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Reddi China Paidayya Petitioner v. Rudrabhatla Maralidhar And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner filed a petition under section 12 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 before the Additional Assistant Settlement Officer, Vizianagaram, seeking grant of a ryotwari patta in respect of lands involved in O.S. No. 216/2-B and 2-C. The Additional Assistant Settlement Officer dismissed that petition. An appeal against that order lay to the Estates Abolition Tribunal under sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act; the Tribunal in this instance was the District Judge, Visakhapatnam. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The petitioner then filed a petition to this Court purporting to invoke revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).
The Office (registry) raised an objection that the Tribunal (the District Judge sitting as Tribunal) is not a "Court" and therefore the High Court cannot exercise revisional jurisdiction under section 115, CPC. Learned counsel for the petitioner (Mr. Kodandaramayya) contended that because the Tribunal had powers of a civil court it was subordinate to the High Court and its orders were therefore amenable to revision under section 115. The Court examined statutory language and judicial authorities bearing on whether the Tribunal is a "Court" subordinate to the High Court and whether section 115 CPC can be invoked.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a petition for revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code lies to the High Court against the orders of the District Judge (sitting as the Estates Abolition Tribunal) in an appeal under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948.
- Whether a Tribunal constituted under section 8 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 is a "Court" subordinate to the High Court for the purposes of section 115 CPC (i.e., whether it occupies the position vis-à-vis the High Court that would permit revisional jurisdiction).
- Whether the grant to the Tribunal of certain powers of a civil court (and application of Civil Procedure Code procedure by rule or notification) suffices to make the Tribunal a Court subordinate to the High Court and thus subject to revision under section 115 CPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Office / Registry
- The Office objected that the Estates Abolition Tribunal (the District Judge as appointed under the Act) is not a "Court" and therefore the High Court cannot exercise revisional jurisdiction under section 115 CPC against its orders.
Petitioner (Mr. Kodandaramayya)
- Contended that the Tribunal had all the powers of a civil court and therefore was subordinate to the High Court; if the Tribunal is to be considered a Court for any purpose, its orders could be revised by the High Court under section 115 CPC.
- Relied on a decision (Rameswaraswam Varu v. Ramalinga Raju, per Bhimasankaram, J.) suggesting that if a Tribunal has powers of review and the Civil Procedure Code applies, it is a Court whose order could be revised under section 115 CPC.
- Also relied on the Rules Supplement (rule 1) and a Notification (dated 28th June, 1956) specifying District Judges as Tribunals to argue that the Tribunal should be treated as a Court subordinate to the High Court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| O.A.O.K. Lakshmanan Chettiar v. J.S. Kannappar (1926 51 M.L.J. 738) — Full Bench | Established that an appointee (e.g., a District Judge or Chief Judge) designated under special statute as a Tribunal is a persona designata and cannot be construed as a "Court" for purposes of conferring status as a Court subordinate to the High Court. | The Court relied on this Full Bench decision to show that a presiding judge appointed as Tribunal is not thereby transformed into a Court; the person is a persona designata and therefore the Tribunal's orders are not automatically subject to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. |
| Parthasaradh Naidu v. Koteswara Rao (1923 46 M.L.J. 29) | Earlier authority referenced in distinguishing the state of the law; used in the Full Bench's reasoning as part of historical analysis. | The Court noted that the Full Bench in Lakshmanan Chettiar referred to Parthasaradh Naidu and drew distinctions based on statutory language; the present opinion accepts the Full Bench's treatment and conclusions. |
| Peyyeti Jagannadha Rao v. Pamari Venkateswar Rao (1959 2 An. W.R. 264) — Division Bench | Held that a Tribunal cannot be considered a Court subordinate to the High Court and that its orders are not liable to be revised under section 115 CPC (fact pattern involved a Revenue Divisional Officer hearing an appeal under the Andhra Tenancy Act). | The Court treated this Division Bench decision as authoritative and controlling: it applied the principle that the key test is whether the Tribunal is subordinate to the High Court (relying on section 3 CPC), and concluded that revisional jurisdiction under section 115 is not available against the Tribunal's order. |
| Rameswaraswam Varu v. Ramalinga Raju (per Bhimasankaram, J.) | Authoritative statement (relied on by petitioner) that if a Tribunal has powers of review and the Civil Procedure Code applies, it may be regarded as a Court whose order could be revised under section 115 CPC. | The Court distinguished and did not accept this as determinative. It held that the correct test is whether the Tribunal is subordinate to the High Court (the position vis-à-vis the High Court, per Peyyeti), not merely whether CPC procedure applies or whether the Tribunal has certain civil-court-like powers. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded by close examination of the statute and of binding judicial authorities rather than by reliance on procedural similarity alone.
- Statutory construction of section 8 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948: the amendment to section 8 (sub-section (2)) provides that the Tribunal will consist of a single member who shall be either a District Judge or an officer eligible to be appointed as a District Judge. The language contemplates appointment of a person of the status of a District Judge (including persons not currently holding that judicial office), and does not expressly make the Tribunal the District Court as an institutional "Court."
- The Court relied on the Full Bench decision in Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Kannappar to conclude that an appointee is a persona designata: when legislation constitutes a presiding judge (or a person of judicial status) as a Tribunal, that does not necessarily convert the tribunal into a "Court" subordinate to the High Court. The Full Bench treated mention of a Court or a judicial officer in such special statutes as descriptive of the person appointed, not as conferring Court status.
- The Division Bench decision in Peyyeti Jagannadha Rao v. Pamari Venkateswar Rao was regarded as directly on point and authoritative: it held that a Tribunal, even if presided over by a District Judge, is not thereby a Court subordinate to the High Court and hence its orders are not revisable under section 115 CPC. The present Court adopted that reasoning and considered it unnecessary to rehearse the pros and cons further.
- The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the mere application of the Civil Procedure Code or the Tribunal's possession of certain civil-court-like powers converts the Tribunal into a subordinate Court. The correct criterion is the Tribunal's position vis-à-vis the High Court (whether it is subordinate), not whether CPC procedure applies to it. The Court relied on section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure as underlying this enquiry (as done in Peyyeti).
- The Court examined the specific statutory grant (section 8(4) of the Madras Estates Act) that "every Tribunal shall have powers of a civil Court to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents." The Court interpreted this as a limited, purposive grant — restricted to compelling attendance and production — and not a general conferral of all civil-court powers or of Court status for all purposes.
- The Court also considered (and rejected as determinative) the petitioner's reliance on rule 1 in the Rules Supplement and the 1956 Notification naming District Judges as Tribunals. The Court held that these provisions, even if they require the Tribunal to adopt aspects of CPC procedure or identify District Judges as presiding persons, do not displace the earlier judicial conclusions that such appointees are persona designata and that the Tribunal is not thereby a Court subordinate to the High Court.
- Having applied the above legal principles and precedents, the Court concluded that the revision petition under section 115 CPC could not be entertained.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court held that the revision petition under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, against the orders of the Tribunal (a District Judge sitting as Tribunal under the Madras Estates Act) is incompetent and cannot be entertained.
Consequences and implications:
- The direct effect on the parties is that the petition seeking revision under section 115 CPC is not maintainable and cannot proceed in that form against the Tribunal's order.
- The Court granted ancillary relief: the petitioner was given time until 30th September, 1960 to convert the application into one under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and to pay the requisite Court fee for that alternative remedy.
- The opinion rests on existing Full Bench and Division Bench authorities (Lakshmanan Chettiar and Peyyeti Jagannadha Rao) and thus does not announce a novel legal principle; it treats the matter as settled by prior decisions and declines to disturb those rulings.
Short form disposition recorded in the opinion: "Revision incompetent; Time for conversion granted."
This matter having been referred to by the Office for orders of Court raises the question whether a revision under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, against the orders of the District Judge in appeal against the order of the Additional Assistant Settlement Officer lies to this Court.
2. The facts leading up to the case are as follows:— The Additional Assistant Settlement Officer, Vizianagaram, dismissed the petition filed before him by the petitioner herein under section 12 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 and thereby refused the grant of the ryotwari patta in respect of the lands said to be concerned in O.S No. 216/2-B and 2-C. An appeal is taken as against this order to the Estates Abolition Tribunal as provided under sub-section (2) of section 15, viz., the District Judge, Visakhapatnam, as he was the Tribunal constituted under section 8 of the Act. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. This petition agrinst that decision of the Tribunal is filed purporting to be under section 115, Civil Procedure Code.
3. To the objection raised by the Office that the Tribunal who heard the appeal, viz., the District Judge, Visakhapatnam’ is not a Court and that therefore the High Court cannot exercise its revisional jurisdiction under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. Mr. Kodandaramayya, learned counsel who appeared for the petitioner, raised the contention that inasmuch as the Tribunal which heard the appeal had all the powers of a civil Court it was subordinate to the High Court. He argued at length that if the Tribunal is considered as a Court for any purpose, it necessarily follows that its orders could be revised by this Court. But an examination of the position with reference to decided cases does not lend support to the contention of the learned counsel. On the other hand, questions arising out of his contentions have, in my view, already been authoritatively decided by judicial pronouncements and that in view of those decisions, it is not open any longer to consider the question afresh.
4. The Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act of 1948 originally provided under section 8 for the constitution of only a Court as a Tribunal. After amendment of that section, it has in sub-section (2) of that section stated that the Tribunal will consist of a single member who shall be either a District Judge or an Officer eligible to be appointed as a District Judge. There is therefore a distinction to be drawn as to the constitution of the Tribunal with reference to the language of the said sub-section as it existed at each relevant time. The Act seeks to make a person of the status of a District Judge or an Officer eligible to be appointed as a District Judge as a Tribunal. The language of the section does not say that it is the District Judge of a Court alone that could be appointed as the Tribunal; ‘but provides persons who could be appointed as a District Judge as the Tribunal. This does not necessarily mean that the Tribunal ought to have been a District Judge of a Court. Even if it be taken as pointed out by the learned counsel that the rules make mention a District Judge of a Court, the Full Bench decision reported in O.A.O.K. Lakshmanan Chettiar v. J.S. Kannappar . 1926 51 M.L.J 738, makes it clear that the appointee is only a persona designata and could not in any sense be construed as a Court. There, Coutts Trotter, C.J, has pointed out that the reference to the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, who has been appointed under the rules under the Madras District Municipalities Act as Tribunal could not be taken as the Court. In other words, that decision makes it clear that the mention of the Court in that connection is only descriptive of the person who has been designated as a person for the purpose of hearing the election disputes. While referring to the earlier Full Bench decision in Parthasaradh Naidu v. Koteswara Rao . 1923 46 M.L.J 29, a distinction has been drawn basing upon the language of section 199(2)(c) of the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920. It is not necessary to have to refer in detail to the state of law as it existed at the time when the decision in Parthasaradhi Naidu v. Koteswara Rao, was given and to the amendments in force when the Full Bench decision in Lakshmanan Chethar v. Kannappar was rendered. It is now settled that when it is not the Court but only a presiding Judge that is constituted the Tribunal for purposes of any special Act, the Tribunal cannot in any sense be construed as a Court. This position is still more clear in this case since in specifying the person that could be appointed as the Tribunal no reference to any Court has been made, because any Officer eligible to be appointed as a District Judge without being in office its also contemplated to be the appointee.
5. It is next to be considered whether in respect of the Tribunal appointed under section 8 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 which is not a Court, the High Court can sit in revision against the decision of the Tribunal (District Judge) in exercise of the powers available under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. In view of the decision in Peyyeti Jagannadha Rao… v. Pamari Venkateswar Rao…. . 1959 2 An. W.R 264., it is not necessary for me to have to deal with the pros and cons arising out of this question. The Division Bench consisting of Chandra Reddy, C.J and Srinivasachari, J., of this Court have there discussed the question, though it arose with reference to an order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer in an appeal against the order of the Tahsildar under section 16 of the Andhra Tenancy Act and therein it has been clearly laid down that a Tribunal cannot be considered as a Court subordinate to the High Court and the order of the Tribunal is not therefore liable to be revised under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. The effect, therefore, of the Full Bench decision reported in O.A.O.K. Lakshmanan Chettiar v. J.S. Kannappar, coupled with that of the Division Bench of this Court reported in Peyyeti Jagannadha Rao… v. Pamari Venkateswar Rao…., will be that even if a District Judge is appointed as the Tribunal, he is only a persona designata and his orders are not subject to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.
6. Mr. Kodandaramayya then argued, relying upon a decision of Bhimasankaram, J., in Rameswaraswam Varu v. Ramalinga Raju, that if a Tribunal has powers of review and the Code of Civil ??? applies to it, it is a Court whose order could be revised under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. But that argument in my view, overlooks the important point which has been stressed on in the decision of the Division Bench in Peyyeti Jagannadha Rao… v. Pamari Venkateswar Rao….. The criterion for judging whether the High Court can exercise jurisdiction over any other Court has therein been hinged on the proposition whether the Tribunal is subordinate to the High Court, and for this purpose the language of section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been relied upon. It thus becomes clear that it is not the application of the Civil Procedure Code for regulating proceedings of the Tribunal that is made the basis, but the position the Tribunal occupies vis-a-vis the High Court as subordinate thereto, that constitutes the real test. Therefore, the mere fact that the procedure contained in the Code of Civil Procedure is also to be followed by a Tribunal cannot be considered as the postulate for conferring upon a Tribunal the postion or status of a Court subordinate to the High Court.
7. Having said that while the application of the procedure under the Civil Procedure Code alone is not the determining factor, it is pertinent to see what exactly section 8 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (XXVI of 1948) says with reference to the procedure to be adopted and for what purpose. The relevant provision is sub-section (4) of section 8 of the Act, and it says that every Tribunal shall have powers of a civil Court to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents. This provision in my view is restrictive and does not make the powers of the civil Court to be exercised for all purposes by the Tribunal but only to compel the attendance of the witnesses for being examined or for the production of documents. It is not therefore possible to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal is a civil Court for all purposes. I should therefore think that there is a fallacy in this argument inasmuch as it is made to depend upon a wrong assumption that the Tribunal has been constituted a Court for all purposes and the Civil Procedure Code applies in toto.
8. It is further argued that rule 1 contained in the Rules Supplement of the Gazette, dated 17th January, 1950, confers on the Tribunal powers exercisable by a civil Court in the trial of suits and in appeals and that therefore the decision of the Tribunal also should be taken to be revisable by the High Court. No doubt, the rule referred to gives some scope to advance such an argument. But that contention ignores that the powers of the High Court to revise the orders of the Tribunal which is dependent on the existence of other precedent conditions referred to already, are not derived by the High Court as a matter of course simply because the Tribunal is made to adopt the procedure provided by the Civil Procedure Code for its deliberations. Again, I find a limitation even in this rule to the effect that the Tribunal shall exercise powers of a civil Court only in respect of trial of suits and in appeals. Therefore to stretch this rule to the extent of making it appear that the Tribunal is a Court which is also subordinate to the High Court is, in my view, a far cry. Reliance is also placed upon the language of the Notification dated 28th June, 1956, which specifies that the District Judge of each district shall be the Tribunal and shall have jurisdiction over the estates or parts thereof in that district for the purposes of the Act. It is stressed that since that notification also adds that the District Judge of the District in whose jurisdiction the major portion of the said estate lies shall be the Tribunal in respect of that estate, that it is with reference to the jurisdiction of the District Court the specification is made. I am however unable to see how this notification is calculated to further the contention of the learned counsel. All that need be said is that neither the rule referred to nor this notification has the effect of running counter to the decision of the Full Bench in Lakshmenan Chettier v. Kannappar, or of the Division Bench in Peyyeti Jagannadha Rao… v. Pamari Venkateswar Rao…..
9. Viewed in any manner, the revision petition sought to be filed cannot be entertained. In view of the fact that the petitioner wants time for converting this application into one under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, he is granted time till the 30th September, 1960, for payment of the Court fee.
10. M.S.K
Revision incompetent; Time for conversion granted.
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