. 452 and 353 IPC), and the petitioner had initially absconded and later surrendered; Director's instruction (RC No. 263/K-I-I/80 dated 17-10-1980) required rustication of students arrested for involvement in criminal cases pending decision, and therefore admission should be refused to maintain discipline. All seats were filled and admissions closed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
T. Gattaiah v. Commr of Labour, Hyd. (1981) 1 APLJ 280 : (1981 LAB IC 942)	Interpreting Article 226's wide language to hold that a writ may be issued against a "person" (including a legal person/private person) where that person is obligated to perform a public duty; emphasises that "person" is not restricted to another government authority.	The court relied on the principle to hold that a writ under Article 226 can lie against the college (a non-governmental body) when it performs public duties and is subject to government regulation and financial aid; the court applied this precedent to reject the college's contention that it was not amenable to writ jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed each principal contention in turn and applied the relevant legal principles and facts from the record.

On the "no-gap" rule: The court accepted the petitioner's contention insofar as no government rule or regulation had been shown to confer a preferential claim to students who completed intermediate without any break. The court observed that no rule or regulation was brought to its notice establishing such a preferential entitlement. Therefore the college's internal rule could not validly restrict the scope of regulations guiding admissions, and the refusal to admit the petitioner on the basis of his having a gap in studies was held unjustified.
On the criminal-case bar: The court examined the Director of Higher Education's instruction (RC No. 263/K-I-I/80, dated 17-10-1980) to the effect that students arrested or involved in criminal cases should be rusticated until the cases are decided. The court found as an admitted fact that the petitioner was involved in a criminal case arising from disturbances at the very college where he sought admission (CR No.126/82 under Sections 452 and 353 IPC), that he absconded and then surrendered, and that the alleged misconduct occurred prior to admission. The court held that the object of the Director's rule — to maintain discipline and academic standards — was clear and legitimate. Consequently, the court concluded that while the "no-gap" rule was not a valid ground to refuse admission, the bar arising from a pending criminal case under the Director's instructions was a valid ground to refuse admission so long as the criminal case remained pending; therefore the college's refusal on this basis was justified and the petitioner's challenge to that ground failed.
On whether the college is an "authority" under Article 12 and amenable to writs under Article 226: The court reviewed the undisputed facts that the college was affiliated to Osmania University, admitted to grant-in-aid by the government (receiving government funds since 1-4-1980), and was bound by acts, rules and instructions issued by the government. The court then analyzed Article 226 and relied upon the principle (as stated in the cited precedent) that Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue writs to "any person or authority" and that "person" can include legal persons and private persons obligated to perform public duties. The court emphasized that the sine qua non for issuing a writ against a person is that the person be obligated to perform a public duty and that there be an infraction in discharge of that duty. Applying that test, the court held that the college's obligation to follow government rules and regulations, and its receipt of government aid and regulation, brought it within the ambit of those against whom a writ may be issued. Accordingly, the college's contention that it was not an authority amenable to writ jurisdiction was rejected.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was dismissed. The court expressly rejected the petitioner's challenge to the college's reliance on the Director of Higher Education's instruction concerning students with pending criminal cases, held that the college was amenable to writ jurisdiction, and further held that the college's "no-gap" preference rule lacked supporting governmental regulation and was not a valid ground for refusal of admission. The final order reads: "In the result the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed."

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner was not granted the relief of admission; the writ petition was dismissed and no costs were awarded.
On the college's practices: The court found the college could not lawfully refuse admission solely on the basis of a locally framed "no-gap" preference that lacks backing in government regulations; however, the college was justified in refusing admission while a pending criminal case (arising from disturbances at the college) stood against the applicant in view of the Director's instruction to maintain discipline.
On broader precedent: The court applied existing principles regarding Article 226 and the availability of writs against persons/authorities performing public duties (as reflected in the cited precedent). The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel, binding rule beyond the application of those principles to the facts of this case.

Source: Summary prepared strictly from the provided opinion text. No additional facts or external information have been added.

Show all summary ...

(1) The petitioner herein seeks a writ of mandamus directing the first respondent to admit him in the first year b. Com. , in telugu medium for the academic year 1982 - 1983.

(2) The relevant averments in brief as stated in the affidavit of the petitioner are that he applied to the first respondent - college for admission to the first year b. Com. On 15 - 7 - 1982 for the academic year 1982 - 83. He secured 488 marks in the qualifying examination. A candidate with 427 marks has been provided with a seat, whereas he has not been admitted. He further avers that he belongs to backward class and the rules of admission give preferential treatment by reservation, but the said rule has not been implemented. Therefore the rejection is illegal and contravenes articles 15 (4) 46 of the constitution of india. Further the first respondent - college is affiliated to the osmania university and also is admitted to grant - in - aid since 1 - 4 - 1980 and so is receiving funds from the government of andhra pradesh and therefore this courts jurisdiction is invoked under art. 226 of the constitution.

(3) In the counter filed by the principal of the first respondent - college, it is stated that the college does not come within the definition of "authority " as envisaged under art. 12 of the constitution of india. Therefore no writ lies against it. Under the education code, the act and the rules made thereunder, the director of higher education is the appellate authority against a decision made by the college. The petitioner in fact, has already preferred an appeal to the director of higher education and therefore on this ground also the writ petition should not be entertained. It is true that the petitioner passed intermediate and secured 488 marks and belongs to backward class "d group. The petitioner discontinued his studies and did not study during the last academic year 1981 - 82.

(4) Sub - clause 7 of guideline - 3 of the brochure annexed to the prospectus, indicates that admission will be given to students who have completed intermediate without any break after ssc and for those intermediate students without any gap after getting through the intermediate examination and in case of non - availability of such students only, the students with break in academic studies will be considered. Admittedly the petitioner passed intermediate examination in june 1981 and did not pursue his studies in the last academic year and therefore there is a gap. Hence he will not be treated on par with regular students. In fact there is heavy rush for admission to b. Com ist year in telugu medium and only those who have passed in one attempt without any gap, have been given admission. Further, the 2nd respondent belonging to b. C. B group and the 3rd respondent was given admission under the category of extra - curricular activities and therefore the grievance made against them is not justified no candidate with a gap and who has secured lesser marks than the petitioner had been accorded admission. It is further avered that the petitioner is a trouble shooter. He entered the college premises along with few others on 27 - 7 - 1982 and went inside the lecture hall and disturbed the classes and created law and order problem. He also made speeches and raised slogans against the state and the government and a crime is registered against him bearing cr. No. 126/82 under ss. 452 and 353, i. P. C. At wanaparthy police station. The petitioner absconded but later surrendered in the munsif magistrates court, wanaparthy on 28 - 7 - 1982 as per the instructions issued by the director of higher education in rc. No. 263/k - i - i/80, dt. 17 - 10 - 1980 students who were arrested by the police for involvement in criminal cases, should be rusticated till the cases are decided the petitioner has indulged in such acts even before his admission to the college and therefore, in order to maintain discipline law and order, it is not desirable to admit the petitioner on this ground also. All the seats meant for b. Com first year have been filled up and the admissions are now closed. In view of the above petitioner cannot be admitted.

(5) The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner are that there is no regulation or instruction by the government or the director of higher education restricting the admission to such of those students who pass the qualifying examination without any break and therefore the rule framed by the college is ultra virus the rule making power.

(6) Secondly, there is no rule issued by the director of higher education not to accord admission to students against whom a criminal case is pending.

(7) Thirdly the defence that the college cannot be defined as an authority within the meaning of art. 12 of the constitution is baseless as the institution is aided by the government and is also regulated by various acts, rules and regulations issued by the government hence the same is controlled by the government and therefore it becomes an agent of the government against whom the writ can lie.

(8) Insofar as the first contention is concerned there is force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. No rule or regulation has been brought to my notice which shows any preferential claim to such of those students, who have passed the qualifying examination without any break before seeking admission to the next higher course. Therefore a rule cannot restrict the scope of regulations that guide the college authorities to follow the guidelines laid down by them in the matter of admission to the course. Hence the refusal on that basis in my view is not justified.

(9) Coming to the next contention that the instructions issued by the director of higher education is that a student who is pursuing studies should be rusticated, if a criminal case is pending against him. The admitted case of the petitioner herein is that he is certainly involved in a criminal case and that too for creating disturbances and law and order problem in the very college where in he is seeking admission. Consequently a criminal case is pending against him and therefore it is a fortiori case. The object behind the rule is quite obvious and that is to maintain discipline and also the standards of academic career. Therefore, if a criminal case is already pending surely the very admission to the college must be barred so long as the criminal case is pending hence the refusal on the basis of this ground is justified and therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this behalf fails and the same is rejected.

(10) Coming to the last contention that the 1st respondent - college is not an authority within the meaning of art. 12 of the constitution and therefore the writ shall not lie; the facts which are not in dispute are that the college is affiliated to the osmania university and is also admitted to grant - in - aid by the government and so receives finances from the government further it is also bound by the act, rules and regulations and instructions issued by the government of and on.

(11) The question hear in is whether it is an authority within the meaning of art 12 of the constitution against which a writ shall lie. Art. 226 of the constitution reads:

"226 (1) :notwithstanding anything in art. 32 every high court shall have power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority including in appropriate cases, any government within those territories directions orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus mandmus, prohibition quo warranto and certiorari, prohibition quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part iii and for any other purpose.

(2). .

(12) So what is manifest from the above article is that a writ can even be issued against a person or any authority and of course in appropriate cases against any government also not only for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part iii but for

"any other purpose. While dealings with this aspect justice choudhary in a decision reported in t. Gattaiah v. Commr of labour, hyd. (1981) 1 aplj 280 : (1981 lab ic 942) held (at p. 949) :"

the very wide and special language of art. 226 of the constitution occurring as it does in a primordial document like the constitution must be given its full meaning. In doing so the fact that the constitution itself declares that the general clauses act would apply to its interpretation must be given its full meaning. In doing so the fact that the constitution itself declares that the general clause act would apply to its interpretation must be taken note of. According to the general clauses act the word person refers no only to a natural person but even to a legal person if so done there is no doubt that a writ under art. 226 of the constitution would be available not only against an authority or government but also against a private person. The restrictive meaning suggested to be given to the word render that word a surplus age because according to that interpretation the word person can only mean another government authority. The rule of interpretation that the meaning of a word should be ascertained from the association it keeps cannot therefore be applied to the word person occurring in art. 226 of the constitution. Concurring with justice choudhary. I have no hesitation in holding that a writ could be issued within the meaning of art. 226 of the constitution even against a person let alone any authority within the meaning of art. 12, as occurring in the said article. But, however, i may state that a writ could be issued against a person who seeks the writ, has sufficient legal interest. In fact the person against. Whom a writ is issued need not even be a public official or an official body. What is sine quo non for the issue of a writ against person or authority is that he should be obligated to perform a public duty. In short, the jurisdiction under art. 226 springs into action whenever there is infraction in the discharge of public duty, whether it is by a person in authority in the state.

(13) In this case, it is the duty of the college authority to follow the rules and regulations issued by the government and any act at variance causing infraction of it, will certainly give rise to the issuance of mandamus directing him to discharge the public duty. The test is not as to what extent the authority obstains financial aid in its management so as to amount to hold that it is controlled or agent of the government. Therefore, the respondents contention in this behalf that a writ cannot lie against the first respondent has no substance and therefore the same is rejected.

(14) In the result the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.