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Pasalapudi Brahmayya And Another v. Teegala Gangaraju .

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Sep 13, 1962
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Factual and Procedural Background

This Civil Revision Petition was referred to a Bench by Narasimham, J., for decision on the true interpretation of Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act. The petitioners entered into a written agreement with the respondent on 31-7-1954 for services as farm watchmen for 1954–55. The respondent agreed to pay specified quantities of grain (162½ kunchams of jonna and 225 kunchams of paddy). The 2nd petitioner and his brother Koopaiah were to render services and not be absent for more than 12 days; any excess absence was to be paid for at stipulated daily rates (Re. 1/- for the 2nd petitioner and eight annas for Koopaiah).

The respondent (plaintiff) alleged breach: the 2nd petitioner allegedly absented 182 days (claim Rs. 182), Koopaiah 20 days (claim Rs. 4), plus Rs. 10 as advocate's fee for a registered notice; after deductions the plaintiff claimed Rs. 91-1-9. The District Munsif decreed the claim for damages but disallowed the Rs. 10 advocate's fee and Rs. 5 claimed for services by the 1st petitioner in place of the 2nd petitioner. The lower Court relied on the contract clause (Ex. A-1) fixing the rate of remission/rebate for excess absence. The revision arises contesting the decree for damages and the proper application of Section 74 (read with Section 73).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the true interpretation of Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act (read with Section 73) in relation to a contractual stipulation fixing a sum payable for breach—specifically, whether a plaintiff can recover a contractual sum simpliciter or must prove actual loss or damage?
  2. Whether the lower Court's decree for damages under the contractual absence clause (Ex. A-1) can be sustained when the lower Court made no finding that the plaintiff suffered any damage.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • On a proper construction of Section 74 read with Section 73, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the contractual sum simpliciter; the plaintiff must prove he suffered loss or damage due to the petitioners' default.
  • Relied on authorities (including Bhai Panna Singh v. Bhai Arjun Singh, AIR 1929 PC 179) establishing that Section 74 disentitles recovery of the penal or liquidated sum unless actual damages are proved.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The plain reading of Section 74 entitles the plaintiff to a decree for some damages or compensation where breach is admitted, even if specific loss is not proved.
  • Relied on Meyyappa v. Nachammal (AfR 1929 Mad 783(2)) which held that absence of proved loss is not a bar to awarding compensation under Section 74.
  • Also relied on other authorities (cited in the opinion) to support entitlement to compensation despite lack of proof of actual loss.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhai Panna Singh v. Bhai Arjun Singh, AIR 1929 PC 179 That Section 74 disentitles recovery simpliciter of the sum named in the contract (penalty or liquidated damages); the plaintiff must prove damages actually suffered. The court accepted this authority as supporting the petitioners' contention that a contractual sum cannot be recovered simpliciter; plaintiff must prove loss.
Pravudayal v. Ramkumar Followed the principle in Bhai Panna Singh that under Section 74 the party must prove actual damages. Referred to as supportive authority for requiring proof of actual damage before recovering contractual sum.
Satyanarayan Amolakchand v. Vithal Narayan Section 74 permits award of compensation even where extent of actual loss is not proved, but not where no loss whatsoever has been caused. Quoted to support the view that compensation under Section 74 presupposes some loss; where no loss, compensation cannot be awarded.
Union of India v. Vasudeo Agarwal Following AIR 1929 PC 179, held that Section 74 disentitles recovery simpliciter of the penal sum unless damages are proved. Used to reinforce the position that plaintiff must prove damages to recover the contractual sum.
Meyyappa v. Nachammal, AfR 1929 Mad 783(2) Held that absence of proof of loss is not a bar to awarding compensation under Section 74. Cited by respondent to contend that Section 74 allows compensation even where no specific loss is proved; the court noted this decision but also observed that the Privy Council case was not before that court.
Mahadeo Prasad v. Siemens Ltd., AIR 1934 Cal 285 Held that the plaintiff must prove his damage in a general sense. Referred to but described by the court as not assisting the respondent's position; quoted for the requirement to show damage in a general sense.
Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Where parties have deliberately specified liquidated damages, there is no presumption they intended the injured party to ignore the specified sum and claim an unascertained amount. Referred to by the court; noted that it does not support the respondent's contention that the plaintiff can ignore the contractual specification and claim unascertained damages.
Clydebank Engineering and Ship Building Co. Ltd. v. Don Jose Ramos-Yzquierdo Y Castaneda (1905) AC 6 Held a stipulated sum for delay to be liquidated damages (not a penalty). Noted by the court; held not to support the respondent's position regarding entitlement without proof of loss.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began from the referral on the proper interpretation of Section 74. It examined competing authorities: those (Privy Council and subsequent Indian decisions) holding that Section 74 disentitles recovery simpliciter of a contractual penal or liquidated sum unless the plaintiff proves actual damages, and other decisions (e.g., Meyyappa v. Nachammal) which held that absence of proof of loss does not bar compensation under Section 74.

The Court evaluated the authorities cited for the respondent and found they did not support the respondent's contention. It noted that some decisions relied upon by the respondent were given without knowledge of the Privy Council decision. The Court accepted the line of authority (including Bhai Panna Singh and subsequent cases) that Section 74 does not permit recovery of the stipulated sum simpliciter and that some proof of damage is required (or at least that the court must be satisfied some damage has ensued).

Applying that principle to the present record, the Court observed that the lower Court had not found that the plaintiff suffered any damage. On that basis, the Court concluded the decree for damages could not be sustained.

Holding and Implications

The Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the plaintiff's suit S. C. No. 126 of 1956 is dismissed.

Direct effect: The decree for damages made by the lower Court is set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed. The parties are to bear their own costs in this Court and in the lower Court. The opinion does not discuss broader legal implications beyond the immediate effect on the parties.

Show all summary ...

1. This Civil Revision Petition has been referred to a Bench of this Court by Narasimham, J., as it raises an important question as to the true interpretation of Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act and accordingly it has now come before us for decision.

2. The petitioners entered into an agreement in writing with the respondent on 31-7-1954 for rendering him service as his farm watchmen for the year 1954-55. The respondent agreed to pay to the petitioners 162-1/2 kunchams of jonna grain and 225 kunchams of paddy for the year. The services were to be rendered by the 2nd petitioner and his younger brother, Koopaiah. They are the sons of the 1st petitioner. It is stipulated under the agreement that the 2nd petitioner and Koopaiah should hot absent themselves for a period exceeding 12 days in the year and that, if they absented them selves on more number of days, the 2nd petitioner should pay for the days he absented himself at the rate of Re. 1/- per day and Koopaiah at the rate of Re. 0-8-0 per day.

3. It is the plaintiff-respondent's case that the 2nd petitioner absented himself for 182 days and that, therefore he is entitled to recover Rs. 182/-as damages as per the terms of the agreement in addition to an amount of Rs. 10/- being the 'Advocate's fee for the registered notice. Koopaiah also absented himself for 20 days and Rs. 4/- is claimed as damages on that account After allowing certain, deductions, the plaintiff claimed an amount of Rs. 91-1-9 from the petitioners.

4. The District Munsif, Kowur decreed the plaintiff's claim with regard to the damages, but disallowed the amount of Rs. 10/- which was sought to be recovered as Advocate's fee for the registered notice and an amount of Rs. 5/- for the services rendered by the 1st petitioner in place of the 2nd petitioner. The lower Court rested its decision on the term in the contract, Ex. A-1 which, stated that:

If the period of absence is more, remission or rebate (mudara) which Lachayya is to give is at the rate of Re. 1/- per day and Koopaiah of us at the rate of eight annas per day
, which according to the lower Court is valid and enforceable according to its tenor: __

5. It is argued by Sri Rangachari, the Reamed counsel for the petitioners that, on a proper construction of Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act read with Section 73 the plaintiff is not entitled to any damages unless he proves that he suffered damaged or loss by reason of the default committed by the petitioners. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decision of the Privy Council in Bhai Panna Singh v. Bhai Arjun Singh, AIR 1929 PC 179. That case arose out of a suit by the vendors for damages for breach of a contract for sale. The contract provided inter alia that the party retracting from the contract shall pay Rs. 10,000/- as damages. The only evidence of loss was that of the loss on resale by Rs. 1,000/- out of which they received Rs. 500/- as advance. It is when considering the claim of the vendors for the amount of Rupees 10,000/- stipulated in the agreement that the Privy-Council held as follows:

"The effect of Section 74 Contract Act of 1872, is to disentitle the plaintiffs to recover simpliciter the sum of Rs. 10,000/- whether penalty or liquidated damages. The plaintiffs must prove the damages they have suffered."

Ultimately, therefore the plaintiffs suit was decreed only for an amount of Rs. 500/-. This is clear authority for the position that though an amount is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in the case of such breach or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of breach must prove the damages he has suffered. This decision was referred to and followed by a Board of the Calcutta High Court in Pravudayal v. Ramkumar, and it was pointed out that:--

"Where an agreement for sale provides that whichever party retracts from the contract will pay a certain sum as damages when the contract is broken the other party cannot under Section 74, Contract Act recover simpliciter the sum whether Us penalty or liquidated damages, He must first prove the actual damages he has suffered."

It was also pointed out that:--

"It is not necessary that the Court has to come to a decision that the penally mentioned is an unreasonable one before the Court can proceed to assess the actual amount of damages."

The learned counsel for the petitioner referred us also to the decision in Satyanarayan Amolakchand v. Vithal Narayan, . In that case, the contract specified a sum of Rs. 1,000/- as damages for its breach and it was contended before Mudholkar, J. that the plaintiff was entitled to this amount or to a reasonable amount irrespective of the question whether the plaintiff had proved the actual, loss. The learned Judge found, on the evidence, that the plaintiff had not shown that he had suffered, any damage at all and proceeded to hold that:--

"No doubt Section 74 says that where a sum is stated in the contract as payable to a party if a breach thereof is caused by the other party the Court has power to grant compensation to the party even though actual loss or damage is not proved. But that does not mean that compensation can be awarded even though no loss whatsoever has been caused. For the very concept of award of compensation is bound up with loss or damage that results from a breach of contract."
The learned Judge further held that:--

"All that Section 74 permits is award of compensation even where the extent of the actual loss or damage is not proved and gives discretion to the Court to fix the amount. Where, as here, no loss or damage has ensued there can be no question of awarding compensation."
Similar is the view taken in Union of India v. Vasudeo Agarwal, , where, following the decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1929 PC 179, it was held that the effect of Section 74 is to disentitle the plaintiff to recover simpliciter the penal sum named in the agreement as doe and payable on breach of contract, whether as penalty or liquidated damages, unless he proves the damages he has suffered. On the authority of these decisions, the plaintiff in this case cannot get a decree for any damages unless he proves that he has suffered loss or damage.

6. But it is argued by Sri Veerabhadraiah, the learned counsel for the respondent, that on a plain reading of Section 74 the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for some damages or compensation as admittedly, the defendants committed breach of the agreement. He relied upon the decision in Meyyappa v. Nachammal, AfR 1929 Mad 783(2), where the learned Judge held that the fact that no loss is proved to have been sustained by the plaintiff on account of the breach of tbe agreement by the defendants is no bar to the awarding of compensation under Section 74 of the Contract Act. Apparently, the decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1929 PC 179 was not, by then, reported and was not brought to the notice of Sundaram, Chetty J. who gave that decision.

7. We are also referred to the decision of. Ameer AH, J. in Mahadeo Prasad v. Siemens Ltd.,. AIR 1934 Cal 285. But this also docs not render any assistance to the respondent. The learned Judge held that the plaintiff must prove his damage in a general sense.

8. We are next referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co., Ltd., . But it does not support the contention of the. Jearned counsel for the respondent. The Supreme Court held that:--

"Where the parties have deliberately specified the amount of liquidated damages there can be no presumption that they at the same time, intended to allow the party who has suffered by the breach to give a go-by to the sum specified and claim instead a sum of money which was not ascertained or ascertainable at the date of the breach."

Reliance also is placed on the decision of the House of Lords in Clydebank Engineering and Ship Building Co. Ltd. v. Don Jose Ramos-Yzquierdo Y Castaneda, (1905) AC 6. The contract in that case was for the building of four torpedo-boat destroyers for the Spanish Government within the stipulated periods. The contract further provided that the penalty for late delivery shall be at the rate of 5001 per week for each vessel not delivered by the contractors within the contract time. The question that arose for decision was whether this stipulation was by way of penalty. It was held that the sum of 5001 a week was to be regarded as liquidated damages and not as a penalty. This decision does not, therefore, support the contention of Mr. Veerabhadrayya.

9. In the present case, the lower Court has not found that the plaintiff has suffered any damage. Therefore, the decree for damages can-rot be sustained. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the plaintiff's suit S. C. No. 126 of 1956, on the file of the lower Court is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs here and in the lower Cour