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State Of A.P. v. Lalitha Oil Mills, Gudur

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Feb 6, 1978
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Three separate revisions (originating from three orders of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal) raise two common questions and were heard together. The assessee in the principal narrated facts is the firm "Sri Lalitha Oil Mills, Gudur", an oil-miller and dealer in groundnuts. For the assessment year 1969-70, the assessee reported gross and net turnovers of Rs. 9,07,174.80 and Rs. 3,84,648.24 respectively; the Commercial Tax Officer (CTO) determined net taxable turnover at Rs. 2,78,008.29.

A disputed turnover of Rs. 1,10,875.57 (the purchase value of groundnut kernel sold to oil-millers within the State) was exempted by the CTO relying on this Court's decision in Madar Khan and Co. v. Assistant Commissioner [1971] 27 S.T.C. 18. The Deputy Commissioner, invoking revisional powers under Section 20(2) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act (the Act), revisited the matter after a subsequent Supreme Court decision in Sri Venkateswara etc. Oil Mill v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1971] 28 S.T.C. 599 (S.C.) and disallowed the exemption, bringing the disputed turnover to tax at 3 per cent. The assessee appealed to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal; the Tribunal held that the CTO's original exemption was given in accordance with the then binding decision of this Court (Madar Khan) and that the Deputy Commissioner erred in exercising revisional powers under Section 20(2). The Tribunal also held, following Madar Khan, that the sales were rightly exempted. The present revisions challenge the Tribunal's conclusions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Deputy Commissioner was justified in exercising his revisional jurisdiction under Section 20(2) of the A.P.G.S.T. Act on the facts and in the circumstances of the case?
  2. Whether the disputed turnover representing the purchase value of groundnut kernel or groundnuts sold to oil-millers within the State by an assessee who is both a dealer and a miller is liable to tax?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessees' Counsel (Mr. Dasaratharama Reddi)

  • Contended that Section 14(4) (and the power under Section 14(4-C) exercisable by higher authorities) is the proper provision to reopen/reassess these cases, and not Section 20(2) revisional jurisdiction.
  • Argued that the Deputy Commissioner should have exercised powers of an assessing authority (under Section 14(4) / 14(4‑C)) to reopen assessments rather than revising them under Section 20(2).
  • Relied on precedents (including Sri Balaganesh Textiles and others) to support the proposition that where the assessment can be reopened under Section 14(4) that route should be followed.
  • Invoked authority on the meaning of "information" in income-tax jurisprudence (Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh) to argue that a subsequent Supreme Court decision could constitute "information" enabling reopening.

Department's Counsel (Mr. D. V. Sastry)

  • Contended that the relevant question is not which law was applied at the time of assessment but what the correct law was at the date when the Deputy Commissioner exercised his revisional power.
  • Submitted that if, at the date of revision, the correct law (as declared by the Supreme Court) made the earlier exemption illegal, the revisional authority could and should apply that law and revise the assessment accordingly under Section 20(2).

Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (as recorded in the opinion)

  • Found that the CTO had granted exemption in reliance on this Court's decision in Madar Khan and Co. and that there was no illegality in the CTO's action at that time; therefore the Deputy Commissioner erred in exercising revisional powers under Section 20(2).
  • On the substantive exemption question, the Tribunal followed Madar Khan and held that the sales were rightly exempted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Madar Khan and Co. v. Assistant Commissioner [1971] 27 S.T.C. 18 Held that "miller" means the person who crushes groundnuts by machinery and does not include mere decorticators; if such a miller is also a dealer he is liable only if purchase is the last purchase within the State. Cited as the basis for the CTO's original exemption; the court noted that the Supreme Court later disapproved this view in Sri Venkateswara etc. Oil Mill.
Sri Venkateswara etc. Oil Mill v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1971] 28 S.T.C. 599 (S.C.) Supreme Court disapproved the Madar Khan view, affirmed State of Andhra Pradesh v. Lakshmi Oil Mills, and held that the event attracting tax is the miller's act of purchasing groundnut (not merely the act of crushing). This decision formed the basis for the Deputy Commissioner's conclusion that the earlier exemption was illegal and justified revision under Section 20(2).
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Lakshmi Oil Mills [1967] 20 S.T.C. 489 High Court decision (affirmed by Supreme Court) holding the view that purchase by miller attracts tax. Referenced as the earlier High Court authority with which the Supreme Court agreed; supports the proposition that purchase by miller is the taxable event.
Radhakrishna and Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1969] 24 S.T.C. 320 Earlier conflicting view (mentioned as one of the decisions with which Madar Khan disagreed). Mentioned to show conflicting High Court/Division Bench views; used in narrative of law development.
Sri Balaganesh Textiles v. Commercial Tax Officer, Tirupathi [1978] 41 S.T.C. 445 (C.R.P. Nos. 209 and 238 of 1977) Division Bench considered whether revisional jurisdiction or reopening under Section 14(4) applied; on its facts held reopening under Section 14(4) was appropriate. Cited by assessees' counsel but the court distinguished it on facts and held it inapplicable to the present facts (since that case involved verification of purchasers' accounts showing escaped turnover).
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Polireddi Satyanarayana [1972] 29 S.T.C. 512 Held that Section 14(4) confers wide powers on assessing authority to reassess where turnover escaped assessment or correct rate was not applied. Relied upon by assessees' counsel; the court accepted the principle but distinguished on facts (present case concerned legality in light of later Supreme Court decision rather than a simple misapplication of rate).
Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. M. J. Devda [1977] 109 I.T.R. 484 Concerned scope of Section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act; correctness assessed in light of law in force when Tribunal rendered decision. The court held the ratio was not applicable to revisional powers under the Sales Tax Act and declined to extend its reasoning to the present context.
Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1959] 35 I.T.R. 1 (S.C.) Holds that "information" under income-tax law includes judicial decisions; thus judicial decisions can constitute information. Referred to by assessees' counsel to argue that the Supreme Court decision could supply "information" to reopen; the court addressed the submission but concluded Section 14(4)'s explicit conditions control reopening and that Section 20 governs revisional action where legality is in question at date of revision.
Deputy Commissioner v. Dhanalakshmi Vilas Cashew Co. [1969] 24 S.T.C. 491 (S.C.) Distinguished revisional jurisdiction from jurisdiction to tax escaped turnover; revisional power is restricted to examining the record to determine whether the order was according to law; taxing escaped turnover is normally exercised on matters dehors the assessment record. The court treated this Supreme Court decision as placing the matter beyond controversy and used it to support the conclusion that the Deputy Commissioner, on examining the record and finding the exemption illegal under the law as laid down by the Supreme Court, could validly exercise revisional jurisdiction under the relevant statutory provision.
State Of Kerala v. M. Appukutty [1963] 14 S.T.C. 242 (S.C.) Affirmed limits on revisional jurisdiction — Deputy Commissioner is restricted to examining the record to determine whether the order was according to law; the power to assess escaped turnover is normally for matters dehors the assessment record. Quoted in the opinion (via Dhanalakshmi) to underline the proper scope of revisional power vis-à-vis escaped turnover assessments.
Rajmal Multanmal and Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer [1976] 37 S.T.C. 252 Held that where exemption granted earlier became illegal due to retrospective amendment and no escapement due to inadvertence/concealment, Section 14(4) was not applicable and Section 20(2) was the correct provision to be applied. Relied upon to show that Section 20(2) is the appropriate provision where an earlier exemption becomes impermissible under subsequently applicable law; used to support the Deputy Commissioner's action.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the two central questions in sequence, grounding its reasoning in the statute and in precedent as explicitly recorded in the opinion.

Statutory framework examined:

  • Section 14(4) sets out the conditions under which the assessing authority may reopen assessments (escapement of turnover, under-assessment, assessed at lower rate, or levying licence/registration fee at wrong rate) and prescribes limitation periods.
  • Section 14(4-C) allows higher authorities (including the Deputy Commissioner) to exercise the powers conferred by Section 14(4) subject to the same conditions.
  • Section 20(1) and (2) confer revisional powers on the Board of Revenue and, respectively, on the Deputy Commissioner and the Commercial Tax Officer to satisfy themselves as to the legality or propriety of subordinate orders or the regularity of proceedings; Sub-section (3) prescribes a limitation (not exceeding four years) for revisional powers in relation to assessment orders.

Analysis on revisional jurisdiction (Section 20(2) vs. Section 14(4)):

  1. The assessees' counsel argued Section 14(4) (or Section 14(4-C) exercisable by higher authorities) was the appropriate route to correct the assessment, relying on the language of Section 14(4) and certain precedents. If the Deputy Commissioner was to act only under Section 14(4), the impugned order would have been beyond the limitation period applicable to reassessment.
  2. The department's counsel argued the relevant inquiry is which law was correct at the date the Deputy Commissioner exercised revision; if, at that date, the correct law (as declared by the Supreme Court) rendered the earlier exemption illegal, the revisional authority should apply the law as it stood.
  3. The Court examined prior decisions distinguishing revisional jurisdiction from the power to tax escaped turnover (notably Deputy Commissioner v. Dhanalakshmi Vilas Cashew Co. and State Of Kerala v. M. Appukutty). Those authorities establish that revisional jurisdiction is limited to examination of the record to determine whether an order is according to law, whereas the power to tax escaped turnover is generally exercised on matters de hors (outside) the record.
  4. Applying those principles, the Court concluded that when the Deputy Commissioner examined the record and found that, in the light of the Supreme Court's decision (Sri Venkateswara), the exemption granted by the assessing authority was illegal, he was entitled to exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 20(2). The Court therefore set aside the Tribunal's finding that the Deputy Commissioner erred in exercising Section 20(2) jurisdiction.

Analysis on substantive taxability of disputed turnover:

  • The Supreme Court in Sri Venkateswara held that the taxable event is the miller's act of purchasing groundnut — the Court reproduces that principle and notes that the Supreme Court disapproved Madar Khan's narrower definition of "miller".
  • However, the Supreme Court expressly did not decide cases where a miller purchases some groundnuts for milling and some for sale; it was not shown in those cases that any assessee purchased groundnuts with an intention to sell them.
  • The burden thus lies on the assessees to show that part of the purchases were intended for resale. The Tribunal made no finding on how much of the turnover was intended for milling and how much for resale.
  • Therefore the Court remitted the matter to the Tribunal to determine, for each assessee, what portion (if any) of the turnover was purchased for resale; relief, if any, is to be given to that extent.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the Deputy Commissioner was justified in exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 20(2) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act when, upon examination of the record, he found that the exemption granted by the assessing authority had become impermissible in the light of the subsequent Supreme Court decision (Sri Venkateswara etc. Oil Mill). The Court set aside the Tribunal's finding that the Deputy Commissioner erred in exercising Section 20(2).

Direct consequences and orders:

  • The three revisions are remitted to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal for fresh disposal in the light of the Court's decision: the Tribunal is to determine how much of the turnover in each case was purchased for milling and how much for resale; relief (exemption) is to be given only if part of the turnover was purchased with the intention to resell.
  • No costs were awarded. Advocate's fee of Rs. 200 was ordered in each revision.

Implications (as stated in the opinion): The decision directly affects the parties by upholding the Deputy Commissioner's exercise of revisional power under Section 20(2) and by remitting the factual question of mixed-purpose purchases back to the Tribunal for determination. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general precedent beyond applying and reconciling existing statutory provisions and case law to the facts; it follows and applies Supreme Court authority on the taxable event and the limits of revisional jurisdiction.

Show all summary ...

1. These three revisions arise out of three separate orders of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, but raise two common questions. We, therefore, propose to dispose of these three revisions by a common judgment. The two questions that arise for our consideration are :

(1) Whether the Deputy Commissioner was justified in exercising his revisional jurisdiction under Section 20(2) of the A. P. G. S. T. Act on the facts and in the circumstances of the case ?

(2) Whether the disputed turnover which represents the purchase value of groundnut kernel or groundnuts sold to oil-millers within the State by the assessee, who is both a dealer and miller, is liable to tax ?

2. For purposes of determining the questions involved, we shall state the facts of the case of the assessee, a firm known as "Sri Lalitha Oil Mills, Gudur". This firm is an oil-miller and dealer in groundnuts. The assessee reported the gross and net turnovers of Rs. 9,07,174.80 and Rs. 3,84,648.24 respectively for the assessment year 1969-70 in the A-l return filed by it. The Commercial Tax Officer determined the net taxable turnover at Rs. 2,78,008.29. The disputed turnover of Rs. 1,10,875.57, which represented the purchase value of the groundnut kernel sold to oil-millers in the State, was exempted from tax having regard to the judgment of this court in Madar Khan and Co. v. Assistant Commissioner [1971] 27 S.T.C. 18. The Deputy Commissioner, in exercise of his revisional powers under Section 20(2) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, hereinafter referred to as "the Act", after following the procedure prescribed, brought this turnover to tax on the basis of a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Sri Venkateswara etc. Oil Mill v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1971] 28 S.T.C. 599 (S.C.). The Supreme Court did not endorse the view of this court in Madar Khan and Co. v. Assistant Commissioner [1971] 27 S.T.C. 18, but affirmed the earlier decision of this court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Lakshmi Oil Mills [1967] 20 S.T.C. 489. The Deputy Commissioner disallowed the exemption granted by the Commercial Tax Officer in respect of the disputed turnover of Rs. 1,10,875.57 and directed the turnover to be brought to tax at 3 per cent. It is against that order of the Deputy Commissioner that the assessee preferred an appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. As similar exemptions were granted by the Commercial Tax Officer in respect of the other two assessees also on the sale of groundnuts or groundnut kernel to millers in the State and as the exemptions were disallowed by the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction, they also preferred appeals to the Tribunal. The Tribunal was of the view that, at the time when the Commercial Tax Officer granted exemption he granted that exemption having regard to the view expressed by this court in Madar Khan and Co. v. Assistant Commissioner [1971] 27 S.T.C. 18 and that, therefore, there was no illegality attached to the exemption granted by the Commercial Tax Officer and hence the Deputy Commissioner was in error in exercising his revisional powers under Section 20(2) of the Act. On the question whether the assessees were entitled to exemption in respect of the sales of groundnut kernel effected by them to the millers in the State, the Tribunal held, following the decision in Madar Khan and Co. v. Assistant Commissioner [1971] 27 S.T.C. 18, that the sales were rightly exempted.

3. We may first consider the question whether the Deputy Commissioner acted within the bounds of the authority conferred upon him in exercising his revisional jurisdiction. It is the case of Mr. Dasaratharama Reddi, appearing for the assessees, that the proper and correct provision applicable in cases of this nature is section 14(4) of the Act and not Section 20(2) and that it was open to the Deputy Commissioner to exercise the powers of the assessing authority by virtue of the provisions of Section 14(4-C) and reopen the assessment, but not revise the assessment in exercise of his powers under Section 20(2) as if there was an illegality in the order of the assessing authority. Mr. D. V. Sastry, the learned counsel appearing for the department, which has filed these revisions, contended that the question is not whether, at the time of the assessment proceedings, correct law was applied by the assessing authority, but whether that was the correct law at the date when the Deputy Commissioner exercised his revisional power. The relevant provisions to be noticed are Sections 14 and 20. To the extent material, they are in these terms:

section 14. (4) In any of the following events, namely, where the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer has escaped assessment to tax, or has been under-assessed or assessed at a rate lower than the correct rate, or where the licence fee or registration fee has escaped levy or has been levied at a rate lower than the correct rate, the assessing authority may, after making such inquiry as he considers necessary, assess the correct amount of tax payable or levy the correct amount of licence fee or registration fee....

(b) within a period of four years from the expiry of the year aforesaid, if any such event has occurred due to any other causes....

(4-C) The powers conferred by Sub-section (4) on the assessing authority may, subject to the same conditions as are applicable in the case of that authority, be exercised also by any of the authorities higher than the assessing authority including the Deputy Commissioner concerned.

Section 20. Revision by Board of Revenue and other prescribed authorities.-(1) The Board of Revenue may suo motu call for and examine the record of any order passed or proceeding recorded by any authority, officer or person subordinate to it, under the provisions of this Act-, including Sub-section (2) of this section, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of such proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.

(2) Powers of the nature referred to in Sub-section (1) may also be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner and the Commercial Tax Officer, in the case of orders passed or proceedings recorded by authorities, officers or persons subordinate to them.

(2-A)....

(3) In relation to an order of assessment passed under this Act, the powers conferred by Sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be exercisable only within such period not exceeding four years from the date on which the order was served on the dealer, as may be prescribed.

4. Entry 6 of schedule III provides the rate of tax at 4 paise in the rupee for groundnut when purchased by a miller other than a decorticating miller in the State, at the point of purchase by such miller and in all other cases at the point of purchase by the last dealer who buys in the State.

5. section 14(4) enumerates the events under which an assessing authority including a Deputy Commissioner can exercise jurisdiction and also prescribes the period of limitation for exercising that jurisdiction. For exercising jurisdiction under section 14(4), there should be either escapement of whole or part of the turnover or the turnover should have been assessed at a rate lower than the correct rate. Mr. D. V. Sastry, having regard to the language of section 14(4), contended that the revisional assessments made by the Deputy Commissioner do not fall under any of the categories contemplated by Sub-section (4). It is his case that it is a simple case of exercise of revisional jurisdiction applying the correct law as laid down by the Supreme Court. In other words, it is his case that, although at the time when exemption was granted to the assessee on the turnover, the assessing authority had acted in accordance with the law, as it then stood, that was not the correct law to be applied at the date of revision, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court. The assessment orders were made on 25th February, 1971 and the Deputy Commissioner passed the impugned orders on 16th October, 1974, within the period of limitation prescribed in Sub-section (3) of Section 20. If we are to find that the Deputy Commissioner, in exercise of the power conferred upon him under section 14(4), could have only acted as an assessing authority, the impugned order would be beyond the period of limitation prescribed in section 14(4-a).

6. Mr. Dasaratharama Reddi invited our attention to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Madhava Reddy and Ramachandra Raju, JJ., in Sri Balaganesh Textiles v. Commercial Tax Officer, Tirupathi [1978] 41 S.T.C. 445 (C. R. P. Nos. 209 and 238 of 1977), filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, to contend that the Deputy Commissioner was in error in exercising the revisional jurisdiction instead of reopening the assessment under section 14(4). That was a case where the assessees filed returns showing the turnover and claimed exemption in respect of a portion of the turnover. The Commercial Tax Officer allowed exemption under various heads totalling Rs. 11,10,594.17 and assessed the assessee on a net turnover of Rs. 5,680.42. The exemptions allowed also included a turnover of Rs. 4,27,564 being the sales of cotton yarn to dealers within the State. The Commercial Tax Officer then issued a notice which was challenged in this court, stating that on subsequent verification of the accounts of the purchasers, it was found that the assessee was the last seller liable to pay tax because there were no subsequent sales in the State by the purchasers. Therefore, the claim for exemption in respect of that turnover was found to have escaped assessment to tax and he proposed to assess the assessee on the escaped turnover. The learned Judges, on those facts, held that at the time of assessment, the exemptions were properly given. It was on account of the verification of accounts of the purchasers that it was found that the exemptions were wrongly granted and, therefore, they upheld the impugned notices given by the Commercial Tax Officer on the ground that he had not acted without jurisdiction. Before the learned Judges, the contention raised was that it was not a case for reopening or making a reassessment but a case where the revisional jurisdiction should have been exercised by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 20(2). The learned Judges negatived that contention on the ground that on account of the verification of the accounts of the purchasers, it was a case falling under section 14(4) and not one falling under Section 20(2). It may thus be seen that, on facts, that case is distinguishable. That was not a case where, by reason of any law as laid down or interpreted by the Supreme Court, the exemptions granted earlier became illegal. Therefore, that decision can have no application to the facts of the present case.

7. Mr. Dasaratharama Reddi next invited our attention to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Polireddi Satyanarayana [1972] 29 S.T.C. 512, to which one of us (Obul Reddi, J., as he then was) was a party. That was a case where an assessment order for the year 1963-64 was passed on a dealer in jaggery which commodity at that time was taxable at the purchase point up to 31st July, 1963 and at the sale point from 1st August, 1963. The assessing authority found that he had committed a mistake in applying the correct rate for the two periods. The Tribunal held that the assessing authority had no power to make a reassessment of the case. On those facts, the Division Bench held that section 14(4) confers wide powers upon the assessing authority to make a reassessment if the circumstances referred to in the provision exist and that he can make a reassessment where the whole or any part of the turnover escapes assessment to tax or if he fails to assess it correctly and makes under-assessment or assesses the turnover at a lower rate and not at the rate prescribed. In that case, the reassessment was made as the correct rate was not applied to the turnover. Therefore, it was held that the assessing authority was competent to do so. That was a clear case of reopening of an assessment as there was an under-assessment in the sense that the correct rate was not applied. In the case before us, we are not concerned with the correct rate of tax, but we are only concerned with the question whether the Deputy Commissioner had jurisdiction to exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 20(4). The learned counsel sought to place reliance upon another decision of this court in Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. M. J. Devda [1977] 109 I.T.R. 484. That was a case where an application was filed in this court under Section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act to direct the Tribunal to refer the question of law to the High Court. The learned Judges rejected the application on the ground that the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the Tribunal will have to be decided only in the light of the law that was in force when the Tribunal rendered the decision. The learned Judges were only concerned with the scope of Section 256(2) in that case. We fail to see how the ratio of a decision rendered on the powers of the High Court under Section 256(2) could be extended to a case where the scope of revisional powers conferred upon a Deputy Commissioner under a different enactment is to be considered. Section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act does not confer any revisional jurisdiction on this court. That was not a case where any question was referred to the High Court on the basis of the subsequent amendments. The High Court, therefore, declined to direct the Tribunal to refer the question in respect of a subsequent amendment of the law.

8. Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1959] 35 I.T.R. 1 (S.C.) only deals with the meaning of the expression "information" occurring in Section 34(l)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The Supreme Court held that the word "information" would include information as to the true and correct state of the law and so would cover information as to relevant judicial decisions. According to Mr. Dasaratharama Reddi, the decision of the Supreme Court in Sri Venkateswara etc. Oil Mill v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1971] 28 S.T.C. 599 (S.C.) would constitute information and it would be open to the assessing authority to reopen the assessment. As already noticed, section 14(4) specifically lays down the conditions for reopening an assessment. Section 20(1) provides as to when a revisional authority can exercise its revisional powers. Section 20(1) makes it manifest that a revisional power could be exercised by the revisional authority for satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of an order or as to the regularity of a proceeding of a subordinate authority. What the Deputy Commissioner was concerned with was the legality of the order passed by the Commercial Tax Officer. He was not concerned with the question whether the exemption was rightly granted at the date when the assessing authority passed the order. He had to apply the law as it stood at the date when he chose to exercise his revisional authority. If, at the date when he chose to exercise his revisional power, it was found that the correct law that is applicable was the one laid down by the Supreme Court, then it would be open to him to issue a notice to the assessee and, after affording him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, revise the assessment in accordance with the law as laid down by the Supreme Court.

9. Now, let us see what this court said in Madar Khan's case [1971] 27 S.T.C. 18. In that case, a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Chinnappa Reddy and Madhava Reddy, JJ., held that the word "miller" in the entry can only mean the person who crushes groundnuts into oil by the employment of machinery and does not include a person who merely decorticates groundnuts and if such a "miller" also functions as a "dealer" he will be liable to tax only if the purchase can be brought within the second limb of entry 3, that is, if it is the last purchase within the State. The learned Judges expressed their disagreement with the view expressed by another Division Bench of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Lakshmi Oil Mills [1967] 20 S.T.C. 489 and also Radhakrishna and Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1969] 24 S.T.C. 320. The Supreme Court, in Sri Venkateswara etc. Oil Mill v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1971] 28 S.T.C. 599 (S.C.) disapproved the view of this court in Madar Khan's case [1971] 27 S.T.C. 18 and said, that they were in entire agreement with the reasoning of the High Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Lakshmi Oil Mills [1967] 20 S.T.C. 489 and in Sri Venkateswara etc. Oil Mill v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1967] 20 S.T.C. 489 (T. R. C. Nos. 48, 43, 49 and 74 of 1966). The Supreme Court held that the event which attracts tax is the act of the miller purchasing groundnut and not his act of crushing the groundnut purchased or dealing with it in any other manner. It was further observed :

It is now well-settled that even under the sales tax laws, the charge in respect of a sale or purchase becomes effective as soon as the sale in the case of sales tax and purchase in the case of purchase tax is made, though the liability of the dealer can be computed only at the end of the year. The incurring of the charge is one thing and its computation is a totally different thing.

10. This court had occasion to consider on more than one occasion the scope and ambit of section 14(4) vis-a-vis Section 20 of the Act. A Division Bench of this Court in Rajmal Multanmal and Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer [1976] 37 S.T.C. 252, to which one of us (Obul Reddi, J., as he then was) was a party, held that where no part of the turnover of the business of the petitioner had escaped assessment to tax on account of any inadvertence on the part of the officer or omission or deliberate concealment on the part of the assessee, but exemption was granted by the appellate authority, which exemption the petitioner was no longer entitled to in view of the retrospective amendment of the law, section 14(4) was not applicable and Section 20(2) was the correct provision to be applied. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Polireddi Satyanarayana [1972] 29 S.T.C. 512, a Division Bench of this Court to which one of us (Obul Reddi, J., as he then was) was a party, construing section 14(4), held that it conferred wide powers upon the assessing authority to make a reassessment if the circumstances referred to in the provision existed and that he could make a reassessment where the whole or any part of the turnover escaped assessment to tax or if he failed to assess it correctly and made under-assessment or assessed the turnover at a lower rate and not at the rate prescribed. It was held by the court that, on the facts of the case, the reassessment was made as the correct rate was not applied to the turnover and the assessing authority was competent to reassess under section 14(4). The decision of the Supreme Court in Deputy Commissioner v. Dhanalakshmi Vilas Cashew Co. [1969] 24 S.T.C. 491 (S.C.), puts the question beyond the pale of any controversy. There, the question arose whether the Deputy Commissioner was correct in exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 15(l)(i) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. There, the learned Judges clearly pointed out the distinction between the revisional jurisdiction and the jurisdiction to tax the escaped turnover. The revisional jurisdiction under Section 15(l)(i), as stated by the learned Judges, is quite distinct and separate from the one created under Rule 33 to tax escaped turnover. The Deputy Commissioner, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 15(l)(i), would be restricted to the examination of the record for determining whether the order of assessment was according to law. Rule 33, which confers powers to assess escaped turnover, is normally to be exercised in matters de hors the record of assessment proceedings. The facts of that case as appear in that Report are:

In the present case the Tribunal proceeded to say :

The turnover was before the officer. There was no inadvertence on the part of the officer in not taxing the turnover. But he did not tax the turnover stating that

"the stock of pepper and ginger available is not liable to tax because they have been sold subsequently"
. This only shows that the assessment was illegal and improper as exemption ought not to have been given as stock was not sold in the year of assessment but subsequently. We therefore find that the turnover had not escaped assessment but that the assessment was made illegally and improperly.

11. On those facts, the Supreme Court said:

As has been observed in State Of Kerala v. M. Appukutty . [1963] 14 S.T.C. 242 (S.C.), in which similar provisions relating to the Madras General Sales Tax Act came up for consideration, the Deputy Commissioner while exercising revisional jurisdiction would be restricted to the examination of the record for determining whether the order of assessment was according to law. The rule which confers power to assess escaped turnover is normally to be exercised 'on matters de hors the record of assessment proceedings' before the assessing authority. It has been pointed out that although the substantive provisions of the Act do not expressly deal with the power and procedure for assessment of escaped turnover but the legislature has left it to be dealt with by statutory rules. In our judgment, the present case is covered by the previous decision of this court.

12. Therefore, when the record was examined by the Deputy Commissioner and he found that on the basis of the law as laid down by the Supreme Court, the exemption granted was illegal, he could have only exercised his revisional jurisdiction under Section 20(2). For the reasons recorded, we set aside the finding of the Tribunal that the Deputy Commissioner erred in law in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 20(2) of the Act.

13. As regards the next question, the Supreme Court has clearly observed in Sri Venkateswara etc. Oil Mill v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1971] 28 S.T.C. 599 (S.C.) that, In none of the cases before us it was shown that any of the assessees had purchased groundnuts with a view to sell them. Hence we need not go into the question as to what would be the position in law where a miller purchases some groundnut for milling and the rest for sale.

14. It, therefore, follows that the learned Judges of the Supreme Court did not decide the question as to what would be the position in law where a miller purchases a part of the turnover of groundnut for milling and the rest for sale. The burden is upon the assessees to show that they purchased a part of the turnover for milling and the rest for sale. The Tribunal has not chosen to give any finding on this question, that is to say, how much of the turnover was intended for milling and how much was intended for sale. We are, therefore, constrained to remit back the case to the Tribunal to decide the question as to how much of the turnover in each case was purchased by the assessee for milling and the rest for sale. If the Tribunal finds that any part of the turnover was purchased by each of the assessees here with the intention of resale, to that extent the Tribunal will give them relief. The three revisions are accordingly remitted back to the Tribunal for disposal afresh in the light of our decision. No costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 200 in each.