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G. Srinivasa Reddy (... v. The Commissioner Of ...
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The writ appeal arises from an excise-auction dispute concerning the auction of foreign-liquor retail shops in Nizamabad for 1967–1968. Originally two shops existed in Nizamabad; a third was sanctioned for the year 1966–1967 and its location was initially fixed at the Kwality Hotel but was later shifted to Navarang Hotel shortly before the auction.
The petitioner (a new entrant in the excise trade) was the highest bidder for two shops at the auction held on 20 July 1967 and obtained them at specified amounts. After the third shop's location was shifted to a nearby hotel (allegedly likely to undersell), the petitioner objected and, by petition dated 27 July 1967 and later by notice through an advocate (served 15 August 1967), attempted to revoke his offers for the two shops. The Department re-auctioned the shops (12 September 1967), realizing lower aggregate receipts than the petitioner's bids and thereby claiming a deficit (approximately Rs. 1,10,200/-). The Department served notice on the petitioner demanding payment of that deficit.
The petitioner filed a writ petition (W.P. No. 318 of 1968) which was dismissed by the learned single Judge (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) on 14-10-1969. The single Judge held that condition No. 8 was a statutory condition (or at least binding) and that the petitioner could not withdraw his bid. The appeal from that judgment was referred to a Full Bench (by order dated 9-7-1971) because of the importance of the point and conflicting Bench decisions on the interpretation of the relevant auction condition. The Full Bench heard arguments and delivered the judgment reproduced in the provided opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Does condition No. 8 of the auction conditions render the auctioneer's (Collector or Deputy Excise Commissioner) knock-down/acceptance final and irrevocable at the moment the hammer falls, subject only to a discretionary power in the Excise Commissioner to stay or cancel within one month?
- If condition No. 8 is so construed, is a bidder entitled to revoke his bid within the 30-day period before any action by the Excise Commissioner, thereby avoiding liability for shortfall on re-auction?
- Whether the condition(s) and rules governing the auction are statutory in nature and, if so, what effect that has upon the rights and liabilities of bidders who attempt revocation.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as recorded)
- The petitioner (through learned counsel Sri B.P. Jeevan Reddy) contended that the petitioner revoked his offer within the 30-day period prescribed by condition No. 8; therefore there was no concluded contract because acceptance was said to be provisional until the Excise Commissioner acted within that month.
- On that footing the petitioner argued there was no binding contract and he could not be held liable for damages arising from the re-auction shortfall.
Respondent's Arguments (as recorded)
- The Government (represented by the Government Pleader) maintained that the present case falls in the category where the auctioning authority's knock-down is final (i.e., acceptance occurs when the hammer falls) and the bidder cannot withdraw after that point.
- The Government Pleader also relied on prior Bench decisions (notably Raghunadha Reddy v. State of Hyderabad) and argued that the condition operated as a statutory provision that prevented unilateral revocation by the bidder after acceptance by the auctioning authority.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Raghunadha Reddy v. The State of Hyderabad, 1962-I A.L.T. 535 | Interpreted an identically worded clause (clause 10) and concluded that the auction became final only after the expiration of one month (i.e., put emphasis on last words making acceptance provisional until that period). | The Full Bench examined that judgment, found that it focused primarily on the last few words of the clause and did not consider the condition as a whole. The Full Bench disagreed with that approach and declined to follow the earlier reasoning as applicable to condition No. 8. |
| Rajanagaram Village Co-operative Society v. Veeraswami Mudali, 1950-II M.L.J. 486 | Referenced as taking a view different from Raghunadha Reddy; relied upon by Satyanarayana Rao, J. in contrast to the Bench decision. | Noted in the opinion as part of the chain of conflicting authorities; used to show there were differing judicial approaches to similar clauses. |
| Chittibabu Adenna v. Garimalla, 28 M.L.J. 617 | Bench decision earlier relied upon by Satyanarayana Rao, J. (and referenced in the debate over clause interpretation). | Mentioned as an antecedent Bench decision that was considered (and sought to be distinguished) in subsequent cases; used to illustrate prior conflicting precedents. |
| The State of A.P. v. Mohd. Ishaq, 1969-II A.P.L.J. 53 | Cited as a case where Kumarayya, J. (as he then was) followed the Bench decision in Raghunatha Reddy. | Reference showed that some later decisions followed the Raghunadha Reddy view; the Full Bench observed that in that particular case the auction rules/proclamation were not produced and therefore the precedent was of limited force. |
| Somasundaram Pillai v. Provincial Government of Madras, AIR 1947 Madras 366 | Used in the chain of authority relied upon by the Bench decision in Raghunadha Reddy. | Mentioned as an antecedent authority that influenced the reasoning in other cases (specifically those that took the view the Full Bench ultimately rejected). |
| W.P. No. 1502 of 1963, judgment dated 9-9-1965 (this Court) | Referred to in the context of the argument under Article 299 of the Constitution that absence of a formal contract would render the arrangement invalid. | The Full Bench relied on that decision to note that the appellant did not press the Article 299 argument further; it was used to show that absence of a formal contract under Article 299 was not determinative in the present context. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench conducted a textual and contextual analysis of condition No. 8 (originally in Urdu; translations were produced by both sides and the Chief Justice also considered the original Urdu text). The court parsed condition No. 8 into three parts and analyzed each part in sequence:
-
Part I — Power of Auctioning Authority:
The first part expressly empowers the Collector (or Deputy Excise Commissioner for Hyderabad) to "knock down bids." The court found the language emphatic and plain: the auctioning authorities are clothed with unconditional power to knock down bids. The words used do not indicate that that acceptance is provisional or tentative. The use of the imperative (e.g., "shall") and the high rank of the officers weigh in favour of treating their knock-down as an operative final acceptance.
-
Part II — Power of the Excise Commissioner:
The second part authorises the Excise Commissioner "within one month from the date of finalisation of the auction" to stay or cancel the original auction and to order re-auction or make other arrangements, and states that the decision of the Commissioner is final. The court characterized the language (e.g., "shall be competent") as permissive/enabling rather than mandatory: it confers discretionary power on the Commissioner to suspend or cancel a concluded auction, not a power to confirm or approve a provisional acceptance. The court emphasized the ordinary meaning of words like "stay" or "cancel" as relating to a completed auction, not an incomplete or inchoate one.
-
Part III — Consequence of Inaction by the Commissioner:
The third part states that, if the Commissioner does not pass any order within one month, "the auction shall be final." The court rejected the appellant's contention that this phrase renders the initial knock-down provisional until the month expires. Instead, the court read the phrase to mean that the Commissioner's discretionary power to stay or cancel becomes exhausted after the stipulated period; in other words, the auction is final vis-à-vis the Commissioner after one month but the acceptance itself is already final at knock-down (subject only to the Commissioner's intervening exercise of power within the month).
The court relied on established principles of construction: give effect to every part of a provision, read ambiguous words in context, harmonize disparate parts where possible, and avoid interpretations that yield absurdity. Using those canons, the Full Bench reconciled all three parts by holding that Part I creates a concluded contract at the moment of knock-down; Part II confers a discretionary power on the Commissioner to set aside or modify that concluded auction within a month; Part III limits the time in which the Commissioner may exercise that discretion (after which his power to stay or cancel is spent).
The opinion also surveyed the remainder of the auction conditions and subsequent legislation/rules to confirm the construction: references to other conditions (Nos. 2, 5, 12, 15, 18) and the later Rules 10 and 17 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to Sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969 (Rule 10 substituting part I and using the word "accepted"; Rule 17 substituting parts II and III) were treated as consistent with the Full Bench's interpretation that acceptance at knock-down produces a completed and irrevocable contract subject only to the Commissioner's discretionary power to rescind within the prescribed period.
The court examined prior conflicting decisions (notably Raghunadha Reddy) and concluded those decisions placed undue emphasis on the final phrase of the clause without considering the condition as a whole. The Full Bench explained why that selective reading led to an erroneous conclusion and said it was necessary to pronounce an authoritative interpretation.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Full Bench held that condition No. 8 makes the contract of auction sale final and irrevocable at the moment the bid is accepted (the knock-down by the auctioning authority), subject only to the discretionary power of the Excise Commissioner to stay or cancel the auction within thirty days; if the Commissioner does not act within that month his power is exhausted and the auction stands finally concluded.
Implications (direct effect on the parties):
- The Full Bench agreed with the conclusion of the learned single Judge and dismissed the petitioner's appeal. The appeal was dismissed with costs (Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-).
- Practical consequence for the petitioner: the attempted revocation of the offers within the 30-day period did not prevent the formation of a concluded, binding contract at the moment of knock-down, and therefore the petitioner remained liable in respect of the loss arising from re-auction (as previously determined and claimed by the respondent).
- The court declined to follow the narrower reading in Raghunadha Reddy (which treated the knock-down as provisional pending the lapse of one month) and explained why that reasoning was not persuasive when condition No. 8 is read as a whole.
Note: This summary is exclusively based on the content of the opinion provided. No information beyond that text has been inferred or added.
Gopal Rao Ekbote, C.J:— The learned Government Pleader questions the correctness of the decision in Raghunadha Reddy v. The State of Hyderabad . 1962-I A.L.T 535.. That is a Bench decision which takes a different view than what was taken by Satyanarayana Rao, J. in Rajanagaram Village Co-operative Society v. Veeraswami Mudali . 1950-II M.L.J 486. Satyanarayana Rao, J. in his decision has relied upon a Bench decision in Chittibabu Adenna v. Garimalla . 28 M.L.J 617. This Bench decision however, was considered in Raghnnatha Reddy v. State of Hyderabad and was sought to be distinguished. Kumarayya, J. (as he then was) followed the Bench decision Raghunatha Reddy v. State of Hyderabad in The State of A.P v. Mohd. Ishaq . 1969-II A.P.L.J 53.. The Bench decision relied on Somasundaram Pillai v. Provincial Government of Madras . AIR 1947 Madras 366.. When the correctness of the Bench decision is thus brought under discussion and as the point involved is of general importance, we feel that an authoritative decision of the full Bench has become necessary. That apart, there are other points also of equal importance which, in our view, must be decided by a Full Bench.
2. Place the papers therefore before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for necessary directions. The Writ Appeal coming on for hearing, on Monday the 27th day of November 1972 before this Court in pursuance of the order of this Court dated 9-7-1971 and made herein, refering the matter to Full Bench and, upon perusing the Appeal and Memo of grounds filed therein in support thereof and the writ and Rule Nisi directed by the order of High Court dt. 14-10-1969 made in W.P No. 318/68 and material papers in the case and upon hearing the arguments of B.P Jeevan Reddy, G. Haridatha Reddy and R.N Reddy, Advocate for the appellant and III Government Pleader on behalf of the Respondent the Court delivered the following:
JUDGMENT
(Judgment of the Court delivered by Hon'ble the Chief Justice)
3. This appeal is from the judgment of our learned brother Chinnappa Reddy, J. given in W.P No. 318 of 1968 on 14-10-1969, whereby the learned Judge dismissed the writ petition.
4. The writ petitioner is a new entrant in the business of excise. His inexperience and lack of understanding seem to have brought him into a plight from which he is finding it difficult to escape. His attempts to extricate himself out of the impasse created by himself cannot succeed in view of the construction of clause 8 of the conditions of sale made by the Commissioner of Excise in pursuance of statutory authority which he had and which conditions the petitioner accepted while making an offer and entering into a contract. The fate of the case hangs on the true interpretation of condition No. 8.
5. In Nizamabad town originally there were two foreign liquor shops. One was located in Das Cafe and the other in the Ananda Hotel. For the first time for the excise year 1966-1967, a third shop was sanctioned for the town and its location was fixed at the Kwality Hotel.
6. In the year 1966-1967, the right to vend foreign liquor at these shops was auctioned and they fetched Rs. 41,000/- Rs. 31,000/- and Rs. 10,000/- respectively. For the year 1967-1968, when the petitioner entered this business for the first time, these three shops were again auctioned on 20th July, 1967. The first two shops were knocked down in the name of the petitioner as he happened to be the highest bidder. These shops were knocked down for an amount of Rs. 1,39,000/- and Rs. 90,000/- respectively.
7. The location of the third shop was shifted from Kwality Hotel to Navarang Hotel a few days prior to its auction, the third shop was knocked down in the name of the previous contractor for an amount of Rs. 51,000/-. The Navarang Hotel, it is alleged, is near to the Anand Hotel where the second shop is located. The petitioner apprehended that the third shop-holder at Navarang is likely to undersell the liquor which might cause losses to the petitioner in his sales at Anand Hotel.
8. He, therefore, on 27-7-1967 made representation through a petition to the Commissioner, Collector and the Superintendent of Excise. He objected to the shifting of the third shop to the Navarang Hotel. He wanted the shop to be located at Kwality where it was previously. He threatened that if the said shop was not shifted back, then “the offer and bid of this petitioner in respect of foreign liquor shops Nos. 1 and 2 shall stand cancelled and withdrawn for all intents and purposes.”
9. As there was no response from any of the officers to whom the petitioner had so addressed, he gave a notice through an Advocate on the 7th August, 1967. For the reasons mentioned in the petition of 27th July, 1967 the petitioner revoked and rescinded his offer in respect of foreign liquor shops Nos. 1 and 2 of Nizamabad made in the auction held on 20th July, 1967 for the year 1967-1968, and which according to him, was provisionally and conditionally accepted by the Collector of Nizamabad. This notice was served upon the Commissioner, Excise on 15-8-1967. Copies were also served upon the Collector and the Superintendent, Excise at about the same time.
10. In view of the notice, the Department was left with no alternative than to re-auction shops Nos. 1 and 2. The re-auction was therefore held on 12-9-1967. These shops fetched Rs. 57,000/- and Rs. 40,000/- respectively.
11. The petitioner had also obtained another shop at Mupla for an amount of Rs. 19,000/- for the same year. He backed out from that offer also. It was also therefore re-auctioned. It fetched Rs. 10,600/- only.
12. The total loss to which the Government was put to was about Rs. 1,10,200/-. The respondents served notice upon the petitioner demanding the said amount of deficit to be paid within a stipulated time. It is this notice which brought the petitioner to this court.
13. The Writ petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge holding that the clause 8 is a statutory condition and even if it were to be a term of contract the petitioner could not have withdrawn his bid. The matter, however, was governed by statutory provision. Observing that Raghunadha Reddy v. State of Hyderabad was decided on a concession that condition No. 10 was not a statutory condition and was therefore liable to be distinguished, the learned Judge therefore held that the petitioner had no right to withdraw his offer, and be was liable to compensate the loss caused to the Government in the re-auction.
14. When the appeal from this judgment filed by the petitioner came before a Bench of this Court, it was referred to a Full Bench by an order dated 9-7-1971 The correctness of the Bench decision reported in Raghunadha Reddy v. State of Hyderabad was challenged, in view of which and because of the question of importance involved in the case, the matter was referred to the Full Bench. That is how the case has come before us.
15. The principal contention of Sri B.P Jeevan Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the petitioner was entitled to revoke the offer before it was finally accepted by the Excise Commissioner within 30 days from the date of the auction, and since the petitioner has revoked his offer within the stipulated period in condition No. 8 of the auction sale, there was do concluded contract and consequently the petitioner could not be held liable for any loss caused in reaction of the shops.
16. It is not now in doubt that a bid in the public auction of excise shops itself constitute an offer which the auctioneer is free to accept, or reject. Such an acceptance in case of a sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer announces its completion by the fall of the hummer or in other customary manner. Consequently, until such announcement is made any bid may be retracted. It is thus plain that revocation of an offer is possible and effective at any time before acceptance. Upto this moment ex-hypothesi no legal obligation exists, as do contract of sale can be said to have been concluded with the buyer. What follows therefore is that the law relating to the revocation of an offer can be summed up into two rules: (1) An offer may be revoked at any time before acceptance. (2) An offer is made irrevocable by acceptance.
17. Now, in some cases it is the auctioning authority which has the power in accept the bid by knocking it down on the spot. In such cases it is obvious that the contract between the parties would be deemed to have been concluded the moment hammer falls down and as announcement to that effect is made by the auctioning, authority.
18. There are however, cases where final bids in the auction are made subject to the confirmation of another superior authority. In other words, unless that superior authority approves or confirms the final bid the offer would not be deemed to have been accepted. In such cases, the auctioning authority acts as a conduit pipe. As agent of the superior authority he receives the offer and transmits to the confirming or approving authority. It is only when the bid in such a case is approved on confirmed by the higher authority that the contract of sale would be deemed to be complete, and until such confirmation or approval is made, the person whose bid has been sent for confirmation to such higher authority is entitled to withdraw his bid. When the bid is so withdrawn before it is accepted by such authority, there would be no concluded contract and as a result, the bidder will not be liable for damages on account of any breach of contract or for the shortfall on the resale.
19. The contention of the learned Advocate for the appellant naturally is that the auction sale held under condition No. 8 falls within the ambit of the second class of cases and not the first. On the other hand, it was argued by the learned Government pleader that the instant case squarely comes within the purview of the first class of cases. Therefore any answer to these rival contentions depends upon the true construction of condition No. 8.
20. Now, conditions of the auction of the privilege of sale of Hyderabad Made Foreign Liquor shops are in Urdu originally. Two translations of the same have been filed, one by the appellant and the other by the Govt. Since one of us (The Chief Justice) is well acquainted with Urdu Language, the original Urdu Conditions were also kept in view. As the translation supplied by the Government does not materially differ from the translation filed by the appellant and as it seems to as to be correct, we will reproduce that translation here.
“8. It shall be within the competence of auctioning authority viz., the Collector in the Districts and Deputy Excise Commissioner Hyderabad Division in the case of Hyderabad District and twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad to knock down bids. However, within one month from the date of the finalisation of the auction the Excise Commissioner shall be competent to stay or cancel the original auction of any shop irrespective of the possession given to the auction purchaser, and to order the reauction of the shop or make any other arrangement of the shop. The decision of the Excise Commissioner in the matter shall be final and no appeal shall lie against the decision of the Excise Commissioner. In case the Excise Commissioner does not pass any orders regarding stay or cancellation within the month of the auction of shops the auction shall be final.”
21. A careful and analytical reading of this condition would indicate that the condition consists of three parts. In the first part, the Collector in the District and the Deputy Excise Commissioner in the case of Hyderabad District and twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad are empowered as auctioning authorities to knock down bids.
22. The second part, authorises the Excise Commissioner to stay or cancel the Original auction within one month from the date of finalisation of auction. He is also empowered to order re-auction or make any other arrangement of the shop. Order of the Commissioner is clothed with finality.
23. The third part indicate the result which would follow if no order is passed by the Excise Commissioner within one month in regard to stay or cancellation of the auction of shops. The result shown is that the “The auction shall be final.”
24. The last few words placed in the quotation have given rise to conlicting interpretations of the said condition. It is contended by the appellant that these words make the acceptance of auctioning authority provisional or tentative becoming final at the conclusion of thirty days when no order contra is passed by the Commissioner; until then there is an inchoate contract and therefore the bidder is entitled to revoke, his offer without being made liable to any damages whatsoever.
25. Before we analyse and construe condition 8, we would like to bear in mind some principles governing construction of a rule in such cases. It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, part, clause and sentence of a section or a rule. A statute therefore should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions. The same rule applies to a section or condition of sale, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant and one part wilt not destroy another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake in using language loosely or of an error.
26. It must be borne in mind that when some of the words of a provision are not explicit, the intention is to be collected from the context. And the intention shall be taken or presumed according to what is consistent with reason and good discretion.
27. It cannot be ignored that the presumption always is that a law maker has a definite purpose in enacting every provision has adapted and formulated the subsidiary provisions in harmony with that purpose, that these are needful to accomplish it; and that, if that is the intended effect, they will, atleast conduce to effectuate it.
28. In case there is some inconsistency or repugnancy in various parts of the same provision, one way to avoid it is to harmonise them if possible, or by regarding the apparently conflicting provisions as dealing with distinct matters or situations. It is obvious that in such cases one must give the provision such meaning as will carry out its Object.
29. Turning back then to condition 8, we find that the first part is complete in itself. It leaves no one in doubt that the Collector or the Deputy Excise Commissioner, as the case may be, who are the statutory auctioning authorities, have been clothed with unconditional power to knock down bids; in other words, make the hammer fall and accept the bid. The words used in the first part are of emphasis and are clear. They do not disclose even remotely that the acceptance by such auctioning authority is provisional or tentative. It is difficult to assume that high authorities such as Collector or Deputy Excise Commissioner were intended to be mere conduit pipes. They are clothed with a statutory authority to finally knock down bids. Thus the imperative word ‘shall’, the high ranking officers who are clothed with the authority and their competence to accept bids are made clear all that indicates that their acceptance is treated as final and not provisional.
30. It is true that the first part of the condition is made subject to the second part. It is immaterial whether the original Urdu word is translated as ‘but’ or ‘however’. Both would indicate that not withstanding the competence of the Collector or the Deputy Commissioner to finally accept the bids, the Commissioner has been empowered to stay or suspend, or even cancel the original auction. It is, however, difficult to read in the second part anything which would have the result of limiting the scope or effect of the first part. There are no words in the second part to make the bids which are knocked down by the Collector or Deputy Excise Commissioner as provisional and not conclusive.
31. The most important aspect of the second part which practically demolished the argument of the appellant is that the second part is an enabling provision. The words “The Excise Commissioner shall be competent,” or “shall have power” (for the Urdu words-Abitabari) denote the permissive nature of the power. See In The Matter of A. Rasul. Ex-facie these words import a discretion and they must be construed as discretionary unless there be anything in the subject matter to which they are applied, or in any other part of the rule or statute to show that they are meant to be imperative. The words “shall have power” or “It shall be within the competence” are words making that legal and possible which there would otherwise be no right or authority to do. They confer a faculty or power, and they do not of themselves do more than confer a faculty or power. These words being, according to their natural meaning, permissive or enabling words only, it lies upon those who contend that an obligation exists to exercise this power to show in the circumstances of the case something which creates an obligation.
32. If these words are permissive and the power conferred is discretionary and the exercise of the discretion is meant only for the purpose of suspending or canceling the finalised, auction, we fail to see how it would be compatible with the contention that the second part confers power on the Commissioner to approve or confirm the bid or the offer which is alleged to have been accepted provisionally. The power to stay or cancel the auction cannot be read as a power to accept or refuse the offer. The very words ‘stay’ or ‘cancel’ unequivocally connote a completed auction. We do not say that ‘we stay an unconcluded contract or sale or auction’. Nor do we say that ‘we cancel the incohate or incomplete contract’.
33. The words “within one month from the date of finalisation of auction leave practically no room for any contention that the result of knocking down the bid referred to in part I, does not amount to “finalisation of auction”.
34. One more thing which should not be overlooked is that the second part also refers to the possibility of giving possession of the shop to the auction purchaser. It is difficult to postulate that unless the auction sale is concluded the possession could be given to an auction purchaser.
35. It is also important to note that the Commissioner is endowed with power to reauction the shop or make any other arrangement. Now there cannot be a reauction unless there has been an auction first.
36. What follows therefore is that the second part expressly treats the acceptance by knocking down the bid mentioned in first part as a completed auction and therefore a concluded contract. The acceptance thus made is not made subject to any approval or confirmation of the Excise Commissioner. On the other band, a power is conferred on the Commissioner to stay or cancel the concluded auction. The interpretation of first part therefore is fully supported by the second part. These two parts do not even remotely suggest that part I speaks of a provisional acceptance and part II of the final acceptance. Both the parts read together bring out prominently the intention of the law maker that acceptance by the auctioning authority makes the contract of sale complete and irrevocable.
37. We then turn to the third part, a few words of which have given rise to the controversy. What was contended was that the last few words of this part bring out in bold relief the intention of the law maker that the acceptance, which is provisional, ripens into a full contract only after the expiry of 30 days during which period if the Excise Commissioner does not pass any order regarding stay or cancellation of the auction.
38. At first flush the argument may appear to be somewhat attractive, but on a closer examination, in our judgment, it must fail as it does not stand any scrutiny. We must confess tint the argument, if accepted to our mind, would lead to most extraordinary results.
39. Let us look at these words carefully in the face. They declare that the auction shall be final. We do not consider these words to be inconsistent with either the first or the second part. They do not necessarily mean that before the expiry of 30 days the auction was not final. Any such reading would amount to directly flying in the face of the express words treating the auction as final used in part II. They will also go contrary to the plain language of Part I. It is the first principle of construction that when the first part of the condition confers an express power to accept the bid, which contract is made subject to stay or cancellation by the Commissioner in the second part, a power inconsistent with that cannot be implied because of the said words used in part III. These words, in our opinion, clearly mean that the power of the Commissioner, if not exercised within the stipulated time, gets exhausted and thereafter he shall have no power to stay nr cancel the auction. It so far as he is concerned it shall be final. It would be an extraordinary feat of interpretation if because of these words, the whole scheme of the condition is overlooked. The express language used in part I and part II will have to be ignored, twisted or distorted for the purpose of making them fit within the supposed meaning of the last few words.
40. The general principle of construction is not to attach any exaggerated importance to a few words of the provision fend ignore or misread the other part of the rule. The condition must be read as a whole. If there appears to be any inconsistency in different parts of the same condition, then every effort must he made to harmonise them. If the construction sought to he placed on the condition because of these few words is accepted, it would produce not only an anomaly but also an a absurdity which in any case we must try to avoid. If these words are read in the context in which they are used and if the plain meaning of the first two parts is kept in view, there would be no difficulty in understanding these words only to mean that the auction shall be final as against the Excise Commissioner who has a discretion to stay or cancel it within a certain time. It is only by such construction that we can make all the three parts harmonious and in accord with the clear intention of the law maker.
41. We are therefore, satisfied that condition No. 8 makes the contract of auction sale final and irrevocable the moment bid is accepted, only subject to its stay or cancellation by the Commissioner with in 30 days.
42. This conclusion is well supported by the entire set of conditions of the auction. Condition No. 2 expressly states at the person in whose name the right to vend foreign liquor is knocked down, shall remit the annual rental within seven days from the date of auction.
43. Condition No. 5 by using the words ‘finally auctioned’ lends strength to this construction.
44. Condition No. 12 brings out this very idea.
45. Condition No. 15 removes any doubt if it still lingers. It states that in case the annual rental is not paid within the prescribed time the privilege of sale shall be reauctioned holding the auction purchaser responsible for the loss.
46. Condition No. 18 similarly uses the words knocked down pointing not to the same destination.
47. That this construction of Condition No. 8 is light can also be seen from Rules 10 and 17, which replace the 8th condition of “The Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to sell liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969, Rule 10 is the substitute for part I of condition No. 8. It uses the words ‘accepted’ in the place of “knock down of bid.” The rule thus is identical but more explicit. Similarly, Rule 17 is the substitute for the second and third parts of the Condition No. 8 Rule 17 is couched substantially in a similar language but makes the intention comparatively clearer What was a little ambiguous in condition No. 8 is made explicit, but the intention of the law maker and the purpose of the Rule remain the same. And it is plain that subsequent legislation on the same subject can be looked into to see what is the proper construction to be put upon an earlier provision which is ambitions.
48. What is therefore plain is that the construction which we have put on condition No. 8 seems to us to be inescapable.
49. It is no doubt true that a Bench of this Court took a contrary view in Rughunadha Reddy v. State of Hyderabad. We have gone through the judgment with the utmost care. The whole judgment turned upon the last few words of condition No. 8 referred to above. These words have been first kept in view and it is in view of these words that condition No. 8 was construed. The attention of the learned judges was obviously not drawn to the various aspects of the condition which we have considered above. The contention before the Court was merely based on the last portion of the condition and it is only because of that it was argued that the third part is provisional till the period of one month. Unfortunately, the learned Government pleader without drawing the attention of the Court to condition No. 8 as a whole preferred to argue that the power of the Excise Commissioner to stay or suspend the auction was the condition subsequent and therefore did not affect the contract which became final between the parties.
50. The result of such argument was that it was almost assumed that there was no concluded contract without going into the details of the condition. The appellant's contention on the strength, particularly of the last portion of condition No. 8 that the approval by the Deputy Commissioner is provisional almost went unchallenged. There was no attempt to interpret seriously condition No. 8. The whole emphasis in the argument was placed on the commissioner's power being a condition subsequent. The learned Judges consequently considered the condition in the light of only the last few words as is apparent from the following observation:
“The clue to the intention of that clause is, in our view, found in the last stipulation where the auction is said to become final only after the expiration of one month”.
51. The further observation “that the auction is not final is also evident from the fact that even where the successful bidder is put in possession, he can be ousted if the auction is not finally approved and it is reauctioned or suspended. Such a unilateral reservation of power makes the acceptance a provisional one” also shows that the consideration was confined, only to the last few words. The other features of the rule were completely omitted from consider deration.
52. We have the greatest respect for the learned Judges who decided the said case. We are however, bound to say that we find ourselves unable to accept the view expressed in regard to condition No. 8 which is identical with clause 10 which fell for their Lordships' consideration. We do not consider that the last few words are the heart of the condition. Nor do they provide any real clue to the understanding of the whole condition. For the reasons which we have elaborately given, we do not think that there is any reason for saying that the acceptance of the bid by the auctioning authority is provisional and becomes final only at the end of 30 days because of inaction on the part of the Commissioner.
53. Another decision of Kumarayya, J. reported in the The State of A.P v. Mohd. Ishaq was also cited. In that case the rules which govern the auction sale were not produced. Proclamation of sale containing the terms was also not produced. The learned Judge hearing the second appeal accepted the finding of the Court below the condition. The appellant's contention on the strength ??? of the last portion of condition No. 8 that the approval by the ??? Commissioner is provisional almost went unchallenged. There was no attempt to interpret seriously condition No. 8. The whole emphasis in the argument was placed on the commissioner's power being a condition subsequent. The learned Judge consequently considered the condition in the light of only the last few words as is apparent from the following observation:
“The clue to the intention of that clause is, in our view, found in the last stipulation where the auction is said to become final only after the expiration of one month”.
54. The further Observation “that the auction is not final is also evident from the fact that even where the successful bidder is put in possession, he can be ousted if the auction is not finally approved and it is reauctioned or suspended. Such a unilateral reservation of power makes the acceptance a provisional one” also shows that the Consideration was confined, only to the last few words. The other features of the rule were completely omitted from consider-deration.
55. We have the greatest respect for the learned Judges who decided the said case. We are however, bound to say that we find ourselves unable to accept the view expressed in regard to condition No. 8 which is identical with clause 10 which fell for their Lordships' consideration. We do not consider that the last few words are the heart of the condition. Nor do they provide any real clue to the understanding of the whole condition. For the reasons which we have elaborately given, we do not think that there is any reason for saying that the acceptance of the bid by the auctioning authority is provisional becomes final only at the end of 30 days because of inaction on the part of the Commissioner.
56. Another decision of Kumarayya, J. reported in The state of A.P v. Mohd. Ishaq was also cited. In that case the rules which govern the auction sale were not produced. Proclamation of sale containing the terms was also not produced. The learned Judge hearing the second appeal accepted the finding of the Court below.
57. It is seen that section 3 empowers the Government to make rules. Under Section 3(1)(d) the Government is also empowered to delegate the powers and duties under the Act. In view of this provision the argument was not further pressed.
58. Even otherwise, the conditions in any case as terms of contract entered into between the appellant and the Government would be binding upon the appellant. Ever in such a case the result of the acceptance of offer by the auctioning authority making the contract of sale complete and irrevocable remains unalterable.
59. In view of our opinion that the rules and conditions of sale are statutory and in view of a decision of this court in W.P No. 1502 of 1963 dated 9-9-1965 the argument that since formal contract was not drawn under Article 299 of the Constitution it is not valid was also not pressed. The last contention was that as the appellant revoked the offer keeping in view Raghunatha Reddy v. State of Hyderabad, therefore, we should absolve the appellant of the liability for damages. We do not think we are entitled to do anything of that kind. Our duty is to interpret and declare the law. The result in each case would flow from the law thus declared.
60. For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the conclusion of the learned single Judge although we reached the conclusion through a different route. Accordingly we dismiss the appeal with costs, Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.
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