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G. Papaiah v. Assistant Director, Medical Services, Secunderabad .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, G. Papaiah, a chowkidar at Station Health Organisation (S.H.O.), Golconda, petitioned under Article 226 seeking to quash Order No. 4565/P/M-3 dated 3-8-1973 issued by the Assistant Director of Medical Services, Headquarters, Andhra (Indep) Sub-Area, Secunderabad. The impugned order withheld the petitioner’s increment for one year and directed postponement of future increments. The enquiry officer had framed two primary charges against the petitioner: (1) misbehaviour while reporting for duty on 16/05/1973, and (2) unauthorised absence from duty despite assurances to the contrary for the period starting 16/05/1973. The enquiry officer, after examining witnesses and documents, found the petitioner guilty of all charges and recommended a documentary punishment and a final warning. The disciplinary authority imposed withholding of increment for one year (and postponement of future increments) instead of the recommendation, and also effected a transfer. The petitioner challenged the order on grounds including that it was not a speaking order, violated principles of natural justice because he was not supplied with the enquiry report and other documents when requested, and that charge no. 2 was not sustainable because extraordinary leave had been granted to regularise his absence.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the disciplinary order withholding increment is a speaking/quasi-judicial order and whether it is legally valid when it does not state reasons for departing from the enquiry officer's recommendation.
- Whether principles of natural justice were violated by not supplying the petitioner with a copy of the enquiry officer's report and related material despite his request.
- Whether charge no. 2 (absence from duty from 16/05/1973 to 25/05/1973) is maintainable in view of an order dated 18/6/1973 granting extraordinary leave for that period to regularise the petitioner’s absence.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (learned counsel A. Lakshmanachar)
- The impugned order is not a speaking order and lacks adequate reasons.
- The order violates principles of natural justice because the petitioner was not supplied with a copy of the enquiry officer's report and other material documents despite requests, and he was not given opportunity to engage counsel and present his case properly.
- Charge no. 2 (unauthorised absence from 16/05/1973 to 25/05/1973) is not sustainable as extraordinary leave was later granted on 18/6/1973 to regularise that absence.
- The first charge (misbehaviour on 16/05/1973) conflicts with charge no. 2, and thus the impugned order should be quashed.
Respondent's Arguments (learned Standing Counsel for the Central Government)
- A copy of the enquiry officer's report need not be provided to the petitioner; the respondent followed procedure under Rule 15(3) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, and no second notice of proposed punishment was required.
- The impugned order is not violative of natural justice and is not laconic; the disciplinary authority was empowered and justified to pass the order.
- There is no conflict between the two charges; the second charge is maintainable despite the grant of extraordinary leave because the authority may still frame charges and impose punishment.
- The disciplinary authority was satisfied of guilt; therefore, there is no illegality or want of jurisdiction warranting interference by the court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Punjab v. Bankhtawar Singh (AIR 1972 SC 2083) | The principle that quasi-judicial orders (such as disciplinary orders imposing penalty on a government servant) must be speaking orders with recorded reasons. | The court relied on this authority to hold that the disciplinary authority must apply its mind to the entire material and record justifiable reasons; the impugned order was found not to be a speaking order because it did not explain why the enquiry officer’s recommendation was not accepted. |
| State of Maharashtra v. B. A. Joshi (AIR 1969 SC 1302) | Principle that the person affected in disciplinary proceedings must be given material necessary to meet the case against him (supporting supply of enquiry report in appropriate circumstances). | The court applied this principle to conclude that, in the interest of justice, a copy of the enquiry officer’s report should have been supplied to the petitioner; absence of such supply (uncontroverted in the record) rendered the impugned order violative of natural justice. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court conducted a step-by-step analysis limited to the material in the record:
- Nature of the order and requirement of reasons:
The court observed that a disciplinary authority exercising quasi-judicial powers must issue a speaking order and apply its mind to the entire facts and circumstances, recording valid reasons. It noted that the enquiry officer had recommended only documentary punishment and a final warning, whereas the disciplinary authority imposed withholding of increment for one year and postponement of future increments without explaining why it rejected the enquiry officer's recommendation. Relying on the principle from State of Punjab v. Bankhtawar Singh, the court held that the impugned order is not a speaking order and the mere assertion that the authority was “satisfied” is insufficient; satisfaction must be objective and founded on an application of mind to the material.
- Violation of principles of natural justice:
The petitioner pleaded (paragraph 9 of the writ petition) that he was not permitted to engage counsel properly and that copies of the proceedings were refused when requested; the respondent did not controvert this averment. The court held that, in the circumstances, the petitioner was entitled to a copy of the enquiry officer’s report because it was essential for him to meet the department’s case. Citing State of Maharashtra v. B. A. Joshi, the court concluded that denial of the report (when requested and uncontroverted) amounted to breach of natural justice, and therefore the impugned order was vitiated on this ground as well.
- Maintainability of charge no. 2 (absence during period covered by leave):
The court examined the order by the Major Officer Commanding (No. SHO/125/A/93 dated 18-6-1973) granting ten days extraordinary leave from 16/05/1973 to 25/05/1973 inclusive, to regularise the petitioner’s intentional absence. The court reasoned that regardless of the nature of leave (extraordinary, ordinary, on pay, etc.), once leave is granted for a period, the public servant is permitted to be absent for that period and the employer cannot both grant leave and subsequently prosecute/punish for the same absence. Therefore, the second charge relating to absence during the period covered by the granted leave was unsustainable and had to be quashed. The court emphasised that if authorities wished to punish, they should first refuse leave and then proceed after due enquiry; they cannot “blow hot and cold.”
- Conflict between charges:
The court noted the petitioner’s submission that charge no. 1 conflicted with charge no. 2 and observed that there was considerable force in that submission but declined to decide the point fully, stating it need not be gone into for the purpose of disposing of the petition.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition was partly allowed. The impugned order was quashed insofar as it imposed the stoppage/withholding of the petitioner’s increment for one year (and the consequential postponement of future increments). The other part of the disciplinary order relating to his transfer was left intact. The writ petition was allowed with costs; advocates' fee assessed at Rs. 100. The formal concluding line in the opinion states: "Petition partly allowed."
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The penalty of withholding one year’s increment and the postponement of future increments was set aside; the transfer imposed by the disciplinary order remains effective. The petitioner is entitled to the relief limited to removal of the increment-stoppage penalty.
- Procedural and doctrinal consequences emphasized by the court: Disciplinary authorities must issue speaking orders when exercising quasi-judicial functions and must provide materially relevant records (such as the enquiry officer’s report) to a charged employee in appropriate circumstances in order to satisfy principles of natural justice.
- Scope of precedent: The opinion applies established precedent (as cited) to the facts; the judgment does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying those principles to this factual matrix.
This summary is strictly confined to and based solely on the content of the provided opinion. No facts or conclusions have been added beyond those contained in the opinion text.
(1) This application by the petitioner, a chowkidar at station health organisation, golconda, under art. 226 of the constitution of india, is to quash the order no. 4565/p/m - 3 dated 3 - 8 - 1973 passed by the assistant director of medical services, headquarters, andhra (indep) sub - area, secunderabad, the respondent herein, withholding his increment for one year, on several grounds.
(2) Mr. A. Lakshmanachar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the impugned order is not a speaking order and it is violative of principles of natural justice as his client was not supplied with a copy of the report of the enquiry officer and copies of some other material documents in spite of his requesting for the same. He further urges that charge no. 2 relating to the unauthorised absence of the petitioner from duty from 16th may to 25th may, 1973 is not sustainable in view of the fact that extraordinary leave has been granted by the concerned authority on 18 - 6 - 1973 itself and in any event, the first charge relating to misbehaviour of the petitioner on 16/05/1973 is in conflict with charge no. 2 and therefore, the impugned order must be quashed.
(3) The claim of the petitioner is resisted by the learned standing counsel for the central government contending inter alia that a copy of the report of the enquiry officer need not be given to the petitioner, as the respondent has followed the procedure prescribed under rule 15 (3) of the central civil services (classification, control and appeal) rules, 1965, and no second notice relating to the proposed punishment need be given. He states that the impugned order is not violative of principles of natural justice nor it is laconic and the respondent is empowered and also justified in passing the impugned order and there is no conflict between the two charges and the second charge also is maintainable as the granting of extraordinary leave for the period does not prevent the disciplinary authority from framing the charge no. 2 and passing the impugned order.
(4) In order to appreciate the respective contents of the parties, it is not only profitable but necessary to notice the two main charges framed by the enquiry officer against the petitioner as indicted in page 4 of the counter - affidavit and they read thus : - - "annexure" statement of articles of charge framed against sri g. Papaiah, chowkidar s. H. O. Golconda. "that the said shri g. Papaiah, chowkidar while functioning as chowkidar in s. H. O. Golconda, behaved in a manner prejudicial to the government servants conduct rules on 16/05/1973 at 12 - 00 hours while reporting for duty. "annexure - ii" the individual in spite of his assurance that he was joining duty on 16 - 5 - 1973 and having been put on duty, did not come for duty. " the enquiry officer, after examining a number of witnesses and documents, submitted his findings, conclusions and recommendations in his report dated 21 - 7 - 1973. He gave salient findings and summary of his enquiry in the report and arrived at the following conclusion and made recommendations as follows: - (1) no. Mes 410323 civ, chowkidar sri g. Papaiah of s. H. O. Golconda has been found guilty of all the charges framed against him. (2) in addition, his character and personality (as pointed descriptively in summary) has taken a turn towards indicipiline, lacking devotion to duty, developing imaginary fear thus prejudicing himself to all his superiors and firmly believing in violence also. (3) it is recommended that he be given some suitable documentary punishment for records and given a final warning to rectify himself of all the weak and bad points. " the respondent, who is the disciplinary authority has passed the impugned order on 3 - 8 - 1973 which reads thus :
"after a careful examination of the disciplinary case of civilian chowkidar of s. H. O. Golconda shri g papaiah, the undersigned is satisfied that the said sr. G. Papaiah is guilty of the charges levelled against him vide charge - sheet dated 18/06/1973. 2. Now, therefore, the undersigned being the appointing authority and authority empowered to award penalty do hereby order that the said sri g. Papaiah is awarded the punishment of withholding his increment for one year. I, further direct that this withholding of increment will have the effect of postponing his future increments on expiry of the period for which his increment is withheld."
From a perusal of the impugned order, it is clear that the disciplinary authority did not accept the recommendation of the enquiry officer to award suitable documentary punishment for records and give a final warning to rectify himself of all the weak and bad points". But instead, the disciplinary authority has withheld the increment of the petitioner for one year and such withholding of the increment will have the effect of postponing his future increments on expiry of the period for which his increment is withheld. The disciplinary authority, while passing an order imposing a penalty on a government servant, is exercising quasi - judicial powers. The quasi - judicial orders must be speaking orders. The disciplinary authority must apply its mind to the entire facts and circumstances and record valid and justifiable reasons or grounds in support of its conclusion. See state of punjab v. Bankhtawar singh (air 1972 sc 2083). The impugned order imposing the penalty of withholding the increment of the petitioner for one year and also directing the postponement of his future increments is not an administrative or executive order but it is a quasi - judicial order and therefore, must be a speaking one. On a perusal of the impugned order it does not appear to be a speaking one. The contention of the respondents counsel that the respondent has accepted the report of the enquiry officer in tot and, therefore, he did not give any reasons cannot be acceded to. As pointed out earlier, the enquiry officer had recommended the awarding of only documentary punishment for records and a final warning but the respondent has awarded the punishment of withholding the petitioners increment for one year and also directed that this withholding of increment should have the effect of postponing his future increments on expiry of the period for which his increment is withheld. He did not give any reasons why he did not accept the recommendations of the enquiry officer or in support of his decision to award the aforesaid punishment. The submission of the learned standing counsel for the central government that the disciplinary authority has satisfied itself that the petitioner was guilty of the charges levelled against him and, therefore, there is no illegality or want of jurisdiction justifying the interference of this court, is also, devoid of any merit. The satisfaction of the disciplinary authority about the guilt or otherwise of the government servant for the charges levelled against him must be an objective but not subjective satisfaction. On a reading of the impugned order, i am satisfied that the respondent has not applied his mind to the entire material facts and circumstances of the case in arriving at a conclusion about the truth or otherwise of the charges levelled against the petitioner. I do not also find any force in the further submission of the respondents counsel that the impugned order has been passed by a military officer and the punishment is not severe. In fact, the impugned order has been passed by the assistant director of medical services, headquarters, andhra (indep) sub - area, secunderabad. Irrespective of the fact whether the order has been passed by a military officer or a civilian authority, it must be in accordance with law as it affects the rights of a citizen.
(5) I shall now advert to the question relating to the violation of principles of natural justice. In paragraph 9 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated that he was not given an opportunity to engage a counsel and submit his case properly and when he asked for copes f the proceedings they were refused. In the counter filed on behalf of the respondent this averment in paragraph 9 of the writ petition has not been controverted. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances, i am satisfied that this is a fit case where a copy of the enquiry officers report must have been supplied to the petitioner in the interest of justice. The petitioner must be given a reasonable opportunity to meet the case of the department relating to the charges levelled against him and in the circumstances of the case, the report of the enquiry officer is really essential for the petitioner to establish his defence version. See state of maharashtra v. B. A. Joshi (air 1969 sc 1302). From the averment in paragraph no. 9 of the writ petition and in view of the fact that there is no counter of the respondent, i must conclude that a copy of the enquiry officers report though requested for, was not supplied to the petitioner. Hence, i hold that the impugned order is also viiolative of principles of natural justice.
(6) This brings me to examine the question whether charge no. 2 relating to the absence of the petitioner from duty for the period commencing from 16/05/1973 and ending with 29/05/1973 is maintainable. Admittedly the major officer, commanding, by his order no. Sho/125/a/93 dated 18 - 6 - 1973, granted ten days e. O. L from 16/05/1973 to 2 5/05/1973 (both days inclusive) to the petitioner to regularise his intentional absence for the period. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that notwithstanding the grant of the extraordinary leave to the petitioner, he can be proceeded against for his absence from duty for that period. Whether it is an extraordinary leave, ordinary leave, leave on pay, leave o half pay, medical leave or casual leave, nonetheless it is a leave. The kind or nature of leave is not material but the substance of the matter is that the petitioner was granted leave. When once leave is granted to a public servant, in respect of a particular period, it must be considered that he is permitted to absent himself from duty for that period. In such a case, it is not permissible or open to the employer or any other authority to proceed against the public servant for absenting from duty for the same period and punish him. The employer, either private or public cannot blow hot and cold. The authorities should have refused to grant leave of any kind to the petitioner and then proceeded to punish him after due and proper enquiry and after affording reasonable opportunity to him. When once leave has been granted, it cannot be said that the petitioner has absented himself from duty and thereby made himself liable to be punished. Hence, the second charge relating to the absence of the petitioner from duty from 16/05/1973 to 2 5/05/1973, both days inclusive, is not sustainable. I may add that the very order granting extraordinary leave states that such leave has been granted to regularise the petitioners intentional absence for the period. The very purpose of granting the leave being to regularise the petitioners intentional absence, i is not open to the respondent to initiate any proceedings against the petitioner for his absence from duty for that period. Judged from any angle, the second charge must be quashed as it is not sustainable.
(7) The further submission of the petitioners counsel that charge no. 1 is in conflict with charge no. 2 and it must also fall to the ground, need not be gone into, although i feel that there is considerable force in that submission.
(8) For all the reasons stated above, the impugned order must be and is hereby quashed in respect of stoppage of increment only. The other part of the order relating to his transfer shall stand. The writ petition is allowed with costs. Advocates fee rs. 100.
(9) Petition partly allowed.
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