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The State Of Andhra Pradesh v. Hotel Sri Lakshmi Bhavan, Visakhapatnam

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Jan 30, 1973
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Factual and Procedural Background

This tax revision arises from an assessment for the year 1964-65 against Sri Lakshmi Bhavan, Visakhapatnam, a hotel represented by its proprietor P. Damodara Nair (the assessee). The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer assessed the assessee on a net turnover of Rs. 55,003.31 and had allowed a deduction of Rs. 4,329.24 as the value of food supplied by the assessee to its employees. The Deputy Commissioner (C.T.), Visakhapatnam, suo motu revised the assessment insofar as it related to that deduction, issued a show-cause notice, and held that the supply of food to workers amounted to sale and was assessable to tax. The assessee appealed to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, which allowed the appeal, holding that supply of food to employees was part payment of wages in kind under a contract of service and not a contract of sale. The State brought this revision challenging the Tribunal's decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the supply of food by a hotel proprietor to his servants (employees) constitutes a "sale" within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 ("the Act").

Arguments of the Parties

State's Arguments (Presented by Mr. Mahadev)

  • The Rs. 25 per month deducted from each employee is a payment for the food supplied; adequacy of price is not material — even a low price can constitute consideration for a sale.
  • There was a transfer of property in goods for money consideration pursuant to agreements between the assessee and its employees; therefore the transactions are sales within section 2(n) of the Act.
  • The absence of profit-motive does not preclude a transaction from being a sale; reliance was placed on the statutory definition of "business" (as amended with effect from 1 April 1966) and several judicial decisions where supplies without profit-motive were held taxable.

Assessee's / Amicus Arguments (Presented by appointed amicus curiae)

  • The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal correctly held that the supply of food to employees was payment of part of wages in kind under a contract of service, not a contract of sale.
  • The State bears the burden of proving the essential ingredients of a sale (mutual consent/contract of sale, intention to sell, consideration in the form of money or other monetary payment); that burden was not discharged.
  • Under G.O. Ms. No. 950 Home (Labour) dated 25th May, 1962 (issued under Section 11(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948), rupees twenty-five per month could be deducted from a worker's wages in lieu of food, and this statutory framework removed volition/free consent as between employer and employee — the supply was by statutory compulsion or under the contract of service and therefore incidental to employment.
  • The supply of food is incidental to the contract of service and customary practice, and thus does not amount to sale even if some payment or deduction is made.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras [1953] 4 S.T.C. 188 (S.C.) Illustration of the essential ingredients of "sale" as understood under Sale of Goods Act and sales tax law. Listed among authorities establishing elements of sale; used to show established principles about transfer of property and consideration.
State Of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co., (Madras) Ltd. [1958] 9 S.T.C. 353 (S.C.) Authority on the interpretation of "sale" and when transfer of property amounts to sale. Referred to as part of the body of case law setting out essential ingredients of a sale.
Bhopal Sugar Industries v. D.P. Dube [1963] 14 S.T.C. 406 (S.C.) Principles regarding sales tax coverage of transfers of goods. Listed among precedents delineating elements of sale under the Act.
Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab [1967] 20 S.T.C. 430 (S.C.) Interpreting "valuable consideration" in the definition of sale; the phrase takes colour from "cash or deferred payment". Relied upon to construe "any other valuable consideration" as meaning monetary payments akin to cash or deferred payment, not payment in kind.
Indian Steel and Wire Products Ltd. v. The State of Madras [1968] 21 S.T.C. 138 (S.C.) Further authority on sale of goods and sales tax principles. Included among the precedents establishing the test for sale under sales tax law.
Chhitter Mal Narain Das v. Commissioner Of Sales Tax. [1970] 26 S.T.C. 344 (S.C.) Held that sale cannot be assumed; volition/consent must be proved; where parties have no option the transaction can be acquisition not sale. Quoted to emphasize that a contract of sale predicates mutual consent and that the department must prove contract/consent; the court relied on it for the proposition that sale must be proved on the materials on record.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Mohammad Rasul of Panna [1970] 26 S.T.C. 202 Substance over form; primary object and intention of parties determine nature of transaction. Used to support the approach of looking at substance not form to determine whether a transaction is sale or service/other.
Dunkerley and Co. v. State of Madras A.I.R. 1964 Mad. 1130 Sale of goods to workmen without profit-motive can nonetheless be sale if transfer of property for consideration occurs in course of trade or business. Considered by the court but distinguished on facts (different factual matrix and legal status of parties in that case).
S.R.E. Workshop Canteen v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Tiruchirapalli [1965] 16 S.T.C. 187 Power of State to tax sales is not restricted to transactions with profit-motive; "trade or business" need not connote profit-motive. Referred to and distinguished on facts and on the point that statutory definition of "business" relied on by State was not in force for the assessment year concerned.
Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. E.I.L. Co-operative Canteen Ltd. [1968] 21 S.T.C. 317 (S.C.) Supply by a registered cooperative society to members was taxable because the society was a separate legal entity satisfying "dealer" definition; supply was for a price and elements of sale were present. Distinguished: those cases involved independent legal entities and supplies for a price; facts differ from present case where supply was incidental to employment.
Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products Limited v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1972] 30 S.T.C. 26 Supply of food and drink by a company to its employees at a canteen chargeable to sales tax where elements of sale are present. Distinguished on facts: in that case there was a company/canteen setting and supplies for a price; not analogous to the instant facts where supply was part-payment of wages under statutory framework.
Chandrabhava Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore A.I.R. 1968 Mys. 156 Supply of food by employers to employees can be regarded as an "advantage" or "amenity" within the Minimum Wages Act. Relied upon to support the characterization of employer-supplied food as an amenity/advantage under the Minimum Wages Act; used to show statutory context for deductions and supplies to employees.
Solar Jung (Salar Jung) Sugar Mills v. State of Mysore [1972] 29 S.T.C. 246 (S.C.) Where statutory control orders still leave scope for mutual assent/contract terms (inspection, bargaining), transactions may constitute sales. Discussed and distinguished: court observed differences in freedom to contract and inspection/appropriation which were absent in the instant facts governed by the G.O. deduction regime.
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Associated Hotels of India Ltd. [1972] 29 S.T.C. 474 (S.C.) Supply of meals to guests in the course of receiving them in a hotel was an indivisible contract of service; amenities incidental to service do not convert the transaction into a sale. Held to be the closest and controlling authority; applied to conclude that supply of food to employees was incidental to contract of service and not a sale.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. Definition and essential elements: The court began by stating the statutory definition of "sale" under section 2(n) of the Act and noted that it must be understood in the light of Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act. It enumerated the essential elements of sale: transfer of property (or agreement to transfer), seller and buyer, mutual consent/contract of sale, and payment or promise of price/consideration. Several precedents were cited to support these elements.
  2. Volition/consent requirement: The court emphasized that mere transfer of property without volition or mutual consent cannot be termed a sale. Where parties have no option and are obliged to complete the transaction, it may amount to acquisition rather than sale. The court relied on authority holding that a contract of sale cannot be assumed and must be proved on the record.
  3. Factual application — source of the arrangement and statutory context: The Tribunal had found that supply of food was effectively part payment of wages; the court observed that G.O. Ms. No. 950 Home (Labour) dated 25th May, 1962 (issued under Section 11(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948) permitted the employer to deduct Rs. 25 from monthly wages in lieu of food. The court treated this as establishing that the assessee routinely paid wages partly in kind and partly in cash and that the assessee was bound by the G.O., reducing the element of free consent in the transactional sense of a sale.
  4. Interpretation of "valuable consideration": The court rejected the State's submission that payment in kind (deduction from wages) amounted to "any other valuable consideration" under section 2(n). Relying on Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan, the court interpreted "any other valuable consideration" as colored by "cash or deferred payment" and confined it to monetary payments (cash or deferred) such as cheque, draft, promissory note, etc., not payment in kind or payment of wages.
  5. Temporal scope of amended definition of "business": The court considered the State's reliance on an inclusive definition of "business" inserted by an amendment effective 1 April 1966, which would capture transactions without profit-motive. It held that this definition was not applicable because the assessment year in question was 1964-65 (ending 31 March 1965); hence the amended definition could not be invoked for the relevant year.
  6. Distinguishing authorities relied upon by the State: The court reviewed cases cited by the State where supplies without profit motive were treated as sales (e.g., Dunkerley, Workshop Canteen, E.I.L. Co-operative Canteen, Hyderabad Asbestos). It distinguished them on facts — typically those cases involved independent legal entities (companies or registered co-operative societies) transacting for a price and satisfying all elements of sale — whereas in the present case the supply was part of a contractual relationship of service and was governed by statutory regulation of wages/deductions.
  7. Reliance on Associated Hotels of India decision: The court found the Supreme Court decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Associated Hotels of India Ltd. to be the nearest and most instructive authority. That decision establishes that where services (receiving guests in a hotel) are indivisible and amenities (meals, lodging) are incidental to the service, the transaction is one of service and not a contract of sale. The court concluded that the same principle applied to supply of food to employees: the supply was incidental to the contract of service and not a sale.
  8. Burden of proof: The court reiterated that the sales tax department bears the onus of proving all essential ingredients of a sale before levying tax. The court found that the department failed to establish intention to sell food to employees for a price or any monetary consideration qualifying under section 2(n).

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court held that the supply of food by the assessee to its employees does not amount to a "sale" within the meaning of section 2(n) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act for the assessment year in question. The court answered the central question in the negative and against the department.

DISPOSITION: The tax revision filed by the State is dismissed with costs. The court fixed advocate's fees of Rs. 200 to be paid to Sri A. Balakoteswara Rao and Sri C. Suryanarayana Murthy (appointed as amicus), in equal proportion.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Tribunal's allowance of the deduction for Rs. 4,329.24 (value of food supplied to employees) stands for the assessment year 1964-65; no sales tax is leviable on that supply for that year under section 2(n) as construed by the court.
  • Burden and proof: Reinforces that the tax department must establish the essential ingredients of a sale (including volition/consent and monetary consideration) before treating a supply as a sale for sales tax purposes.
  • Scope of precedent: The court applied and relied upon existing Supreme Court authority (notably Associated Hotels of India) to govern the instant facts; the opinion does not purport to announce a new legal principle beyond applying and distinguishing prior decisions to the facts at hand.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. This tax revision case by the State gives rise to a short but an interesting question of law, whether the transaction relating to supply of food by a hotel proprietor to his servants (employees) constitutes a sale within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act (6 of 1957) (hereinafter referred as

"the Act"
).

2. In order to appreciate the scope of the question, it is necessary to briefly refer to the material facts that gave rise to the question. For the year 1964-65, the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Visakhapatnam, had assessed Sri Lakshmi Bhavan, Visakhapatnam, a hotel represented by its proprietor P. Damodara Nair (hereinafter called "the assessee") to tax under the assessment order dated 20th January, 1966, on a net turnover of Rs. 55,003.31. In arriving at the net turnover, the assessing authority had allowed the turnover of Rs. 4,329.24, being the value of food supplied by the assessee to its employees, as a deduction. The Deputy Commissioner (C.T.), Visakhapatnam, suo motu seeking to revise the assessment in so far as it relates to the exemption of the turnover amounting to Rs. 4,329.24, representing the value of the food supplied by the assessee to its employees, granted by the assessing authority, issued a notice to show cause why the aforesaid turnover should not be assessed to tax. The assessee submitted its explanation stating that a sum of Rs. 25 per month per head was being deducted from money wages paid to the workers, as per the provisions of G.O. Ms. No. 950 Home (Labour) dated 25th May, 1962, and hence, the supply of food to its emyloyees does not constitute sale within the meaning of "the Act". Rejecting the objection raised by the assessee the Deputy Commissioner held that food was supplied to the workers in lieu of money and the same was for any other valuable consideration and, therefore, the supply of food amounts to sale assessable to tax. Aggrieved by the decision of the Deputy Commissioner, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal, on a consideration of the facts and circumstances, found that there is a fundamental distinction between the supply of food to the customers and the employees in a hotel and that the supply of food to the hotel workers was under a contract of service under which the employees are employed by the assessee. The supply of food by the assessee to its employees was, in effect, payment of part of the wages to the workers in kind under the contract of service, but not under any contract of sale. It was further found that if the supply of food to the workers were under a contract of sale, one would expect the workers also to be charged for each meal at the same rate at which the customers were charged. In the case on hand, it was found that the flat rate of Rs. 25 at which deductions were made from the monthly wages of each worker towards supply of food was admittedly far below the amount which the customers would be charged and, therefore, the appeal was allowed. Hence this revision by the State.

3. Mr. Mahadev, the learned counsel appearing for the State, pressed upon us that a sum of Rs. 25 per mensem though not the usual price, has been paid by each of the employees for the supply of food by the assessee and the adequacy of price can never be a consideration for deciding whether a transaction partakes the character of a sale or not. In other words, he contended that there is transfer of property in goods for money consideration pursuant to an agreement of sale entered into between the assessee and its employees of their own free will and volition and, therefore, the transaction amounts to sale within the meaning of section 2(n) of "the act". As no one appeared for the assessee, though notice has been served in due course, we had appointed Mr. A. Balakoteswara Rao and Mr. C. Surya-narayana Murthy as amicus curiae to assist the court. Mr. Balakoteswara Rao opposed the claim of the State contending, inter alia, that the ingredients of the concept of "sale" have not been established by the State on whom the burden lies, before taxing the transactions in question, that the assessee was paying the wages to its employees partly in kind and partly in cash pursuant to the G. 0. issued by the State Government on 25th May, 1962, that there is no volition or free consent of the parties as the assessee is bound by the G.O. and that the Tribunal has rightly allowed the claim of the assessee. Mr. C. Suryanarayana Murthy, the learned counsel referred to the concept of contract in modern times and added that the supply of food by the assessee to its employees is only incidental to the contract of service agreed to by the parties, but does not amount to "sale".

4. For a proper appreciation of the respective contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, it is necessary to advert, at the outset, to the concept of "sale". "Sale" is defined under section 2(n) of "the act" as "every transfer of the property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business for cash, or for deferred payment, or for any other valuable consideration". It is trite law that the concept of sale under "the Act" has to be understood as a sale of goods within the meaning of Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act. The essential ingredients or elements of "sale" are: (i) transfer of property or agreement to transfer property, (ii) by seller to buyer, (iii) pursuant to any bargain or agreement of sale or with mutual consent, and (iv) for the payment or promise of payment of a price or for consideration (See Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras [1953] 4 S.T.C. 188 (S.C.), State Of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co., (Madras) Ltd. and Co. [1958] 9 S.T.C. 353 (S.C.), Bhopal Sugar Industries v. D.P. Dube [1963] 14 S.T.C. 406 (S.C.), Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab [1967] 20 S.T.C. 430 (S.C.), and Indian Steel and Wire Products Ltd. v. The State of Madras [1968] 21 S.T.C. 138 (S.C.).

5. Mere transfer or every transfer of property, if there is no element of volition to choose the terms of the contract, cannot be termed to be a sale. Where the contracting parties have no option but to complete the transaction, it amounts to acquisition but not a sale of goods. The heart of the matter is that there should be an agreement or mutual consent between the contracting parties in order to make such a transaction a valid and complete sale. In other words, a sale predicates a contract. A contract cannot be assumed but has to be proved on the materials on record in each case (See Chhitter Mal Narain Das v. Commissioner Of Sales Tax. [1970] 26 S.T.C. 344 at 348 (S.C.). In order to arrive at the nature of the transaction, one of the guiding factors is the primary object and intendment of the parties in entering into the transaction. The intendment and object of the transaction has to be gathered from the terms of the agreement or contract entered into by the parties. However, it may be noticed that it is the substance but not the form of the contract entered into that should be looked into or taken as the guide to decide the intendment and the object of the contract (See Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Mohammad Rasul of Panna [1970] 26 S.T.C. 202 at 205.

6. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we shall now examine, what exactly is the nature of the transaction and intendment of the parties herein when the assessee supplied food to its employees. As pointed out earlier, the Sales Tax Tribunal, which is the final fact-finding authority, has held that the supply of food by the assessee to its employees was in effect payment of part of the wages to the workers in kind and the other in cash under the contract of service and the supply of food was not made under any contract of sale. Under the G.O. Ms. No. 950 Home (Labour) dated 25th May, 1962, issued by the State Government under Section 11(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the assessee can deduct only rupees twenty-five from the monthly wages of a worker employed by it in lieu of the food supplied to him. It has been the custom and practice of the assessee to pay wages partly in kind and partly in cash. Hence, there is no volition or free consent of the parties as the assessee is bound by the G. 0. The primary intendment and object of the transaction between the assessee and its servants must be held to be not to sell food but to supply the same under a statutory obligation. Otherwise the employees have to pay much more than Rs. 25 per month for the supply of food made to them by the assessee. The transaction is really in the interests of the employees. The supply of food by the assessee to its employees would also be beneficial to it as it can expect better work and service from its employees.

7. The submission of Mr. Mahadev that the supply of food by the assessee to its servants amounts to "sale" as there was "valuable consideration" within the meaning of section 2(n) of "the act" and there was profit-motive, cannot be acceded to. Valuable consideration cannot be equated to the payment of wages in kind. The expression "any other valuable consideration" used in section 2(n) of "the act" must mean any monetary payment other then payment in the nature of cash or deferred payment. In other words, payment of money by way of bank cheque, draft, insurance, promissory note or any other monetary payment in the nature of cash or deferred payment, must be construed as any other "valuable consideration". Further the term "price" means money consideration. It takes in only cash or deferred payment. The expression "any other valuable consideration" has a wider connotation than the term "price". As ruled by the learned Judge, Subba Rao, C.J., speaking for the court in Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab [1967] 20 S.T.C. 430 at 445 (S.C.), "the expression 'valuable consideration' takes colour from the preceding expression 'cash or deferred payment'. If so, it can only mean some other monetary payment in the nature of cash or deferred payment". For these reasons, we are unable to subscribe to the view canvassed on behalf of the sales tax department that though the supply of food by the assessee to its employees is not for price, it is for "any other valuable consideration" within the meaning of section 2(n) of "the act".

8. We shall now turn to the plea of Mr. Mahadev that the transaction in the case on hand is a "sale" although there is no profit-motive in the supply of food to the employees. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on the definition of "business" and on the decisions in (i) Dunkerley and Co. v. State of Madras A.I.R. 1964 Mad. 1130, (ii) 5. R.E. Workshop Canteen v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Tiruchirapalli [1965] 16 S.T.C. 187, (iii) Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. E.I.L. Co-operative Canteen Ltd. [1968] 21 S.T.C. 317 (S.C.), and (iv) The Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products Limited v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1972] 30 S.T.C. 26.

9. The definition of "business" under clause (bbb) of section 2 of "the act" has been inserted by Section 2 of the Amendment Act 7 of 1966, which came into force with effect from 1st April, 1966. This definition is an inclusive one. By Sub-clause (i) thereof, it takes in any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture irrespective of whether such trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or concern is carried on or undertaken with a profit-motive or not and whether or not any gain or profit accrued therefrom. Under sub-clause (ii) of section 2 (bbb) of "the act", any transaction in connection with, or incidental or ancillary to, such trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or concern, also amounts to business. This definition would doubtless support the submission of Mr. Mahadev that the element of profit-motive or gain is not a necessary ingredient for a valid sale to be assessable to sales tax. However, it must be held that this definition of "business" is not applicable to the case on hand. As pointed out earlier, this definition is only prospective and has come into force only on 1st April, 1966. We are now concerned with the assessment for the year 1964-65 which ended with 31st March, 1965, and, hence, we are not governed by the new definition of "business". The definition of "business" which was in force at the relevant time does not support the contention advanced on behalf of the sales tax department.

10. We shall now turn to the decided cases relied upon by the State. In Dunkerley and Co, v. State of Madras A.I.R, 1954 Mad, 1130, (sic) it was held that sale of foodgrains by the company to its workmen without profit-motive was none the less a sale assessable to sales tax as there was transfer of property in the goods for consideration in the course of business or trade. In S.R.E. Workshop Canteen v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Tiruchirapalli [1965] 16 S.T.C. 187, Ramakrishnan, J., held that "the power of the State to tax sales of goods is not restricted to sales which are in the course of trade or business with a profit-motive". True, the expression " trade or business" need not necessarily connote a profit-motive, though such motive ordinarily exists when a business is done as a means of livelihood. In Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. E.I.L. Co-operative Canteen Ltd. [1972] 30 S.T.C. 26, supply of refreshments by a co-operative society to its members was held to be taxable even though there was no profit-motive in that transaction. Therein, the co-operative society registered under the Madras Co-operative Societies Act was a legal entity which satisfied the ingredients of the definition of "dealer" under the Madras General Sales Tax Act. The society being a separate independent taxable entity was competent to deal with its members. It can, therefore, sell, supply or distribute goods from or to its members, whether in the course of business or not. The refreshments were supplied for a price in the canteen maintained by it and all the constituent elements of "sale" have been satisfied. Therefore, though there was no profit-motive in the supply of refreshments to its members by the registered society, the transactions were held to be valid sales assessable to sales tax. To the same effect is the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products Limited v. The State of Andhra Pradesh [1972] 30 S.T.C. 26, wherein it was held that supply of food and drink by a company to its employees at the canteen maintained by it was chargeable to sales tax. In these cases, the co-operative societies are admittedly legal entities and every transaction of purchase or supply of an item of refreshment by the society or canteen to the employees was for a price and all the ingredients of sale were found. The aforesaid decisions do not advance the plea of the petitioner herein and those cases are distinguishable on facts.

11. The supply of food by the assessee to its employees appears to be more in the nature of a domestic transaction as there is no element of commerce or profit. It admits of no doubt that the utility of goods by a dealer for his personal consumption is not assessable to sales tax as the constituent elements of "sale" are not present. However, the consumption of goods by a dealer in the course of his manufacturing process or business may be regarded as a "sale" assessable to sales tax. The supply of food by a hotel proprietor to his employees may be pursuant to the service contract or the usual custom prevalent in a particular area. Each case depends upon its own facts and circumstances. When judged from the commercial or business point of view, the supply of food by a hotel proprietor to his employees must ordinarily, unless the contrary is established, be regarded as part payment of wages in kind which is incidental to the contract of service.

12. We shall now refer to (i) Chandrabhava Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore A.I.R. 1968 Mys. 156, (ii) Chhitter Mal Narain Das v. Commissioner Of Sales Tax. [1970] 26 S.T.C. 344 (S.C.), (iii) Salar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Mysore [1972] 29 S.T.C. 246 (S.C.), and (iv) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Associated Hotels of India Ltd. [1972] 29 S.T.C. 474 (S.C.), cited by Mr. Balakoteswara Rao.

13. Chandrabhava Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore A.I.R. 1968 Mys. 156, is a case arising under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, wherein a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court held that the supply of food by the owners of residential houses and eating houses to their employees was an advantage amounting to an amenity within the meaning of the Minimum Wages Act. It was observed by the court at page 178 as follows:

We see no reason why food provided by the employers to their employees in hotel industry cannot be regarded as an advantage and why that advantage should not be regarded as an 'amenity' within the meaning of the Minimum Wages Act.

14. We are not impressed with the submission of Mr. Mahadev that Section 11(3) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, requires the State Government to issue a notification authorising the provision of supplies of essential commodities at concessional rates by the employer to the employees only in appropriate cases and does not compel it to do so in every case, and, therefore, the hotel proprietors need not invariably supply food at concessional rates to their employees. This plea is besides the point at issue as the Government had, in fact, issued a G. 0. on 25th May, 1962, under section 11(2) of "the act". By virtue of the aforesaid notification, the employees have a right or choice to question the quality of food supplied to them by the assessee, although there is no compulsion on them to invariably take food.

15. In Chhitter Mal Narain Das v. Commissioner Of Sales Tax. [1970] 26 S.T.C. 344 (S.C.), the supply of wheat by a dealer to the Food Controller at the controlled price under clause 3 of the U.P. Wheat Procurement (Levy) Order, 1959, was held by the Supreme Court to be not a sale within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, assessable to sales tax. Therein it was held that the U.P. Wheat Procurement (Levy) Order had imposed a liability on the licence-holder (dealer) to deliver half the quantity of wheat on hand to the Controller at the controlled price and if he failed to carry out that obligation, he was liable to be penalised. Hence, it was held that the Wheat Procurement (Levy) Order ignored the volition of the dealer.

16. The Supreme Court in Solar Jung Sugar Mills v. State of Mysore [1972] 29 S.T.C. 246 (S.C.), on a consideration of the terms of the agreements entered into between the sugar mills and the growers for the supply of sugarcane, held that the Sugarcane Control Orders promulgated by the Mysore State Government controlling and regulating the sale or purchase of sugarcane, which was declared to be an essential commodity, did not absolutely impinge on the freedom to enter into contract, and delimiting areas for transactions or parties or denoting prices for transactions were all within the area of individual freedom of contract with limited choice. Therein, the grower could bargain for a higher price and could also ask for payment in advance. Payment might be made in cash or in kind. There was scope for rejection of goods as the sugarcane supplied by the grower would be accepted only after inspection. On a consideration of the entire facts, it was ruled that there was offer, inspection and appropriation of goods to the contiact and the mutual assent was not only implicit but also explicit and the transactions constituted "sales" within the meaning of Section 2(t) of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957, exigible to tax.

17. We shall now turn to the decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Associated Hotels of India Ltd. [1972] 29 S.T.C. 474 (S.C.), which appears to be the nearest case on the point. Therein, the Associated Hotels of India Limited received guests in its several hotels. They provided lodging, public and private rooms, bath with hot and cold running water, meals and other amenities. They charged the guests with a fixed sum for their stay in the hotel for each day. The question that fell for decision was whether the company was liable to pay sales tax under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, in respect of meals served in the hotel to the guests who stayed there. The Supreme Court, confirming the decision of the High Court, held that the supply of meals by the Associated Hotels of India Ltd. to the guests who stayed in the hotels did not amount to "sale" within the meaning of the Punjab Sales Tax Act as the entire transaction was essentially one and indivisible, namely, one of receiving a customer in the hotel to stay. The amenities provided to the guests were found to be incidental to the service and the transaction entered into between the hotel management and the guests was held to be essentially one of service, as this service of receiving guests was not liable to be split up into two parts, one of service and the other of sale of food-stuffs. The learned Judge, Shelat, J., who spoke for the court, ruled thus (at pages 480-481):

In considering whether a transaction falls within the purview of sales tax, it becomes necessary at the threshold to determine the nature of the contract involved in such a transaction for the purpose of ascertaining whether it constitutes a contract of sale or a contract of work or service. If it is of the latter kind it obviously would not attract the tax. From the decisions earlier cited it clearly emerges that such determination depends in each case upon its facts and circumstances. Mere passing of property in an article or commodity during the course of the performance of the transaction in question does not render it a transaction of sale. For, even in a contract purely of work or service, it is possible that articles may have to be used by the person executing the work and property in such articles or materials may pass to the other party. That would not necessarily convert the contract into one of sale of those materials. In every case the court would have to find out what was the primary object of the transaction and the intention of the parties while entering into it. It may in some cases be that even while entering into a contract of work or even service, parties might enter into separate agreements, one of work and service and the other of sale and purchase of materials to be used in the course of executing the work or performing the service. But, then in such cases the transaction would not be one and indivisible, but would fall into two separate agreements, one of work or service and the other of sale.

18. While considering the facts in that case, the learned Judge proceeded to observe thus:

The transaction in question is essentially one and indivisible, namely, one of receiving a customer in the hotel to stay. Even if the transaction is to be disintegrated there is no question of the supply of meals during such stay constituting a separate contract of sale, since no intention on the part of the parties to sell and purchase food-stuffs supplied during meal-times can be realistically spelt out. No doubt, the customer, during his stay, consumes a number of food-stuffs. It may be possible to say that the property in those food-stuffs passes from the hotelier to the customer at least to the extent of the food-stuffs consumed by him. Even if that be so, mere transfer of property, as aforesaid, is not conclusive and does not render the event of such supply and consumption a sale, since there is no intention to sell and purchase. The transaction essentially is one of service by the hotelier in the performance of which meals are served as part of, and incidental to, that service, such amenities being regarded as essential in all well conducted modern hotels.

19. On the application of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court, we have no hesitation to hold that the supply of food by the assessee to its employees is essentially an amenity and an incident of contract of service entered into between the parties. The supply of food cannot, in the circumstances, be held to be in pursuance of any contract of sale. The concept of contract of sale is different from that of service. The onus is admittedly on the sales tax department to prove the necessary ingredients of sale before levying tax on any transaction. The department has failed to establish any intention on the part of the assessee to sell food to its employees for a price or for any other valuable consideration. Unless and until the department establishes the essential ingredients of a valid sale, the supply of food by the assessee to its employees cannot be held to be a sale exigible to sales tax. The principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Associated Hotels of India Ltd. [1972] 29 S.T.C. 474 (S.C.). governs the case on hand. For all the reasons stated and on a consideration of the entire facts and circumstances, we hold that the supply of food by the assessee to its employees does not amount to "sale" within the meaning of section 2(n) of "the act". Our answer to the question is in the negative and against the department.

20. In the result, the tax revision case is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee is fixed at Rs. 200 payable to Sri A. Balakoteswara Rao and Sri C. Suryanarayana Murthy, Advocates, appointed as amicu in equal proportion.