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C. Venkatappa Naidu . v. State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others
Judgment Summary — Manoher Pershad, C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This writ appeal challenges the judgment of Gopalakrishnan Nair, J., which dismissed the appellant's writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari to quash G.O. Rt. No. 412, Home (Transport III) Department dated 6 February 1965. That Government order confirmed an order of the Transport Appellate Authority dated 9 October 1964.
The core factual sequence in the record is as follows:
- The 4th respondent operated a two-stage carriage on the Markapur–Nandyal road.
- Venkatasubbarao obtained another stage carriage permit to ply the same route with tentative fixed timings and later applied for rotation of timings to cover all buses on the route; the Regional Transport Authority (RTA), Kurnool granted rotation.
- The 4th respondent appealed to the State Transport Authority (STA), but the appeal was rejected as time-barred; a revision to the Government was dismissed, and the 4th respondent then filed Writ Petition No. 894 of 1959 which was dismissed subject to a direction that the Government might consider condoning the delay.
- The Government condoned the delay and remitted the appeal to the STA on merits; the STA allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the RTA, which again dismissed the petition for rotation.
- On 17 September 1961 the stage carriage of Venkatasubbarao was purchased by the appellant and the permit was validly transferred to him. The appellant filed Writ Petition No. 323 of 1962 challenging the RTA's rejection of the rotation; that petition was allowed and the matter went back to the RTA.
- On 21 June 1963 the RTA granted the appellant's application for rotation of timings. The 4th respondent appealed to the STA which allowed the appeal and set aside the RTA order. The appellant sought revision to the Government under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act; the revision was dismissed.
- The appellant then filed Writ Petition No. 280 of 1965 before Gopalakrishnan Nair, J., raising three primary contentions; the learned Judge rejected those contentions and dismissed the writ petition. The present writ appeal challenges that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether fixation or change of timings/timetable for stage carriages is a condition of the permit such that changes require the approval of the Road Transport Authority (i.e., whether the Secretary R.T.A. or other authority could change timings without authority) — essentially the legal effect of the amendment to Section 48(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
- Whether the Government, in dismissing the revision under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, had applied its mind sufficiently such that the Government's order should be sustained despite not being a detailed speaking order.
- Whether the Government's impugned order properly took into account Rule 212(3) of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1964 (i.e., whether the Transport Authority was required to and did consider public interest and the special circumstances enumerated in the rule when deciding change of timings or additional trips).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)
- The fixation of timings was not a condition of the permit; therefore, a change of the timing did not involve any change in the conditions of the permit.
- Because fixation of timings was not a condition of the permit, the 4th respondent was not entitled under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act to prefer an appeal to the State Transport Authority, and consequently the STA acted without jurisdiction in allowing the 4th respondent's appeal.
- The Government's order in revision did not show that the Government had applied its mind — the order was not a speaking order and thus should be set aside.
- The impugned Government order failed to take proper note of Rule 212(3) of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1964, which the appellant contended required particular consideration of the listed factors and the public interest.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of arguments advanced specifically by the respondents beyond the procedural steps and the appellate/revisional history.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| P. Satyanarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh (Bench decision) [AIR 1959 Andh Pra 420 referenced] | Held that under Section 48(3) as amended in 1957 the timetable for stage carriages is part of the permit; fixation of time is a condition of the permit and the Secretary R.T.A. had no power to change timings. | The Court followed this Bench decision and applied its principle to conclude that fixation of time is a condition of the permit; this disposition led to rejecting the appellant's first contention. |
| Kali Mudaliar v. Vedachala Mudaliar (Madras Bench decision cited) | Earlier Madras Bench decisions (pre-amendment) that held fixation of time was not a condition of the permit. | The Court treated these earlier pre-amendment decisions as inapplicable after the amendment of Section 48(3) and (4); therefore it did not follow them. |
| Sukdeo Kumar v. State of Bihar (cited) | Earlier authority aligned with the view that fixation of time was not a condition (pre-amendment jurisprudence). | The Court noted such pre-amendment decisions but declined to follow them in view of the later amendment and the Bench decision in P. Satyanarayana. |
| P. C. Oommen v. R. T. Board, Kottayam (cited) | Earlier decisions concerning the status of timetable as part of permit under older law. | The Court considered these earlier authorities as not supportive of the appellant after the amendment and therefore did not accept their reasoning. |
| K. M. Thomas v. State Transport Authority (cited) | Another earlier authority referenced in the context of pre-amendment jurisprudence. | The Court declined to follow such pre-amendment views and instead applied the Bench decision that treated timetable as part of the permit post-amendment. |
| Patna High Court decision (following AIR 1952 Mad 345) (referenced) | Held that even after the amendment of Sections 48(3) and (4), fixation of time remained not a condition of the permit. | The Court rejected the Patna High Court's view, stating that when this Court had clearly held fixation of time is a condition of the permit after amendment, the Patna view could not be followed. |
| Kerala High Court decisions (including AIR 1959 Ker 339 and another noted decision) | Conflicting views in Kerala decisions: one held change of timings is not a condition; another (relying on Bench decision) held fixation is a condition after amendment. | The Court stated it could not accept those Kerala decisions that contradicted the Bench decision treating timetable as a condition after amendment. |
| M.P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (Supreme Court) | When a revising authority (Central Government in that case) rejects a revision application as not disclosing valid grounds, it was not bound to give elaborate reasons; absence of fuller reasons is not by itself a ground for quashing. | The Court relied on this principle to reject the appellant's contention that the Government order was vitiated merely because it did not give extensive reasons; it held the Government had applied its mind sufficiently. |
| Vedachala Mudaliar v. State of Madras (referenced) | An earlier decision relevant to the fixation-of-time issue (pre-amendment context). | The Court stated it need not discuss this case further in view of the Supreme Court pronouncement relied upon; the opinion does not apply its reasoning to alter the Court's disposition. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed each of the appellant's three main contentions in turn and applied existing statutory provisions and precedent from this Court and other courts as follows:
-
First contention — whether fixation/change of timings is a condition of the permit:
- The Court relied principally on the Bench decision in P. Satyanarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, which interpreted Section 48(3) (as amended in 1957) to make the timetable part of the permit and thus a condition of the permit.
- That decision also indicated that the Secretary R.T.A. lacked the power to change timings under Section 48(3) because fixation of time now formed part of the permit conditions and departure from the permit requires RTA approval.
- The Court observed that earlier decisions (Madras Bench and others) which held fixation of time was not a condition were pre-amendment and therefore not persuasive after the statutory amendment. The Court expressly declined to follow Patna and certain Kerala decisions that took a contrary view post-amendment.
- On this basis the Court concluded that fixation of time is a condition of the permit and therefore rejected the appellant's first contention that a change of timing did not involve a change in permit conditions or that the STA acted without jurisdiction.
-
Second contention — whether the Government applied its mind in the revision order:
- The Court reviewed the Government's revision order and found that it had considered the contentions raised and dealt with them.
- The appellant's objection was that the Government's order lacked reasons and hence demonstrated a failure to apply mind. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in M.P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, where it was held that a revising authority rejecting a revision application as not disclosing valid grounds is not obliged to give fuller reasons; absence of detailed reasons does not in itself invalidate the order.
- Applying that principle, the Court held that the Government had applied its mind and that the order could not be set aside merely because it was not elaborately reasoned.
-
Third contention — whether the Government/Transport Authority neglected Rule 212(3) of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1964:
- The Court reproduced Rule 212(3), which directs transport authorities, when deciding additional trips or change of timings, to have regard to (i) need for additional facilities or revision of timings in the interests of the public, and (ii) special circumstances such as changes in railway timings, number of permits, route variations, with a proviso about excluding mail-carrying stage carriages from rotation.
- The appellant urged that the Government's order ignored Rule 212(3). The appellant argued that 'public interest' should apply only to clause (i) and not to clause (ii); i.e., that clause (ii) special circumstances would not require consideration of public interest.
- The Court rejected that narrow reading. It held Rule 212(3) requires the Transport Authority to consider both the interests of the public and the special circumstances listed. The rule does not permit ignoring public interest in decisions on timings; rather, the authority must consider public interest alongside the special circumstances.
- On this basis the Court found no merit in the appellant's contention that Rule 212(3) had been ignored or misapplied by the Government or transport authorities.
Having disposed of each contention on the basis of the statutory scheme, the Bench authority decision, and the Supreme Court authority on reasoned orders, the Court concluded that the appellant's challenges failed.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is DISMISSED.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The judgment of Gopalakrishnan Nair, J., dismissing the appellant's writ petition is upheld.
- The Government order (G.O. Rt. No. 412, Home (Transport III) Department dated 6 February 1965) confirming the order of the Transport Appellate Authority stands.
- No costs were awarded; the Court expressly ordered "No costs."
Broader implications:
The opinion applies and reaffirms the Bench decision that, after the statutory amendment to Section 48, fixation of timetable/timings is a condition of a stage carriage permit and cannot be altered without appropriate authority. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel precedent beyond applying existing authority and does not, in the text, elaborate broader constitutional or policy implications beyond these direct legal conclusions.
This summary is confined strictly to matters contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal conclusions beyond that text.
JUDGMENT Manoher Pershad, C.J.
1. This writ appeal is directed against the judgment of our learned brother Gopalakrlshnan Nair dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant for the issue of a writ of certiorarl to quash G. O. Rt. No. 412, Home (Transport III) Department dated 6th February, 1965 passed by the Government in Home Department, confirming the order dated 9-10-1884 of the Transport Appellate Authority The facts leading to this appeal are:
2. The 4th respondent was plying two stage carriage on the Markapur-Nandyal road. One Venkatasubbarao obtained another stage carriage permit to ply on the same route which was granted with tenative fixed timings. Thereafter he applied for rotation of timings on the route to cover all the buses plied on it. The Regional Transport Authority, Kurnool granted rotation of timings as prayed for by Venkatasubbarao. The 4th respondent thereupon preferred an appeal to the State Transport Authority. That appeal was rejected as time-barred. Aggrieved by the order he filed a revision to the Government which also was dismissed. He thereupon came to this court in Write Petn. No. 894 of 1959. This petition was dismissed subject to the directions that the Government might consider whether it could condone the delay on the part of the 4th respondent in filing the appeal before the State Transport Authority.
3. In pursuance of this observation the Government condoned the delay and remitted the appeal for consideration on merits to the State Transport Authority. That Authority allowed the appeal and sent the matter to the Regional Transport Authority for fresh consideration. The Regional Transport Authority dismissed the petition for rotation of timings. Prior to this, i.e., on 17-9-1961 the stage carriage of Venkata-Bubba Rao was purchased by the appellant who consequently upon a valid transfer of the permit in his favour for plying stage carriage on the Markapur-Nandyal route filed Writ Petition No. 323 of 1962 against the R. T. A's order rejecting Venkatasubba Rao's application for rotation of timings. That writ petition was allowed. The matter then went back to the R. T. A. for being considered on the merits The Regional Transport Authority, Kurnool on 21-6-1963 granted an application of the appellant for rotation of timings,
4. Aggrieved by this order of the Regional Transport Authority, the 4th respondent filed an appeal to the State Transport Authority. The State Transport Authority allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority Aggrieved by the order of the appellate authority, the appellant filed a revision to the Government under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act This revision was dismissed. The appellant, therefore, came to this court again in writ petition No. 280 of 1965 which came up before our learned brother Gopala-krishnan Nair, J. Sri Venugopala Reddy learned counsel for the petitioner urged three points before our learned brother. The first contention was that the fixation of timings was not a condition of the permit and that therefore a change of the timing did not involve any change of the condition of the permit Following up this argument, it was further urged by the learned counsel that the 4th respondent, therefore, was not Entitled under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act to prefer an appeal to the S. T. A and that the S.T.A. in passing the orders allowing the 4th respondent's appeal acted wholly without jurisdiction. The 2nd contention urged was that the order passed by the Government in the revision did not show that the Government had applied its mind to the case and that it was not a speaking order and has therefore to be set aside. The third contention raised was that the impugned order of the Government did not pay any regard to Rule 212 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Rules Our learned brother repelled the three contentions and dismissed the writ petition. In this writ appeal the same three points are urged by Sri Venugopala Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant.
5. So far as the first point is concerned, we may point out that an identical question had come up for consideration in the case of P. Satyanarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, before a Bench of this Court and it was held therein that:
"Under section 48(3) as amended in 1957, the time table for stage carriages has assumed importance and now forms part of the permit. The delegation authorised by rule 134 (a) (ii) cannot be of much assistance as Section 48(3) is not mentioned in the Rule. It is doubtful whether the authority to delegate what was not then a condition of permit would still be available when the new section 48(20) prohibits departure from conditions of the permit save with the approval of the Road Transport Authority, and the old Rule contains no authority to delegate this power Hence, the Secretary R.T.A. had no power to change the timings under section 48 (3)."
Our learned brother has followed this decision and held against the appellant. Sri Venugopal Reddy draws our attention to the earlier Madras Bench decision in Kali Mudaliar v. Vedachala Mudaliar, , Sukdeo Kumar v. State of Bihar, . P. C. Oommen v. R. T. Board. Kottayam. and K. M. Thomas v. State Transport Authority, and contended that the Bench Decision of this Court in AIR 1959 Andh Pra 420 required further consideration. We do not agree with the contention of the learned cousnel. The earlier Bench Decision in was before the amendment of section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Under the old section fixation of time was not one of the conditions of the permit whereas now under section 48(3) and (4) this has been made a condition of the permit. Rajamannar C. J. and Venkata-rama Iyar while considering the scope of section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act rightly held that fixation of time was not a condition of the permit. This ruling, therefore. does not help the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant
6. The Patna High Court no doubt in, the case of following the decision of the Madras High Court in AIR 1952 Mad 345 has held that even after the Amendment of Sections 48(3) and (4), the position still remains the same i.e., the fixation of time is not a condition of the permit. With due respect to the learned Judges when this court has very clearly held that after the amendment fixation of time or change of time is a condition of the permit, we cannot follow the view taken by the Patna High Court.
7. The case of was a case which does not relate to the amendment, and in this case also the learned Judge has relied on the Madras Bench decision in .
8. Vaidialingam, J. in the case of relying on the bench decision of this court in has held that after the amendment fixation of time is one of the conditions of the permit. This view of the learned Judge appears to be different from his earlier decision in AIR 1959 Ker 339. While dealing with section 48 (3) he has taken the view that the change of timings is not a condition of the permit, but as stated earlier in view of the Bench Decision of this court we cannot accept this decision of the Kerala High court.
9. From the above discussion it is evident that the fixing of time is a condition of the permit. The first argument of the learned counsel, therefore, falls.
10. The next contention that the Government in passing the order in revision did not apply its mind to the case also, to our mind, does not appear to be well founded. A reading of the order shows that the Government did apply its mind to the contentions raised and dealt with them fairly. What is urged by Sri Venugopala Reddy is that the order does not give any reasons and that is enough to show that the Government 'did not apply its mind In the case of M.P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering the revisional powers of the Central Government by majority observed thus:
"Where the Central Government rejected the revision application holding that the application did not disclose any valid ground for interference it was sufficient The Central Government acting under rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules. 1960 was not bound to give its order fuller reasons for rejecting the application.
An order of Court dismissing a revision application often gives no reasons but this is not a sufficient ground for quashing it Likewise an order of an administrative tribunal rejecting a revision application cannot be pronounced to be invalid on the sole ground that it does not give reasons for the rejection "
11. It may be observed here that Subba Rao J. dissenting with the view observed that:
"What is essential is that reasons shall be given by an appellate or revisional tribunal, expressly by reference to those given by the original tribunal. The nature and elaboration of the reasons necessarily depend upon the fact of each case. In the present case neither the State nor the Central Government's order discloses the reasons for rejecting the application of the appellant. In the circumstances the Central Government's order is vitiated, as it does not disclose any reasons for rejecting the revision application of the appellant."
12. In view of the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court we need not discuss the case of Vedachala Mudaliar v. State of Madras, ,
13. In the last contention urged by the appellant also we see no substance. What is urged by the learned counsel Sri Venugopal Reddy is that the impugned order did not at all take note of Rule 212 (3) of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1964. In order to appreciate the contention we have to refer to Rule 212 (3). It runs as under:
"(3) The Transport authorities shall, in deciding whether to grant or refuse additional trips or change of timings, have regard to the following:--
(i) need for provision of additional facilities or for revision of existing timings in the interests of public;
(ii) special circumstances such as change in the railway timings, changes in the number of the permits either on the route or on the sectors of the route, or variations of routes.
Provided that whenever rotation of timings is to be enforced, stage carriages carrying mails should be excluded in the Public interests and the rotation should be enforced only in respect of all the other stage carriages on the particular route."
14. Interpreting this rule our learned brother has held that interest of public is the main consideration whereas the contention of Sri Venugopala Reddy is that if that was so Rule 212 (3) would not have been as it is According to him interests of public would be only in cases where there is need for provision of additional facilities or for revision of existing timings and not for Clause (ii) which relates to special circumstances such as change in the railway timings, changes in the number of permits etc To our minds the interpretation put by the learned counsel cannot be accepted. The above rule, in our opinion, does not enable the Transport Authority to ignore from taking into consideration public interest in granting change of timings. On the other hand, what the rule requires is that the Transport Authority should take into consideration the interests of the public and also special relevant circumstances enjoined in Sub-rule (8) (ii)
15. There is, therefore, no merit in this appeal It is dismissed. No costs.
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