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Syed Mashood Ali Pet... v. Secretary, Board Of ...

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Nov 21, 1960
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Three writ petitions challenge an order dated 1-7-1960 of the Commissioner for Government Examinations, Andhra Pradesh, which canceled the marks obtained by the petitioners in all subjects at the H.S.C. Public Examination of March/April 1960 and debarred them from appearing for the next two examinations (October 1960 and March 1961) on the ground of alleged malpractices.

The three petitioners (Syed Mashhood Ali, roll no. 9790; Alam Ali Khan, roll no. 9839; Mohammad Arifur Rahman, roll no. 9820) sat at the All Saints High School centre. The centre experienced widespread misconduct: candidates brought forbidden material, resorted to rowdyism, attempted to assault an assistant superintendent, and caused damage to school property. Examiners scrutinised scripts and reported 580 suspected cases; a Select Malpractice Committee confirmed suspicion in 207 cases, and the Commissioner finally punished 171 candidates, including the three petitioners.

Procedurally, the petitioners sought various writs: certiorari (to quash the impugned order) and/or mandamus (to direct the Board/Commissioner to publish or refrain from giving effect to the order). The Commissioner averred that explanations were called for through the petitioners' Headmaster, those explanations were considered, and the Commissioner was satisfied of the petitioners' guilt before imposing punishment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the enquiries conducted by the Select Malpractice Committee and the Commissioner for Government Examinations were carried out with due regard to the rules of natural justice (i.e., whether the petitioners were given a reasonable and adequate opportunity to know the precise charges and to meet them).
  2. Whether, as an outcome of any procedural defect, the impugned punitive order (cancellation of marks and one-year debarment) should be stayed or quashed, and whether mandamus should be issued to publish the 1st petitioner’s result.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners contend they were not informed with sufficient preciseness of the charges against them; thus they were denied a full and fair opportunity to make representations and to satisfy the authorities of their innocence.
  • Their explanations were general denials because the communicated accusations were vague—petitioners were not told in which subject or in which specific answers they were alleged to have copied or aided copying.

Respondent (Commissioner for Government Examinations) Arguments

  • The Commissioner states that explanations were called for from delinquent candidates through the Headmaster of the relevant High School; the Headmaster obtained the petitioners’ explanations and submitted them to the Commissioner.
  • After considering those explanations together with reports from examiners and the Select Malpractice Committee, the Commissioner was satisfied of the petitioners’ guilt and imposed the prescribed punishment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ceylon University v. Fernado. 1960 I W.R. 223. Cited for the proposition that the Select Malpractice Committee and the Commissioner, though administrative bodies, exercise quasi-judicial functions. Used to support the court’s starting point that natural justice principles must be observed by these bodies when conducting inquiries into alleged examination malpractices.
General Medical Council v. Spackman. 1943 A.C. 627. Quoted for an authoritative exposition of "natural justice"—the need for opportunity to be heard, impartiality, and that a decision contrary to essential principles of justice is no decision. The court extracted and relied on the passage to define the essential requirements of natural justice and to hold that a violation of those principles renders the decision invalid.
Spackman v. Plumsted District Board of Works (10 App. Cas. 229) Illustrated that in absence of special procedural provisions the law implies that substantial requirements of justice (notice, hearing, impartiality, honesty) must be observed by decision-makers. Quoted within the Spackman passage and used to illustrate what "natural justice" entails for administrative decision-makers in the context of the case.
Board of Education v. Rice. 1911 A.C. 179. Administrative tribunals must act in good faith, fairly listen to both sides, and give a fair opportunity to those affected to correct or contradict relevant statements prejudicial to them. Adopted by the court (via quotation) to assert that petitioners should have been given an adequate opportunity to meet and contradict the relevant adverse material.
Local Government Board v. Arlidge. 1915 A.C. 120. Affirmed application of Board of Education v. Rice principles; decision-makers must act judicially, without bias, and give parties adequate opportunity to present their case; procedures need not be identical to courts. Used to reinforce the court’s view that the Select Committee and Commissioner had to act judicially and give adequate opportunity even though their procedures need not mirror a formal trial.
Rex v. Local Government Board, Ex Parte Arlidge (1914) I.K.B. 160 Discussed the imprecision of the phrase "contrary to natural justice" but emphasized impartiality and full and fair opportunity as essential requirements. Quoted to acknowledge limits in defining natural justice yet to underline its core elements (impartiality and opportunity to be heard) relied on by the court.
Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd (judgment of Harnam J.) Set out concise requirements of natural justice: accused should know nature of accusations, be given opportunity to state his case, and the tribunal should act in good faith. Invoked to enumerate the essential components of natural justice that the petitioners should have been afforded.
General Medical Council v. Spackram (referenced—appears to be a typographical variant of Spackman) Adduced (by way of dicta) that "convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms." Quoted by the court to emphasize that administrative convenience cannot override the demands of justice in proceedings with serious consequences for students.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in identifiable steps grounded in the text:

  1. Characterisation of the bodies: The court accepted (and cited authority for) that the Select Malpractice Committee and the Commissioner, although administrative, perform quasi-judicial functions when enquiring into examination malpractices.
  2. Obligation to observe natural justice: Because these bodies exercise quasi-judicial functions and no special procedure was prescribed, the court held they were obliged to observe the principles of natural justice. The opinion extensively quoted authorities (notably General Medical Council v. Spackman and Board of Education v. Rice) to set out those principles: impartiality, honest procedure, notice, and an adequate opportunity to correct or contradict prejudicial material.
  3. Identification of the core question: The crucial legal question was whether the enquiries into the petitioners' alleged malpractices were conducted with due regard to these rules of natural justice—i.e., whether the petitioners were given a reasonable and adequate opportunity to meet specific charges.
  4. Application to the facts: The court examined how the petitioners had been informed and how explanations were obtained. It noted that the petitioners were not caught copying in the act, that scrutiny of scripts occurred without them being present, and that their Headmaster was merely directed to obtain explanations. The petitioners were told only that they had indulged in violence/rowdyism and copying in general terms; they were not informed in which specific subject(s) or which answers were alleged to exhibit copying, nor who the nearby candidates were or what common mistakes constituted the internal evidence.
  5. Evaluation of adequacy of opportunity: The court concluded that the petitioners were given only vague and indefinite charges and therefore could not mount a specific defence. The petitioners' explanations were general denials because the accusations lacked the necessary particularity. Under the authorities quoted, this failure meant the petitioners were not given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict relevant prejudicial statements.
  6. Resulting legal effect: Because the procedure departed from essential principles of natural justice, the court held that the impugned administrative decision could not stand. The court clarified that it was not substituting its view on the merits of the internal evidence (i.e., whether the petitioners actually copied), which lay within the authorities’ exclusive jurisdiction; rather, the procedural inadequacy alone invalidated the order.
  7. Remedial direction: The court ordered that a writ of Mandamus issue directing the Commissioner to forbear from giving effect to the impugned order dated 1-7-1960 (i.e., to suspend operation of the cancellation and debarring) and indicated that the authorities were free to hold fresh enquiries, if desired, provided they inform each candidate of the exact charges and furnish detailed particulars of alleged malpractice before taking any further step.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petitions partly allowed.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The court issued a writ of Mandamus directing the Commissioner for Government Examinations, Andhra Pradesh, to forbear from giving effect to the impugned order dated 1-7-1960 which cancelled the petitioners' marks and debarred them for one year.
  • The court declined to grant the 1st petitioner’s separate prayer for a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary to the Board of Secondary Education to publish his result for the March/April 1960 examination.
  • The court recorded that it would be open to the authorities to conduct fresh enquiries in each case, but only after providing the candidate with exact charges and detailed particulars of the alleged malpractice and after considering the candidate’s explanation.
  • There was no order as to costs in any of the cases.

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion confines itself to the procedural defect in these cases and directs remedial procedural steps; it does not purport to re-evaluate or substitute findings of internal evidence (which remain within the authorities' jurisdiction). The opinion does not articulate a new substantive precedent beyond applying established principles of natural justice to the facts before the court.

Petitions partly allowed.
Show all summary ...

These three writ petitions arise out of the action taken by the Commissioner for Government Examinations, Andhra Pradesh, in canceling the marks obtained by the petitioners in all the subjects at the H.S.C Public Examination of March/April 1960, and in further debarring them from appearing for the examination for one year i.e, for the examinations to be held in October, 1960 and in March, 1961. The action was taken on the ground that the three petitioners had indulged in malpractices during the said examination. These three writ petitions can be disposed of by a common judgment as the facts are similar, and the question of law that arises is the same. In W.P No. 523 of 1960 the petitioner is Syed Mashhood Ali, and his roll number at the examination was 9790; the petitioner in W.P No. 527 of 1960 is Alam Ali Khan and his roll number was 9839 and the petitioner in W.P No. 540 of 1961 is Mohammad Arifur Rahman and his roll number was 9820. The writ petitioners will be referred to hereinafter as the 1st, 2nd and 3rd petitioner respectively.

2. The order by which the punishment was a warded to the petitioners was made on 1-7-1960 and it was in the following terms:

“Sub: H.S.C public examination March/April 1960-Alleged malpractice by certain Candidates-Orders passed:

As the candidates whose roll numbers are furnished hereunder had recourse to malpractice during the H.S.C examination March/April 1960, the Commissioner for Government Examinations, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, has ordered that their marks in all the subjects at the Public Examination of March/April 1960 should be canceled and that they should further be debarred from appearing for one year i.e, two examinations October 1960 and March 1961. The candidates may be informed accordingly”.

3. The roll numbers of the three petitioners were among these appended to the above order.

4. In these writ petitions, the 1st petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari or any other writ to quash the above order and also a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary to the Board of Secondary Education, Government of Andhra Pradesh to announce his result in the examination. The 2nd petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ to quash the said order, while the third petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Commissioner for Government Examinations and the Secretary to the Board of the Secondary Education to forbear from giving effect to the said order.

5. The facts culminating in the impugned order may be briefly stated: The three petitioners were students of the Government Multi-Purpose High School, Chanchalguda. They appeared for the H.S.C Public Examination held in March/April, 1960 and took the examination at the All Saints High School, Hyderabad, which was one of the centres for that examination. At that centre, 800 candidates of nine different High Schools and also private candidates sat for the examination. The 1st petitioner's name was registered for six compulsory subjects and one optional subject, and he took the examination in all the seven subjects. The examination was held from 31st March to 8th April 1960. The 1st petitioner was seated in room No. 11 where 22 candidates were examined including the petitioner and the candidate with roll No. 9791 was his immediate neighbour.

6. The 2nd petitioner took the examination in six compulsory subjects and one optional subject. He was seated in room No. 13 where 28 candidates were examined and three other candidates with roll Nos. 9837, 9838 and 9841 were his immediate neighbours in the examination hall.

7. The 3rd petitioner was seated in another room and his immediate neighbours were candidates bearing roll Nos. 9818, 9819, and 9821 to 9825.

8. For the conduct of the examinations, a number of invigilators and one chief superintendent were appointed. The examinees, however, resoled to violence and malpractices on a large scale. Many candidates are said to have taken forbidden materials into the examination hall and the invigilators detected as many as seven such cases then and there. The situation at this centre during the conduct of the examination became uncontrollable, because the majority of the candidates resorted to malpractices and indulged in acts of rowdyism. They attempted to assault one of the Assistant Superintendents and caused damage to the school building and furniture which was estimated at Rs. 500/-. Consequently the examination could not be conducted in an orderly manner but with great difficulty it was completed according to the time-table.

9. The Chief Superintendent of the centre, by his Setter dated 18-4-1960, reported that most of the candidates who appeared at the centre depended for their success on malpractice of one form or another and most of them brought written or printed matter with them into the examination hall in spite of strict vigilance, while some were trying to bribe the invigilators seeking their help and some others were trying their best to elicit information from school peons as to who the examiners concerned were. Seven cases of copying with forbidden material were caught redhanded and reported. One of the Assistant Superintendents was attempted to be man-handled by the candidates for his strict vigilance and for not yielding to the request of the candidates to allow them to resort to ???.

10. With a view to investigate and probe into the matter, certain examiners of the H.S.C Public Examination were appointed to scrutinise the scripts in each subject of all the candidates who appeared at the All Saints High School Centre and, report cases of suspected malpractices on the strength of internal evidence furnished by the scripts. After having gone through the scripts, they reported as many as 580 cases of suspected malpractices. The cases of the three petitioners fell in that category.

11. The reports of the examiners along with the report of the Chief Superintendent together with a copy of plan of the seating arrangements were placed before a body of Experts known as Select Malpractice Committee of the Board of Secondary Education which was appointed to advise the Commissioner for Government Examinations in matters of suspected malpractices. After having examined the 580 cases of suspected malpractices relating to the centre, the Committee confirmed the examiners' suspicion with regard to 207 cases. The cases of the petitioners were among those 207. The Commissioner for Government Examinations then examined, the 207 cases and finally 171 candidates including the three petitioners were punished. In the case of the 1st petitioner, the Select Malpractice Committee reported that he was guilty of copying in Hindi paper but did not agree with the opinion of the examiner in Elementary Mathematics (paper-I) that he had copied in that paper also. The Commissioner for Government examinations agreed with the finding of the Select Malpractice Committee. The 1st petitioner's neighbour bearing roll No. 9791 was similarly found to have copied in the Hindi paper.

12. The same procedure was followed with regard to the 2nd petitioner also. The Select Malpractice Committee reached the conclusion that he and his neighbours had been guilty of copying in Telugu (Second Language). With this finding, the Commissioner for Government Examinations agreed. The 2nd petitioner's answer papers are said to have revealed that he had copied the answer for Question No. 7 in the Telugu paper as also several other answers.

13. Similarly the 3rd petitioner was found to have copied in two subjects-Telugu (Second Language) and Hindi. With regard to the former his answer to question No. VII contained similar mistakes as in the answers given by candidates bearing roll numbers 9818, 9819 and 9821 to 9825. In the Hindi paper, he is said to have copied answers to question No. VIII and the other guilty party was the candidate bearing roll number 9821.

14. It appears from the counter affidavits filed by the Commissioner for Government Examinations that explanations were called for from the delinquent candidates as to why action should not be taken against them for the acts of indiscipline and rowdyism and also for the alleged copying. Explanations were called for through the Headmaster of the concerned High School. It is said that the Headmaster of the Chenchalguda High School had obtained the explanations of the petitioners and submitted them to the Commissioner for Government Examinations. After considering the explanation, the Commissioner for Government Examinations was satisfied about the guilt of the petitioners and no imposed the punishment of cancellation of their examination and debarring them for one year.

15. The main contention on behalf of the petitioners is that they had not been told with any degree of preciseness what the charges against them were with the result that they have not had a full and fair opportunity to make their representations and satisfy the authorities that they were not guilty of any malpractice. It is not disputed before me and in my opinion it cannot be disputed that the Select Malpractice Committee and the Commissioner for Government Examinations, when conducting enquiries into cases of alleged malpractices at examinations exercise quasi-judicial functions and not mere administrative functions notwithstanding that they are administrative bodies. See Ceylon University v. Fernado . 1960 I W.R 223.. That being so and in the absence of any prescribed procedure, it is incumbent on them to observe the principles of natural justice in conducting such enquiries. Therefore, the crucial issue in these cases resolves itself into the question whether the enquiries against the petitioners were conducted with due regard to the rules of natural justice. These rules have been defined in varying language in a large number of cases. In this connection it will be useful to extract a passage from the speech of Lord Wright in the case of General Medical Council v. Spackman . 1943 A.C 627 @ 640. wherein reference was made to several important decisions on the topic:

“Natural justice” seems to be used in contrast with any formal or technical rule of law or procedure. Some light on what it connotes may be got from the authorities, to certain of which I now refer. Thus Spackman v. Plumsted District Board of works (10 App. Cas. 229) was a case of administrative decision in a matter of local government. Under the relevant Act an architect's certificate was made conclusive for fixing a general line for buildings. The Earl of Seaborne L.C made some general observations. He said that: “No doubt in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, the law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a Judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter and he must act honestly and impartially and not under dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given, by law. There must be no malversation of any kind. There would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice”. I have italicized the two phrases which the Earl of Selborne seems to me to use as meaning what is generally meant by “natural justice”. He adds, that “this is a matter not of a kind requiring form, not of a kind requiring litigation at all, but requiring only that the parties should have an opportunity of submitting to the person by whose decision they are to be bound by such considerations as in their judgment ought to be brought before him”. I may also quote briefly from two other decisions of this House which indicate what is the duty of what are called “administrative tribunals,” not, perhaps, very happily because the word “tribunal” suggests a court of law and a litigation, whereas what is meant may better be described as the duty of a body charged by statute with a duty of deciding. I quote first the language of Lord Loreburn L.C in Board of Education v. Rice (1911 A.C 179, 182). He said:

“Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not originated, the practice of imposing upon departments or officers of State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds. It will, I suppose, usually be of an administrative kind but sometimes it will involve a matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not add that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides for that is a duty lying upon every one who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. They have no power to administer an oath and need I not examine witnesses. They can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties to the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view……The Board is in the nature of the arbitral tribunal and a court of law has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from the determination either upon law or upon fact. But if the court is satisfied either that the Board have not acted judicially in the way I have described, or have not determined the question which they are required by the Act to determine then there is a remedy by mandamus and certiorari. Lord Loreburn had just expressly observed that the Board “can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties to the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view”. The words fair and relevant are to be noted. If this statement is applicable to an ‘administrative tribunal.’ It must, in my opinion, be applicable to the proceedings of the councils which may not inaptly be described as a professional tribunal like so many other similar professional bodies which are invested by statute for grave reasons of public policy with disciplinary powers over members of the profession.”

“In Local Government Board v. Arlidge (1915 A.C 120), the same general principles were applied and the language of Lord Loreburn in Board of Education v. Rice (1911 A.C 179) was approved. The case raised the issue whether the respondent had a fair hearing. In the public inquiry, which had been held in accordance with the statute, he and his witnesses had been heard orally, but after the inquiry the board's inspector submitted his report to the board who decided the matter after considering the facts and evidence given at the inquiry and the inspector's report. The respondent claimed that he should have seen the report and been heard orally by the officer of the board who actually decided it. He had been offered the opportunity of submitting a written further statement, but had not availed himself of it. This House, reversing the majority of the Court of Appeal, Hamilton L.J dissenting, held that parliament must have intended that the ordinary procedure of the board, which was the deciding body, would be followed (as they held it had been), and that the work of decision had been done judicially and fairly in the sense indicated by Lord Loreburn. Viscount Haldane L.C said (1915 A.C 120, 132): When the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred to them without bias and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity of adequately presenting the case made. The decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete out justice. But it does not follow that the procedure of every such tribunal must be the same.”

16. Then at page 644 of the report, the following passage appears:—

“In Rex v. Local Government Board, Ex Parte Arlidege (1914) I.K.B 160; 199) Hamilton L.J described the phrase “contrary to natural justice” as an expression “sadly lacking in precision”. So it may be, and, perhaps, it is not desirable to attempt to force it into any procrustean bed, but statements which I have quoted may, atleast, be taken to emphasisze the essential requirements that the tribunal should be impartial and that the medical practitioner who is impugned should be given a full and fair opportunity of being heard. These are conditions of the validity of any decision enunciated by the council……If the principles of natural justice are violated, in respect of any decision, it is, indeed, immaterial whether the same decision would have been arrived at in the absence of the departure from the essential principles of justice. The decision must be declared to be no decision.”

17. One other judgment which may be usefully referred to on the general statement as to the requirements of natural justice, is that of Harnam J. (as he then was) in Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd. The learned Judge said thus:—

“What then are the requirements of natural justice in a case of this kind? First, I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusations made; secondly that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and thirdly, of course, that the tribunal should act in good faith. I do not myself think that there really is anything more.”

18. In the present cases, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the authorities have acted in good faith and to the best of their judgment in the interests of student discipline. But the real question is whether the enquiries conducted by the authorities against the petitioners were in accordance with the requirements of natural justice; in other words, were the petitioners given a reasonable opportunity of meeting the charges levelled against them? A reasonable opportunity means, an adequate opportunity and this presupposes that the person against whom a charge is leveled, should be told with sufficient particularity and preciseness what the charge is and what the allegations are on which the chargers based. It must be remembered that in these cases the Petitioners were not caught in the act of copying and the subsequent scrutiny of the scripts was not done in their presence. The Headmaster of the petitioners' High School was directed to obtain the explanations of the petitioners. But it would appear that all that the petitioners were told was that they in common with a large number of other candidates, had indulged, in acts of violence and rowdyism and that they had also resorted to copying. “Malpractice” was, however, the gravamen of the accusation. But none of the petitioners was informed in what subject and in what answer he had copied or allowed some one else to copy from him. The petitioners were asked to answer vague and indefinite charges and their explanations were bare denials. The 1st petitioner stated:—

“I declare that I have not copied in the examination hall. Nor did I do any action which brings bad name to the school, nor have I taken part in destroying the furniture.”

19. The 2nd petitioner gave the following explanation.

“I have not committed any mischief in the examination hall nor copied nor broken the furniture nor tried to make fun of the teacher.”

20. Similarly the 3rd petitioner gave the following statement:—

“I declare that I have not copied in any paper in the examination hall. Nor have I caused any kind of loss to the furniture. I have not given trouble to the invigilators. Nor did I commit any action which would bring bad name to the school.”

21. Thus the explanations offered by the petitioners were as nebulous as the accusations they were asked to meet. The petitioners were not informed in what paper or papers and in what manner they had copied or aided others in copying. Each of them should have been told that he had copied in a particular subject and that his answer to a particular question contained the same mistakes as those committed by the candidates who were sitting in close proximity to him in the examination hall. He should have been further informed who those other candidates and what the common mistakes were.

22. In the absence of such particulars, it cannot be said that the petitioners had been adequately informed of the case they had to meet and given an adequate opportunity of meeting it. In other words, to adapt the vital condition postulated by Lord Loreburn in Board of Education v. Rice to the present cases, a fair opportunity had not been given to the petitioners to correct or contradict any relevant statement to their prejudice. On this ground alone, these writ petitions have to be allowed to this extent namely that in each of these cases a writ of Mandamus will issue to the Commissioner for Government Examinations, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, to forbear from giving effect to the impugned order dated 1-7-1960 by which the marks of each of the petitioners were cancelled and he was debarred from appearing for the H.S.C Public Examination for one year. This is not to say that on the internal evidence furnishes by the scripts, the conclusion reached by the authorities is not correct; that is amatter within their exclusive jurisdiction. It is not the province of this court to go into that question. All that I have held is that the procedure adopted by the authorities has not satisfied the requirements of natural justice. It is, however, open to the authorities to hold fresh enquiry in each of these cases apprise the candidate concerned of the exact charge he has to meet, furnish him with detailed particulars of the aleged malpractice and after considering his explanation, take such action as they deem fit. It is true all this may cause some inconvenience but in matters like this, which entail serious consequences ta students effected it is much more inconvenient to adopt the facile formula that the end just fies the means. As was pointed out by Lord Atkin in a telling dictum in General Medical Council v. Spackram, “Convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms.”

23. The further relief asked for by the 1st petitioner viz. that a writ of mandamus should issue directing the Secretary to the Board of Secondary Education to publish his result in the H.S.C Public Examination held in March/April, 1960, cannot obviously be granted.

24. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above, but there will be no order as to costs in any of these cases.

Petitions partly allowed.