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The Public Prosecutor v. Kuppam Satyanarayana .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeals arise from seven criminal prosecutions initiated before the Judicial First Class Magistrate of Proddatur under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (Central Act 37 of 1954), in respect of offences under Section 16(1) of that Act. The accused in these prosecutions were dealers in foodgrains and importers of a commodity described as Agra Toor Dhall.
The Sanitary Inspector (also designated as Food Inspector by G.O. No. 1621 dated 29-9-1956) purchased two annas worth of dhall in each matter, split each purchase into three shares, placed each share in separate sealed bottles, and distributed them such that one bottle was delivered to the accused, one was sent to the Public Analyst for analysis, and one was sent to the Magistrate's Court. The Public Analyst reported that the samples contained an artificial water-soluble yellow colouring matter derived from coal tar and described the sample as "mis-branded" under the Act. Complaints in writing were submitted to the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court by the Commissioner of the Proddatur Municipality, who signed as the complainant. These prosecutions were thereafter the subject of these seven Criminal Appeals.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the prosecutions were instituted by a competent/authorised person or authority under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (Central Act 37 of 1954).
- Whether the Judicial First Class Magistrate had jurisdiction to take cognizance of complaints which were instituted by the Commissioner of the Municipality, given the language and limits prescribed in Section 20 of the Act.
- What remedy or order should follow if the prosecutions were instituted by an unauthorised person and proceedings were taken without jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents' (Accused) Arguments
- The learned counsel for the accused, Mr. Adavi Rama Rao, raised a preliminary objection that the prosecutions were not instituted by a competent authority as required by Section 20 of the Act — i.e., that the person instituting the prosecution (the Commissioner) was not authorised under that provision.
Prosecution's Arguments
- The learned Public Prosecutor argued that the presence of the signatures of the Sanitary Inspector (P.W.1) and the Municipal Health Officer on page 2 of the complaint indicated that the prosecutions must be deemed to have been validly instituted. The Public Prosecutor relied on the G.O. designating Food Inspectors (including Municipal Health Officer and Sanitary Inspectors) and contended that because the Municipal Health Officer is the designated Food Inspector in municipalities having such an officer, that fact rendered the prosecutions valid despite the Commissioner being the named complainant.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| The State v. Mool Chand, A.I.R. 1957 Allahabad 343 | Held that where power to prosecute under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was not vested in the officer who instituted proceedings (Assistant Medical Officer (Health) in that case), the prosecution was bad in law. | Used to support the proposition that prosecutions instituted by unauthorised persons under the Act are invalid and that appeals in such circumstances may be dismissed or proceedings quashed. |
| Public Prosecutor v. Abboyee Chettiar, 1935 M.W.N. 591 | Accepted the preliminary objection that the officer (Special Officer of the Municipal Council at Chidambaram) was not competent to institute proceedings under the applicable statute. | Relied upon to show that where the instituting officer lacked competence, the appellate court directed dismissal of the State's appeal (i.e., the proceedings were not sustained). |
| Public Prosecutor v. Chinta Venkatarayudu, A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 471 | Was treated as a similar authority under the older Madras statute (Madras Act III of 1918) concerning competence to institute prosecutions. | Applied by analogy to reinforce the conclusion that proceedings instituted by an unauthorised person are liable to be quashed. |
| Re. The Cannanore Milk Supply Co-operative Society, Cannanore (case under Central Act No. 37 of 1954) | Under the Central Act, a preliminary objection to launching the prosecution was upheld and the proceedings were quashed. | Directly cited as precedent under the Central Act supporting the quashing of proceedings where the right to institute prosecution was not exercised by an authorised person. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by identifying the statutory restriction in Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, which prescribes who may institute prosecution under the Act. The court quoted and then enumerated the categories in Section 20 (state government; a person with written consent of the State Government; a local authority; a person with written consent of a local authority; a person authorised by the State Government; a person authorised by a local authority; and a purchaser under Section 12 armed with a Public Analyst's report and filing it with the complaint).
Factually, the complaints in all matters were signed and submitted by the Commissioner of the Proddatur Municipality and read in a manner that left no doubt the Commissioner was the complainant who had instituted the prosecutions. Although page 2 of an old form contained a heading "Consent of the Local Executive Officer" and bore signatures of the Sanitary Inspector and Municipal Health Officer, the court observed that the form appears to have been an old form adapted from the Madras Prevention of Adulteration Act (III of 1918) and that parts of it (e.g., the Local Executive Officer consent heading) were irrelevant under the Central Act.
The court examined the Government Order (Notification No. II) under Section 9 of the Act appointing Food Inspectors, which provided in its Schedule that in municipalities having a Municipal Health Officer the Municipal Health Officer and Sanitary Inspectors under his control are the Food Inspectors, and where a municipality does not have a Municipal Health Officer the Commissioner and Sanitary Inspectors under his control would be Food Inspectors. The court accepted that the Food Inspector or Municipal Health Officer could have instituted prosecutions, but emphasized that the person who in fact instituted the complaints was the Commissioner.
On the plain language of Section 20, the court concluded that the Commissioner of the Proddatur Municipality did not fall within any of the seven authorised categories listed in Section 20. The court held that where a statute creates an offence and prescribes the procedure and the limits of the jurisdiction conferred, courts cannot disregard those statutory conditions: non-compliance with the mandatory conditions in the Act meant the Judicial First Class Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaints.
The court relied on authorities (including the cases cited above) to support the legal proposition that proceedings instituted by unauthorised persons under the Act are invalid and that steps taken by a Magistrate after taking cognizance in such circumstances are taken without jurisdiction. Consequently, all steps taken since the Magistrate took cognizance were regarded by the court as non-existent.
On the basis of that analysis the court determined the appropriate remedial order: the complaints should be returned to the complainant, and the proceedings before the Magistrate from the time of cognizance were to be quashed.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The Court quashed the proceedings in all seven cases and directed that the Judicial First Class Magistrate return the complaints to the complainant.
Direct implications for the parties:
- The court concluded that the prosecutions had not been instituted in compliance with the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act; therefore, the Judicial First Class Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaints.
- All steps taken by the Magistrate from the point when cognizance was taken (including taking cognizance itself) were declared to be without jurisdiction and are quashed; the Magistrate is directed to return the complaints to the complainant.
Broader implications: The opinion applies established authority that prosecutions instituted by persons not authorised under the Act are invalid; the judgment does not assert that it is creating new law beyond the application of that principle to the facts of these cases.
Final Order (as stated in the opinion): Proceedings quashed.
1. These seven Criminal Appeals are directed against the judgments of the Judicial First Class Magistrate of Proddatur, before whom prosecutions had been instituted under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (Central Act 37 of 1954), (which is hereinafter referred to as the Act) in respect of offences committed under Section 16(1) of the said Act, separately each case.
2. I shall briefly state only such facts as are necessary for the disposal of this matter in the view I have taken which is indicated below. The various accused in these prosecutions are dealers in foodgrains and importers of the food commodity known as Agra Toor Dhall. The Sanitary Inspector of the Municipality (who is also designated as Food Inspector by G.O No. 1621 dated 29-9-1956) purchased two annas worth of dhall in each, split them into three shares, put them in three separate bottles, sealed them, delivered one to the accused in each case, sent one to the Public Analyst for analysis purposes and sent one bottle to the Magistrate's Court. The Public Analyst who carried out the analysis of the grain came to the conclusion that they contained artificial water soluble yellow colouring matter derived from coal tar and hence branded the sample as ‘mis-branded’ food within the meaning of the Act. Hence the prosecutions.
3. The learned counsel appearing for the accused (Respondents) in these appeals, Mr. Adavi Rama Rao, raised a preliminary objection that the prosecutions in these cases had not been instituted by the competent authority i.e, the authority empowered to institute the proceedings under section 20 of the Act. Section 20 of the Act is as follows:
(1) “No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, on with the written consent of, the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or a local authority:
Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in Section 12, if he produces in court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint.
(2) No Court inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate or a magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act.”
4. It may be seen from this section that only the following persons or authorities can institute prosecution under the Act. (1) The State Government, (2) a person with the written consent of the State Government, (3) a local authority, (4) a person with the written consent of the local authority, (5) a person authored in this behalf by the State Government, (6) a person authorised in this behalf by a local authority, and (7) by a purchaser referred to in Section 12 of the Act provided he is armed with a copy of the report of the Public Analyst and files it along with the complaint.
5. In all the present eases, the prosecutions had been instituted by complaint in writing by the Commissioner of the Proddatur Municipality submitting complaints in writing to the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court, Proddatur wherein he described himself as the complainant and he had also appended his signature at the end of the complaint on page 2 thereof. A reading of the complaints leaves no room for doubt, in my mind, that the complainant is the Commissioner of the Proddatur Municipality and that it was he that had instituted the prosecutions in these cases. It is unfortunate that an old form which was in vogue under the Madras Prevention of Adulteration Act (III of 1918) had been adopted carrying out carelessly, amendments mutatis mutandis to suit the requirements of the provisions of the Central Act 37 of 1954 e.g, the whole of page 2 of the complaint which is headed “Consent of the Local Executive Officer” which would have been revelant under section 18 of the Old Madras Act is completely out of place and irrelevant in a complaint under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (Central Act) in which there is no place for the Local Executive Officer giving his consent to a prosecution.
6. It is true that at the bottom of page 2, besides the principal signature of the Commissioner above the printed matter “Signature of Commissioner” in the place provided for the purpose, there are also the signatures of the Sanitary Inspector, Mr. Y.L Kantha Rao who figures as P.W 1 in these cases and also that of the Municipal Health Officer. It is contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that the fact that the Sanitary Inspector had subscribed his signature although he had not described himself as the Food Inspector, who alone is authorised under the G.O quoted above, to institute prosecutions under the Act and the fact that the signature of the Municipal Health Officer who is the authority authorised under G.O.Ms No. 313 (Health) dated 23-2-1956 to be a Food Inspector for the purpose of the Act and as this is a Municipality which has got a Municipal Health Officer, the person designated as the Food Inspector is the Municipal Health Officer and not the Commissioner, the prosecutions must be deemed to have been validly instituted. In this connection the relevent extract of the G.O is set out below:
Notification No. II.
“In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, (Central Act XXXVII of 1954) the Government of Andhra, hereby
(1) appoints the persons specified in column (1) of the Schedule below to be food inspectors for the purposes of the said Act, and
(2) directs that the persons aforesaid shall, exercise powers within the local areas specified in the corresponding entries in column (2) of the said Schedule.
The Schedule.
(1) (2) Persons. Local Areas. 1. Municipal Health Officer and Sanitary Inspectors under his control. Municipality having Municipal Health Officer. 2. Commissioner of Municipality and Sanitary Inspectors under his control. Municipality not having a Municipal Health Officer.
7. While it can be conceded that the Food Inspector of the area as well as the Municipal Health Officer could have instituted prosecutions in these cases, is the Commissioner who purports to do so and the mere fact that these two officers viz., the Sanitary Inspector and the Municipal Health Officer had subscribed their signatures to page 2 of the complaint does not, in my opinion, in any way alter the fact that the complainant is the Commissioner of the Municipality himself and not any other authority.
8. The further question that falls to be considered is, granting that it is the Commissioner that had instituted the prosecutions in these cases, whether the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate was competent and correct in taking cognizance of these complaints having regard to the language of Section 20 of the Act. As has been made clear, the Commissioner of the Proddatur Municipality does not fall within any of the seven categories of persons or authorities set out by me supra as authorities under Section 20. Having regard to the plain language of Section 20, as the complaints in these cases have been instituted by an unauthorised person, the Judicial First Class Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of these complaints and take action on the footing thereof. When a statute which creates an offence provides for a procedure to be followed and prescribed the limits and limitations within which the Jurisdiction created thereunder could be exercised, it is not open to courts of law to give a go-bye to it and hold that notwithstanding the non-compliance with the conditions provided in the Act, they could nevertheless proceed with the enquiry and the trial into these offences. I have no doubt in my mind that in these Criminal Appeals the prosecutions had not been instituted in compliance with the provisions of the Act and the Judicial First Class Magistrate could not have taken cognizance thereof.
9. The next question to be considered is what is the proper order to be made in the circumstances. The following cases were cited by the learned advocate for the respondents. The State v. Mool Chand . A.I.R 1957 Allahabad 343. dealt with a case under the present Act wherein it was held that as the power to prosecute under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was not vested in the Assistant Medical Officer (Health), the prosecution of the respondent is bad in law and so holding they dismissed the appeal by the State summarily. In the case reported in the Public Prosecutor v. Abboyee Chettiar . 1935 M.W.N 591. while agreeing with the preliminary objection taken that the Special Officer of the Municipal Council at Chidambaram, was not competent to institute the proceedings, the appeal by the State was directed to be dismissed. In Public Prosecutor v. Chinta Venkatarayudu . A.I.R 1956 Mad. 471. a similar order was made. These two are cases under the Old Madras Act III of 1918. In Re. The Cannanore Milk Supply Co-operative Society, Cannanore4 which is a case under the Central Act viz., Act No. 37 of 1954, the preliminary objection to the launching of the prosecution taken by the counsel for the accused was upheld and the proceedings were quashed. As the objection which has been upheld by me relates to the taking of cognizance of the case itself by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, having regard to the language of Section 20, it is clear that the proceedings in the several cases, from the point of time when the cognizance was taken including the taking cognizance of the complaint, were obviously without jurisdiction. In other words, whatever the Magistrate did viz., taking cognizance of the case and further steps that have followed must in law be regarded as having been taken without jurisdiction and without competency. That being the case all the steps must in law be regarded as non-existent. In other words, the order that this Court has now to make is the order which the Judicial First Class Magistrate should have made in the earlier instance namely, the return of the complaints, as he is unable to take cognizance of them. Hence the entire proceedings taken by the Magistrate in all these cases from the time the complaints were instituted before him including his taking cognizance thereof are quashed and the Judicial First Class Magistrate is directed to return the complaints to the complainant. Order accordingly.
K.J.R
10. Proceedings quashed.
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