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M. Venkataraya Sarma Petitioner v. Y. Sivaram Prasad And Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Mar 9, 1960
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Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by Chandra Reddy, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

A member of Artamur Panchayat (within the limits of Bantumilli Panchayat Samithi) invoked the Court's jurisdiction and, by an order dated 29th December 1959, the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the Krishna Zilla Parishad were called upon to show cause why an information in the nature of quo warranto should not be exhibited against them.

The grounds of the application were twofold: (1) the election of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman was held before the constitution of the Zilla Parishad; and (2) the notice issued by the District Collector for the meeting at which the election occurred allegedly did not comply with rule 4 of the Andhra Pradesh (Conduct of Election of President and Vice-President of Panchayat Samithis or Chairman of Zilla Parishad) Rules, 1959.

Relevant statutory and temporal facts set out in the opinion: the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samithis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1959 received the Governor's assent on 18th September 1959 and came into force on 2nd October 1959. By a Government notification dated 29th October 1959, Zilla Parishads were to be constituted with effect from 1st December 1959. The composition of Krishna Zilla Parishad had been completed by 28th November 1959, and the election of Chairman and Vice-Chairman was held on 30th November 1959 — one day prior to the notified constitution date of 1st December 1959.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the election of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman held on 30th November 1959 was defective because it took place before the constitution of the Zilla Parishad (contrary to the Act and the Government notification).
  2. Whether, even if defective, the irregularity warranted the issuance of a writ in the nature of quo warranto (i.e., whether the defect constituted usurpation sufficing to exercise the Court's prerogative writ jurisdiction).
  3. Whether the relator (petitioner) had locus standi to institute information in the nature of quo warranto despite lacking a personal interest.
  4. Whether rule 4 of the relevant election rules (requiring at least five clear days' notice) was infringed and, if so, whether that defect invalidated the election.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Relator's) Arguments

  • The election of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman was invalid because it was held on 30th November 1959, i.e., before the Zilla Parishad was constituted (the constitution date being 1st December 1959 by Government notification).
  • The notice for the meeting did not satisfy rule 4 of the relevant rules (notice less than five clear days), rendering the election irregular.

Government / Respondents' Arguments

  • The Government contended that the notification fixing 1st December 1959 should be read as the date from which the Parishad would function — i.e., implying the election was within permissible temporal limits.
  • The Government also argued that the relator lacked locus standi, having no personal interest; therefore the relator could not exhibit an information in the nature of quo warranto.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rex v. Speyer and Rex v. Cassel (1916, 1 K.B.D. 595) Where an irregularity in appointment can be cured by immediate re-appointment, a court in its discretion may refuse an information in the nature of quo warranto; if re-appointment would be illegal, the court may permit the matter to be brought before it. The Court applied this principle to hold that because the defect (election a day early) could be cured by electing the same persons after 1st December 1959, the irregularity did not amount to usurpation and did not justify the exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction.
Sangram Singh v. 1. Election Tribunal, Kotah (quoted; Bose, J. cited) High Courts exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in a discretionary manner and will not act as appellate courts; writs should not be entertained in this class of cases unless substantial injustice has ensued or is likely to ensue. The Court relied on this principle to emphasize that the High Court should not lightly entertain writs challenging elections for local bodies unless substantial injustice is shown. As no substantial injustice was proved, the Court declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first construing the Government notification of 29th October 1959 and the relevant statutory provisions (Sections 36 and 37 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samithis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1959). The notification constituted Zilla Parishads with effect from 1st December 1959. The Court read "constitution of the Parishad" (the term used in the notification) as referring to the formal constitution (i.e., the body constituted with its enumerated members), and not as authorizing the Parishad to function prior to that constitution date.

Sections 36 and 37 were read together: Section 36 prescribes the constitution and composition of a Zilla Parishad, and Section 37 provides that the Chairman and Vice-Chairman "shall be elected by the members of the Zilla Parishad from among themselves." From this combined reading the Court concluded that the election of Chairman and Vice-Chairman could only take place after the Parishad had been constituted.

On that basis the Court found the election held on 30th November 1959 to be irregular (because it preceded the constitution date of 1st December 1959). The Court then addressed whether that irregularity warranted the grant of the rule (i.e., a writ of quo warranto).

The Court rejected the Government's locus standi argument: it held that a private relator can exhibit an information in the nature of quo warranto in relation to municipal/local public offices; a person need not have a personal interest in order to invoke such proceedings to challenge illegal occupation of a public office.

However, the Court applied the test (as articulated by earlier authorities) whether the irregularity amounted to usurpation of a public office — a test focused on whether there was a legal disability or prohibition against the person occupying the office. The Court noted that it was not argued that the elected persons were otherwise disqualified, and that all formalities except the timing defect had been observed. Crucially, the Court found that the defect was curable: the same persons could lawfully be elected after 1st December 1959. Relying on authority (Rex v. Speyer and Rex v. Cassel and the comments of Lush, J.), the Court held that where a defect can be cured by re-appointment/re-election, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, would normally refuse to entertain the information.

The Court also invoked the discretionary limits on Article 226 jurisdiction (citing Sangram Singh via Bose, J.): High Courts should not be turned into courts of appeal to correct mere errors of law unless substantial injustice has resulted or is likely to result. The petitioner's case did not demonstrate any substantial injustice or prejudice to rate-payers, the Parishad, or members of constituent bodies.

Regarding the separate complaint about non-compliance with rule 4 (five clear days' notice), the Court examined the rules and noted that sub-rule (2) grants the District Collector discretion to shorten the notice period in case of urgency. Consequently, the Collector had "ample jurisdiction" to give shorter notice. The Court also observed that only a member of the Parishad could properly raise that ground, and in this case no member objected; all members participated without protest. The Court inferred that the petitioner might have been set up by unsuccessful candidates and concluded there was no justification to entertain the information on that ground either.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Writ petition dismissed.

The petition was dismissed, and the dismissal was ordered without costs. The Court refused to grant the rule in the nature of quo warranto.

Implications and direct effects (as stated or directly inferable from the opinion):

  • The Court held that the election held on 30th November 1959 was irregular because it preceded the formal constitution date of 1st December 1959, but this irregularity did not amount to usurpation because it was curable by re-election after constitution.
  • The Court confirmed that a private relator may institute information in the nature of quo warranto concerning public local offices, but the exercise of writ jurisdiction is discretionary and will be refused where the defect is curable and no substantial injustice has been shown.
  • The Court accepted that sub-rule (2) of the relevant election rule vested the Collector with discretion to shorten notice in case of urgency; non-compliance with the five clear days' rule was not fatal in the circumstances and in the absence of a timely objection by Parishad members.
  • Direct practical outcome: the occupying Chairman and Vice-Chairman were not ousted by this proceeding and the writ petition challenging their election was dismissed without costs.
  • The opinion did not purport to lay down a novel binding precedent beyond applying established principles on (a) curable irregularities in appointment/election and (b) the discretionary nature of Article 226 relief in election-related disputes.

Writ petition dismissed. (Final line of the opinion)

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Chandra Reddy, C.J

2. The Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the Krishna Zilla Parishad were called upon by an order of this Court dated 29th December 1959 made at the instance of a member of Artamur Panchayat within the limits of Bantumilli Panchayat Samithi to show why an information in the nature of quo warranto should not be exhibited against them to show by what authority they were holding these offices.

3. The grounds of application were that the election of the Chairman and Vice-chairman was held before the constitution of the Zilla Parishad and that the notice issued by the Collector of the District for the holding of the meeting for their election did not satisfy the requirements of rule 4 of the Andhra Pradesh (Conduct of Election of President and Vice-President of Panchayat Samithis or Chairman of Zilla Parishad) Rules, 1959.

4. A few facts material for the purpose of this enquiry need mention. The Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samithis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act was enacted by the State Legislature in 1959 and the assent of the Governor was obtained on the 18th September 1959 and the Act came into force on 2nd October 1959. By notification dated 29th October, 1959, all the Zilla Parishads in the State of Andhra Pradesh were to be constituted with effect from 1st December 1959, the Krishna Zilla Parishad being one such. In spite of this notification fixing 1st December as the date for the constitution of the Parishads, the election of the Chairman and Vice-chairman of the Krishna Zilla Parishad was held on 30th November 1957, the composition of the Parishad having been completed by 28th November 1959. Thus, the election of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman was held a day prior to the constitution of the Parishad. It is this defect that has been mainly responsible for the filing of this information in the nature of quo warranto.

5. The first point that calls for decision is whether the eleciion of the Chair man and Vice-Chairman held on 30th November 1959 was defective by reason of its being opposed to the terms of the Act. For an appraisal of this question, it is necessary to refer to the notification issued by the Government on 29th October, which is in these terms:

“The Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samithis and Zilla Parishads Act, Constitution of Zilla Parishads.

(G.O.Ms No. 1010, Planning and Development Samithi-I 27th October, 1959).

In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 36 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samithis and Zilla Parishads Act 1959 (Andhra Pradesh Act XXXV of 1959), the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby constitutes with effect from the 1st day of December 1959 a Zilla Parishad for every district in the State of Andhra Pradesh.

6. It is immediately plain that what the notification contemplated was the constitution of the Parishads and not the functioning of the Parishads from 1st December 1959 as contended on behalf of the Government. The constitution and the composition of Zilla Parishad are provided for in Section 36 of the Act.

7. We will pause here to read section 36 in so far as it is relevant for the present enquiry.

“(1) The Government may, by notification constitute a Zilla Parishad for a district with effect from such date as may be specified therein.

(2) Every Zilla Parishad shall, by the name of the District for which it is constituted, be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to enter into contracts and may by its corporate name, sue and be sued.

(3) Every Zilla Parishad shall consist of the following members, namely:—

xxxxxxxx”

8. It is seen that the Parishad is to be constituted with the members enumerated therein. Then follows the election of the Chairman and Vice-Chair-man.

9. The machinary for this election is set up in Section 37. That section, omitting again the unnecessary portions, runs as follows:

“(1) There shall be a chairman and a vice-chairman for each Zilla Parishad who shall be elected by the members of the Zilla Parishad form among themselves.

Provided that the District Collector shall not be elected as chairman or vice-cbairman.

xxxxxxxx”

10. A combined reading of these two sections makes it abundantly clear that the election of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman could take place only after the constitution of the Parishad. The Government appointed 1st December 1959 as the date for the constitution of the Parishad. In other words, as already pointed out, preliminary elections were to be over before that date. It was thereafter only that the election of the Chaiiman and Vice-Chairman could be held. As already remarked, we are unable to agree with the contention advanced on behalf of the Government that 1st December 1959 was the date from which the Parishad should function. We do not think that the expression ‘Constitution of the Parishad’ used in the notification connotes the functioning of the parishad. It follows that the election of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman on 30th November 1959 was not regular.

11. The only controversy that survives is whether this irregularity in the holding of the election of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman would warrant the granting of the rule. At the outset, we must say that we cannot accede to the theory propounded on behalf of the Government that the relator having no personal interest in the matter could not exhibit this information against the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman. It is argued on behalf of the Government that the petitioner has no locus standi to seek the jurisdiction of the Court for this purpose. In our opinion, an information would lie even at the instance of a relator who has no personal interest in the matter. Information in the nature of quo warranto could be filed in the case of Municipal Corporations or local Boards on the relation of private parties. It is open to a private individual to bring it to the notice of the Court that a person who is disqualified to hold an office is still holding it. A person who is not legally entitled to hold an office should not be permitted to hold it.

“…………………………this proceeding by information in the nature of quo warranto will lie for usurping any office, whether created by charter alone, or by the Crown, with the consent of Parliament, provided the office be of a public nature, and a substantive office not merely the function or employment of a Deputy or servant held at the will and pleasure of others. The test to be applied is whether there has been usurpation of and office of a public nature and an office substantive in character, that is, an office independent in title.”

12. Therefore, it is competent for a voter or a member of any of the local bodies to invoke the jurisdiction of this court for the issue of information in the nature of quo warranto Consequently, the proceedings could be entertained by this Court for the purpose for which its jurisdiction is invoked.

13. This leads us to the question whether the jurisdiction of this court should be exercised in a case like this. As pointed out by Tindal, C.J in deciding whether the information should be refused or whether the rule should be granted, the test is whether there has been usurpation of an office; in other words, whether there is a legal disability to hold the office by or a legal prohibition against a person occupying a particular place. It is not argued before us that the persons elected as Chairman and Vice-Chairman were in any way disqualified to be elected as Chairman and Vice-Chairman. But all that is urged is that the elections instead of being held after 1st December 1959 took place a day prior to the proper constitution of the Parishad. Could it be posited that this amounted to usurpation of the places by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman? In our opinion, the answer is in the negative. It is admitted that all the formalities were observed before the election took place and no defect other than the one pointed out has vitiated the conduct of the elections. In the circumstances, we find it difficult to characterise the holding of the offices by the two respondents as usurpation. It is to be remembered that these very persons could be elected after 1st December 1959. As observed by Lord Reading, C.J in Rex v. Speyer and Rex v. Cassel . 1916-I K.B.D 595 @ 612..

“If the irregularity in the appointment of an office held at pleasure could be cured by immediate re appointment, the Court in the exercise of its discretion would doubtless refuse the information, but if, as in this case, any re-appointment would be illegal, I cannot see any sound reason why the court should not permit the matter to be brought before it.”

14. To the same effect are the remarks of Lush, J. occurring at page 631. He observed:

“Under those circumstances the Court would not make an (order ousting them from their office, as the existing defect if there is one, could be cured, and they could be re-appointed.”

15. In this case, there is no impediment in the way of these two persons being elected again as Chairman and Vice-Chairman. That being so, this is not a fit one for the exercise of our jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

16. It should be borne in mind that these writs are not issued as a matter of course but only as ex debitu justitiae. In this connection we will do well to remember what Bose, J. observed in Sangram Singh v. 1. Election Tribunal, Kotah. His Lordship observed:

“That, however, is not to say that the jurisdiction will be exercised whenever there is an error of law. The High Courts do not, and should not act as Courts of appeal under. Art. 226. Their powers are purely discretionary and though no limits can be placed upon that discretion, it must be exercised along recognised lines and not arbitrary and one of the limitations imposed by the Courts on themselves is that they will not exercise jurisdiction in this class of cases unless substantial injustice has ensued, or is likely to ensue. They will not allow themselves to be turned into Courts of appeal or revision, to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense, for, though no legislature can impose limitations on these constitutional powers, it is a sound exercise of discretion to bear in mind the policy of the Legislaure to have disputes about these special rights decided as speedily as may be. Therefore, writ petitions should not be lightly entertained in this class of cases.”

17. It is not alleged that the holding of election a day to the constitution of the Parishad has resulted in injustice or hardship either to the rate-payers or to the Zilla Parishad. It has not put the Parishad to any unnecessary expenditure or prejudiced the rights of members of the Parishad of the constituent Panchayat Samithis or Panchayats. It is no ??? that persons who were disqualified or who were not entitled to take part in the election had participated therein. As already mentioned, the only defect that is pointed out is that the election had taken, place a day prior to the constitution of the Parishad. That being so, there will be no justification for us to grant the rule as prayed for.

18. Another complaint against this election is that rule 4 of the relevant rules has been infringed in regard to election in that five clear days, notice was not given to the members of the Panchayat Samithi. That rule says:

“(1) Notice of the date and hour of such meeting shall be given in the form appended to these rules to the members of the Panchayat Samithi at least five clear days previous to the day of the meeting”

19. If the rule had stood alone, there would have been substance in the contention raised on behalf of the Petitioner. But there is sub-rule (2) which vests discretion in the Collector to shorten the duration of the notice. Sub Rule (2) recites,

“In case of urgency, the Collector may convene a meeting referred to in rule 3 on giving a shorter notice than that specified in sub-rule (1).”

20. There is, therefore, ample jurisdiction in the Collector to give short notice. That apart, it is only a member of the Parishad that could make this ground of attack against the election and not a person who is unconnected with the Parishad. It must be mentioned here that no objection was taken by any of the members of the Parishad either on the ground that the election should not take place before 1st December 1959 or on the ground of want of proper notice. In fact, all the members, without any protest, participated in the election. The inference is obvious that the unsuccessful candidates have set up the present petitioner with a view to have the election challenged. This is not to say that it was not competent for the petitioner to bring to the notice of the Court about any irregularity in the conduct of the election. Be that as it may, we do not think that there will be any justification to comply with the request of the petitioner to allow him to exhibit information against the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Krishna Zilla Rarishad in the nature of quo warranto.

21. In the result, the petition is dismissed, but without costs.

Writ petition dismissed.