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Yerramilli Satyanandan v. Yerramitli Pudra Raju And Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Nov 15, 1961
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Opinion Summary — Chandra Reddy, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The subject matter of these appeals is execution of a final decree obtained by the plaintiff (respondent 1). The plaintiff originally sued for partition and separate possession in O.S. No. 51 of 1939 (Subordinate Judge's Court, Amalapuram). A preliminary decree was passed on 26-2-1941. Appeals (A.S. Nos. 118 and 248 of 1941) led to a compromise and a preliminary decree dated 8-4-1943 in terms of the memorandum of compromise. A Commissioner was appointed to divide the outstandings, reported, and after objections a final decree was passed by the trial Court on 13-8-1947. Clause 3 of that final decree entitled the plaintiff to recover Rs. 22,821-4-3 with interest at 6% per annum from 1-4-1943.

The defendants appealed. The High Court (Madras) by its judgment and decree dated 29-11-1951 (A.S. No. 715 of 1947) modified several terms of the decree; of relevance is cl. 5 of the High Court's decree which deleted the trial Court's cl. 3 and remanded to the Subordinate Judge to enquire, ascertain proper expenses for collection of the outstandings, determine correct amount due to the plaintiff (his half share), calculate interest at 6% from 1-4-1943 till payment, and frame cl. 3 accordingly after giving parties opportunity to adduce evidence.

Pursuant to that direction, the plaintiff filed I.A. No. 877 of 1952. After enquiry the Subordinate Judge passed a modified final decree on 21-1-1958 fixing the plaintiff's recovery at Rs. 19,835-3-8 with interest at 6% from 1-4-1943 until realisation. Further I.As were later allowed to include sums omitted and to effect other amendments; the final decree as ultimately amended emerged on 31-3-1958.

The plaintiff (decree-holder) then proceeded with execution of the amended decree claiming Rs. 31,262-8-3, after crediting Rs. 20,000 paid earlier by the judgment-debtor pursuant to a condition for stay (two instalments: one in 1943 and another in 1948). The judgment-debtor resisted execution on the ground that the execution petition was barred by limitation because it was filed more than three years after the High Court's decree dated 29-11-1951. The trial Court rejected the limitation objection and directed execution to proceed. The judgment-debtor appealed; several appeals followed and are the subject of this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the execution petition in respect of the plaintiff's share of the outstandings was barred by limitation—specifically, whether limitation must be computed from the date of the High Court's decree (29-11-1951) or from the later date when the Subordinate Judge passed the modified final decree after the remand and enquiry.
  2. Whether the Subordinate Judge's action in reconstituting cl. (3) pursuant to the High Court's cl. (5) amounted to a merely ministerial formal act (in which case limitation would run from the High Court decree), or whether it required fresh judicial enquiry so as to create a new decree-date for the purpose of limitation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (judgment-debtor) — Arguments

  • The execution petition was barred by limitation because it was presented more than three years after the High Court's appellate decree dated 29-11-1951; therefore limitation should be calculated from that date.
  • Even if execution in respect of the outstandings could not be levied until ascertainment, the decree is indivisible for purposes of execution and limitation commences on the date on which any portion could be executed; since part of the original decree was immediately executable, limitation should run from 29-11-1951.
  • Reliance was placed on the decision in Gopalakrishnayya v. Bhosayya (1954-1 Mad LJ 462) to support the proposition that limitation runs from the date of the High Court decree where a High Court has adjudicated rights and remaining matters (e.g., ascertainment of costs) are formalities.

Respondent (decree-holder / plaintiff)

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's point‑by‑point submissions opposing the limitation plea. The record shows, however, that the respondent proceeded with execution of the modified final decree and the trial Court permitted execution to proceed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gopalakrishnayya v. Bhosayya, 1954-1 Mad LJ 462 Where the High Court adjudicates the rights of the parties and the remaining matters (for instance ascertainment of costs) are essentially formal, the decree is indivisible and limitation may run from the date of the High Court's decree. The court held this authority inapplicable to the instant case because in Gopalakrishnayya the High Court had finally adjudicated rights and remaining steps were formal, whereas here the High Court remanded the question of the plaintiff's share for fresh enquiry and judicial determination by the trial Court.
Khulna Loan Co. Ltd. v. Jnanendra Natil Bose, AIR 1917 PC 85 Where a decree is of a kind such that the date of the original decree must be taken as the date for limitation (recognising effects of O.20, r.7 CPC), limitation runs from the original decree date. The court found no analogy: that case concerned a single decree for sale and recovery out of sale proceeds and arose under Section 48 CPC; the present facts required fresh ascertainment by the trial Court after remand.
Rameshwar Singh v. Homeswar Singh, 40 Mad LJ 1 : (AIR 1921 PC 31) For the Limitation Act to apply, the decree sought to be enforced must be in a form capable of enforcement; if a decree is so limited that it cannot be enforced until further steps are taken, limitation does not commence until the decree is capable of execution. The court relied on this principle to hold that because the High Court remanded a judicial enquiry into the outstandings allotted to the plaintiff, there was nothing enforceable as to that part until the enquiry was concluded and the Subordinate Judge passed the modified decree; accordingly limitation had not begun to run and the execution petition was timely.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by construing cl. (5) of the High Court's decree of 29-11-1951. It observed that cl. (5) clearly remanded to the Subordinate Judge a substantive matter — namely, the ascertainment of the correct amount due to the plaintiff as his half share of the outstandings and the calculation of interest — and directed that the Subordinate Judge should do so in the light of the High Court's observations and after affording parties an opportunity to adduce evidence.

From this construction the court concluded that the Subordinate Judge's task was not merely ministerial or formal. Rather, the Subordinate Judge was required to undertake a judicial enquiry (both oral and documentary evidence), consider the material, and re-constitute cl. (3) of the lower Court's decree in accordance with his findings. Consequently, the later modified final decree of 21-1-1958 (and the further amendments culminating in the final version of 31-3-1958) represented an adjudicative act, not a mere clerical insertion.

The court distinguished the authorities relied upon by the appellants. Gopalakrishnayya was held inapplicable because there the High Court had finally adjudicated and the remaining steps were formal; Khulna Loan Co. likewise did not fit because it concerned a single decree (sale and recovery) and arose under different provisions (Section 48 CPC). The court emphasized that those cases do not govern the present situation where a fresh judicial determination was expressly remanded to the trial Court.

The court expressly relied on the principle from Rameshwar Singh that the Limitation Act applies only when a decree is in a form capable of enforcement. While some parts of the overall decree may have been satisfied (the decree-holder had withdrawn sums previously paid and there remained a modest balance in his hands), the specific portion concerning the outstandings due to the plaintiff could not be executed until the Subordinate Judge completed the enquiry and fixed the plaintiff's share. Until that contingency was resolved, there was no executable decree for that portion and limitation did not begin to run in respect of it.

The court also observed that if the defendants were dissatisfied with the modified final decree passed after enquiry they should have appealed against it; having not appealed, they could not contend that no modification had occurred.

On these bases the court concluded that the execution petition was within time and that the trial Court correctly directed execution to proceed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The order of the Court below permitting execution was confirmed and all appeals were dismissed. The opinion concludes: Appeals dismissed.

Implications (direct consequences): The consequence for the parties is that execution of the modified final decree may proceed; the appellant's limitation plea failed because the court held that the part of the decree concerning the plaintiff's share of the outstandings was not in a form capable of execution until the Subordinate Judge completed the remanded judicial enquiry and passed the modified decree. Costs were awarded: a consolidated fee of Rs. 500 and a junior's fee of Rs. 150 were fixed. The court did not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond the application of existing principles (as applied and distinguished in the opinion).

End of summary — based exclusively on the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

Chandra Reddy, C.J:— The subject matter of all these appeals is a final decree which was put in execution by respondent 1, the decree-bolder.

2. The circumstances culminating in these appeals may be briefly stated. The first respondent laid an action for partition and separate possession of his properties in O.S No. 51 of 1939 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Amalapuram. A preliminary decree was passed on 26-2-1941. Appeals were preferred to the High Court of Madras in A.S Nos. 118 and 248 of 1941 against this preliminary decree which ultimately ended in a compromise and a preliminary decree dated 8-4-1943 was passed in terms of the memorandum of compromise filed by the parties. Pursuant to this compromise, the plaintiff filed a petition for the appointment of a commissioner to divide the outstandings due to the family as per the schedule attached to the compromise decree and the Court appointed a Commissioner, who submitted a report dividing the outstanaings. After hearing the objections of the parties, a final decree was passed by the trial Court on 13-8-1947. Among the several directions was the one embodied in Cl. 3 of the final decree enabling the plaintiff to recover Rupees 22,821-4-3 being his half share of the outstandings as per schedules V and VI attached to the written statement, with interest at six per cent per annum from 1-4-1943 till date of payment. It is unnecessary for us to refer to the other terms of the decree, as nothing turns upon them. The aggrieved defendants preferred an appeal against this decree. The High Court made changes in regard to several terms of the decree by its judgment and decree dated 29-11-51 in A.S No. 715 of 1947. The only modification that has a significance in this enquiry is that contained in cl. 5 of the High Court's decree, which is in these words:

“That cl. 3 of the decree of the lower Court be and hereby is deleted and that in respect of the following two items of expenses, namely, (1) Court's costs, fees & voluntary (sic) amounting to a sum of Rs. 4,872-11-6 and (2) Fees for petitions Rs. 400.V the Subordinate Judge, Amalapuram, do enquire and ascertain what is properly debitable for expenses for collection of the outstandings and also having regard to what is contained in para 4 supra, he shall ascertain the correct amount due to the plaintiff from the defendant for the plaintiff's half share of the outstandings collected and calculate interest at six per cent per annum on the amounts so payable by the defendants to the plaintiff continuously from 1-4-1343 till date of payment in accordance with the observations and directions contained in the judgment herein and frame cl. 3 in accordance with his finding and incorporate the same as cl. 3 of the decree of the lower Court.”.

3. It is with the scope and ambit of this clause that we are here concerned. This clause makes it abundantly clear that the High Court while setting aside part of the final decree of the trial Court, has directed it to enquire afresh into the items enumerated therein end determine the amounts due to the plaintiff after affording opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence, in the light of the observations contained in its judgment.

4. In consonance with this direction, the plaintiff filed I.A No. 877 of 1952 for the passing of an amended final decree after holding an enquiry into the natter as directed by the High Court. After an elaborate enquiry, the Subordinate Judge passed a modified final decree on 21-1-1958. That decree is in these words:

“that the plaintiff do recover from the defendants a sum of Rs. 19,835-3-8 (Rupees Twenty-thousand eight ninety one annas seven and pies eight as admitted by the defendant in ground No. 3 of the appeal grounds in A.S No. 715 of 1947 on the file of the High Court, Madras, minus Rs. 10564-0 being the half share debltable in respect of expenses of collection of outstandings as per the consent memo dated 9-1-1958, filed by both the parties), being the half share of the outstandings as per schedules V and VI attached to the written statement of 1st defendant with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from 14-1943 till date of realisation.”

Subsequently two more I. As were filed for amendment of this decree to include certain sums left out in the final decree and for other purposes which need not be stated here and they were accepted by the Subordinate Judge.

5. Thereafter, the plaintiff levied execution of the decree as finally amended in 1958 claiming a sum of Rs. 31,262-8-3. This figure was arrived at after giving credit to a sum of Rs. 20,000/- paid by the judgment-debtor as required by the order of the Madras High Court in C.M.P No. 6615 of 1947 as a cendition to the grant of stay of execution of the decree. The judgment-debtor deposited the sum of Rs. 20,000/- in two Instalments of Rs. 10,000/- each, one on 14-1943 and another on 16-4-1948.

6. The execution petition was resisted by the judgment-debtor on the ground that it was barred by limitation as it was filed more than three years of the making of the appellate decree i.e, on 29-11-1951.

7. This objection did not find favour with the trial Court with the result that it directed execution to proceed. Aggrieved by this decision, the judgment-debtor filed these three appeals.

8. A common contention is urged in all these appeals, namely, that for purposes of limitation time has to be calculated from 29-11-1951 as that was the date of the decree of the High Court and the date on which the Subordinate Judge subsequently modified the decree would not furnish period of limitation since the Subordinate Judge merely incorporated the re-constituted cl. (3) of the decree of the High Court. Even assuming that the decree as regards the outstandings could not be executed till the ascertainment of the outstandings that would fall to the share of the plaintiff, still time has to be reckoned from 29-11-1951 as the other part of the original decree was executable. Since a decree is indivisible for purposes of execution limitation commences on the date on which execution could be levied in regard to the portion of the decree continues the learned counsel for the appellant.

9. In support of his contention, the learned counsel places reliance on Gopalakrishnayya v. Bhosayya, 1954-1 Mad LJ 462. That was a suit to recover possession of lands in the occupation of the respondents with mesne profits. The suit was opposed on the objection that the lands formed part of an estate with occupancy rights inhering in the defendants and that it was not competent for the plaintiffs to maintain the suit in the Civil Court. These pleas were negatived by the District Munsif and the suit decreed and this was affirmed on appeal by the Subordinate Judge, Masulipatnam. But a Bench of the Madras High Court which heard the second appeal, accepted the contention of defendants, allowed the appeal and ordered the plaint to be returned for presentation to the proper Court and awarded costs to the defendants in all the three Courts. While the costs awarded in the High Court were taxed and inserted in the decree, there was a direction that the costs payable in the lower Courts should be ascertained by those Courts. Conformably to this, the defendants filed a petition to amend the decree by inserting costs as provided in the High Court's decree dated 11-9-1937 and this was ordered on 6-1-1938. On 27-3-1944, the defendants applied in the trial Court to recover Rs. 83-3-0 payable by way of costs., The objection raised by the plaintiffs was that as the decree of the High Court was passed on 9-12-1931, the execution petition presented on 27-3-1944 was barred under Section 48 of the CPC. This argument was accepted by Rajamannar C.J and Venkatarama Ayyar J. when the matter ultimately came up before them by way of a Letters Patent Appeal and the E.P dismissed.

10. In support of their conclusion, the learned Judges relied on Khulna Loan Co. Ltd. v. Jnanendra Natlt Bose, AIR 1917 PC 85. In that case, a combined mortgage decree was passed on 28-5-1896. The properties were sold on 24-6-1907 and after appropriating the sale proceeds towards the decree, there was a balance still. An execution application for recovery of this balance was filed on 6-3-1911. The High Court of Calcutta decided that in view of O. 20, R. 7 of the CPC, the date of the decree must be taken to be 28-5-1896 and that the period of twelve years under Section 48 of the CPC was to be computed from that date. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee merely confirmed the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, as they saw no reason to differ from the judgment of that Court.

11. The raison d'etre of 1954-1 Mad LJ 462, as also AIR 1917 PC 85 does not govern the instant case. In the first case, the adjudication of the rights of the parties was made by the High Court when it allowed the appeal and directed the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court and ascertainment of costs was only a formality which could be complied with in time. The decree being indivisible and there being no impediment in the way of executing a part of the decree at once, it was held that the starting point of limitation was the date of the High Court decree. The second case also has no analogy here for the reason that in that case there was only one decree for sale of the properties and for recovery of the amount due to the mortgagee out of the sale proceeds. Further, both the cases arose under Section 48 of the CPC.

12. The situation here is altogether different. So far as the share of the outstandings of the plaintiff is concerned, a fresh determination had to be made by the Subordinate Judge after a further enquiry into the matter, as the parties were not agreed about the basis adoptetf by the trial Court in the calculation of the amounts. A reading of cl. (5) leaves no room for doubt that the High Court remanded that part of the matter to the trial Court with a direction that it should ascertain the correct amount due to the plaintiff from the defendants towards his share of the outstandings and calculate interest at six per cent. In doing so, the trial Court had to bear in mind the observations and directions of the High Court and to reconstitute cl. (3) in consonance with its finding. That finding was to be arrived at after a judicial enquiry-That being the position, there is no substance in the submission made on behalf of the appellant that the trial Court had to discharge only ministerial duties and not judicial functions.

13. Clause (5) of the High Court's decree makes it plain that after giving opportunity to the parties to adduce both oral and documentary evidence and on a consideration of the material before it, the trial Court had to pass a modified final decree, in regard to that part of the claim of the plaintiff. It is in conformity with the direction of the High Court that a modified final decree was passed by the Subordinate Judge on 21-1-1958. It is this modified decree that is sought to be executed. If the defendants were aggrieved by it, they should have attacked it in appeal. Not having done it, it is not open to them to contend that there was no modification of the decree. It is also to be borne in mind that the final decree that was eventually made the subject matter of the E.P is the one that emerged on 31-3-1958 after it was lastly amended in I.A No. 877 of 1952.

14. In the light of these circumstances, there is no force in the contention that, at any rate, in regard to that portion of the decree which is executable immediately, it is barred by limitation either. We have already stated that a sum of Rs. 20,000/- was paid by the judgment-debtor in 1948 and the decree-holder was permitted to withdraw this amount without furnishing security. It appears that sums of Rs. 10,000/- each were credited towards the amount already determined and subsequent interest and costs upto 29-11-1951 (as could be seen from Exhibits A-4(a) and A-5(a). After appropriation there was a sum of Rs. 7,590-14-8 in the hands of the decree-holder to be adjusted towards the monies to be ascertained in accordance with cl. (3) of the final decree. Thus, the position immediately after the passing of the decree by the High Court was that the decree to the extent of mesne profits etc., was satisfied and the decree-holder had little over Rs. 7,500/- in his hands, to be appropriated towards his claim arising out of the directions embodied in cl. (3).

15. At that stage, what is it that the decree-holder could execute? He had to await the determination of the amounts due to him as representing his share of the outstandings. Till that contingency arose, there was no executable decree.

16. In this connection, we may usefully refer to the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Rameshwar Singh v. Homeswar Singh, 40 Mad LJ 1 : (AIR 1921 PC 31).

17. The decree that was the subject of scrutiny by their Lordships contained a direction that the money payable thereunder should be realised by sale of the properties of one Janeshwar in the possession of Ekradeshwar. Ekradeshwar first obtained possession of Janashwar's properties in 1914 and the decree-holder applied on 18-12-1914 to execute that decree. An objection was taken that it was barred under Article 182 of the Limitation Act. Rejecting this plea, their Lordships remarked:

“They are of opinion that, in order to make the provision of the Limitation Act apply, the decree sought to be enforced must have been in such a form as to render it capable in the circumstances of being enforced. A decree so limited in its scope as that of the 27th July, 1906, under consideration cannot, in their opinion, be regarded as being thus capable of execution.”

The principle enunciated in this passage is applicable to the Instant case. There was nothing that could be enforced in the Instant case till the outstandings to be allotted to the share of the plaintiff were determined. It is only after ascertainment of the outstandings that the decree was in a form capable of execution. This topic need not detain us any longer. We are of the opinion that the execution petition was quite in time, the decree not having been barred and it could be proceeded with.

18. In the result, the order of the Court below is confirmed and all the appeals are dismissed with costs. A consolidated fee of Rs. 500/- towards the ??? fee and Rs. 150/- as the junior's fee are fixed.

DF/M/K.S.B

19. Appeals dismissed.