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Commissioner Of Gift-Tax, A.P v. Ch. Chandrasekhara Reddy.

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Jul 7, 1976
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Factual and Procedural Background

The question referred to the High Court arose from a transfer by the assessee of 10 acres and 54 cents of wet land in Nellore district to his only daughter, C. Vijayalakshmi, made on 1 January 1967 during the interval between her betrothal (15 October 1966) and her marriage (1 March 1967). The Gift-tax Officer treated the transfer as a gift and, while granting exemption under section 5(1)(vii) and the basic exemption under Section 5(2) of the Gift-tax Act, determined a taxable gift of Rs. 43,000 by valuing the land at Rs. 63,000.

On appeal, the assessee argued before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that he was in reality a member of a Hindu undivided family (having acquired 27 acres on partition in 1957) and that the transfer was a provision made in discharge of his legal obligation to perform his daughter's marriage (i.e., not a gift). The Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected the contention that the assessee's status affected the liability and upheld the Gift-tax Officer's assessment and valuation.

Before the Appellate Tribunal, the assessee again asserted that the transfer was a provision for his daughter's marriage, discharged under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and general Hindu law; valuation was also disputed. The Tribunal found the father was under an obligation to get his daughter married in a manner befitting his status, concluded the transfer was made in discharge of that obligation and was a reasonable provision, and held that the transfer was not a "taxable gift." The Tribunal did not decide valuation as it was unnecessary given this finding.

At the revenue's instance, the following question was referred to the High Court for its opinion: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the transfer of lands made by the assessee to his only daughter fell within the meaning of 'taxable gift' under the Gift-tax Act?"

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the transfer of lands made by the assessee to his only daughter fell within the meaning of "taxable gift" under the Gift-tax Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The transfer did not amount to a "gift" under the Gift-tax Act because appropriation of joint family funds for the marriage of an unmarried daughter does not constitute a gift.
  • The assessee's correct status was that of a Hindu undivided family (he received 27 acres on partition in 1957), and he had erroneously declared himself an individual for income-tax purposes.
  • Whether the property was separate or joint, the father was under a legal obligation to perform his daughter's marriage; the transfer was a provision made in discharge of that obligation and therefore not a gift attracting gift-tax.
  • The valuation of the lands as adopted by the taxing authorities was disputed.

Revenue's Arguments

  • The Gift-tax Officer initially rejected the assessee's contention that the transfer was not a gift; the Officer treated the transfer as a gift made by the father in consideration of the marriage but allowed statutory exemptions while determining a taxable gift.
  • The revenue's counsel argued that to be "incident" to marriage the conveyance must be shown to be inseparable or closely connected with the marriage; reliance was placed on dictionary definitions and authorities to emphasise that customary practice in the particular community or family must be shown.
  • The revenue relied upon prior case law (including M.S.M. Ratnaswami Nadar v. Commissioner of Income-tax and a decision of this court in Commissioner of Gift-tax v. Bhupathiraju Venkata Narasimharaju) to support its position (the opinion discusses these points and their (in)applicability to the issue before the Court).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kamala Devi v. Bachulal Gupta (Supreme Court) Set out principles under general Hindu law regarding duty/obligation of parents/guardians to give a girl in marriage and that a reasonable portion of joint family property may be given as marriage gift; recognition of moral/religious obligation to provide for daughter. The Court treated this authority as confirming that the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act re-enacted the position under general Hindu law that a father may be under an obligation to give some property to a daughter on marriage; used to support that reasonable provision may be regarded as part of maintenance/expenses "incident" to marriage.
M.S.M. Ratnaswami Nadar v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Madras High Court) In the context of Section 16(3)(a)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, observed that "consideration" must be valuable and measurable in money or money's worth; adequacy implies measurable financial consideration. The Court found this decision arose under a different statutory provision (Income-tax Act) and concluded it was of limited assistance to the present Gift-tax question.
Commissioner of Gift-tax v. Bhupathiraju Venkata Narasimharaju (this Court) Considered whether a father as karta can make valid and reasonable provision for maintenance of minor daughters under Hindu undivided family context. The Court noted that the earlier decision did not address whether a transfer constituted consideration under the Gift-tax Act and therefore its observations were not directly relevant to the specific question before the High Court.
Commissioner of Gift-tax v. RM S. Ramanathan Chettiar (Madras High Court) Held that "money's worth" in the Gift-tax Act has wide connotation and may include considerations that ultimately amount to or are reducible to money; a payment giving quittance to a family obligation to maintain could be "money's worth" and not a gift. The High Court regarded this decision as supportive of the assessee's position to the extent that a conveyance made to discharge a father's obligation to provide for marriage maintenance might constitute consideration (i.e., not a gift).
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Indian Molasses Co. P. Ltd. (Supreme Court) Identified two procedural courses when a court considers a referred question: (1) call for a supplementary statement of case from the Tribunal; or (2) decline to answer the question and leave the Tribunal to take steps under the relevant statutory provision. The High Court cited this authority when discussing procedural options available to it in responding to the Tribunal's reference and used it to frame the choice between seeking further material from the Tribunal or declining to answer.
New Jahangir Vakil Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax; Petlad Turkey Red Dye Works Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Supreme Court) Established that if a court calls for a supplementary statement of case from a Tribunal, the Tribunal is generally restricted to the evidence on the record and may not be entitled to take additional evidence. The Court referred to these authorities to explain the limitations of the supplementary-statement route and noted that restricting the Tribunal to existing record evidence might produce injustice in the present circumstances.
Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Supreme Court) Also addresses limitations on a tribunal's taking of additional evidence when a court directs a supplementary statement of case. Used alongside the other Supreme Court authorities to caution that calling for a supplementary statement may prevent the Tribunal from receiving new evidence, potentially causing injustice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded from statutory definitions and the factual findings of the Tribunal. It first noted the statutory definition of "gift" in Sub-section (xii) of Section 2 of the Gift-tax Act as a voluntary transfer without consideration in money or money's worth. It then set out relevant provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act (Section 20 and Section 3(b)(ii)), observing that "maintenance" expressly includes "in the case of an unmarried daughter, also the reasonable expenses of and incident to her marriage."

The Court emphasized that the present transfer was not made for the direct purpose of marriage expenses; instead the question was whether a conveyance made in anticipation of marriage can be treated as falling within "reasonable expenses ... incident to her marriage." To unpack "incident," the Court relied on a recognized commentator (N. R. Raghavachariar) and dictionary authorities (Black's Law Dictionary and Siroud's Judicial Dictionary) to determine that "incident" denotes something usually connected with another thing, and that for a conveyance to be "incident" to marriage it must be shown that giving such property is usually connected with the marriage in the particular community or family concerned.

The Court examined precedent. It accepted Kamala Devi as establishing (under general Hindu law) the existence of an obligation or duty to make reasonable provision for a daughter's marriage and concluded that the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act re-enacted that position. It distinguished decisions that arose under different statutory contexts (notably M.S.M. Ratnaswami Nadar under the Income-tax Act and the court's earlier Bhupathiraju decision) as not directly determining the Gift-tax question here. It observed that the Madras High Court's decision in RM S. Ramanathan Chettiar, which interpreted "money's worth" broadly, supported the proposition that a transfer made to discharge a family's maintenance obligation could qualify as consideration rather than a gift.

Critically, the Court found that the Tribunal's reasoning omitted a necessary inquiry: whether the transfer of 10 acres and 54 cents was, in the relevant community or family, the usual or customary provision to make on a daughter's marriage. Although the Tribunal found the provision reasonable and concluded it was "incident" to the marriage, it did not examine whether such conveyances were the usual practice in that community or family — a factual matter central to deciding if the transfer was properly characterized as "incident" (and thus potentially a transfer for consideration).

The Court considered procedural options in response to the referral. Citing Supreme Court authorities, it acknowledged two courses: (1) call for a supplementary statement of the case from the Tribunal (but this would confine the Tribunal to the record and might preclude taking further evidence, risking injustice), or (2) decline to answer and leave the Tribunal to decide afresh under the statutory mechanism (Section 26(6) of the Gift-tax Act). Weighing these, the Court concluded that a supplementary statement limited to the existing record might result in injustice because the omitted factual inquiry could require evidence beyond the record.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The High Court declined to answer the referred question on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal had failed to consider whether the conveyance was the usual provision for the daughter's marriage in that particular family or community and thus whether it could properly be regarded as "incident" to the marriage.

Implications:

  • The Tribunal is to determine the factual question it omitted to decide — namely, whether the conveyance was the usual/customary provision in the particular family or community and therefore "incident" to the marriage — and then dispose of the appeal under Section 26(6) of the Gift-tax Act in the light of the observations in this judgment.
  • The Court expressly avoided calling for a supplementary statement from the Tribunal to prevent restricting the Tribunal to the record and potentially causing injustice; instead it left the matter to the Tribunal to act under the statute.
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • The Court did not pronounce a new definitive legal rule resolving the referred question on the merits; it remitted the matter to the Tribunal for determination of the omitted factual issue and consequent disposal under the statutory provision.

This summary is prepared strictly from the information contained in the provided opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond the opinion have been included.

Show all summary ...

1. In this case, at the instance of the revenue, the following question has been referred to this High Court for its opinion :

"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the transfer of lands made by the assessee to his only daughter fell within the meaning of 'taxable gift' under the Gift-tax Act ?"

2. The facts leading to this reference are as follows : The assessee transferred 10 acres and 54 cents of wet land in Nellore district to his only daughter, C. Vijayalakshmi, he having no son, in consideration of her marriage. The betrothal had taken place on October 15, 1966, and the marriage took place on March I, 1967, and on January 1, 1967, i.e., during the period between the betrothal and the marriage, the assessee transferred 10 acres and 54 cents of land to his daughter. Before the Gift-tax Officer, the assessee contended that this transfer did not amount to a gift as contemplated by the Gift-tax Act, as the appropriation of joint family funds for the purpose of marriage of an unmarried daughter would not constitute a gift. This contention was rejected by the Gift-tax Officer, since the assessee was assessed as an individual in the income-tax records. He, however, held that the assessee, in his capacity as father, had made the gift in consideration of the marriage of the donee and granted exemption under section 5(1)(vii) besides the basic exemption under Section 5(2) of the Gift-tax Act and determined the taxable gift at Rs. 43,000. He came to the conclusion that the value of the lands conveyed by the assessee to his daughter was Rs. 63,000 at the date of the conveyance. The assessee carried the matter in appeal and before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner it was contended on his behalf that he had got 27 acres of wet land on a partition between himself, his brother and his father on August 29, 1957, and that his correct status was that of Hindu undivided family, though due to ignorance of law, he erroneously declared his status as an individual for the purpose of income-tax. It was further contended on his behalf that, whether the assessee's properties were his separate properties or joint family properties, he was under a legal obligation to perform the marriage of his daughter; that the transfer was only a provision made in discharge of that obligation ; and that, therefore, there was no gift at all attracting liability to gift-tax. The assessee also disputed the valuation of the lands. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the question regarding the correct status of the assessee was irrelevant since a Hindu father, having separate properties or joint family properties, is bound to look after his children and also perform the marriage of his daughters. But he held that the law does not cast an obligation on him to make a gift of certain properties to his daughter who is being married. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the assessment made by the Gift-tax Officer as well as the valuation adopted by him.

3. On further appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, it was pointed out on behalf of the assessee that the transfer in question was made on January 1, 1967, in consideration of his daughter's marriage, which was fixed on March 1, 1967, and that the transfer of 10 acres and 54 cents of land by the assessee to his only daughter was made as a provision for her marriage in order to enable her to get married to a proper match, which obligation as a Hindu father he had to discharge under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, apart from his liability under the general Hindu Law in a Hindu undivided family. It was, therefore, contended that the said transfer was not liable to gift-tax. Before the Appellate Tribunal also, the valuation adopted by the taxing authorities was disputed.

4. The Appellate Tribunal considered the liability of a Hindu to maintain his children as provided under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and held that the assessee was under an obligation, both under the general Hindu law as well as under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, to get his daughter married in a manner befitting his status and also to enable her to acquire a status and dignity in her husband's family. The Tribunal found that the transfer in question was made in discharge of the obligation which the assessee owed to his daughter. The Tribunal also found that the transfer of 10 acres and 54 cents of land out of the total extent of 27 acres and odd, which the assessee got on partition, was a reasonable provision for his only daughter's marriage and the same was not without consideration and did not fall within the meaning of "taxable gift" under the Gift-tax Act. The Tribunal did not go into the question of valuation of the transferred lands, as it was unnecessary in view of the finding regarding the non-taxable nature of the so-called gift. Therefore, at the instance of the revenue, the question set out hereinabove has been referred to us for our opinion.

5. Sub-section (xii) of Section 2 of the Gift-tax Act defines "gift" to mean the transfer by one person to another of any existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration in money or money's worth. The rest of the definition is not material for the purpose of this judgment. Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act provides for maintenance of children and aged parents. Under Sub-section (1) of the said section, a Hindu is bound, during his or her lifetime, to maintain his or her legitimate or illegitimate children and his or her aged or infirm parents. Sub-section (b) of Section 3 defines :

"'Maintenance' includes--(i)...

(ii) in the case of an unmarried daughter, also the reasonable expenses of and "incident" to her marriage."

6. It is nobody's case that the transfer in question was effected for the purpose of expenses of the marriage of the assessee's daughter and the whole question that has to be considered in the present case is whether the transfer or conveyance by the assessee to his unmarried daughter in anticipation of the marriage can be said to be by way of reasonable expenses "incident" to her marriage. The learned commentator of Hindu law, Mr. N. R. Raghavachariar, in his commentary on Hindu Law, 5th edition, states at page 1103 :

"The words '"incident" to marriage' are used to indicate the necessity for inclusion in the expenses payable for the marriage of an unmarried daughter not only the actual expenses of her marriage but also the expenses "incident"al to the marriage, namely, presents at the marriage, and other necessary expenses that have to be customarily incurred both before and after the actual marriage such as the expenses of the betrothal function and the nuptials that may take place after the marriage."

7. In Black's Law Dictionary, 4th edition, at page 904, it has been pointed out that the word ""incident"" is also used to denote anything which is usually connected with another, or connected for some purposes though not inseparably. Therefore, if the giving of laud is usually connected with the marriage, it can be said to be "incident" to the marriage, so far as this particular community of the assessee or the family of the assessee is concerned.

8. The learned counsel for the revenue has drawn our attention to Siroud's Judicial Dictionary 3rd edition (page 1412), wherein the meaning of the word

"incident"
is given as under :

"A thing is '"incident"' to another when it appertains to, or follows on, that other which is more worthy, or principal, e.g., a Court Baron is "incident" to a manor, rent to a reversion, distress to rent, timber trees to the freehold, title deeds to an estate, etc., 'and of "incident"s, some be separable, and some inseparable'; ..."

9. It was contended on behalf of the revenue that, in order that such conveyance of the land can be said to be "incident" to the marriage, it must be shown that conveyance and marriage are inseparable or closely connected with each other. In our opinion, the definition given in Black's Law Dictionary correctly brings out the import or intendment of the word ""incident"". Therefore, in order to find out whether conveyance of land on the occasion of the daughter's marriage can be said to be "incident" to the marriage, it must be found whether the usual custom or practice was to convey land on the occasion of a daughter's marriage so far as this particular community of the assessee or the family of the assessee was concerned.

10. In Kamala Devi v. Bachulal Gupta, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the position under the general Hindu Law regarding the power of a Hindu widow to make an alienation of a reasonable portion of her husband's property in favour of the daughter as marriage gift. S.K. Das J., who delivered the judgment of the court, has considered all the relevant authorities on this point from paragraph 14 onwards and in paragraph 20 the learned judge has summarised the legal position thus:

"On an examination of the decisions referred to above the following principles clearly emerge: (1) It is the imperative religious duty and a moral obligation of a father, mother or other guardian to give a girl in marriage to a suitable husband ; it is a duty which must be fulfilled to prevent degradation, and direct spiritual benefit is conferred upon the father by such a marriage......(6) Some decisions go to the length of holding that there is a moral or religious obligation of giving a portion of the joint family property for the benefit of the daughter and the son-in-law, and a gift made long after the marriage may be supported upon the ground that the gift when made fulfils that moral or religious obligation."

11. In the different authorities, which have been considered in paragraph 14 onwards, it has been pointed out that a reasonable portion of the joint family property may be given to the daughter on the occasion of her marriage and it appears to us that when the legislature enacted in Section 3(b)(ii) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act that reasonable expenses of and "incident" to her marriage amour to maintenance, it was merely re-enacting the position which prevailed under the general Hindu law. Therefore, both under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act as well as under the general Hindu law, the father is under an obligation to give some property to the daughter on the occasion of her marriage and the only question is whether this is usually done or not.

12. Mr. P. Rama Rao, for the department, has drawn our attention to two decisions, one is of the Madras High Court and the other of this court in this connection. The first decision is M.S.M. Ratnaswami Nadar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, . That case arose under the provisions of Section 16(3)(a)(iv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the question was whether the income derived from the properties settled by the assessee on his daughters was liable to be included in the total income of the assessee under Section 16(3)(a)(iv). That decision rendered in the context of the provisions of the Income-tax Act can hardly be helpful to us. Mr. Rama Rao particularly relied upon the following observations of Ramaswami J., who delivered the judgment of the court:

"A consideration of these cases would show that in order to take the case out of the provisions of section 16(3)(a)(iv), the consideration must be a valuable consideration and the use of the word 'adequate' before the word 'consideration' implies that the valuable consideration should be measurable in terms of money or money's worth. In other words, if the consideration could not be measured in terms of money or money's worth and there is no objective measure for assessing the adequacy, it would not satisfy the provisions of the section though for purposes of enforcing the agreement or contract, there was consideration within the meaning of the Contract Act. The learned counsel for the assessee contended that the liability to maintenance is a financial obligation and that it could be measured in terms of money. In fact, section 23 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, sets out the facts and circumstances, which the courts shall have regard to in fixing the amount of maintenance. It may be the quantum depends on the evidence, but it cannot be said that the liability could not be measured in terms of money and that, therefore, the transaction is supported by adequate consideration. So ran the argument of the learned counsel for the assessee. The argument, of course, is attractive. But we are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel. What is transferred is the property and not the income from the property alone. The property had been transferred irrevocably and for ever, though the liability to maintain is only so long as the son is a minor or unable to maintain himself within the meaning of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. By executing this document, we are also unable to hold that the assessee is relieved from his obligation. If the property is lost, or does not yield any income, the assessee could not plead that he was not liable to maintain the son any longer ; nor could the minor relieve himself of his right to be maintained by any contract with the father, as such a contract will not be binding on him. At best, the settlement amounts only to a provision for maintenance."

13. Now, it must be noted that the above observations are made in the context of a different provision of law altogether and the considerations which weighed with the learned judges while considering the provisions of Section 16(3)(a)(iv) of the Income-tax Act are hardly the factors which require consideration in the problem before us. Under these circumstances, this decision of the Madras High Court relied upon by Mr. P. Rama Rao for the department can hardly help us.

14. The other decision on which Mr. Rama Rao relied strongly is the decision of this court in Commissioner of Gift-tax v. Bhupathiraju Venkata Narasimharaju, . The question before the Division Bench of this court consisting of Obul Reddi C.J. and Sriramulu J. was whether the father in his capacity as the karta of a Hindu undivided family can make a valid and reasonable provision for the maintenance of his minor daughters. There was no question before the court in that case whether the transfer could be said to be for consideration within the meaning of the definition in Section 2(xii) of the Gift-tax Act. Therefore, the observations in the above-said decision of this court have no bearing on the problem before us.

15. It may be pointed out that in Commissioner of Gift-tax v. RM S. Ramanathan Chettiar, the words "money's worth" in Section 2(xii) of the Gift-tax Act came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court and it was held that the words "'money's worth' in Section 2(xii) of the Gift-tax Act, 1958, have a wide connotation and are not necessarily to be understood in the strict context of money in specie but that which would eventually or in the ultimate analysis or result be reduced to or converted into money and, as the payment in the instant case had the effect of giving quittance to the family obligation to maintain the karta's wife, such consideration is money's worth and, hence, the payment was not a gift."

16. To the extent to which we have proceeded on the footing that, if the conveyance can be said to have been made to discharge the obligation of the father to provide maintenance for the marriage of his daughter in the shape of providing for reasonable expenses "incident" to the marriage, it can be said to be a transfer for consideration. This decision of the Madras High Court helps the assessee.

17. We find from the order of the Tribunal that the Tribunal has not considered as to whether, looking at the usual practice among this particular community, the conveyance of 10 acres and 54 cents of land by the assessee to his only daughter could be said to be reasonable or not. No doubt, the Tribunal has observed that the conveyance could be said to be provision of reasonable expenses "incident" to the marriage. But the question as to whether this was the usual practice in this particular community has not been examined by the Tribunal.

18. Two courses, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Indian Molasses Co. P. Ltd., [1970] 78 ITR 474 (SC) are open to us : (1) to call for a supplementary statement of the case from the Tribunal, (2) to decline to answer the question raised by the Tribunal and to leave the Tribunal to take appropriate steps to adjust its decision under Section 26(6) of the Gift-tax Act in the light of the decision of this court. If we direct the Tribunal to submit a supplementary statement of the case, the Tribunal will, according to the decisions of the Supreme Court in New Jahangir Vakil Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Petlad Turkey Red Dye Works Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1963] 48 ITR (SC) 92 and Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, be restricted to the evidence on the record and may not be entitled to take additional evidence. That may result in injustice.

19. In the circumstances we think it proper to decline to answer the question on the ground that the Tribunal has failed to consider and decide the question whether the conveyance under consideration was by way of usual provision for the marriage of the daughter and thus "incident"al to the marriage in this particular family or in this particular community. It will be open to the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal under Section 26(6) of the Gift-tax Act in the light of the observations made in this judgment, after determining the question which ought to have been decided. There will be no order as to costs.