- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
R. Ramanujam v. D. Venkat Rao And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The proceedings arise from an eviction petition (R.C. No. 38 of 1974) filed by a landlord against Seethamma, who occupied premises after the death of the original tenant K. Rajayya (died 29-1-1971). The landlord alleged that Seethamma, whom he had permitted to continue as tenant from 1-2-1971 at Rs.100 per month, failed to pay rent from that date through November 1972 and had sublet the premises to Ramanujam (Rajayya's nephew). The landlord sought eviction on grounds of wilful default and subletting.
Seethamma denied tenancy and asserted she was not the landlord's tenant; she also contended Ramanujam was the tenant after Rajayya's death. Ramanujam applied to be impleaded (I.A. No. 462 of 1974) and was added as respondent No. 2 on 11-10-1974. He claimed to be Rajayya's heir/statutory tenant and denied being Seethamma's sub-tenant.
The Rent Controller found Ramanujam was not a tenant (and that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between him and the landlord), but held Seethamma to be the tenant and found she wilfully defaulted in rent; the Controller rejected the subletting claim and ordered both respondents to vacate within two months.
Ramanujam appealed (R.A. No. 1 of 1976) to the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court (Appellate Authority). The Appellate Authority held Ramanujam did not fall within categories in S.2(ix) of the A.P. Rent Control Act and therefore was not the tenant by operation of law; it concluded his appeal was not maintainable and dismissed it without deciding on subletting or wilful default. Seethamma did not appeal and later died during the pendency of the appeal.
Ramanujam then filed Civil Revision Petition No. 1324 of 1981 against the Appellate Authority's judgment. After the Appellate Authority's dismissal, the landlord filed an execution petition (E.P. No. 18 of 1981) and Ramanujam filed E.A. No. 28 of 1981 under Rule 23(7) of the Rent Control Rules, contending that eviction on the basis of R.C. No. 38 of 1974 (and the confirmed appeal order) was not maintainable since the authorities had found he was not a tenant. The Rent Controller dismissed E.A. No. 28 of 1981, and Ramanujam filed C.R.P. No. 2094 of 1981.
The matter was referred to a Bench of this Court to decide the question of importance whether the authorities below had jurisdiction to order eviction of a person they had found not to be a tenant and related issues as to heritability of tenancy and the applicability of S.2(ix) of the A.P. Rent Control Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Ramanujam (the nephew of the deceased tenant Rajayya), as a legal representative/heir, could be treated as tenant by operation of law and thereby maintain his appeal against eviction proceedings.
- Whether the authorities below had jurisdiction to pass orders of eviction against a person when they had concurrently found that that person was not the tenant of the landlord.
- How S. 2(ix) of the A.P. Rent Control Act should be interpreted in relation to who qualifies as a "tenant" after the death of a contractual tenant.
- Whether the Supreme Court decision in Damadilal v. Parashram (AIR 1976 SC 2229) governs the question of heritability of tenancy rights and, if so, whether it overrides earlier contrary Supreme Court decisions.
Arguments of the Parties
Revision Petitioner (Ramanujam) — Sri Surya Gupta
- Contended the authorities below misinterpreted S. 2(ix) of the Act and were wrong to deny that Ramanujam was a tenant by operation of law after Rajayya's death.
- Argued that leasehold rights are heritable and relied on the Supreme Court decision in Damadilal v. Parashram to support entitlement of legal heirs to tenancy rights even if they are not expressly enumerated in S. 2(ix).
- Maintained that, as an heir/legal representative and as one who was in occupation, he was entitled to resist the eviction and to have his appeal considered on merits.
Landlord — Sri Sankararao
- Contended the eviction petition had been filed only against Seethamma and not originally against Ramanujam; Ramanujam procured impleadment and therefore is bound by the orders passed in the eviction proceedings.
- Argued that because Ramanujam chose to be impleaded as respondent No. 2, he cannot now take an inconsistent stance in execution proceedings by claiming he was not a tenant and that the Rent Controller lacked jurisdiction to evict him.
- Maintained that the authorities below were justified in ordering eviction against Ramanujam after holding he was not a tenant.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| N. Sobhanadri v. Md. Abdul Basheer, AIR 1978 Andh Pra 277 | Interpreted S. 2(ix) narrowly — held persons other than surviving spouse/son/daughter living with tenant do not qualify as statutory tenants. | The Court noted this earlier single-judge decision of the High Court and held that it is no longer good law in view of the Supreme Court's later ruling in Damadilal; the present Court declined to follow its restrictive interpretation. |
| Damadilal v. Parashram, AIR 1976 SC 2229 | Held that statutory tenancy may carry a heritable interest: a legal heir can succeed to tenancy rights and prosecute proceedings; statutory tenants may have heritable rights depending on statutory provisions. | The Court relied on Damadilal as a binding and later Supreme Court decision that supports the proposition that tenancy rights can be heritable; applied it to hold Ramanujam entitled to claim tenancy rights as heir and that his appeal is maintainable. |
| Anand Nivas v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi, AIR 1965 SC 414 | Held that a statutory tenant (holding over after termination) has only a personal right to remain in occupation and that such tenancy is not heritable. | The Court identified this as an earlier contrary Supreme Court authority but held that Damadilal's later contrary ruling prevails; Anand Nivas was treated as overruled on this point by Damadilal. |
| J.C. Chatterji v. Shri Krishna Tandon, AIR 1972 SC 2526 | Held that after termination of contractual tenancy a statutory tenant's right is a personal right and does not devolve to heirs; tenancy is not heritable. | The Court noted this earlier ruling as contrary to Damadilal and applied the later Supreme Court decision (Damadilal) as prevailing; J.C. Chatterji was therefore displaced on the point of heritability. |
| Division Bench of this Court, C.R.P. No. 99 of 1969 (dated 24-4-1970) | Held that an eviction petition is maintainable against the legal representative of a deceased tenant even if that person does not fall within the categories enumerated in S.2(ix) of the A.P. Rent Control Act; where the Rent Control Act is silent, definition of "legal representative" in the Civil Procedure Code applies. | The Court cited and relied upon this Division Bench decision as supportive authority for the proposition that legal representatives may be impleaded and eviction petitions are maintainable against them; it reinforced the conclusion that Ramanujam could be impleaded as the legal representative of Rajayya. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise analytical manner grounded in statutory construction and precedent analysis:
- The Court first examined S. 2(ix) of the A.P. Rent Control Act to understand the statutory definition of "tenant" and the three categories explicitly included by that definition: (a) persons by whom rent is payable; (b) surviving spouse/son/daughter who had been living with the tenant as a family member up to the tenant's death; and (c) a person continuing in possession after termination of the tenancy in his favour.
- The Court considered the High Court single-judge decision in N. Sobhanadri (which had applied a narrow interpretation of S.2(ix)) and summarized its holding that persons merely living in the building with the tenant do not become tenants under S.2(ix).
- The Court then confronted the conflict in Supreme Court authority concerning heritability of tenancy: earlier two-judge decisions (Anand Nivas; J.C. Chatterji) had held that statutory tenancy was not heritable and that a statutory tenant had only a personal right. However, Damadilal (a later Supreme Court decision) critically examined the statutory foundations and concluded that heritability cannot be denied without examining the statute; the Court in Damadilal held that statutory tenants may possess heritable interests, and that the later Supreme Court view is binding where there is a conflict between earlier Supreme Court decisions.
- Applying Article 141 principles and precedent hierarchy, the Court held Damadilal (the later Bench) to be binding over the earlier conflicting Supreme Court decisions and thus accepted the proposition that tenancy rights can be heritable.
- The Court also relied on a Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (C.R.P. No. 99 of 1969) which held eviction maintainable against the legal representative of a deceased tenant even if that person is not enumerated in S.2(ix), and that in the absence of a definition of "legal representative" in the Rent Control Act, the Civil P.C. definition applies.
- On these bases the Court concluded that Ramanujam, as a legal representative/heir of the deceased tenant Rajayya and being in occupation, was properly impleaded and entitled to claim tenancy rights by virtue of heritability recognized in Damadilal. Consequently, the Appellate Authority was wrong to hold his appeal not maintainable solely because he did not fall into the categories of S.2(ix).
- Because the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal on maintainability grounds without deciding the merits (notably whether Ramanujam committed wilful default), the Court found it necessary to set aside the Appellate Authority's judgment and remand the appeal for disposal on merits. The Court expressly instructed that the appeal be restored to the Appellate Authority and decided according to law on the substantive issues (including wilful default).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court set aside the Appellate Authority's judgment in R.A. No. 1 of 1976, held that Ramanujam (the revision petitioner) is entitled to claim tenancy rights as heir/legal representative by operation of law, and remanded the appeal to the Appellate Authority for disposal on merits. Civil Revision Petition No. 1324 of 1981 was allowed (without costs); Civil Revision Petition No. 2094 of 1981 was dismissed.
Immediate consequences and practical effects:
- The Appellate Authority must restore R.A. No. 1 of 1976 to its file and decide the appeal on merit (including whether the petitioner committed wilful default), applying the legal position that tenancy rights may be heritable as indicated by the Supreme Court in Damadilal.
- Ramanujam, having been impleaded as the legal representative of the deceased-tenant, has standing to resist eviction and to have substantive issues determined rather than being dismissed on the ground of non-maintainability.
- The High Court expressly held that the earlier High Court single-judge decision in N. Sobhanadri is no longer good law insofar as it conflicts with the Supreme Court's ruling in Damadilal on heritability.
- No costs were awarded to either side in the decisions disposed in this opinion.
Broader legal implication noted by the Court:
- The Court emphasized that where later Supreme Court decisions conflict with earlier ones, the later decision of a bench of equal strength is binding (Article 141) — here leading to acceptance of Damadilal's approach to heritability of tenancy over preceding authority.
Order accordingly.
Punnayya, J.:— Civil Revision Petition No. 1324 of 1981 is directed against the judgment passed by the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, in R.A No. 1 of 1976.
2. One K. Rajayya was the original tenant, who took the premises bearing Nos. 3-4-154 and 3-4-155, Tobacco Bazar, Secunderabad, on a monthly rent of Rupees 100 from the landlord. Rajayya died on 29-1-1971, Rajayya's concubine Seethamma, who has living with Rajayya, at the time of his death, requested the landlord to allow her to continue in the premises in question after the death of Rajayya on the same rent of Rs. 100 per month from 1-2-1971 till she gets an alternative accommodation. The landlord agreed to take Seethamma as his tenant and permitted her to be in the occupation of the suit premises on the same rent of Rs. 100 per month from 1-2-71. As she failed to pay the rents from 1-2-1971 till the end of November, 1972, the landlord got issued a notice on 19-12-1972 terminating the tenancy of Seethamma and asked her to vacate the premises by January, 1973 and demanded her to pay Rupees 2,200 towards arrears of rent. Thereafter the landlord filed eviction petition against Seethamma on the ground of wilful default in the payment of rents. He also took the ground of subletting alleging that Seethamma had sublet the premises to one Ramanujam, the nephew of the original tenant, Rajayya.
3. Seethamma resisted the eviction petition. She denied the landlord's allegation that after the death of Rajayya she requested the landlord to allow her to be in the occupation of the premises in question on the rent of Rs. 100 per month from 1-2-1971 till she gets an alternative accommodation and she asserted that she was not the tenant of the landlord. She also contended that Ramanujam, the nephew of Rajayya is tenant of the suit premises after the death of Rajayya. She, therefore, contended that she did not commit any wilful default nor any sub-letting.
4. Ramanujam filed I.A No. 462 of 1974 for impleading himself requesting the Rent Controller to implead him as respondent No. 2 in the eviction petition R.C No. 38 of 1974. He claimed that he was the nephew of the original tenant, Rajayya and he was living with him at the time of his death and he should, therefore, be treated as the heir of Rajayya and as the statutory tenant. The Rent Controller allowed his petition and impleaded him as second respondent in the above mentioned Eviction Petition as per the order dated 11-10-1974. Ramanujam filed counter, resisting the eviction petition. He contended that he and the first respondent are entitled to occupy the premises under law as of right after the death of the tenant, Rajayya. He also contended that he was paying rents even during the lifetime of Rajayya. He further contended that he filed R.C No. 170/1972 under S. 14 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, hereinafter called as the A.P Rent Control Act, alleging that he was the tenant of the landlord-petitioner's father and the petitioner interfered with his amenities of passage etc. But that petition was dismissed for default. He denied the allegation of the landlord that he was the sub-tenant of Seethamma. He also contended that he was paying rent till Aug., 1972 and later the landlord refused to receive the rents with ulterior motive.
5. The learned Rent Controller held that the second respondent's contention that he is the tenant is barred by res judicata in view of the decision in R.C No. 170 of 1972 as the Rent Controller gave a finding in I.A No. 504 of 1972 in R.C No. 170 of 1972 that the second respondent is not the tenant and that finding binds the second respondent even though R.C No. 170 of 1972 filed by him was dismissed for default. Even on merits the learned Rent Controller held that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between them in respect of the premises occupied by him. But the learned Rent Controller held that the first respondent is the tenant of the petitioner-landlord. He rejected the petitioner's claim of sub-letting. He also held that the first respondent committed default in the payment of rents. On the basis of the finding that the first respondent committed wilful default, the learned Rent Controller allowed the eviction petition and directed both the respondents Seethamma and Ramanujam to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises within two months from the date of the order.
6. Aggrieved with the said order of eviction the second respondent preferred Appeal R.A No. 1 of 1976 before the Chief Judge City Small Causes Court, who is the Appellate Authority. The first respondent did not choose to prefer any appeal. Hence the second respondent-appellant impleaded Seethamma in the appeal. But during the pendency of the appeal Seethamma died.
7. The Appellate Authority did not accept the claim of appellant Ramanujam that he was the tenant by the operation of law under S. 2(ix) of the Act after Rajayya's death, even though he was Rajayya's nephew and living with him as a member of his family, since he does not come under any of the categories of the persons mentioned in S. 2(ix) of the Act. He, therefore, held that Ramanujam is not the tenant of the landlord and hence the appeal filed by him is hot maintainable. In view of the finding that the appeal is not maintainable, the Appellate Authority felt it not necessary to examine the questions whether Seethamma had not sublet the premises to Ramanujam or whether Ramanujam committed wilful default in payment of rents? The Appellate Authority, therefore, dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved with the judgment passed by the Appellate Authority in R.A No. 1 of 1976 Ramanujam preferred this revision.
8. After the dismissal of R.A No. 1 of 1976 the landlord filed E.P No. 18 of 1981 in R.C No. 38 of 1974 before the Rent Controller, Secunderabad, against Ramanujam. Then Ramanujam filed E.A No. 28 of 1981 under R. 23(7) of the Rent Control Rules. In that petition Ramanujam contended that inasmuch as the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority held that he was not the tenant, he cannot be evicted on the basis of the orders passed in R.C No. 38 of 1974, confirmed by the judgment in R.A No. 1 of 1976 and the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to pass orders of eviction against him and as such the E.F is not maintainable and it should, therefore, be dismissed.
9. The landlord contended in his counter that Ramanujam, against whom the eviction order was passed and the same was confirmed by the Appellate Authority is not permitted to take the plea that the eviction petition is not maintainable since he got himself impleaded in the eviction petition even though the landlord did not implead him and hence he is bound by the eviction order and it is not open to him to take inconsistent plea that he is not the tenant and the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to pass eviction order.
10. The Rent Controller took the view that Ramanujam is not a third party but he got himself impleaded as party in R.C No. 38 of 1974 as the second respondent and hence he is bound by the orders passed in R.C No. 38 of 1974 and confirmed by the Appellate Authority in R.A No. 1 of 1976. He therefore, observed that the provisions of R. 23(7) are not available to Ramanujam and dismissed the E.A No. 28 of 1981. Aggrieved with that order Ramanujam filed C.R.P No. 2094 of 1981.
11. The two revisions came for hearing before Muktadar, J. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner contended that the authorities below have no jurisdiction to order for eviction of the revision petitioner when they came to the conclusion that the revision petitioner was not the tenant and when under the Rent Control Act the Rent Controller has jurisdiction to pass orders of eviction only against a tenant. The counsel appearing for the landlord, on the other hand, contended before the learned single Judge that since Ramanujam got himself impleaded in the eviction petition claiming himself to be the tenant of the landlord, he is bound by the decision of the authorities below when the order for eviction is passed from the premises after holding that he was not the tenant. Brother Muktadar, J., entertained a doubt wheher the authorities below were correct in passing orders of eviction under the Rent Control Act when they gave a finding that the revision petitioner was not the tenant of the landlord and there was no assignment of tenancy, nor he was a sub-tenant of the landlord. The learned single Judge, therefore, felt that a question of importance is involved, and hence, it should be decided by a Bench, and thus he referred the matter to a Bench. Thus the matter came before us.
12. Sri Surya Gupta appearing for the revision petitioner contends that the authorities below did not consider the provisions of S. 2(ix) of the Act in their proper perspective and are erroneous in not taking Ramanujam as the tenant by operation of law even though he is the heir of the original tenant, Rajayya and was living with him at the time of death in the premises and the definition of the tenant should not be restricted to the tenant, his surviving spouse or son or daughter of the deceased son who had been living with the tenant in the building as member of the tenant's family up to the death of the tenant, and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour.
13. Sri Sankararao, appearing for the landlord, on the other hand, contends that the landlord filed the eviction petition against Seethamma but not against Ramanujam. But Ramanujam got himself impleaded as the 2nd respondent in the eviction petition R.C No. 38/1974 after obtaining orders on 11-10-1974 in I.A No. 462/1974. He, therefore, contends that he is bound by the orders of eviction passed by the authorities below and the Authorities below were justified under law in ordering for eviction of Ramanujam from the premises after holding that he is not a tenant and hence it is not open to Ramanujam to take inconsistent stand in the execution petition and plead that he is not the tenant and that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to pass orders of eviction against him.
14. Before we deal with the several contentions raised by both the sides, we would like to consider the scope and effect of the provisions of S. 2(ix) of the Act, which give the definition of the tenant. S. 2(ix) of the Act reads as follows:—
“Tenant” means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son or daughter, of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the building as member of the tenant's family up to the death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building, by its tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in a public market, cartstand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been framed out or leased by a local authority.”
15. This definition would make it clear that (1) a person by whom rent is payable or on whose account rent is payable for a building is treated as a tenant, (2) if such a tenant dies, his surviving spouse or his son or daughter who had been living with him in the building as a family member up to his death; and (3) if the tenant continues to be in possession even after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, he can also be treated as tenant.
16. Chennakesay Reddy, J., had an occasion to consider the ambit of the definition of the word ‘tenant’ in S. 2(ix) of the Act in N. Sobhanadri v. Md. Abdul Basheer, AIR 1978 Andh Pra 277. In that case one Krishnamachari was the tenant. He died unmarried. His brother Venkatachari, the father of the petitioners 2 to 4 survived him. The petitioners were living in the house along with their uncle Krishnamachari, the deceased till his death as members of joint Hindu family. After the death of Krishnamachari the petitioners tendered rent, but the landlord refused to receive the same. Thereafter, the rent was sent by money order, but it was also refused. Once again the petitioners remitted the rents due for the months of February and Mar. 1977 but they were also refused. Then the petitioners issued a registered notice on 22-4-1974 calling upon the landlord to specify the Bank with his account number in which the rents can be deposited by them. But the landlord did not give any reply. Hence the petitioners filed an application before the Rent Controller under S. 8(5) of the Act. The landlord resisted this application on the ground that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between them either by agreement or by operation of law and that the petitioners were not the tenants within the meaning of S. 2(ix) of the Act after the death of the tenant Krishnamachari. The Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority upheld the contention of the landlord and refused to treat the petitioners as tenants, as the tenants fall within the meaning of S. 2(ix) of the Act and refused to grant permission under S. 8(5) of the Act to deposit the rents in the court. The petitioners were, therefore, aggrieved with the concurrent, findings of the Authorities below and preferred a revision. It is in that context that the learned single Judge examined the ambit of the definition of the word ‘tenant’ given under S. 2(ix) of the Act and held that the petitioners do not fall within the persons mentioned in the definition of S. 2(ix) of the Act and observed as follows (at p. 278):—
“The definition which extends the tenancy which is otherwise extinguished on death includes only three classes of persons, viz., surviving spouse, son or daughter. Even for these three classes of persons, further limitation is placed for their becoming a statutory tenant. It is that they should be living with the tenant as members of his family at the time of his death. So a member of the household or friend merely living in the building along with the statutory tenant at the time of the death of the tenant cannot be held to be a tenant within the meaning of the definition of “tenant”.
17. Sri Surya Gupta, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the leasehold rights are heritable and as such Ramanujam who was the legal representative of the deceased-tenant, can be treated as a statutory tenant. In support of his contention he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Damadilal v. Parashram, AIR 1976 SC 2229.
18. As against this contention Shri Shankar Rao contends that in the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in An and Nivas v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi, AIR 1965 SC 414, and J.C Chatterji v. Shri Krishna Tandon, AIR 1972 SC 2526 it was held that the leasehold rights are not heritable and hence any legal representative of the deceased tenants is not entitled to be treated as a statutory tenant and it is only those persons, who are specifically mentioned in the definition of the tenant given in S. 2(ix) of the Act that are entitled to claim as statutory tenant.
19. In Anand Nivas v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi, (AIR 1965 SC 414) (supra) the Supreme Court dealt with Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 as amended in 1959. The question there was whether a tenant whose tenancy had been terminated had any right to sub-let the premises. Their Lordships, Hidayatullah, and Shah, JJ., held that the statutory tenant meaning a tenant whose tenancy was determined but who continues in possession has no power of sub-letting. Their Lordships observed that a person remaining in occupation of the premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly, though in law not accurately, called a statutory tenant. Such a person is not tenant at all; he has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the statute in that he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and performs the other conditions of the tenancy.
His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal; it is not capable of being transferred or assigned, and devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. The right of a lessee from a landlord on the other hand is an estate or interest in the premises and in the absence of a contract to the contrary is transferable and the premises may be sublet by him. But with the determination of the lease, unless the tenant acquired the right of a tenant holding over, by acceptance of rent or by assent to his continuing in possession by the landlord the terms and conditions of the lease are extinguished and the rights of such a person remaining in possession are governed by the statute clone. His Lordship Sri Sarkar, J., rendered dissenting judgment.
20. In J.C Chatterji v. Shri Krishna Tandon (AIR 1972 SC 2526) (supra) the Supreme Court dealt with Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950. The question for decision was whether on the death of a statutory tenant his heirs succeed to the tenancy so as to claim protection of the Act. In this case it was held that after the termination of contractual tenancy, a statutory tenant enjoys only a personal right to continue in possession and on his death his heirs do not inherit any estate or interest in the original tenancy.
21. Both the cases proceed on the basis that, a tenant whose tenancy had been determined but who continues in possession is described as a statutory tenant having no estate or interest in the premises except a personal right to remain in occupation and the tenancy rights are not heritable.
22. In Damadilal's case (AIR 1976 SC 2229) supra Sheo Prasad and Tirath Prasad were members of a Hindu Joint Family and they brought a suit for ejectment on July, 31, 1962, against their tenants, Beganal and Budharmal on the grounds mentioned in cls. (a) and (f) of S. 12(I) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, which provides under clause (a) for the eviction of a tenant if the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served on him by the Landlord in the prescribed manner and under clause (f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned.
23. The plaintiff's case under S. 12(1)(a) was that the defendants-tenants had defaulted in paying rent for the period Oct. 1, 1961 to May 31, 1962 and did not also pay or tender the amount in arrears within two months of the service of the notice of demand. The plaintiff's case under cl. (f) was that the accommodation was required bona fide by the plaintiff's for the purpose of starting their own business. Before the suit was instituted the plaintiffs had determined the tenancy from May 31, 1962 by a notice dated May 7, 1962. The house in dispute was let out to the defendants on a monthly rent of Rs. 275/- for the purpose of their business. The trial Court by its judgment and decree dated Nov. 11, 1974 dismissed the suit for eviction. The plaintiffs were, therefore, aggrieved with the decision of the Rent Controller and preferred appeal. The Appellate Authority reversed the decision of the trial court and decreed the suit. The defendants were therefore aggrieved with the decision of the Appellate Court and preferred the second appeal in the High Court.
24. During the pendency of the second appeal in the High Court both the tenants died. Budharmal died on or about Jan. 27, 1966 and his legal representatives were brought on record and substituted in his place without objection. Begamal died on March 2, 1967 and his heirs applied for being brought on record in his place as appellants. The plaintiffs made an application praying for an order that the appeal had abated as a consequence of the death of both the defendants. In this application the plaintiffs contended that Budharmal and Begamal were “merely statutory tenants and their right to resist ejectment on the basis of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Act was merely a personal right”, which was not heritable and had “not devolved upon their heirs”. By its order dated July 26, 1967 the High Court allowed the application for substitution made by Begamal's heirs overruling the plaintiff's objection. Ultimately on Nov. 6, 1967 the High Court allowed the appeal setting aside the decree of the lower Appellate Court and restoring the decree of the trial court dismissing the suit. The plaintiffs once again preferred appeal before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High Court.
25. Before the Supreme Court Mr. Gupta for the plaintiffs-appellants raised three contentions, out of which the first contention is relevant for the purpose of these revisions. That contention was that Begamal and Budharamal both of whom were statutory tenants had no heritable interest in the demised premises and on their death, the right to prosecute the appeal in the High Court did not survive to their heirs and legal representatives. In support of his contention Mr. Gupta relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Anand Niwas v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi (AIR 1965 SC 414) (supra) and J.C Chatterji v. Shri Krishna Tandon (AIR 1972 SC 2526) (supra).
26. Their Lordships considered the decisions in these two cases and ultimately observed as follows (para 11 of AIR 1976 SC 2229):—
“We find it difficult to appreciate how in this country we can proceed on the basis that a tenant whose contractual tenancy has determined but who is protected against eviction by the statute, has no right of property but only a personal right to remain in occupation, without ascertaining what his rights are under statute. The concept of a statutory tenant having no estate or property in the premises which he occupies is derived from the provisions of the English Rent Acts. But it is not clear how it can be assumed that the position is the same in this country without any reference to the provisions of the relevant statute. Tenancy has its origin in contract. There is no dispute that a contractual tenant has an estate or property in the subject matter of the tenancy and heritability is an incident of the tenancy. It cannot be assumed, however, that with the determination of the tenancy the estate must necessarily disappear and the statute can only preserve his status of irremovability and not the estate he had in the premises in his occupation. It is not possible to claim that the “sanctity” of contract cannot be touched by legislation. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Act, 1961 to find out whether the respondent predecessors-in-interest retained a heritable interest in the disputed premises even after the termination of their tenancy”.
27. Their Lordships further held as follows (at p. 2236 of AIR 1976 SC):
“The concept of statutory tenancy under the English Rent Acts and under the Indian statutes like the one we are concerned with in this appeal rests on different foundations. It must, therefore, be held that the predecessors-in-interest of the present respondents had a heritable interest in the premises and consequently the respondents had the right to prosecute the appeal in the High Court. Mr. Gupta's first submission thus fails”.
28. Their Lordships, therefore, deprecated the difference between the contractual tenancy and the statutory tenancy with regard to the heritability of the tenancy, when the tenancy has its origin in contract. According to their Lordships there is no dispute that a contractual tenant has an estate or property in the subject matter of the tenancy and heritability is an incident of the tenancy. It cannot be assumed, however, that with the determination of the tenancy the estate must necessarily disappear and the statute can only preserve his status of irremovability and not the estate which he had in the premises in his occupation.
29. Thus the legal position on this aspect is clear; where a tenant dies, his legal heir is entitled to claim tenancy rights by operation of law in respect of the premises for which the deceased was the tenant, even though he does not come under any of the categories of persons enumerated in S. 2(ix) of the Rent Control Act. This right is conferred on a statutory tenant by virtue of the incident of heritability just as it is available in the case of a contractual tenant.
30. Sri Shankar Rao contends that their Lordships of the Supreme Court rendered this decision with reference to S. 2(i) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 read with S. 14 of the same Act and hence it has no application to the case on hand.
31. We find it difficult to accept this contention in view of the proposition of law laid down by their Lordships in this case. In that case, as stated above the main controversy was the question of heritability of the tenancy after the death of the deceased tenant. In the earlier decisions in Anand Niwas v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi (AIR 1965 SC 414) (supra) and J.C Chatterji v. Shrikrishna Tandon (AIR 1972 SC 2526) (supra) their Lordships unequivocally held that the tenancy under rent Acts is not at all heritable and with the determination of the tenancy the estate disappears and the statute can preserve only his status of irremovability. But in Damadilal v. Parashram (AIR 1976 SC 2229) (supra) their Lordships declined to follow the view taken in Anand Niwas v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi (supra) and J.C Chatterji v. Shri Krishna Tandon (supra) with regard to the heritability. Their Lordships, on the other hand, positively laid down that just as the contractual tenant, the statutory tenant also has an estate or property in the subject matter of the tenancy and the heritability is an incident of the tenancy.
Thus there is a conflict of view taken in Anand Niwas v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi (supra) and J.C Chatterji v. Shri Krishna Tandon (supra) and the case in Damadi Lal v. Parashram (supra). It is now well settled that Art. 141 gives a constitutional status to the theory of the precedents in respect of the law declared by the Supreme Court, which is essential for proper administration of justice. Where there is conflict between the two decisions of the Supreme Court given by Judges of equal strength, the decision of the later Bench would be binding. If that be so, the decision, in Damadilal's case (supra) will prevail over the ruling in J.C Chatterji's case (supra) which was rendered by a Bench of two Judges, the ruling in Damadilal's case prevails.
32. Besides the decision of the Supreme Court in Damadilal's case we have the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, which is also helpful to the case on hand. The Division Bench of this Court in C.R.P No. 99 of 1969 dated 24-4-1970 held that an application for eviction was maintainable against the legal representative of the deceased tenant though it does not come within the categories of persons mentioned in S. 2(ix) of the A.P Rent Control Act as S. 24(2) of the Rent Control Act permits that an eviction petition can be filed against the legal representative of the tenant.
33. The legal representative is not defined by the Rent Control Act. It is, therefore, clear that even though Ramanujam was not the tenant, he is in the occupation of the premises as the nephew of the deceased tenant-Rajayya. Hence he claims to be the legal representative of the deceased-tenant, Rajayya. Obviously he does not come under the categories of persons mentioned in S. 2(ix) of the Rent Control Act. But there cannot be any doubt that as the nephew of the deceased tenant, he would come under the legal representative as defined in S. 2(11) of the Civil P.C as there is no definition of legal representative in the A.P Rent Control Act. The Division Bench of this court in the above Civil Revision Petition held that where the Rent Control Act is silent the definition of legal representative given in the Civil P.C applies. The above cited ruling of the Division Bench also makes it clear that an eviction petition is maintainable against the legal representative of the deceased tenant even though he does not come under the category of persons mentioned in S. 2(ix) of the Rent Control Act.
34. Thus it is clear that inasmuch as Ramanujam is the legal representative of the deceased tenant (Rajayya) he was rightly impleaded as the second respondent in the eviction petition. Even the decision of the Supreme Court in Damadilal's case (AIR 1976 SC 2229) (supra) laid down that a legal heir can be brought on record in an eviction petition and he is entitled to claim tenancy rights of the deceased-tenant by virtue of the heritability.
35. In view of this legal position, the contention of Sri Surya Gupta that the revision petitioner is entitled to claim tenancy rights from the deceased-tenant, on the ground of heritability, is well founded. The revision petitioner is, therefore, entitled to resist the eviction petition and his appeal is, therefore, maintainable.
36. As we have followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Damadilal's case (supra), we have to hold that the decision of the single Judge in N. Sobhanadri v. Md. Abdul Basheer (AIR 1978 Andh Pra 277) (supra) of this Court is no more a good law.
37. Since the tenancy is heritable as laid down by the Supreme Court in Damadilal's case (supra) and the revision petitioner has been in occupation of the premises, which were taken by the deceased-tenant under the agreement of tenancy, he is entitled to claim tenancy rights in respect of that premises as the heir of the deceased tenant. As the petitioner is a statutory tenant, it is open to the landlord to evict the petitioner under any one of the grounds mentioned in S. 10 of the A.P Rent Control Act and it is again open to the revision petitioner to resist it. The eviction petition was filed on the ground of wilful default. The revision petitioner contends that he has not committed wilful default in the payment of rents. Neither the Rent Controller nor the Appellate Authority gave a decision whether the petitioner committed wilful default or not, though the petitioner adduced evidence and filed documents in support of his contention that he is not a defaulter. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal only on the ground that the appeal is not maintainable. As we held that the appeal is maintainable, we have to remand the matter to the Appellate Authority for disposal on merits. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the Appellate Authority and remand the matter to the Appellate Authority. We direct the Appellate Authority to restore the appeal on its file and dispose of it in accordance with law.
C.R.P No. 1324/81:
38. In view of the order of remand, the Civil Revision Petition No. 1324 of 1981 is allowed, but without costs.
C.R.P No. 2094 of 1981:
39. As the orders of the Rent Controller as confirmed by the Appellate Authority are set aside and the matter is remanded to the Appellate Authority with the direction that the appeal should be restored to his file and it should be disposed of on merits, no orders need be passed in this revision petition. It is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.
Order accordingly.
Alert