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Sri. Gopalaswamivari... v. Commissioner For Hin...

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Apr 8, 1960
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitions challenged the legality of levying and collecting a contribution under Section 76(1) and an audit fee under Section 76(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (Madras Act XIX of 1951) in circumstances where no services under Section 76(1) or no audit under Section 76(2) had in fact been done. The petitioners (archakas of temples in East Godavari District) had been in possession of temple lands and had not paid contribution or audit fees for several years. The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments issued notices seeking arrears; the petitioners objected to the Commissioner's jurisdiction and sought writs of mandamus to restrain enforcement.

The petitioners relied on an earlier unreported judgment of Umamaheswaram, J. in W.P. No. 58 of 1953 (which followed the Supreme Court's decision in the Sirur Mutt case) holding that contributions under Section 76(1) were a tax and therefore invalid, and that audit fee under Section 76(2) could not be collected where no audit had been carried out. An appeal against that judgment (W.A. No. 58 of 1956) was dismissed by a brief order. In the present proceedings the High Court noted subsequent legislative amendments (Act XIII of 1955) and referred the matter to a Bench under Rule 4 to determine important questions of law. The Court ultimately heard the consolidated challenges and rendered an opinion dismissing the writ petitions with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 76(1) of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (Madras Act XIX of 1951) is intra vires (i.e., constitutionally valid).
  2. If Section 76(1) is intra vires, whether the Commissioner must indicate in the notice of assessment the nature and quantum of services rendered by the Department to the particular temple when calling for contribution.
  3. Whether the audit fee under Section 76(2) could be collected from a temple only after the audit of its accounts had actually been carried out (i.e., whether actual audit is a condition precedent to levying the audit fee).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (summarised)

  • The contribution levied under Section 76(1) partakes of the character of a tax rather than a fee and is therefore ultra vires; reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in the Sirur Mutt case and on the unreported decision of Umamaheswaram, J. (W.P. No. 58 of 1953).
  • Alternatively, even if Section 76(1) is valid, the Commissioner must specify in the demand notice the nature of supervision, control, administrative functions and the services rendered to the particular institution (i.e., the nature and quantum of services) — contention based on a rule framed by the State Government (referred to as rule 2).
  • With respect to retrospective demands, it was contended that Section 79(1) permits retrospective levy only for a period of three years preceding the fasli in which the assessment was made (i.e., limits retrospective assessments).
  • The audit fee under Section 76(2) should be levied only after the actual audit is carried out; reliance was again placed on the order of Umamaheswaram, J. in W.P. No. 58 of 1953.

Respondent / Commissioner's Position (summarised)

  • The State relied on subsequent amendments (Act XIII of 1955) to Section 76 which, by creating an earmarked separate fund for contributions, removed the defect identified by the Supreme Court in the Sirur Mutt case and validated the levy as a fee-like contribution for services.
  • The Commissioner is to take into account the considerations enumerated in the relevant rule when fixing contributions; there is no requirement in the statute or rule that the Commissioner must specify the detailed nature and quantum of services in the demand notice.
  • With respect to audit fees, the statutory language of Section 76(2) requires institutions of specified income to pay for meeting the cost of auditing accounts; nowhere does the section require that the audit be completed before the fee is levied. The counter-affidavits also stated that auditors had been appointed district-wise and remunerations had been paid.
  • Finally, assessments for prior years should be examined by the Commissioner (including the question of retrospective limitation under Section 79(1)), and the institutions have the statutory right to file objections under Section 78(2).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner of H.R.E., Madras v. Sirur Mutt (Supreme Court; cited as 1954 S.C.J. 335) Held that Section 76 (as originally enacted) was a tax, not a fee, because contributions were not earmarked and went to the Consolidated Fund; absence of correlation between contribution and expenses negated the fee theory. The Court used this decision to explain the defect in the original Section 76(1) and to justify the legislative amendment (Act XIII of 1955) that created an earmarked fund; after amendment the objection grounded on Sirur Mutt no longer prevailed.
Sri Sirur Mutt v. Commissioner H.R.E., Madras (Madras High Court judgment, affirmed by the Supreme Court) Distinguished the treatment of contribution and audit fee: the judgment stated that audit fee under Section 76(2) "stands on a different footing and it cannot be treated as tax." The Court relied on this distinction to conclude that audit fees are not taxes and to reject the contention that audit fees could only be levied after the audit had been carried out.
Basavalinga Swami v. Commissioner H.R. & C.E. (Bench of this Court; after 1955 amendment) Held that contributions were intended to meet expenses connected with the office of the Commissioner and were made for special services rendered for the benefit of the institutions; the contributions need not exactly match actual expenses. The Court applied the doctrine of this case to support the validity of contributions after the 1955 amendment and to reject the argument that contributions must not exceed actual expenses incurred.
Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay (cited as XVII S.C.J. 484) Stated that fees collected by Government need not precisely equal expenses incurred but there must be a correlation between the levy and the expenses; fees may be approximate to the expenses. The Court invoked this principle to support the position that, after the amendment creating an earmarked fund, the contribution reasonably correlates with the service cost and hence qualifies as a fee rather than a tax.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner:

  1. Identified the legal starting point: the Supreme Court's decision in the Sirur Mutt case had invalidated the original Section 76(1) because contributions were not earmarked and went into the Consolidated Fund, creating the character of a tax rather than a fee.
  2. Examined the legislative response: Act XIII of 1955 amended Section 76(1) to require that contributions "be kept and administered as a separate fund" and enacted Section 76A(2) to deal with pre-amendment collections. The Court concluded that the amendment removed the objectionable feature that led to Sirur Mutt.
  3. Read Section 76 as amended (and the inserted Section 76A) and concluded that the amendment created an earmarked fund for meeting the cost of services rendered by the Department. Given that change, the contribution could no longer be regarded as invalid on the grounds taken in Sirur Mutt.
  4. Relied on subsequent authority (Basavalinga Swami) and on the Supreme Court's decision in Panachand Gandhi to affirm that fees need only correlate with expenses and can be approximate; therefore contributions post-amendment are sustainable even if not an exact match to costs.
  5. Considered the contention that rule 2 required the Commissioner to specify the services and their quantum in the demand notice: the Court found this argument unsubstantial. Rule 2 requires the Commissioner to take enumerated circumstances into account when assessing contribution; it does not oblige the Commissioner to list or prove detailed services in the demand notice. If a temple felt the contribution excessive, it could raise objections with the Commissioner — the courts should not substitute their own fact-finding in this administrative assessment.
  6. Addressed the retrospective limitation issue (Section 79(1) permitting retrospective levy for three years): the petitioners had not produced material to disprove assessments for prior years; the Court directed that the Commissioner should examine this matter and allowed petitioners the right to file statutory objections (Section 78(2)).
  7. Treated the audit-fee contention: examined Section 76(2)'s language and earlier decisions. The Court concluded that Section 76(2) requires institutions of a specified income to pay a sum to meet audit costs and does not make actual audit a condition precedent to levying the audit fee. To require proof of an actual audit before levying the fee would enable institutions to evade payment by refusing to produce accounts. Rule 5 (under Section 100) imposes a duty on trustees to produce accounts, and the Commissioner must forward them to appointed auditors; the levy need not wait until every account has actually been audited.
  8. Rejected the view expressed by Umamaheswaram, J. in W.P. No. 58 of 1953 insofar as it held Section 76(1) invalid and insofar as it treated audit-fee as requiring a prior audit; observed that the earlier Bench had not been shown the post-Sirur Mutt amendments.
  9. Noted that an allegation that no auditors had been appointed did not warrant relief because it was not pleaded as a ground for mandamus and because counter-affidavits stated that auditors were in fact appointed district-wise.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Writ petitions dismissed. The Court dismissed the writ petitions and awarded costs of Rs. 100 in each petition.

Direct consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The amended Section 76(1) (post-Act XIII of 1955) is not invalid on the grounds advanced — the 1955 amendment (creating an earmarked separate fund) removed the defect identified in the Sirur Mutt decision and the contribution levied under Section 76(1) is sustainable.
  • The Commissioner is not required to specify, in the demand notice, the detailed nature and quantum of services rendered to each institution; the Commissioner must, however, have regard to the considerations set out in the relevant rule when fixing contributions, and institutions can object to the amount before the Commissioner.
  • Audit fees under Section 76(2) may be levied without the audit having actually been completed; the statutory scheme contemplates collection to meet the cost of auditing accounts, and making actual audit a condition precedent would facilitate evasion.
  • Questions about retrospective assessments (limitations under Section 79(1)) and the specific faslis for which demands were made should be investigated by the Commissioner; institutions retain the statutory right to file objections (Section 78(2)).
  • No relief was granted to the petitioners on the grounds they raised; the Court expressly dissented from the view of Umamaheswaram, J. and held that the view could no longer be regarded as sound in light of subsequent legislative amendments and later decisions.

The opinion did not purport to lay down a new general precedent beyond its application to the cases before the Court; it interpreted the statutory amendments and applied existing authority to uphold the levies and reject the petitioners' contentions.

Disposition: Writ petitions dismissed with costs of Rs.100 each.

Show all summary ...

In this petition the legality of the levy and collection of contribution and audit fee under Sec. 76(1) & 2 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (Act XIX of 1951, in cases where no services in terms of Section 76(1) or audit under Section 76(2) have actually been done has been challenged. In support of the contention of the petitioner, reliance is placed upon an unreported decision of Umamaheswaram J., in W.P No. 58 of 1953, where the learned Judge following the decision of the Supreme Court in Sirur Muti's case . 1954 S.C.J 335 held that contribution under Section 76(1) cannot be levied as it is a tax. He also held that since no audit of accounts was done, audit fee cannot be collected under Section 76(2).

2. An appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent appeal was filed against that judgment in W.A No. 58 of 1956, and by a brief order dated 23rd August, 1956, Subbarao C.J, and Bhimasankaram, J. stated:

“There are no grounds to interfere. The Writ Appeal is dismissed.”

3. It seems to me that the scope and effect of the amending Act (Act IV of 1954) passed by the Andhra legislature soon after the rendering of the Supreme Court and Act XIII of 1955 have not been considered, either by Umamaheswaram, J. or by the Bench in the writ Appeal. This petition raises a very important question of law and whatever view I am inclined to take in respect of the contentions raised and the construction of Section 76(1) or (2) in the events that have happened, namely, the decision of Umamaheswaram, J., being affirmed by the bench in writ Appeal, I think this is a fit case in which I should refer the petition to the consideration by a bench. Accordingly, I refer this petition and W.P Nos. 1052 of 1958; W.P Nos. 883, 1332 of 1958; 1176, 1474 and 1318 of 5891 to a bench under Rule 4 of the Rules to regulate proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution (Appellate Side Rules Andhra Pradesh High Court, 1958.

4. [In pursuance of the above said order — these petitions came before Chandra Reddy, C.J and Srinivasachari, J.]

5. (Order of the Court pronounced by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice)

6. In W.P No. 58 of 1953, Umamaheswaram, J.; decided that contributions under Section 76(1) of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act were not valid because of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Sirur Mutt's case. He also thought that the levy of audit-fee could be made only after the audit was actually carried out by the Department. An appeal filed by the Commissioner against this order was dismissed by a Bench of this Court in limine. We are told that the attention of either Umamaheswaram, J. or of the Bench was not drawn to the fact that subsequently amendments were introduced in Section 76 of that Act providing for the earmarking of the contributions for the specific purposes for which they were collected, thus rendering the levy of contribution quite legal. We are told that the attention of the Bench was also not drawn to that part of the order of Umamaheswaram, J., bearing on sub-section (2) of Section 76.

7. We are not inclined to agree with the decision of Umamaheswaram, J. in regard to the interpretation of Section 76(2) and no reasons are given in support of his conclusions. There is also no difficulty to sustain the contributions having regard to the amendments made to section 76 in 1955. There are also decisions of this Court subsequently upholding the validity of the levy of contribution.

8. However, to obviate any controversy as to whether the order of Umamaheswaram, J. was impliedly approved of by the Bench, we think it desirable that this matter should be decided by a Full Bench.

9. (Order of the Court pronounced by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice.)

10. The questions to be decided by the Full Bench are; (1) whether Section 76(1) of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (Madras Act XIX of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is intra vires; in the affirmative, whether the Commissioner has to indicate the nature and quantum of services rendered by the Department to the particular temple in the notice issued calling for contribution; and (2) whether the audit fee could be collected from a temple only after the audit is done.

11. The petitioners in all these cases are archakas of some of the temples situated in East Godavari District. As they have been in possession and enjoyment of lands belonging to the temples and as they have not paid either the contribution or the audit fee for a number of years, the Commissioner for the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments was obliged to require the petitioners to pay the arrears of contribution and the audit fee. The petitioners filed objections questioning the jurisdiction of the Commissioner to make this demand. As this had no effect on the officers concerned, they have approached this Court for the issue of writ of mandamus to restarin the Commissioner from enforcing the notice under Section 76 of the Act.

12. It is urged in support of these petitions that as the contribution levied under Section 76(1) partakes of the character of tax; it should be struck down as ultra vires. Alternatively, it is stated that before the Commissioner could make an assessment in this behalf, he should indicate in the notice the nature of the services rendered by him and this not having been done in the instant cases, it was beyond the competence of the Commissioner to call upon the petitioners to pay the particular amounts by way of contribution.

13. The first branch of the argument is founded on the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of H.R.E Madras v. Sirur Mutt. It was there laid down by their Lordships that since Section 76 of the Act did not contemplate the setting up of separate fund but the contribution went into the consolidated fund out of which the emoluments payable to the Commissioner and his staff employed in the Department should be paid, it could not be regarded as ‘fee’ but was more in the nature of ‘tax’ and consequently, Section 76(1) was invalid and had to be struck down. The reasoning of their Lordships in this behalf is contained in the following observations:

“Section 76 of the Madras Act speaks definitely of the contribution being levied in respect to the services rendered by the Government; so far it has the appearance of fees. It is true that religious institutions do not want these services to be rendered to them and it may be that they do not consider the State interference to be a benefit at all. We agree, however, with the learned Attorney-General that in the present day concept of a State, it cannot be said that services could be rendered by the State only at the request of those who require these services. If in the larger interest of the public, a State considers it desirable that some special service should be done for certain people, the people must accept these services, whether willing or not. It may be noticed, however that the contribution that has been levied under Section 76 of the Act has been made to depend upon the capacity of the payer and not upon the quantum of benefit that is supposed to be conferred on any particular religious institution. Further, the institutions which come under the lower income group and have income less than Rs. 1,000,- annually, are excluded from the liability to pay the additional charges under Clause (2) of the Section. These are undoubtedly some of the characteristics of a tax, and the imposition bears a close analogy to income-tax. But the material fact which negatives the theory of fees in the present case is that the money raised by levy of the contribution is not ear-marked or specified for defraying the expenses that the Government has to incur in performing the services. All the collections go to the Consolidated Fund of the State and all the expenses have to be met not out of these collections but out of the general revenues by a proper method of appropriation as is done in case of other Government expenses. That in itself might not be conclusive, but in this case there is total absence of any correlation between the expenses incurred by the Government and the amount raised by contribution under the provision of section 76 and in these circumstances the theory of a return of counter-payment or quid pro quo cannot have any possible application to this case. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was right in holding the contribution levied under section 76 is a tax and not a fee and consequently it was beyond the power of the State Legislature to enact this provision.”

14. It is to get over the difficulty created by this judgment that the Andhra State Legislature introduced amendments to Section 76 in 1955 providing for the contributions constituting a separate fund ear-marked for the services to be rendered to the institutions in the state by the Department which had been created for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the statute.

15. We will pause here to read Section 76 both as it originally stood prior to the decision of the Sirur Mutt's case and after it was amended in 1955, in so far as it is relevant for the present enquiry.

“76(1) In respect of the services rendered by the Government and their officers, every religious institution shall, from the income derived by it, pay to the Government annually such contribution not exceeding five per centum of its income as may be prescribed.

(4) The Government shall pay the salaries, allowances, pensions and other beneficial remuneration of the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners and other officers and servants (Other than executive officers of religious institutions) employed for the purposes of this Act and the other expenses incurred for such purposes, including the expenses of Area Committees and the cost of auditing the accounts of religious institutions.”

16. It is not necessary for us to recite the amendments carried out in 1954 as they were replaced by those in 1955.

17. Section 2 of Act XIII of 1955 which amended Section 76 is in these words:—

“In Section 76 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951) hereinafter referred to as the principal Act—

(i) for sub-section (1), the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely:—

(1) In respect the services rendered by the Government and their officers, every religious institution shall from the income derived by it, pay to the Government annually for meeting the cost of such services, such contribution not execeeding five per centum of its income as may be prescribed. The contribution so paid shall be kept and administered as a separate fund.”

18. Section 3 of the amendment Act enacted:

After section 76 of the principal Act, the following section shall be inserted, namely:

“76A (2) The Government shall pay into the fund referred to in sub-section (1) of section 76, the balance, if any, remaining out of the aggregate of the contributions paid or realized before the commencement of the said Act, in pursuance of Sub-Section 1 of Sec. 76 after deducting therefrom the sums paid under sub-section (4) of section 76 (except in so far as such payments relate to the cost of auditing the accounts).”

19. It is immediately clear that the objectionable features of Section 76(1) which were responsible for the Supreme Court striking it down as invalid were removed by the amendment. Therefore, the contribution levied under Section 76(1) could no longer be regarded as invalid.

20. This matter was considered by a Bench of this Court in Basavalinga swami v. Commissioner H.R & C.E after the amendment of Section in 1955. There, it was ruled that the contributions imposed were primarily intended for meeting the expenses connected with the office of the Commissioner for the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments and that the imposts were made for special services rendered for the benefit of institutions from which the payments were demanded. The doctrine of this case was followed subsequently in a number of cases. The contention that the contributions levied under the section should not exceed the actual expenses incurred in connection with the services is devoid of force.

21. The fees collected by the Government could only be approximate to the expenses incurred by them in rendering any particular kind of service. In this view of ours, we are supported by the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay . XVII S.C.J 484 at 491. Their Lordships observed.

“It may not be possible to prove in every case that the fees that are collected by the Government approximate to the expenses that are incurred by it in rendering any particular kind of services or in performing any particular work for the benefit of certain individuals. But in order that the collections made by the Government can rank as fees, there must be correlation between the levy imposed and the expenses incurred by the State for the purpose of rendering such services.”

22. After the passing of the amendment Act (XIII of 1955), it cannot be disputed that such correlation exists between the contribution and the levy imposed by the department.

23. The corner stone of the argument of Sri Narasimha Rao, Counsel for the petitioners, that Section 76(1) is unconstitutional is the unreported judgment of Umamaheswaram, J. in W.P No. 58 of 1953, which, according to him was approved impliedly by the Bench that heard the appeal against his order W.A No. 58 of 1956. The basis of the opinion of the learned judge is Commissioner of H.R.E, Madras v. Sirur Mutt. Obviously, the attention of the learned judge was not drawn to the amendments that were made subsequent to the Sirur Mutt's case, by the Andhra State legislature, nor were they brought to the notice of the Bench which threw out the appeal preferred against the judgment of Umamaheswaram, J. in limine. Therefore, the view of Umamaheswaram, J. could no longer be regarded as sound having regard to the state of law as it exists to day.

24. When Sri Narasimha Rao realised that his argument ignores the amendments made in 1955, he did not persist in attacking the vires of Section 76(1) as unconstitutional.

25. He next fell back upon the contention that rule 2 as made by the State Government made it incumbent upon the Commissioner to state in the demand notice what supervision and control were exercised by his Department and what administrative functions were performed by him or the Deputy Commissioner or the Assistant Commissioners under the Act in respect of that institution and also what services were rendered to the institution. In our opinion, this argument is unsubstantial. All that rule envisages is that before the Commissioner could assess the contribution payable by any temple, he should take into account the various circumstances enumerated in the rule. He is not required to specify these services in the demand notice or to establish in a Court of law the nature and quantum of services rendered by him. It is for the Commissioner to have regard to the considerations set out in that rule in fixing the amount of contribution payable by each of the institutions. Of course, if any institution feels that the contribution payable by it is excessive, it is open to it to urge the objections before him and it is for the Commissioner to consider that matter. It is not within the province of the Courts to go into these questions. For these reasons, this contention is negatived.

26. It is next urged by Sri Narasimha Rao that Section 79(1) authorises the levy of contribution with retrospective effect only for a period of three years preceding the fasli in which the assessment was made. The petitioners have not placed any material before us to show that such assessments were not made in the prior years. However, as this matter has not been investigated so far by any authority, we think that it has to be enquired into by the Commissioner. Section 78(2) clothes every institution with a right to file objections within fifteen days from the date of receipt of notice to the levy of contribution in regard to any particular year. Instead of choosing this course, the petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the Commissioner to levy the contribution. However, having regard to the representation that the judgment of Umamaheswaram, J., led the petitioners to take that course, we think that in the interest of justice the petitioners should be permitted to file objections in respect of the various faslis for which the demands were made.

27. Coming to the second question, the foundation for the argument that before audit fee could be levied the audit must be actually carried out is the order of Umamaheswaram, J., dated 13-9-1955 in W.P No. 58 of 1953. Here also the argument is that this opinion must be deemed to have been affirmed by the Bench in W.A No. 58 of 1956. The learned Judge has not considered this aspect of the matter at all except to say:

“So far as the audit fees for faslis 1355 to 1361 is concerned, a writ of prohibition is also issued.”

28. The reasons why the Writ of prohibition should issue are not mentioned. Therefore, this is not of much help to us in considering the principles underlying this decision Perhaps, the learned Judge thought that the decision in the Sirur Mutt's case has that effect also. But, in the judgment of the Madras High Court in Sri Sirur Mutt v. Commissioner H.R.E Madras which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in regard to the interpretation of Section 76 of the H.R & C.E Act, Satyanarayana Rao, J. who spoke for the Court observed at page 595 of the report as follows:

“The audit fee prescribed by Section 76(2) stands on a different footing and it cannot be treated as tax.”

29. That apart, the language of Section 76(2) does not warrant the proposition that the services should be first rendered before the audit fee is imposed. We will look at that section here:—

“(2) Every religious institution, the annual income of which, for the fasli year immediately preceding as calculated for the purposes of the levy of contribution under sub-Section (1) is not less than one thousand rupees, shall pay to the Government annually, for meeting the cost of auditing its accounts, such further sum not exceeding one and a half per centum of its income as the Commissioner may determine.”

30. All that Section 76(2) says is that every religious institution in enjoyment of a certain amount of income will be required to pay audit fee for meeting the cost of auditing its accounts. In other words, this fee is to be collected from the various institutions in the State to enable the Department to meet the expenses of auditing the accounts. Nowhere in the section is it indicated that the actual auditing should precede the demand for the audit fee. If effect is to be given to this contention, it would lie within the powers of the archakas to evade payment of the audit fee. They may effectively prevent the department from having recourse to section 76(2) by not producing their accounts at all for audit. Surely, that could not have been the intention of the legislature in making this provision. It is true the department is under an obligation to have the accounts of every institution audited as and when they are produced by persons in charge of accounts. Rule 5 framed under Section 100 of the Act makes it incumbent upon the trustees to produce the accounts before the Commissioner who will forward them to the auditor appointed in this behalf. But the recourse to Section 76(2) need ??? be postponed till the production of the books by the trustees and the audit thereof. It follows that it is not a condition precedent to the levy of audit fee that the accounts of every institution should have been in fact audited. This contention also is equally inadmissible and has to be rejected.

31. The argument that in fact no auditors have been appointed by the Department does not deserve any consideration. For one thing, this was not set out as a ground for the issue of a writ of mandamus and, therefore, the Commissioner had no opportunity of meeting this allegation. Even otherwise, it is stated in one of the counter affidavits that, in fact, auditors were appointed district wise and they had been paid remunerations for auditing the accounts of all institutions.

32. For the reasons, we dissent from the view expressed by Umamaheswaram, J. in W.P No. 58 of 1953. In appeal, this view of the learned judge does not seem to have been canvassed. Their attention does not even seem to have been drawn to the last sentence that the writ is issued even with regard to the audit fee.

33. In the result, these Writ Petitions are dismissed with costs Rs. 100/- in each.

Writ petitions dismissed.