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Venkateswara Stone Co. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, A.P

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Feb 2, 1978
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Factual and Procedural Background

Under a partnership deed dated 3 May 1971, Messrs. Venkateswara Stone Company was constituted with 15 partners. One partner, T. Linga Reddi, died on 29 September 1972. A new partnership deed was executed on 6 June 1973 but made retrospective effect from 30 September 1972; under that deed the two widows of the deceased were admitted and the new firm had 16 partners. The business continued to be carried on in the same name, and the partnership books were not closed on 29 September 1972 but were continued and closed on 31 December 1972. The partners apportioned profits up to 29 September 1972 according to the old deed and profits for 30 September–31 December 1972 according to the new deed. Separate returns were filed for the two periods (income Rs. 70,674 for the first period and Rs. 24,154 for the subsequent period). A declaration for continuation of registration under Section 184(7) was filed for the old partnership; the new firm declared itself as unregistered.

The Income-tax Officer assessed the entire income for the period 1 January 1972 to 31 December 1972 in the assessee's hands, concluding there was no dissolution on the death of Linga Reddi. This view was upheld by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and by the Appellate Tribunal. The assessee referred the question to the court, asking whether the partnership constituted on 30 September 1972 should be treated as distinct and separate from the partnership that existed up to 29 September 1972 and whether its income could be taxed separately.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the partnership firm which came into existence on 30 September 1972 after the death of partner Shri T. Linga Reddi is distinct and separate from the partnership which was in existence till 29 September 1972, and whether the income of that (new) firm is liable to be taxed separately.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments (Mr. Anjaneyulu)

  • The death of a partner operates to dissolve the firm by operation of law in the absence of any agreement to the contrary (relying on Clause (c) of Section 42 of the Indian Partnership Act).
  • The partnership deed dated 6 June 1973 (retrospective to 30 September 1972) contains recitals referring to continuation of the business but does not contain any express agreement that the firm would continue notwithstanding the death of a partner; therefore the firm stood dissolved on the death.
  • The subsequent partnership constituted from 30 September 1972 was a distinct and separate firm; the mere continuance of business or carrying on business under the same name does not by itself prove that the firm continued.
  • Relied upon the Full Bench decision of this court in Addl. Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vinayaka Cinema to support the proposition that Section 187 (and not Section 188) does not apply where dissolution occurs by operation of law on the death of a partner and a new firm is subsequently constituted.

Revenue's Arguments (Mr. Rama Rao)

  • There need not be an express contract to prevent dissolution on death; such a contract may be implied from the conduct of the parties.
  • The conduct of the partners indicated that there was no dissolution: the business was not discontinued on death, partnership accounts were not closed on the date of death, and no separate books of account were opened for the subsequent period.
  • On that basis the Tribunal concluded there was effectively a change in the constitution of the firm rather than a dissolution and subsequent new firm; this view aligns with authorities construing Section 187 and related provisions (the revenue also relied on earlier cases including Veeraraghavulu Chetty and Venugopal Rice decisions).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Addl. Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vinayaka Cinema (Full Bench) Held that where a partner dies and the firm is dissolved, it cannot be regarded as merely a change in constitution; interpreted Section 187 (and Section 188) in that context. The court regarded the Full Bench's view as governing the present case and applied it to conclude that the new partnership constituted after death was distinct and separate from the prior firm; relied on this decision to answer the reference in favour of the assessee.
Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. Visakha Flour Mills [1977] 108 ITR 466 (AP) Affirmed the Division Bench view in T. Veeraraghavulu Chetty's case regarding change in constitution where new partners are introduced and the business continues with assets and liabilities; considered interplay of Section 187 provisions. The Visakha Flour Mills Full Bench decision was cited as part of the chain of authorities considered by the court; the court noted it affirmed the Division Bench decision in Veeraraghavulu Chetty but distinguished those facts from the present case because those did not involve a death causing dissolution by operation of law.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. T. Veeraraghavulu Chetty & Sons Co. [1975] 100 ITR 723 (AP) Where partners are added and the business continues with the same assets and liabilities, it is a change in constitution and the entire income for the year is to be assessed as one under Section 187(2)(a); Section 188 does not apply because there is no succession of a new firm to an old firm. The court treated Veeraraghavulu Chetty as the authority on situations of mere change in constitution, but distinguished it from the present facts because that case did not involve dissolution by death; the present case was held to be governed by the Full Bench (Vinayaka Cinema) which dealt with death-induced dissolution.
Sri Venugopal Rice, Turmeric and Polish Mill v. Income-tax Officer (I.T.A. 404 (Hyderabad), 68-69) Authority dealing with a firm where one partner died and his son was taken in as partner holding the same share; Tribunal's approach to succession and continuity of assets and liabilities was considered. Cited as part of the factual matrix and earlier Tribunal decisions which informed the courts' consideration of succession/change in constitution issues; used in the chain of precedent reviewed by the Full Benches.
Nandlal Sohanlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Punjab & Haryana High Court) A Full Bench of that High Court, by majority, took a view contrary to the Full Bench majority in Vinayaka Cinema regarding the question of continuation/succession when a partner dies. The revenue cited this contrary Full Bench decision and urged reference to a larger (seven-judge) Bench. The court declined that course and explained that, in its view, the Full Bench decision of this court (Vinayaka Cinema) governs the matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the partnership deed's recitals and the statutory background. It identified Clause (c) of Section 42 of the Indian Partnership Act, which provides that, subject to contract between the partners, a firm is dissolved by the death of a partner. The central analytical steps were:

  1. Examined the partnership deed recitals and terms: the deed referred to continuation of the business but did not contain an express provision that the firm shall continue notwithstanding the death of a partner.
  2. Considered whether an implied contract (or an implied intention during the deceased partner's lifetime) prevented dissolution on death. The court found no evidence that during Linga Reddi's lifetime the partners had agreed (expressly or impliedly) that the firm would not be dissolved on death.
  3. Addressed the significance of the partners' post-death conduct (accounts not closed, business continued, no separate books): the court held that these facts alone do not establish an implied contract that the firm would not be dissolved by death.
  4. Reviewed controlling precedents: the court analysed the decisions in Veeraraghavulu Chetty, Visakha Flour Mills and the Full Bench in Vinayaka Cinema. It noted that Veeraraghavulu Chetty dealt with addition of partners during the year (no death) and held such situations to be mere changes in constitution assessable as a single firm under Section 187. The Full Bench in Vinayaka Cinema distinguished Veeraraghavulu Chetty on the basis that the latter did not concern dissolution by operation of law on death; Vinayaka held that where the firm is dissolved due to death it cannot be treated as mere change in constitution.
  5. Applied the Full Bench principle: because the present facts showed no clause preventing dissolution on death and were similar to the facts considered in the Full Bench's Vinayaka Cinema decision, the court concluded Vinayaka governs the present dispute.
  6. Rejected the revenue's request for reference to a larger Bench despite a contrary Punjab & Haryana authority (Nandlal Sohanlal), concluding that the Full Bench decision of this court should be followed.

In short: absence of an express agreement (and absence of convincing evidence of an implied agreement) that the firm would survive a partner's death, together with the Full Bench authority, led the court to conclude the original firm was dissolved on the death and the post-death partnership constituted a distinct firm.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court answered the reference in favour of the assessee and held that the partnership firm which came into existence on 30 September 1972 is distinct and separate from the partnership which was in existence up to 29 September 1972, meaning the income of the new firm is liable to be taxed separately.

Direct consequences and practical effect:

  • The assessment treating the entire year's income as assessable to the earlier firm was set aside as contrary to the court's conclusion: the two periods may be treated separately for tax assessment purposes in accordance with the finding that two distinct firms existed for the respective periods.
  • No costs were awarded; an advocate's fee of Rs. 250 was directed.

Broader implications: The opinion relied on and followed the existing Full Bench authority (Addl. Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vinayaka Cinema) to resolve the present question. The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond applying those precedents; it does not discuss any broader change in the law beyond the direct effect on the parties.

Show all summary ...

1. This reference at the instance of the assessee raises the question whether Section 187 or 188 of the Income-tax Act applies. Mr. Anjaneyulu, the learned counsel appearing for the assessee, relying upon the Full Bench decision of this court in Addl, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vinayaka Cinema contended the Section 187 does not apply to a situation where a firm is dissolved by the operation of law on account of the death of one of the partners, and that the fact that the partners of the dissolved firm continued the same business as before by taking in one or more partners by fresh agreement will not bring the case under Section 187 of the Act.

2. The facts leading to this reference are these :

Under a deed of partnership dated May 3, 1971, the firm of Messrs. Venkateswara Stone Company, Kasturpalli, came into existence with 15 partners. The deceased, Linga Reddi, who was one of the partners of the firm, died on September 29, 1972. A new partnership firm came into existence under a fresh partnership deed executed on June 6, 1973, with retrospective effect from September 30, 1972. The two widows of Linga Reddi were admitted as partners into the new firm with effect from September 30, 1972. This firm consisted of 16 partners as against 15 partners of the previous firm. The business was carried on in the name of Messrs. Venkateswara Stone Company. The books of account were not closed on September 29, 1972, on the date when Linga Reddi died. They were continued till December 31, 1972, when the accounts of the partnership firm were closed for that calendar year. By mutual consent of the parties, the profits up to September 29, 1972, were apportioned on time basis and disbursed among the partners in accordance with the earlier partnership deed dated May 3, 1971. The profits of the subsequent period September 30,1972, to December 31, 1972, were also ascertained on the same basis and distributed among the partners in accordance with the second deed of partnership dated June 6, 1973. The firm filed a return for the first period declaring an income of Rs. 70,674 and a separate return for the subsequent period September 30, 1972, to December 31, 1972, declaring an income of Rs. 24,154. Along with the first return of income the assessee also filed a declaration for continuation of registration under Section 184(7) of the Act. That was in respect of the partnership which was in existence till September 29, 1972. The income of the newly constituted firm was declared in the status of an unregistered firm. The claim of the assessee was that in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the partnership which was constituted under the deed dated May 3, 1971, came to be dissolved by the operation of law on the death of Linga Reddi and that the partnership which came into existence subsequently with effect from September 30, 1972, was a distinct and separate one. The Income-tax Officer negatived the contention that there were two separate firms and assessed the entire income for the period from January 1, 1972, to December 31, 1972, in the assessee's hands holding that there was in fact no dissolution of the firm on the death of Linga Reddi. That view was upheld both by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal. Hence, at the instance of the assessee, the following question was referred to this court for its opinion :

"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the partnership firm which came into existence on September 30, 1972, after the death of partner, Shri T. Linga Reddi, can be considered as distinct and separate from the partnership which was in existence till September 29, 1972, and the income of that firm is liable to be taxed separately ?"

3. Mr. Anjaneyulu contended that a scrutiny of the recitals in the partnership deed dated June 6, 1973, would clearly bring out the fact that there was no agreement to the contrary between the deceased and the surviving partners for the continuance of the firm and, as such, the Tribunal erred in holding that there was no dissolution of the firm on the death of a partner. Before we refer to the provisions of law and the decisions relied upon by Mr. Rama Rao, the learned counsel for the revenue, and Mr. Anjaneyulu, the learned counsel for the assessee, it may be useful to refer to the relevant recitals in the partnership deed dated June 6, 1973 :

"Whereas the business of working up of quarries Nos. 1 and 2 at Gandlepally and quarry in Survey No. 662 at Angadi Raichur by excavating stones, etc., and selling the same under the name and style of M/s. Sri Venkateswara Stone Co. was carried on at Gandlepally and Angadi Raichur with head office at Kasturpally, in partnership by the parties of the first 14 parts along with Shri T. Linga Reddi on terms and conditions incorporated in the deed of partnership dated 3rd May, 1971, till 29th September, 1972, on which date the said T. Linga Reddi died.

AND WHEREAS with effect from 30th September, 1972, the said business is continued in partnership by the parties referred to hereinabove, the parties of the first 14 parts having agreed to take up the party of the 15th part, namely, Smt. T. Bhagya Devi w/o late T. Linga Reddi, as partner, to which she has also agreed on terms and conditions mutually agreed upon with 6%, 11%, 6%, 3%, 6%, 6%. 8%, 4%, 9%, 11%, 5%. 5%, 11%, 2% and 2% respectively.

And whereas the parties hereto hereby agree to continue the said business on the said terms and conditions in future.

AND WHEREAS the parties hereto are desirous of reducing to writing and recording hereunder the terms and conditions so mutually agreed Upon between them.

NOW THIS DEED WITNESSETH THAT the parties hereto mutually agree, declare and covenant as follows :

1. That the name of the partnership business shall continue to be M/s. Venkateswara Stone Co.

2. That the business of the firm shall continue to be that of working up of the quarries Nos. 1 and 2 of the Gandlepally and quarry in Survey No. 662 of Angadi Raichur, by excavating stones, etc., and selling the same and doing allied business or any other quarries which may be obtained in future.

3. That the business of the firm shall continue to be carried on at Gandlepalli and Angadi Raichur wherein the quarries are situated but for all purposes the office of the firm shall be at Kasturpalli, Post Revalapalli, Taluk Kodangal, District Mahaboobnagar. If needed, the business may be extended to any other place or places as may be agreed upon by the partners.

4. The capital of the firm shall be the amount standing to the credit of the parties. Additional capital required may either be supplied by the partners or may be borrowed from outside. The partners shall not be entitled to interest on their capital."

4. The learned counsel for the assessee contends that nowhere in the deed of partnership do we get that, notwithstanding the death of a partner, there shall be no dissolution of the firm. The terms of the partnership deed only refer to the continuance of the business of that firm and not continuance of the firm as such. Relying upon the recital "that the business of the firm shall continue to be carried on", Mr. Anjaneyulu contended that so long as there is nothing to indicate that the dissolution of the firm shall not occur in the event of the death of one of the partners the firm gets automatically dissolved on the death of a partner by virtue of Clause (c) of Section 42 of the Indian Partnership Act. In this connection, it is contended by Mr. Rama Rao for the revenue that a contract to the contrary need not be expressed and it could be implied, and that having regard to the conduct of the parties, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that there was no dissolution of the firm and it was only a case of a change in the constitution of the firm. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the revenue invited our attention to the inference drawn by the Tribunal, namely, that on the death of Linga Reddi, the business of the firm was not discontinued, the partnership accounts were not closed for profit and loss and no separate books of accounts were opened for the subsequent period. It is on these grounds that the Tribunal concluded that "in effect, the partners of the firm never thought of dissolution of the firm". The test in a case of this nature is to see whether there was any implied contract between the deceased and the other partners that the partnership shall continue notwithstanding the death of any one of them. None of the lower authorities had directed itself to this aspect of the case. Section 42 of the Partnership Act to the extent relevant reads :

"42. (c) Subject to contract between the partners a firm is dissolved by the death of a partner."

5. There was no express contract between the partners. There is also nothing to suggest that the conduct of the partners was such that during the lifetime of Linga Reddi they intended there would be no dissolution of the firm by reason of the death of a partner. The mere fact that no separate sets of accounts were opened or that the accounts were not closed for profit and loss will not by itself establish that there was a contract to the contrary between the partners that the firm shall not get dissolved on the death of one of them. A Full Bench of five judges of this court in Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vinayaka Cinema had to consider the question whether Section 187 or 188 of the Act would be applicable in the case of a dissolution of a firm by operation of law. As the correctness of the view of the Full Bench of three judges of this court in Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. Visakha Flour Mills [1977] 108 ITR 466 (AP) was canvassed, the Bench of five judges was constituted/ Mr. Rama Rao in this connection invited our attention to the fact that both the Full Benches (Full Bench of three judges in Addl. Commissioner of Income-tax v. Visakha Flow Mills [1977] 108 ITR 466 (AP) and the Full Bench of five judges in Addl. Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vinayaka Cinema , had affirmed an earlier decision of a Bench of this court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. T. Veeraraghavulu Chetty & Sons Co. , to which one of us (Chief Justice) was a party. Kondaiah J., speaking for the Full Bench in Visakha Flour Mills' case [1977] 108 ITR 466 (AP), followed the view expressed by the Division Bench in Veeraraghavulu Chetty's case . In deciding that case, the Tribunal followed its earlier decision in another case, Sri Venugopal Rice, Turmeric and Polish Mill v. Income-tax Officer (I.T.A. 404 (Hyderabad), 68-69). In that firm, there were 19 partners and one of them died. A subsequent deed was drawn up, the only change effected being that in the place of the deceased partner, his son was taken as a partner into the same share in profit and loss. In Veeraraghavulu Chetty's case , there was no death of any partner, but the assets and liabilities belonging to the old firm were taken over by the new firm. Veeraraghavulu Chetty's firm continued with four partners up to October 29, 1965, and on October 30, 1965, three more partners were added. All the previous partners continued to remain as partners and continued the business till the end of the accounting year. The business as such continued with the same assets and liabilities. On the facts aforesaid, the Division Bench held :

"Where some partners are added and the business as such is continued with the assets and liabilities of the old firm, it is a case of change in the constitution of the firm and the income of the firm for the entire assessment year is liable for a single assessment. The assessment should be made on the firm as constituted at the time of assessment under Section 187(2)(a). Section 188 does not apply to such firm inasmuch as there is no question of the new firm succeeding to the old one and the income and business of the old firm continued as such throughout the accounting year."

6. That decision was affirmed by the Full Bench in Visakha Flour Mills' case [1977] 108 ITR 466 (AP). The Division Bench decision was also affirmed by the Full Bench of five judges in Vinayaka Cinema's case . Divan C.J., who spoke for the majority, referring to Veeraraghavulu Chetty's case , observed thus (page 492);

"In Commissioner of Income-lax v. T. Veeraraghavulu Chetty & Sons , a Division Bench of this court consisting of Obul Reddy C.J. and Sriramulu J. dealt with a situation where there was introduction of new partners in the midst of the accounting year. They were not dealing with a situation where a firm was dissolved because of the provisions of the Partnership Act, and it was held that the- entire income of the firm for the whole year was to be assessed instead of two separate assessments and the conclusion of the learned judges of the Division Bench is correct in the light of the fact that the case was clearly governed by the provisions of Section 187(1) as interpreted by us."

7. What Mr. Rama Rao contended is that the decision of this court in Veeraraghavulu Chetty's case [1975] 100 1TR 723 {AP) was based not only on the facts of that case, but also on the facts of the case of Venugopal Rice, Turmeric and Polish Mill Contractors Co. (ITA 404/1968-69), where one of the partners died. The fact, however, remains that so far as Veeraraghavulu Chetty's case was concerned, there was no death of a partner and obviously it is for that reason that in Vinayaha Cinema's case , the Full Bench by majority affirmed that decision. In this reference, we are concerned with the applicability of Vinayaka Cinema's case . We may, therefore, refer to the facts of that case. That was a case where for running a cinema business a partnership had come into existence under a deed dated April 29, 1967. There were 9 partners including one Srinivasulu and his son, Kamalakara Rao. Kamalakara Rao was a major at the relevant time and was the managing partner of the firm. Srinivasulu had gifted away four out of twelve shares that he held in the firm to his daughter, Smt. Y. V. Ramani, and had formed a sub-partnership with her in the firm. That sub-partnership also was recognised by the income-tax department and assessments were made separately in respect of the father and daughter in respect of their respective share incomes. Srinivasulu died on August 17, 1968, and on that very day another partner, Subbarama Reddy, retired from the firm after gifting away his interest in the firm's business to one K. Panchala Lakshmamma. There was no clause in the partnership deed dated April 29, 1967, providing that, in the event of the death of one of the partners, the firm was not to be dissolved. Hence, as a result of the death of Srinivasulu, the old partnership firm stood dissolved under the provisions of the Partnership Act. By deed dated August 19,,1968, a new partnership firm was constituted and under the new partnership deed, seven of the partners of the old firm together with two new partners, viz., Smt. Y. V. Ramani and K. Panchala Lakshmamma, started a new partnership firm. This new firm was also registered under the Income-tax Act. For the assessment year 1969-70, two separate returns were filed, one for the period April 1, 1968, to August 17, 1968, and the other for the period August 18, 1968, to March 31, 1969. The question that was ultimately referred on those facts was:

"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and in view of Section 187(2)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, a single assessment could not be made on the aggregate of the income for the two periods and the tax charged on such aggregate income ?"
Per majority, the Full Bench held:

"Therefore, when a partner dies and the firm is dissolved, though it can be said that he ceases to be a partner, it cannot be said that there is a mere change in the constitution of the firm."

8. In our opinion, the view expressed by the Full Bench governs this case also. The facts there too were that there was no clause in the partnership deed to the effect that, in the event of the death of one of the partners, the firm was not to be dissolved. The facts in this reference are almost similar to the facts with which the learned judges were concerned in that case. As already noticed by us, the recitals do not show that the firm shall be continued in the event of the death of one of the partners. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is a case of change in the constitution of the firm.

9. Mr. Rama Rao next sought to invite our attention to a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Nandlal Sohanlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax , where a Full Bench of five judges of that court, by a majority of 4 to 1 took a contrary view to the one expressed by this court by a majority, of 3 to 2 in Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vinayaka Cinema [FB] and requested, that, in view of the importance of the question involved and the differing views expressed earlier by a Full Bench of this court and the Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the case merits to be referred to a larger Bench of seven judges. We are unable to agree that this case requires to be decided by a larger Bench of seven judges. Having regard to the view expressed by the Full Bench of this court in Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vinayaka Cinema , we hold that the firm which came into existence on the death of Linga Reddi is distinct and separate from the partnership firm, which was in existence till September 29, 1972.

10. The reference is answered accordingly in favour of the assessee. No costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 250.